Rather than clear variables and break out of a loop that just ends up
returning anyway, just return. This makes all the abort points
consistent in this function.
Change-Id: I51d862e7c60a9e967773f15a17480b783af8c456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11422
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Breaking from inside the inner loop doesn't do what the code wants.
Instead the outer loop will continue running and it's possible for it to
read off the end of the buffer. (Found with libFuzzer.)
Next change will update the other abort points in this code to match.
Change-Id: I006dca0cd4c31db1c4b5e84b996fe24b2f1e6c13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11421
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10940
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10801
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
For now, they can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_RC4_TLS.
Of note, this means that `MEDIUM' is now empty.
Change-Id: Ic77308e7bd4849bdb2b4882c6b34af85089fe3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10580
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10447
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9043
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These are probably a good idea to ship so long as we have the PSK
callbacks at all, but they're not *completely* standard yet and Android
tests otherwise need updating to know about them. We don't care enough
about PSK to be in a rush to ship them, and taking them out is an easier
default action until then.
Change-Id: Ic646053d29b69a114e2efea61d593d5e912bdcd0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10225
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We'll enable them once we've gotten it working. For now, our TLS 1.3
believes there is no PSK.
Change-Id: I5ae51266927c8469c671844da9a0f7387c297050
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8760
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.
Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They were defined with the wrong MAC.
Change-Id: I531678dccd53850221d271c79338cfe37d4bb298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8422
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In TLS 1.3, the iv_length is equal to the explicit AEAD nonce length,
and is required to be at least 8 bytes.
Change-Id: Ib258f227d0a02c5abfc7b65adb4e4a689feffe33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8304
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is easier to deploy, and more obvious. This commit reverts a few
pieces of e25775bc, but keeps most of it.
Change-Id: If8d657a4221c665349c06041bb12fffca1527a2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL used to only forbid it on the server in plain PSK and allow it on the
client. Enforce it properly on both sides. My read of the rule in RFC 5246 ("A
non-anonymous server can optionally request a certificate") and in RFC 4279
("The Certificate and CertificateRequest payloads are omitted from the
response.") is that client auth happens iff we're certificate-based.
The line in RFC 4279 is under the plain PSK section, but that doesn't make a
whole lot of sense and there is only one diagram. PSK already authenticates
both sides. I think the most plausible interpretation is that this is for
certificate-based ciphers.
Change-Id: If195232c83f21e011e25318178bb45186de707e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7942
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I6267c9bfb66940d0b6fe5368514210a058ebd3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7494
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is in preparation for adding AES_256_GCM in Chromium below AES_128_GCM.
For now, AES_128_GCM is preferable over AES_256_GCM for performance reasons.
While I'm here, swap the order of 3DES and RC4. Chromium has already disabled
RC4, but the default order should probably reflect that until we can delete it
altogether.
BUG=591516
Change-Id: I1b4df0c0b7897930be726fb8321cee59b5d93a6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7296
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Besides avoiding the -Wformat-nonliteral warning, it is easier to
review (changes to) the code when the format string is passed to the
function as a literal.
Change-Id: I5093ad4494d5ebeea3f2671509b916cd6c5fb173
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6908
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We don't actually have an API to let you know if the value is legal to
interpret as a curve ID. (This was kind of a poor API. Oh well.) Also add tests
for key_exchange_info. I've intentionally left server-side plain RSA missing
for now because the SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD abstraction only gives you bytes and
it's probably better to tweak this API instead.
(key_exchange_info also wasn't populated on the server, though due to a
rebasing error, that fix ended up in the parent CL. Oh well.)
Change-Id: I74a322c8ad03f25b02059da7568c9e1a78419069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6783
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only ECDHE-based ciphers are implemented. To ease the transition, the
pre-standard cipher shares a name with the standard one. The cipher rule parser
is hacked up to match the name to both ciphers. From the perspective of the
cipher suite configuration language, there is only one cipher.
This does mean it is impossible to disable the old variant without a code
change, but this situation will be very short-lived, so this is fine.
Also take this opportunity to make the CK and TXT names align with convention.
Change-Id: Ie819819c55bce8ff58e533f1dbc8bef5af955c21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format packing them tightly made newlines inconsistent which
wasn't very helpful.
Change-Id: I46a787862ed1f5b0eee101394e24c779b6bc652b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Trim the cipher table further. Those values are entirely determined by
algorithm_enc.
Change-Id: I355c245b0663e41e54e62d15903a4a9a667b4ffe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6516
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS is the same as HIGH (but for CHACHA20), so those are redundant.
Likewise, MEDIUM vs HIGH was just RC4. Remove those in favor of
redefining those legacy rules to mean this.
One less field to keep track of in each cipher.
Change-Id: I2b2489cffb9e16efb0ac7d7290c173cac061432a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6515
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's redundant with other cipher properties. We can express these in code.
Cipher rule matching gets a little bit complicated due to the confusing legacy
protocol version cipher rules, so add some tests for it. (It's really hard to
grep for uses of them, so I've kept them working to be safe.)
