It's about time we got rid of this. As a first step, introduce a flag,
so that some consumers may stage this change in appropriately.
BUG=chromium:534766,chromium:532048
Change-Id: Id53f0bacf5bdbf85dd71d1262d9f3a9ce3c4111f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The names in the P-224 code collided with the P-256 code and thus many
of the functions and constants in the P-224 code have been prefixed.
Change-Id: I6bcd304640c539d0483d129d5eaf1702894929a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15847
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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RSA_verify_raw is the same as RSA_public_decrypt and fits the calling
convention better. This also avoids the extra copy.
Change-Id: Ib7e3152af26872440290a289f178c9a1d9bc673f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15826
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to implement RSA-PSS in the FIPS module without pulling
in EVP_PKEY. It also allows people to use RSA-PSS on an RSA*.
Empirically folks seem to use the low-level padding functions a lot,
which is unfortunate.
This allows us to remove a now redundant length check in p_rsa.c.
Change-Id: I5270e01c6999d462d378865db2b858103c335485
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We check the length for MD5+SHA1 but not the normal cases. Instead,
EVP_PKEY_sign externally checks the length (largely because the silly
RSA-PSS padding function forces it). We especially should be checking
the length for these because otherwise the prefix built into the ASN.1
prefix is wrong.
The primary motivation is to avoid putting EVP_PKEY inside the FIPS
module. This means all logic for supported algorithms should live in
crypto/rsa.
This requires fixing up the verify_recover logic and some tests,
including bcm.c's KAT bits.
(evp_tests.txt is now this odd mixture of EVP-level and RSA-level error
codes. A follow-up change will add new APIs for RSA-PSS which will allow
p_rsa.c to be trimmed down and make things consistent.)
Change-Id: I29158e9695b28e8632b06b449234a5dded35c3e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15824
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of the ECDSA code returning a tri-state -1, 0, 1.
Change-Id: I8bd1fcd94e07dbffc650f414ebc19f30236378bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15667
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14449
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was a mess. HMAC_CTX_copy_ex would avoid having to cleanup and init
the HMAC_CTX repeatedly, but even that is unnecessary. hctx_tpl was just
to reuse the key. Instead, HMAC_CTX already can be reset with the same
key. (Alas, with a slightly odd API, but so it goes.) Do that, and use
goto err to cleanup the error-handling.
Thanks to upstream's b98530d6e09f4cb34c791b8840e936c1fc1467cf for
drawing attention to this. (Though we've diverged significantly from
upstream with all the heap-allocated bits, so I didn't use the change
itself.)
While I'm here, tidy up some variable names and cite the newer RFC.
Change-Id: Ic1259f46b7c5a14dc341b8cee385be5508ac4daf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14605
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is a remnant of a previous iteration of the SSL client certificate
bridging logic in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ifa8e15cc970395f179e2f6db65c97a342af5498d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=22
Change-Id: I9f392eef44e83efb4b13931acb2a3c642cbf1f29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14308
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Playing around with the code, we seem to have sufficient positive test
vectors for the logic around the high bits, but not negative test
vectors. Add some. Also add a negative test vector for the trailing
byte.
(For future reference, use openssl rsautl -raw for raw RSA operations
and openssl pkeyutil for EVP_PKEY_sign.)
Change-Id: I36eddf048e51e037fd924902cd13dcb3c62bfd02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14325
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imported from upstream's 04cf39207f94abf89b3964c7710f22f829a1a78f.)
The other half of the change was fixed earlier, but this logic was still
off. This code is kind of a mess and needs a rewrite, but import the
change to get it correct and sufficiently tested first.
(If we could take the sLen = -2 case away altogether, that would be
great...)
Change-Id: I5786e980f26648822633fc216315e8f77ed4d45b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14321
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
One test case is commented out, to be fixed in a follow-up.
Change-Id: I543c7f54e63837c6e8088fdcbb03226e0144b2e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14320
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Import test data from:
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1-vec.zip
This is a set of RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP test vectors including some edge cases
with unusual key sizes.
(Imported from upstream's 946a515a2b370dbadb1f8c39e3586a8f1e3cff1a.)
