This callback receives information about the ClientHello and can decide
whether or not to allow the handshake to continue.
Change-Id: I21be28335fa74fedb5b73a310ee24310670fc923
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3721
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This mostly[*] doesn't matter for TLS since the message would have been
rejected anyway, but, in DTLS, if the peer rejects our Finished, it will send
an encrypted alert. This will then cause it to hang, which isn't very helpful.
I've made the change on both TLS and DTLS so the two protocols don't diverge on
this point. It is true that we're accepting nominally encrypted and
authenticated alerts before Finished, but, prior to ChangeCipherSpec, the
alerts are sent in the clear anyway so an attacker could already inject alerts.
A consumer could only be sensitive to it being post-CCS if it was watching
msg_callback. The only non-debug consumer of msg_callback I've found anywhere
is some hostapd code to detect Heartbeat.
See https://code.google.com/p/webrtc/issues/detail?id=4403 for an instance
where the equivalent behavior in OpenSSL masks an alert.
[*] This does change behavior slightly if the peer sends a warning alert
between CCS and Finished. I believe this is benign as warning alerts are
usually ignored apart from info_callback and msg_callback. The one exception is
a close_notify which is a slightly new state (accepting close_notify during a
handshake seems questionable...), but they're processed pre-CCS too.
Change-Id: Idd0d49b9f9aa9d35374a9f5e2f815cdb931f5254
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3883
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
May as well use this convenience function when we can. A little tidier. Even
fixes a leak on malloc failure in eckey_type2param.
Change-Id: Ie48dd98f2fe03fa9911bd78db4423ab9faefc63d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3772
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix a few remnants of them being unsigned long. Also rename extremely unhelpful
variable names in SSL_get_error. i is now ret_code to match the header.
Change-Id: Ic31d6626bfe09c9e21c03691dfc716c5573833ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3881
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some things were misindented in the reformatting.
Change-Id: I97642000452ce4d5b4c8a39b794cec13097d8760
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 687eaf27a7e4bdfc58dd455e2566b915a7a25c20. I don't think any
of the *Update functions can actually fail (we should verify this and, if
accurate, document it), but HMAC_Final can. It internally copies an EVP_MD_CTX.
Change-Id: I318cb9d0771d536249a26b61d34fe0413a4d3a10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3830
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
signed/unsigned comparison. Just add a cast for now as in s3_both.c. Later
we'll properly size_t it alongside other tightening of this interface.
Change-Id: Idc8441d65e8ca65e39ab7172a8ec87d9ad710ed6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3860
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The assert was supposed to be *added* in fcf25833 but instead replaced
the check.
BUG=465557
Change-Id: I0d3db5038515021e5bdd1ccb9ff08d4f78552621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3850
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never called or implemented.
Change-Id: Id41c2fbd23d27cc440e8a23ac1b2d590e50ff20f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
None of these are version-specific. SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD's interface will change
later, but this gets us closer to folding away SSL3_ENC_METHOD.
Change-Id: Ib427cdff32d0701a18fe42a52cdbf798f82ba956
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3769
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Turn them into static functions that take in an hm_fragment. It's not
immediately obvious that the frag_off/frag_len bounds checks and the msg_len
consistency check are critical to avoiding an out-of-bounds write. Better to
have dtls1_hm_fragment_mark also check internally.
Also rework the bitmask logic to be clearer and avoid a table.
Change-Id: Ica54e98f66295efb323e033cb6c67ab21e7d6cbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Notably, drop all special cases around receiving a message in order and
receiving a full message. It makes things more complicated and was the source
of bugs (the MixCompleteMessageWithFragments tests added in this CL did not
pass before). Instead, every message goes through an hm_fragment, and
dtls1_get_message always checks buffered_messages to see if the next is
complete.
