Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These are connection state, so they should be reset on SSL_clear.
Change-Id: I861fe52578836615d2719c9e1ff0911c798f336e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27384
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Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
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No sense in tempting middleboxes unnecessarily.
Change-Id: Iec66f77195f6b8aa62be681917342e59eb7aba31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24964
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Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
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This is connection state, not configuration, so it must live on
ssl->s3, otherwise SSL_clear will be confused.
Change-Id: Id7c87ced5248d3953e37946e2d0673d66bfedb08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24264
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Upgrade-Note: SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment) on the server
should switch to SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment2).
(Configuring any TLS 1.3 variants on the server enables all variants,
so this is a no-op. We're just retiring some old experiments.)
Change-Id: I60f0ca3f96ff84bdf59e1a282a46e51d99047462
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23784
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This introduces a wire change to Experiment2/Experiment3 over 0RTT, however
as there is never going to be a 0RTT deployment with Experiment2/Experiment3,
this is valid.
Change-Id: Id541d195cbc4bbb3df7680ae2a02b53bb8ae3eab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22744
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Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22164
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These are common between TLS and DTLS so should not have the ssl3_
prefix. (TLS-only stuff should really have a tls_ prefix, but we still
have a lot of that one.)
This also fixes a stray reference to ssl3_send_client_key_exchange..
Change-Id: Ia05b360aa090ab3b5f075d5f80f133cbfe0520d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21346
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The handshake should be generic between TLS and DTLS.
Change-Id: I6feb2f013dd5d771f206750653ab9d117d7ea716
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21348
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
An Array<T> is an owning Span<T>. It's similar to absl::FixedArray<T>
but plays well with OPENSSL_malloc and doesn't implement inlining. With
OPENSSL_cleanse folded into OPENSSL_free, we could go nuts with
UniquePtr<uint8_t>, but having the pointer and length tied together is
nice for other reasons. Notably, Array<T> plays great with Span<T>.
Also switch the other parameter to a Span.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I4cdcf810cf2838208c8ba9fcc6215c1e369dffb8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20667
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Right now we report the per-connection value during the handshake and
the per-session value after the handshake. This also trims our tickets
slightly by removing a largely unused field from SSL_SESSION.
Putting it on SSL_HANDSHAKE would be better, but sadly a number of
bindings-type APIs expose it after the handshake.
Change-Id: I6a1383f95da9b1b141b9d6adadc05ee1e458a326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20064
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That's the last of it!
Change-Id: I93d1f5ab7e95b2ad105c34b24297a0bf77625263
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19784
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Bug: 128
Change-Id: Ief3779b1c43dd34a154a0f1d2f94d0da756bc07a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19144
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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SSL_state_string_long and SSL_state_string are often used for debugging
purposes. The latter's 6-letter codes are absurd, but
SSL_state_string_long is plausible. So we don't lose this when
converging state machines or switching to TLS 1.3, add this to TLS 1.3.
Bug: 128
Change-Id: Iec6529a4d9eddcf08bc9610137b4ccf9ea2681a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19524
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This loosens the earlier restriction to match Channel ID. Both may be
configured and offered, but the server is obligated to select only one
of them. This aligns with the current tokbind + 0-RTT draft where the
combination is signaled by a separate extension.
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I786102a679999705d399f0091f76da236be091c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19124
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Rather than init_msg/init_num, there is a get_message function which
either returns success or try again. This function does not advance the
current message (see the previous preparatory change). It only completes
the current one if necessary.
Being idempotent means it may be freely placed at the top of states
which otherwise have other asychronous operations. It also eases
converting the TLS 1.2 state machine. See
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/11n7LHsT3GwE34LAJIe3EFs4165TI4UR_3CqiM9LJVpI/edit?usp=sharing
for details.
The read_message hook (later to be replaced by something which doesn't
depend on BIO) intentionally does not finish the handshake, only "makes
progress". A follow-up change will align both TLS and DTLS on consuming
one handshake record and always consuming the entire record (so init_buf
may contain trailing data). In a few places I've gone ahead and
accounted for that case because it was more natural to do so.
This change also removes a couple pointers of redundant state from every
socket.
Bug: 128
Change-Id: I89d8f3622d3b53147d69ee3ac34bb654ed044a71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18806
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Instead, the DTLS driver can detect these states implicitly based on
when we write flights and when the handshake completes. When we flush a
new flight, the peer has enough information to send their reply, so we
start a timer. When we begin assembling a new flight, we must have
received the final message in the peer's flight. (If there are
asynchronous events between, we may stop the timer later, but we may
freely stop the timer anytime before we next try to read something.)
The only place this fails is if we were the last to write a flight,
we'll have a stray timer. Clear it in a handshake completion hook.
