finishedHash should keep a running secret and incorporate entropy as is
available.
Change-Id: I2d245897e7520b2317bc0051fa4d821c32eeaa10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12586
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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I missed this one.
Change-Id: I642fb5878568870743727579126f63246ff179c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12580
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CRYPTO_ghash_init exposes the (often hardware accelerated) internals for
evaluating GHASH. These can be used for evaluating POLYVAL[1] on
platforms where we don't have dedicated code for it.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-02#section-3
Change-Id: Ida49ce4911f8657fa384b0bca968daa2ac6b26c1
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The key is only needed during initialisation because after that point it
is implicit in the table of powers. So no need to keep it around. There
was a non-specific “haunted house” comment about not changing this, but
I've successfully tested with all the assembly versions so I think that
comment is no longer true.
Change-Id: Id110156afb528904f114d9a4ff2440e03a1a69b8
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The GCM code has lots of cases of big-endian support left over from
OpenSSL. Since we don't support big-endian systems, drop that code.
Change-Id: I28eb95a9c235c6f705a145fbea72e7569dad2c70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12476
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This should shave 20% (40 seconds) off our Windows cycle times, going by
the graphs. It's 15% off our Linux ones, but that 15% is only 11
seconds.
Change-Id: I077c3924c722d597f66fc6dec72932ed0c81660a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
bot_update does a git clean -dff before each run, so we were
redownloading all the utilities on each run. This should make the bots
only download them when the change. (Chromium's setup is similar.)
Change-Id: I7eb83217761ceabe58b5480242a7df93d9bfaa52
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12561
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MSVC, on 32-bit systems, defines sizeof(long)=4 which means that a
uint32_t could end up negative when passed to |ASN1_INTEGER_set| on
Windows.
Change-Id: Ib07487ab524550c832909bf10521aae61d654416
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j and md_size are public values, so this can just be done directly. (If
they weren't, we'd have worse problems.) This makes the loop look the
same as the rotation loop below.
Change-Id: Ic75550ad4e40b2015668cb12c26ca2d20bd285b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12474
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Some declarations can be moved closer to use, etc.
Change-Id: Ifa9a51ad77639b94020b15478af234c82466390f
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Although we ignore all but the first identity, keep clients honest by
parsing the whole thing. Also explicitly check that the binder and
identity counts match.
Change-Id: Ib9c4caae18398360f3b80f8db1b22d4549bd5746
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Due to recent changes, changing the SSL session timeout from cert_cb is
not possible anymore since the new |SSL_SESSION| is initialized *after*
cert_cb is run. The alternative would be using |SSL_CTX_set_timeout| but
the specific |SSL_CTX| could be shared by multiple |SSL|s.
Setting a value on a per-connection basis is useful in case timeouts
need to be calculated dynamically based on specific certificate/domain
information that would be retrieved from inside cert_cb (or other
callbacks).
It would also be possible to set the value to 0 to prevent session
resumption, which is not otherwise doable in the handshake callbacks.
Change-Id: I730a528c647f83f7f77f59b5b21d7e060e4c9843
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Change-Id: I69cbb0679e1dbb6292a8f4737851736e58c17508
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12481
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BUG=101
Change-Id: Ia1edbccee535b0bc3a0e18465286d5bcca240035
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12470
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There is no more derivation step. We just use the resumption secret
directly. This saves us an unnecessary memcpy.
Change-Id: I203bdcc0463780c47cce655046aa1be560bb5b18
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This change imports sha256-armv4.pl from upstream at rev 8d1ebff4. This
includes changes to remove the use of adrl, which is not supported by
Clang.
Change-Id: I429e7051d63b59acad21601e40883fc3bd8dd2f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12480
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This code wants something which can represent -128..127 or so, not
something about characters.
Change-Id: Icdbfec370317a5e03803939a3b8d1555f8efff1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12468
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clang-format mangled this a little.
Change-Id: Ic4d8de0e1f6e926efbe8d14e390fe874b4a7cdcb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12467
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The compiler should be plenty smart enough to decide whether to inline a
static function called only once. We don't need to resort to so
unreadable a ternary chain.
Change-Id: Iacc8e0c4147fc69008806a0cc36d9e632169601a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12466
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I3350ff0e4ffe7495a83211b89c675a0125fb2f06
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EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT makes more sense than
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT here.
Change-Id: I0dbdc91bab59843d5c04f2d0e97600fe7644753e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If y is zero, there is no point with odd y, so the odd bit may not be
set, hence EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT. This code instead computed the
Kronecker symbol of x and changed the error code to
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT if not a square.
As the comment says, this was (intended to be) unreachable. But it
seems x was a typo for tmp1. It dates to before upstream's
6fb60a84dd1ec81953917e0444dab50186617432, when BN_mod_sqrt gave
garbage if its input was not square. Now it emits BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE.
Upstream's 48fe4d6233ac2d60745742a27f820dd88bc6689d then mapped
BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE to EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT.
Change-Id: Id9e02fa1c154b61cc0c3a768c9cfe6bd9674c378
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12463
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Zero only has one allowed square root, not two.
Change-Id: I1dbd2137a7011d2f327b271b267099771e5499c3
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This is fine because TLS PRFs only go up to SHA-384, but since
SSL_SESSION::master_key is sized to 48, not EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, this should
explicitly check the bounds.