The downside is that we pay one more copy of the message data in the common
case. This is only during connection setup, so I think it's worth the
simplicity. (If we want to optimize later, we could either tighten
ssl3_get_message's interface to allow the handshake data being in the
hm_fragment's backing store rather than s->init_buf or swap out s->init_buf
with the hm_fragment's backing store when a mesasge completes.
This CL does not address ssl_read_bytes being an inappropriate API for DTLS.
Future work will revise the handshake/transport boundary to align better with
DTLS's needs. Also other problems that I've left as TODOs.
Change-Id: Ib4570d45634b5181ecf192894d735e8699b1c86b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3764
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We actually don't really care about this special-case since we only test client
full handshakes where the runner sends the second Finished not the shim
(otherwise the overlap logic and retransmitting on every fragment would
probably break us), but it should probably live next to the fragmentation
logic.
Change-Id: I54097d84ad8294bc6c42a84d6f22f496e63eb2a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3763
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the peer fragments Finished into multiple pieces, there is no need to
retransmit multiple times.
Change-Id: Ibf708ad079e1633afd420ff1c9be88a80020cba9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3762
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We don't support DTLS renego. Removing this separately from the rewrite to call
out intentionally dropping this logic.
Change-Id: Ie4428eea0d2dbbb8b4b8b6474df4821de62558cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3761
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, add a separate init_with_direction hook. Normal AEADs ignore the
direction, while legacy AEADs must be initialized with it. This avoids
maintaining extra state to support the delayed initialization.
Change-Id: I25271f0e56ee2783a2fd4d4026434154d58dc0a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old test just sent an empty ServerKeyExchange which is sufficient as we
reject the message early. But be more thorough and implement the actual
ephemeral key logic in the test server.
Change-Id: I016658762e4502c928c051e14d69eea67b5a495f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That might be a reasonable check to make, maybe.
DTLS handshake message reading has a ton of other bugs and needs a complete
rewrite. But let's fix this and get a test in now.
Change-Id: I4981fc302feb9125908bb6161ed1a18288c39e2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3600
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Test both asynchronous and synchronous versions. This callback is somewhat
different from others. It's NOT called a second time when the handshake is
resumed. This appears to be intentional and not a mismerge from the internal
patch. The caller is expected to set up any state before resuming the handshake
state machine.
Also test the early callback returning an error.
Change-Id: If5e6eddd7007ea5cdd7533b4238e456106b95cbd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3590
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This involves more synchronization with child exits as the kernel no longer
closes the pre-created pipes for free, but it works on Windows. As long as
TCP_NODELAY is set, the performance seems comparable. Though it does involve
dealing with graceful socket shutdown. I couldn't get that to work on Windows
without draining the socket; not even SO_LINGER worked. Current (untested)
theory is that Windows refuses to gracefully shutdown a socket if the peer
sends data after we've stopped reading.
cmd.ExtraFiles doesn't work on Windows; it doesn't use fds natively, so you
can't pass fds 4 and 5. (stdin/stdout/stderr are special slots in
CreateProcess.) We can instead use the syscall module directly and mark handles
as inheritable (and then pass the numerical values out-of-band), but that
requires synchronizing all of our shim.Start() calls and assuming no other
thread is spawning a process.
PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST fixes threading problems, but requires
wrapping more syscalls. exec.Cmd also doesn't let us launch the process
ourselves. Plus it still requires every handle in the list be marked
inheritable, so it doesn't help if some other thread is launching a process
with bInheritHandles TRUE but NOT using PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST.
(Like Go, though we can take syscall.ForkLock there.)
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/oldnewthing/archive/2011/12/16/10248328.aspx
The more natively Windows option seems to be named pipes, but that too requires
wrapping more system calls. (To be fair, that isn't too painful.) They also
involve a listening server, so we'd still have to synchronize with shim.Wait()
a la net.TCPListener.
Then there's DuplicateHandle, but then we need an out-of-band signal.
All in all, one cross-platform implementation with a TCP sockets seems
simplest.
