This was changed in draft-ietf-quic-tls-13 to use a codepoint from the
reserved range.
Change-Id: Ia3cda249a3f37bc244d5c8a7765ec34a5708c9ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29464
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This change adds server-side support for compressed certificates.
(Although some definitions for client-side support are included in the
headers, there's no code behind them yet.)
Change-Id: I0f98abf0b782b7337ddd014c58e19e6b8cc5a3c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have a successful TLS 1.3 deployment, in spite of non-compliant
middleboxes everywhere, so now let's get this optimization in. It would
have been nice to test with this from the beginning, but sadly we forgot
about it. Ah well. This shaves 63 bytes off the server's first flight,
and then another 21 bytes off the pair of NewSessionTickets.
So we'll more easily notice in case of anything catastrophic, tie this
behavior to draft 28.
Update-Note: This slightly tweaks our draft-28 behavior.
Change-Id: I4f176a919bf7181239d6ebb31e7870f12364e0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28744
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Update-Note: Enabling TLS 1.3 now enables both draft-23 and draft-28
by default, in preparation for cycling all to draft-28.
Change-Id: I9405f39081f2e5f7049aaae8a9c85399f21df047
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28304
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We forgot to do this in our original implementation on general ecosystem
grounds. It's also mandated starting draft-26.
Just to avoid unnecessary turbulence, since draft-23 is doomed to die
anyway, condition this on our draft-28 implementation. (We don't support
24 through 27.)
We'd actually checked this already on the Go side, but the spec wants a
different alert.
Change-Id: I0014cda03d7129df0b48de077e45f8ae9fd16976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28124
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This schism came up in passing again, and I realized we never added a
TLS-level test for this. Fix that.
Change-Id: I10f910bb5a975d6b3b73d99e7412ade35654fddb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: I7298c878bd2c8187dbd25903e397e8f0c2575aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26846
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In this round, Google servers will echo the extension in order to test
the latency of both parties sending a PQ key-agreement message.
The extension is sent (and echoed) for both full and resumption
handshakes. This is intended to mirror the overhead of TLS 1.3 (even
when using TLS 1.2), as a resumption in TLS 1.3 still does a fresh key
agreement.
Change-Id: I9ad163afac4fd1d916f9c7359ec32994e283abeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26185
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We don't advertise compressed coordinates (and point format negotiation
was deprecated in TLS 1.3), so reject them. Both Internet Explorer and
Firefox appear to reject them already.
Later I hope to add an easier to use ECDH API that acts on bytes, not
EC_POINT. This clears the way for that API to only accept uncompressed
coordinates. Compressed coordinates never got deployed over NIST curves,
for better or worse. At this point, there is no sense in changing that
as new protocols should use curve25519.
Change-Id: Id2f1be791ddcf155d596f4eb0b79351766c5cdab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This adds support for sending the quic_transport_parameters
(draft-ietf-quic-tls) in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions, as well as
reading the value sent by the peer.
Bug: boringssl:224
Change-Id: Ied633f557cb13ac87454d634f2bd81ab156f5399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24464
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Mono's legacy TLS 1.0 stack, as a server, does not implement any form of
resumption, but blindly echos the ClientHello session ID in the
ServerHello for no particularly good reason.
This is invalid, but due to quirks of how our client checked session ID
equality, we only noticed on the second connection, rather than the
first. Flaky failures do no one any good, so break deterministically on
the first connection, when we realize something strange is going on.
Bug: chromium:796910
Change-Id: I1f255e915fcdffeafb80be481f6c0acb3c628846
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25424
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This extension will be used to measure the latency impact of potentially
sending a post-quantum key share by default. At this time it's purely
measuring the impact of the client sending the key share, not the server
replying with a ciphertext.
We could use the existing padding extension for this but that extension
doesn't allow the server to echo it, so we would need a different
extension in the future anyway. Thus we just create one now.
We can assume that modern clients will be using TLS 1.3 by the time that
PQ key-exchange is established and thus the key share will be sent in
all ClientHello messages. However, since TLS 1.3 isn't quite here yet,
this extension is also sent for TLS 1.0–1.2 ClientHellos. The latency
impact should be the same either way.
Change-Id: Ie4a17551f6589b28505797e8c54cddbe3338dfe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24585
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 includes a server-random-based anti-downgrade signal, as a
workaround for TLS 1.2's ServerKeyExchange signature failing to cover
the entire handshake. However, because TLS 1.3 draft versions are each
doomed to die, we cannot deploy it until the final RFC. (Suppose a
draft-TLS-1.3 client checked the signal and spoke to a final-TLS-1.3
server. The server would correctly negotiate TLS 1.2 and send the
signal. But the client would then break. An anologous situation exists
with reversed roles.)
However, it appears that Cisco devices have non-compliant TLS 1.2
implementations[1] and copy over another server's server-random when
acting as a TLS terminator (client and server back-to-back).
Hopefully they are the only ones doing this. Implement a
measurement-only version with a different value. This sentinel must not
be enforced, but it will tell us whether enforcing it will cause
problems.
[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25168.html
Bug: 226
Change-Id: I976880bdb2ef26f51592b2f6b3b97664342679c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24284
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upgrade-Note: SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment) on the server
should switch to SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment2).
(Configuring any TLS 1.3 variants on the server enables all variants,
so this is a no-op. We're just retiring some old experiments.)
Change-Id: I60f0ca3f96ff84bdf59e1a282a46e51d99047462
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23784
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The current PR says the sender only skips it during the handshake. Add a
test that we got this right.