Change-Id: I2b1bcaab5cdfc3ce4d7a8b8ed5cc4c6d15d10270
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Change-Id: I3a5d949eec9241ea43da40ce23e0e7f2a25e30e5
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This aligns with ec_test which has a ForEachCurve helper and avoids
writing these loops all the time. As a bonus, these tests start working
in DTLS now.
Change-Id: I613fc08b641ddc12a819d8a1268a1e6a29043663
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12380
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This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
Change-Id: Ib8a1fe185224ff02ed4ce53a0109e60d934e96b3
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(Otherwise we end up touching potentially unwound stack.)
I looked into why our builders didn't catch this and it appears that, at
least with Clang 3.7, ASAN doesn't notice this. Perhaps Clang at that
version is being lazy about destructing the scoped CBB and so doesn't
actually go wrong.
Change-Id: Ia0f73e7eb662676439f024805fc8287a4e991ce0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12400
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It is not called outside of t1_enc.c.
Change-Id: Ifd9d109eeb432e931361ebdf456243c490b93ecf
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This prevents a compiler warning from breaking ppc64le build.
Change-Id: I6752109bd02c6d078e656f89327093f8fb13a125
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12363
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since the printed format for errors uses colons to separate different
parts of the error message, this was confusing.
Change-Id: I4742becec2bcb56ad8dc2fdb9a3bb23e4452d1b2
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Bazel builds tests as shared libraries and the new p256-x86_64_test
depends on accessing unexported symbols. Thus we need to define
BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY when building tests.
Change-Id: I1270c69ac9d1bcf6baa05ef6666078bd368d80cf
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This change contains a C implementation of SHA-1 for POWER using
AltiVec. It is almost as fast as the scalar-only assembly implementation
for POWER/POWERPC family in OpenSSL but it is easier to maintain and it
allows error checking with tools like ASAN.
This is tested only for ppc64le. It may nor may not work for other
platforms in the POWER/POWERPC familiy.
Before:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~30 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~140 MB/s
After:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~70 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~480 MB/s
Change-Id: I790352e86d9c0cc4e1e57d11c5a0aa5b0780ca6b
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We do not change ALPN on renego, so the value should carry over and not
be cleared.
Change-Id: Id54a083945542b4457d9c2787f0fe7c30239b76f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12306
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If the function fails, it's an internal_error.
Change-Id: I4b7cf7a6ca2527f04b708303ab1bc71df762b55b
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It doesn't need to be exported out of t1_lib.c.
Change-Id: I000493e1e330457051da1719ca9f8152a4ff845a
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Otherwise the run_tests target sometimes gets confused.
Change-Id: If49e945bf5137c68db4927ab0f9845d25be63bac
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Previously the option to retain only the SHA-256 hash of client
certificates could only be set at the |SSL_CTX| level. This change makes
|SSL| objects inherit the setting from the |SSL_CTX|, but allows it to
be overridden on a per-|SSL| basis.
Change-Id: Id435934af3d425d5f008d2f3b9751d1d0884ee55
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The former has always worked. The latter is new to the revised
processing order.
Change-Id: I993d29ccaca091725524847695df4d1944b609cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11848
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This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
Change-Id: Id40d851ccd87e06c46c6ec272527fd8ece8abfc6
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This is in preparation for determining the cipher suite (which, in TLS
1.2, requires the certificate be known) before resumption.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- cert_cb is now called whether resumption occurs or not. Our only
consumer which uses this as a server is Node which will require a
patch to fix up their mucking about with SSL_get_session. (But the
patch should be quite upstreamable. More 1.1.0-compatible and
generally saner.)
- cert_cb is now called before new_session_cb and dos_protection_cb.
BUG=116
Change-Id: I6cc745757f63281fad714d4548f23880570204b0
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This simplifies a little code around EMS and PSK KE modes, but requires
tweaking the SNI code.
The extensions that are more tightly integrated with the handshake are
still processed inline for now. It does, however, require an extra state
in 1.2 so the asynchronous session callback does not cause extensions to
be processed twice. Tweak a test enforce this.
This and a follow-up to move cert_cb before resumption are done in
preparation for resolving the cipher suite before resumption and only
resuming on match.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- The legacy SNI callback happens before resumption.
- The ALPN callback happens before resumption.
- Custom extension ClientHello parsing callbacks also cannot depend on
resumption state.
- The DoS protection callback now runs after all the extension callbacks
as it is documented to be called after the resumption decision.
BUG=116
Change-Id: I1281a3b61789b95c370314aaed4f04c1babbc65f
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A BN_ULONG[P256_LIMBS] can't represent a negative number and
bn_set_words won't produce one. We only need to compare against P.
Change-Id: I7bd1c9e8c162751637459f23f3cfc56884d85864
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12304
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RT#4625
(Imported from upstream's e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf.)
Add a test in ec_test to cover the ecp_nistz256_points_mul change. Also
revise the low-level infinity tests to cover the changes in
ecp_nistz256_point_add. Upstream's 'infty' logic was also cleaned up to
be simpler and take advantage of the only cases where |p| is infinity.
Change-Id: Ie22de834bf79ecb6191e824ad9fc1bd6f9681b8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12225
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