Change-Id: I38233e309a0fa6814baf61e806732138902347c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3563
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Align the DTLS and TLS implementations more. s3_pkt.c's version still has
remnants of fragmentable alerts and only one side marks some variables as
const. Also use warning/fatal constants rather than the numbers with comments.
Change-Id: Ie62d3af1747b6fe4336496c047dfccc9d71fde3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Saves making a temporary SSL_CTX and looking at its insides.
Change-Id: Ia351b9b91aec8b813ad7b6e373773396f0975f9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These were added in upstream's 7e159e0133d28bec9148446e8f4dd86c0216d819 for
SCTP. As far as I can tell, they were a no-op there too. The corresponding RT
ticket makes no mention of them.
SSL_get_error checks the retry flags of the BIO already. Specifically it checks
BIO_should_read and BIO_should_write, but those two automatically set
BIO_should_retry.
(Minor, but I noticed them idly. One less thing to think about when the state
machines finally unify.)
Change-Id: I17a956a51895fba383063dee574e0fbe3209f9b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3560
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Which is just an exported wrapper around ssl3_get_cipher_by_value.)
Change-Id: Ibba166015ce59e337ff50963ba20237ac4949aaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3543
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream settled in this API, and it's also the one that we expect
internally and that third_party code will expect.
Change-Id: Id7af68cf0af1f2e4d9defd37bda2218d70e2aa7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3542
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can pass the fragment pointer to dtls1_retransmit_message rather than
having it look it up again.
Change-Id: If6957428418a44e7ceac91a93f7c6032d331d9d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3510
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also move BIO_print_errors_fp up a level so it's less repetitive. There's
enough exit points now that it doesn't seem like adding a separate return exit
code for each has held up. (Maybe there should be a macro that samples
__LINE__...)
Change-Id: I120e59caaa96185e80cf51ea801a5e1f149b1b39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3530
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Tighten up the requirements for False Start. At this point, neither
AES-CBC or RC4 are something that we want to use unless we're sure that
the server wants to speak them.
Rebase of original CL at: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1980/
BUG=427721
Change-Id: I9ef7a596edeb8df1ed070aac67c315b94f3cc77f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3501
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also adds a flag to runner.go to make it more suitable for printing to a pipe.
Change-Id: I26fae21f3e4910028f6b8bfc4821c8c595525504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3490
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I believe this is a remnant of DSA. The logic strangely fails to check for
failure and then goes out of its way to ERR_clear_error. I believe this is so
that keys that are missing parameters silently move on. This dates to
upstream's dfeab0689f69c0b4bd3480ffd37a9cacc2f17d9c, which is SSLeay 0.9.1b. At
that time, EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters only did anything for DSA. (Now it only
does anything for ECDSA.)
My read is that this comes from DSA in PKIX's "optional domain parameters"
craziness. RFC 3279 says:
If the DSA domain parameters are omitted from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using a
signature algorithm other than DSA, then the subject's DSA domain parameters
are distributed by other means.
This was probably part of some weird thing where, if your certificate is
missing parameters, the server would know what to use based on the private key.
(Also this was making the malloc tests unhappy.)
Change-Id: I8d8122a9f50a19e2bbe067f311a8e2d30774935c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It may fail because the BIO_write to the memory BIO can allocate.
Unfortunately, this bubbles up pretty far up now that we've moved the handshake
hash to ssl3_set_handshake_header.
Change-Id: I58884347a4456bb974ac4783078131522167e29d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3483
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found while diagnosing some crashes and hangs in the malloc tests. This (and
the follow-up) get us further but does not quite let the malloc tests pass
quietly, even without valgrind. DTLS silently ignores some malloc failures
(confusion with silently dropping bad packets) which then translate to hangs.
Change-Id: Ief06a671e0973d09d2883432b89a86259e346653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3482
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
False Start is the name it's known by now. Deprecate the old API and expose new
ones with the new name.