Change-Id: I1d8aa85a8578e47b26c74bb4e4c246975619d574
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14318
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=129
Change-Id: Ie64a445a42fb3a6d16818b1fabba8481e6e9ad94
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14029
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Within the library, we never need to exponentiate modulo an even number.
In fact, all the remaining BN_mod_exp calls are modulo an odd prime.
This extends 617804adc5 to the rest of the
library.
Change-Id: I4273439faa6a516c99673b28f8ae38ddfff7e42d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If copy fails, we shouldn't call cleanup. Also remove some pointless
NULL checks after EVP_PKEY_up_ref.
See also upstream's 748cb9a17f4f2b77aad816cf658cd4025dc847ee.
Change-Id: I2acb6892cde1ab662ca6a620d87179f9be609cba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13830
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I81a94be94103d3c763cd6b2c1b8196300808c6fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13386
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imported from upstream's 13ab87083af862e4af752efa4b0552149ed2cc19.)
Change-Id: I2f7cf8454d28d47f5ca19544479b2ab98143a3ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13048
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is imported from upstream's
71bbc79b7d3b1195a7a7dd5f547d52ddce32d6f0 and test vectors taken
initially from 2d7bbd6c9fb6865e0df480602c3612652189e182 (with a handful
more added).
The tests are a little odd because OpenSSL supports this "salt length
recovery" mode and they go through that codepath for all verifications.
Change-Id: I220104fe87e2a1a1458c99656f9791d8abfbbb98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12822
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We've taken to writing bssl::UniquePtr in full, so it's not buying
us much.
Change-Id: Ia2689366cbb17282c8063608dddcc675518ec0ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12628
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10801
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10804
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10447
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This gets cURL building against both BoringSSL as it is and BoringSSL
with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER set to 1.1.0.
BUG=91
Change-Id: I5be73b84df701fe76f3055b1239ae4704a931082
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10180
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream have added |EVP_PKEY_up_ref|, but their version returns an int.
Having this function with a different signature like that is dangerous
so this change aligns BoringSSL with upstream. Users of this function in
Chromium and internally should already have been updated.
Change-Id: I0a7aeaf1a1ca3b0f0c635e2ee3826aa100b18157
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8736
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I named the compatibility function wrong.
Change-Id: Idc289c317c5826c338c1daf58a2d3b26b09a7e49
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a __pragma expression which allows this. Android builds us Windows with
MinGW for some reason, so we actually do have to tolerate non-MSVC-compatible
Windows compilers. (Clang for Windows is much more sensible than MinGW and
intentionally mimicks MSVC.)
MinGW doesn't understand MSVC's pragmas and warns a lot. #pragma warning is
safe to suppress, so wrap those to shush them. This also lets us do away with a
few ifdefs.
Change-Id: I1f5a8bec4940d4b2d947c4c1cc9341bc15ec4972
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8236
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
More spring-cleaning of unnecessary incompatibilities. Since
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf doesn't specify a configuration file, it's
perfectly sound to have such a function.
Dear BoringSSL, please add all algorithms.
Uh, sure. They were already all there, but I have added them!
PS: Could you also load all your configuration files while you're at it.
...I don't have any. Fine. I have loaded all configuration files which I
recognize. *mutters under breath* why does everyone ask all these strange
questions...
Change-Id: I57f956933d9e519445bf22f89853bd5f56904172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8160
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
One of the codepaths didn't free the group. Found by libFuzzer.
BUG=chromium:603893
Change-Id: Icb81f2f89a8c1a52e29069321498986b193a0e56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7685
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: I4e8d4af3129dbf61d4a8846ec9db685e83999d5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7565
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Instead, embed the (very short) encoding of the OID into built_in_curve.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: I0db36f83c71fbd3321831f54fa5022f8304b30cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7564
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
A lot of consumers of obj.h only want the NID values. Others didn't need
it at all. This also removes some OBJ_nid2sn and OBJ_nid2ln calls in EVP
error paths which isn't worth pulling a large table in for.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: Id6dff578f993012e35b740a13b8e4f9c2edc0744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I24d0179ca5019e82ca1494c8773f373f8c09ce82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7566
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