Change-Id: Ib27eb942f11d955b8a24e32321efe474037f5254
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23024
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This introduces a wire change to Experiment2/Experiment3 over 0RTT, however
as there is never going to be a 0RTT deployment with Experiment2/Experiment3,
this is valid.
Change-Id: Id541d195cbc4bbb3df7680ae2a02b53bb8ae3eab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22744
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22164
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This reverts commit 75d43b5785. Chatting
with EKR, there is some reason to believe that doing this might cause
more middlebox issues. Since we're still in the middle of working
towards viable deployment in the first place, revert this.
We can experiment with this later. I should have arranged for this to be
controlled more carefully anyway.
Change-Id: I0c8bf578f9d7364e913894e1bf3c2b8123dfd770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22204
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This does not affect TLS 1.2 (beyond Channel ID or NPN) but, in TLS 1.3,
we send several encrypted handshake messages in a row. For the server,
this means 66 wasted bytes in TLS 1.3. Since OpenSSL has otherwise used
one record per message since the beginning and unencrypted overhead is
less interesting, leave that behavior as-is for the time being. (This
isn't the most pressing use of the breakage budget.) But TLS 1.3 is new,
so get this tight from the start.
Change-Id: I64dbd590a62469d296e1f10673c14bcd0c62919a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22068
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
RSABadValueTooLong should have the true one as a suffix, not a prefix,
so that the version check still works. Also do the padding manually to
catch a few other bad padding cases. This is sufficient coverage so that
disabling any one comparison in the padding check flags some failure.
Change-Id: Ibcad284e5ecee3e995f43101c09e4cf7694391e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21904
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Application records may be packed with other application data records or
with handshake records. We also were never testing CCS and handshake
being packed together. Implement this by moving the packing logic to the
bottom of BoGo's DTLS record layer.
Change-Id: Iabc14ec4ce7b99ed1f923ce9164077efe948c7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21844
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Thanks to Dimitar Vlahovski for pointing this out.
Change-Id: I417f52ec6c3e950bdab6079962b29976fb75c029
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21324
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The Java client implementation of the 3SHAKE mitigation incorrectly
rejects initial handshakes when all of the following are true:
1. The ClientHello offered a session.
2. The session was successfully resumed previously.
3. The server declines the session.
4. The server sends a certificate with a different SAN list than in the
previous session.
(Note the 3SHAKE mitigation is to reject certificates changes on
renegotiation, while Java's logic applies to initial handshakes as
well.)
The end result is long-lived Java clients break on some certificate
rotations. Fingerprint Java clients and decline all offered sessions.
This avoids (2) while still introducing new sessions to clear any
existing problematic sessions.
See also b/65323005.
Change-Id: Ib2b84c69b5ecba285ffb8c4d03de5626838d794e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20184
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Found with libFuzzer.
Bug: chromium:763097
Change-Id: I806bcfc714c0629ff7f725e37f4c0045d4ec7ac6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20105
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
For historical reasons, TLS allows ServerHellos (and ClientHellos)
without extensions to omit the extensions fields entirely.
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4296 reports this is even
necessary for compatibility with extension-less clients. We continue to
do so, but add a test for it anyway.
Change-Id: I63c2e3a5f298674eb21952fca6914dad07d7c245
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19864
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We currently forbid the server certificate from changing on
renegotiation. This means re-verifying the certificate is pointless and
indeed the callback being called again seems to surprise consumers more
than anything else.
Carry over the initial handshake's SCT lists and OCSP responses (don't
enforce they don't change since the server may have, say, picked up new
OCSP responses in the meantime), ignore new ones received on
renegotiation, and don't bother redoing verification.
For our purposes, TLS 1.2 renegotiation is an overcomplicated TLS 1.3
KeyUpdate + post-handshake auth. The server is not allowed to change
identity.
Bug: 126
Change-Id: I0dae85bcf243943b1a5a97fa4f30f100c9e6e41e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19665
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
I messed up https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8883 and caused
both sides to believe they had sent the final Finished. Use next_message
to detect whether our last flight had a reply.
Change-Id: Ia4d8c8eefa818c9a69acc94d63c9c863293c3cf5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19604
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
CertificateVerify must be sent after a non-empty Certificate msg for:
1) TLS1.2 client
2) TLS1.3 client and server
This CL adds tests for those use cases.
Change-Id: I696e9dd74dcd523c6f8868a4fb9ada28fd67746d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19044
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This would only come up if the peer didn't pack records together, but
it's free to handle. Notably OpenSSL has a bug where it does not pack
retransmits together.
Change-Id: I0927d768f6b50c62bacdd82bd1c95396ed503cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Due to SSL 3.0 legacy, TLS 1.0 through 1.2 allow ClientHello and
ServerHello messages to omit the extensions field altogether, rather
than write an empty field. We broke this in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/17704/ when we needed to a
second ServerHello parsing path.
Fix this and add some regression tests to explicitly test both the
omitted and empty extensions ClientHello and ServerHello cases.
Bug: chromium:743218
Change-Id: I8297ba608570238e19f12ea44a9fe2fe9d881d28
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This implements PR #1051
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1051).
Local experiments were not able to replicate the claims in the PR, but
implement this anyway for comparison purposes.
Change-Id: Ic9baf5e671f9a44565020466a553dd08f5ec0f1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17844
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17327
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I90286da596d5822d4cfedf40995d80cf76adaf97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17536
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