Change-Id: I32d307027e178fd7d9c0069686cc046f75fdbf6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3481
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I found no users of this. We can restore it if needbe, but I don't expect
anyone to find it useful in its current form. The API is suspect for the same
reasons DTLSv1_listen was. An SSL object is stateful and assumes you already
have the endpoint separated out.
If we ever need it, server-side HelloVerifyRequest and DTLSv1_listen should be
implemented by a separate stateless listener that statelessly handles
cookieless ClientHello + HelloVerifyRequest. Once a ClientHello with a valid
cookie comes in, it sets up a stateful SSL object and passes control along to
that.
Change-Id: I86adc1dfb6a81bebe987784c36ad6634a9a1b120
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3480
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Caught by malloc valgrind tests on Basic-Client-Sync. Also one by inspection
and verified with valgrind. Those should pass now with the exception of
CRYPTO_free_ex_data being internally implemented with malloc.
(Clearly we next should make our malloc tests assert that the containing
function fails to catch when we fail to check for some error and things
silently move one.)
Change-Id: I56c51dc8a32a7d3c7ac907d54015dc241728c761
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
pqueue_free requires the queue be empty.
Change-Id: I633e18fe71ddec51d6005210fcb6570ef53b9808
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3410
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Win64 fires significantly more warnings than Win32. Also some recent
changes made it grumpy.
(We might want to reconsider enabling all of MSVC's warnings. Given the sorts
of warnings some of these are, I'm not sure MSVC's version of -Wall -Werror is
actually tenable. Plus, diverging from the Chromium build, especially before
the bots are ready, is going to break pretty readily.)
Change-Id: If3b8feccf910ceab4a233b0731e7624d7da46f87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3420
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have got to get rid of that parameter...
Change-Id: I17f2d1282636f7d077f21dabdc135eecf9300998
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, error strings were kept in arrays for each subdirectory and
err.c would iterate over them all and insert them at init time to a hash
table.
This means that, even if you have a shared library and lots of processes
using that, each process has ~30KB of private memory from building that
hash table.
This this change, all the error strings are built into a sorted list and
are thus static data. This means that processes can share the error
information and it actually saves binary space because of all the
pointer overhead in the old scheme. Also it saves the time taken
building the hash table at startup.
This removes support for externally-supplied error string data.
Change-Id: Ifca04f335c673a048e1a3e76ff2b69c7264635be
OpenSSL's internal names for the ciphers are not the standard ones and are not
easy to consistently map to the standard ones. Add an API to get the real names
out. (WebRTC wants an API to get the standard names out.)
Also change some incorrect flags on SHA-256 TLS 1.2 ciphers;
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT and SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 are the same after TLS
1.2. A TLS 1.2 cipher should be tagged explicitly with SHA-256. (This avoids
tripping a check in SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name which asserts that default-hash
ciphers only ever use SHA-1 or MD5 for the bulk cipher MAC.)
Change-Id: Iaec2fd4aa97df29883094d3c2ae60f0ba003bf07
Nothing else on SSL* is thread-safe. (Also SSL_set_generate_session_id is never
called.) This removes the last use of CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL.
Change-Id: I4cf8c05d7cef4ea27962ce29902649317c22f74d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3361
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found by running malloc tests with -valgrind. Unfortunately, the next one is
deep in crypto/asn1 itself, so I'm going to stop here for now.
Change-Id: I7a33971ee07c6b7b7a98715f2f18e0f29380c0a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have a stateful object hanging off the SSL* now. May as well use it and
avoid having to remember to reset that.
Change-Id: I5fc5269aa9b158517dd551036e658afaa2ef9acd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's currently a mix of GoogleCPlusPlusStyle and unix_hacker_style. Since it's
now been thoroughly C++-ified, let's go with the former. This also matches the
tool, our other bit of C++ code.
Change-Id: Ie90a166006aae3b8f41628dbb35fcd64e99205df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