Change-Id: I973c592ee5721192949a45c259b93192fa309edb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18864
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Bug: 132
Change-Id: I75d6ce5a2256a4b464ca6a9378ac6b63a9bd47e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18644
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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I started by switching a couple fields to SSL_HANDSHAKE and then kept
following transitive bits.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I640dadd3558615fa38c7e8498d4efe7449b0658f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18245
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The previous attempt around the 'struct ssl_st' compatibility mess
offended OSS-Fuzz and UBSan because one compilation unit passed a
function pointer with ssl_st* and another called it with
bssl::SSLConnection*.
Linkers don't retain such types, of course, but to silence this alert,
instead make C-visible types be separate from the implementation and
subclass the public type. This does mean we risk polluting the symbol
namespace, but hopefully the compiler is smart enough to inline the
visible struct's constructor and destructor.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ia75a89b3a22a202883ad671a630b72d0aeef680e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Clear out some of the easy cases.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Icd5c246cb6bec4a96c72eccd6569235c3d030ebd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18204
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
And, with that, stage one is complete. ssl/internal.h may include C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I0cb89f0ed5f4be36632a50744a80321595dc921c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17768
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17327
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Also mirror the structure of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 code a bit.
Change-Id: I7b34bf30de63fa0bd47a39a90570846fb2314ad5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17539
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The original motivation behind the sign/complete split was to avoid
needlessly hashing the input on each pass through the state machine, but
we're payload-based now and, in all cases, the payload is either cheap
to compute or readily available. (Even the hashing worry was probably
unnecessary.)
Tweak ssl_private_key_{sign,decrypt} to automatically call
ssl_private_key_complete as needed and take advantage of this in the
handshake state machines:
- TLS 1.3 signing now computes the payload each pass. The payload is
small and we're already allocating a comparable-sized buffer each
iteration to hold the signature. This shouldn't be a big deal.
- TLS 1.2 decryption code still needs two states due to reading the
message (fixed in new state machine style), but otherwise it just
performs cheap idempotent tasks again. The PSK code is reshuffled to
guarantee the callback is not called twice (though this was impossible
anyway because we don't support RSA_PSK).
- TLS 1.2 CertificateVerify signing is easy as the transcript is readily
available. The buffer is released very slightly later, but it
shouldn't matter.
- TLS 1.2 ServerKeyExchange signing required some reshuffling.
Assembling the ServerKeyExchange parameters is moved to the previous
state. The signing payload has some randoms prepended. This is cheap
enough, but a nuisance in C. Pre-prepend the randoms in
hs->server_params.
With this change, we are *nearly* rid of the A/B => same function
pattern.
BUG=128
Change-Id: Iec4fe0be7cfc88a6de027ba2760fae70794ea810
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17265
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
BUG=76
Change-Id: If58a73da38e46549fd55f84a9104e2dfebfda43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
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This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way
to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature
algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly.
For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be
enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an
external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it.
(On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an
Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14450
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This moves the early data switch to CERT to make this
|SSL_set_SSL_CTX|-proof.
Change-Id: Icca96e76636d87578deb24b2d507cabee7e46a4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14545
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BUG=76
Change-Id: Ie894ea5d327f88e66b234767de437dbe5c67c41d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12960
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Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT, so we gracefully decline 0-RTT
as a server and forbid their combination as a client. We'll keep this
logic around until Channel ID is removed.
Channel ID will be replaced by tokbind which currently uses custom
extensions. Those will need additional logic to work with 0-RTT.
This is not implemented yet so, for now, fail if both are ever
configured together at all. A later change will allow the two to
combine.
BUG=183
Change-Id: I46c5ba883ccd47930349691fb08074a1fab13d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14370
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Once 0-RTT data is added to the current 0-RTT logic, the server will
trigger a write when processing incoming data via SSL_read. This means
SSL_read will block on transport write, which is something we've not
tried to avoid far (assuming no renegotiation).
The specification allows for tickets to be sent at half-RTT by
predicting the client Finished. By doing this we both get the tickets on
the wire sooner and avoid confusing I/O patterns. Moreover, we
anticipate we will need this mode for one of the QUIC stateless reject
patterns.
This is tested by always processing NewSessionTickets in the
ExpectHalfRTTData path on 0-RTT connections. As not other
implementations using BoGo may not do this, this is configurable via the
shim config.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ia0f56ae63f15078ff1cacceba972d2b99001947f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14371
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is a remnant of before we made the handshake write
flight by flight.
Change-Id: I94c0105bb071ffca9ff5aa4c4bf43311c750b49a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14369
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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David Benjamin
Steven Valdez
Nick Harper
Steven Valdez
Alessandro Ghedini