Change-Id: Ic6b3fcd55d76d4a51b31bf7ae629a2da50a7450e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3072f884be77b8646e90d316154b96448f0cf2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6520
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a few things that will be kind of a nuisance and possibly not worth it
(crypto/asn1 dumps a lot of undeclared things, etc.). But it caught some
mistakes. Even without the warning, making sure to include the externs before
defining a function helps catch type mismatches.
Change-Id: I3dab282aaba6023e7cebc94ed7a767a5d7446b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts most of commit 271777f5ac. The old
ChaCha20-Poly1305, though being transitioned to the old name, should not change
in behavior. This also avoids adding a special-case to SSL_AEAD_CTX.
Also revert the name change to SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305. The one consumer
for that function doesn't need to distinguish the old and new variants, so
avoid unnecessary turbulence.
Change-Id: I5a6f97fccc5839d4d25e74e304dc002329d21b4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change reduces unnecessary copying and makes the pre-RFC-7539
nonces 96 bits just like the AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and RFC 7539
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. Also, all the symbols related to
the pre-RFC-7539 cipher suites now have "_OLD" appended, in
preparation for adding the RFC 7539 variants.
Change-Id: I1f85bd825b383c3134df0b6214266069ded029ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
They're really not all that helpful, considering they're each used
exactly once. They're also confusing as it is ALMOST the case that
SSL_TXT_FOO expands to "FOO", but SSL_TXT_AES_GCM expand "AESGCM" and
the protocol versions have lowercase v's and dots.
Change-Id: If78ad8edb0c024819219f61675c60c2a7f3a36b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6307
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The Android system BoringSSL has a couple of changes:
∙ ChaCha20-Poly1305 is disabled because it's not an offical
cipher suite.
∙ P-521 is offered in the ClientHello.
These changes were carried in the Android BoringSSL repo directly. This
change upstreams them when BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM is defined.
Change-Id: If3e787c6694655b56e7701118aca661e97a5f26c
RSA_PSK is really weird in that it takes a Certificate, but you're not
expected to verify it. It's just a funny way to transmit an RSA key.
(They probably should have used the RSA_EXPORT ServerKeyExchange
spelling.) Some code now already doesn't account for it right around
certificate verification.
Given ECDHE_PSK exists, hopefully there will never be any need to add
this.
Change-Id: Ia64dac28099eaa9021f8d915d45ccbfd62872317
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5941
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We wish to be able to detect the use of RC4 so that we can flag it and
investigate before it's disabled.
Change-Id: I6dc3a5d2211b281097531a43fadf08edb5a09646
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5930
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ssl.h should be first. Also two lines after includes and the rest of the
file.
Change-Id: Icb7586e00a3e64170082c96cf3f8bfbb2b7e1611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5892
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was checking algorithm_mac rather than algorithm_enc.
(Coincidentally, it gave the right answer if you compiled out the
ChaCha20 ciphers since SSL_AES128GCM and SSL_AEAD shared a value.)
Change-Id: I17047425ef7fabb98969144965d8db9528ef8497
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5850
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.
ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.
Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)
The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)
The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Apparently we left those as zero. Oh well. This only affects
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits, but so long as we have the field, it ought to be correct.
Change-Id: I2878ec22c2f5a6263f805e04d9fd8448994639b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)
Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.
Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than support arbitrarily many handshake hashes in the general
case (which the PRF logic assumes is capped at two), special-case the
MD5/SHA1 two-hash combination and otherwise maintain a single rolling
hash.
Change-Id: Ide9475565b158f6839bb10b8b22f324f89399f92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5618
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's purely the PRF function now, although it's still different from the
rest due to the _DEFAULT field being weird.
Change-Id: Iaea7a99cccdc8be4cd60f6c1503df5be2a63c4c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's a property of just algorithm_enc and hopefully AES-GCM will
continue to be the only true AEAD that requires this. Simpler to just
keep it in ssl_aead_ctx.c.
Change-Id: Ib7c060a3de2fa8590b2dc36c23a5d5fabff43b07
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to remove the confusing EVP_PKEY argument to the
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD wrapper functions. It also simplifies some of the
book-keeping around the CERT structure, as well as the API for
configuring certificates themselves. The current one is a little odd as
some functions automatically route to the slot while others affect the
most recently touched slot. Others still (extra_certs) apply to all
slots, making them not terribly useful.
Consumers with complex needs should use cert_cb or the early callback
(select_certificate_cb) to configure whatever they like based on the
ClientHello.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: Ice29ffeb867fa4959898b70dfc50fc00137f01f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The distinction was not well-enforced in the code. In fact, it wasn't
even possible to use the RSA_SIGN slot because ssl_set_pkey and
ssl_set_cert would always use the RSA_ENC slot.
A follow-up will fold away the mechanism altogether, but this is an easy
initial simplfication.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I66b5bf3e6dc243dac7c75924c1c1983538e49060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
