Rather than use those weird bitmasks, just pass an evp_aead_direction_t
and figure it out from there.
Change-Id: Ie52c6404bd0728d7d1ef964a3590d9ba0843c1d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20666
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We forgot to reset that value.
Change-Id: Ic869cb61da332983cc40223cbbdf23b455dd9766
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20084
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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By resolving Channel ID earlier, we can take advantage of
flight-by-flight writes.
Change-Id: I31265bda3390eb1faec976ac13d7a01ba5f6dd5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19925
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This fixes a regression in Conscrypt added by
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19144. SSL_get_session
otherwise attempts to return hs->new_session, but that has been released
at this point.
Change-Id: I55b41cbefb65b3ae3cfbfad72f6338bd66db3341
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19904
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That's the last of it!
Change-Id: I93d1f5ab7e95b2ad105c34b24297a0bf77625263
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19784
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Bug: 128
Change-Id: Ief3779b1c43dd34a154a0f1d2f94d0da756bc07a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19144
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We currently forbid the server certificate from changing on
renegotiation. This means re-verifying the certificate is pointless and
indeed the callback being called again seems to surprise consumers more
than anything else.
Carry over the initial handshake's SCT lists and OCSP responses (don't
enforce they don't change since the server may have, say, picked up new
OCSP responses in the meantime), ignore new ones received on
renegotiation, and don't bother redoing verification.
For our purposes, TLS 1.2 renegotiation is an overcomplicated TLS 1.3
KeyUpdate + post-handshake auth. The server is not allowed to change
identity.
Bug: 126
Change-Id: I0dae85bcf243943b1a5a97fa4f30f100c9e6e41e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19665
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We do not call the new_session callback on renego, but a consumer using
SSL_get_session may still attempt to resume such a session. Leave the
not_resumable flag unset. Also document this renegotiation restriction.
Change-Id: I5361f522700b02edf5272ba5089c0777e5dafb09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19664
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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They both can be moderately large. This should hopefully relieve a little
memory pressure from both connections to hosts which serve SCTs and
TLS 1.3's single-use tickets.
Change-Id: I034bbf057fe5a064015a0f554b3ae9ea7797cd4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19584
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Use SSL_SESSION_get_digest instead of the lower level function where
applicable. Also, remove the failure case (Ivan Maidanski points out in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/337852/1/src/ssl/t1_enc.c that
this unreachable codepath is a memory leak) by passing in an SSL_CIPHER
to make it more locally obvious that other values are impossible.
Change-Id: Ie624049d47ab0d24f32b405390d6251c7343d7d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Rather than init_msg/init_num, there is a get_message function which
either returns success or try again. This function does not advance the
current message (see the previous preparatory change). It only completes
the current one if necessary.
Being idempotent means it may be freely placed at the top of states
which otherwise have other asychronous operations. It also eases
converting the TLS 1.2 state machine. See
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/11n7LHsT3GwE34LAJIe3EFs4165TI4UR_3CqiM9LJVpI/edit?usp=sharing
for details.
The read_message hook (later to be replaced by something which doesn't
depend on BIO) intentionally does not finish the handshake, only "makes
progress". A follow-up change will align both TLS and DTLS on consuming
one handshake record and always consuming the entire record (so init_buf
may contain trailing data). In a few places I've gone ahead and
accounted for that case because it was more natural to do so.
This change also removes a couple pointers of redundant state from every
socket.
Bug: 128
Change-Id: I89d8f3622d3b53147d69ee3ac34bb654ed044a71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18806
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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With on_handshake_complete, this can be managed internally by the TLS
code. The next commit will add a ton more calls to this function.
Change-Id: I91575d3e4bfcccbbe492017ae33c74b8cc1d1340
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18865
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Instead, the DTLS driver can detect these states implicitly based on
when we write flights and when the handshake completes. When we flush a
new flight, the peer has enough information to send their reply, so we
start a timer. When we begin assembling a new flight, we must have
received the final message in the peer's flight. (If there are
asynchronous events between, we may stop the timer later, but we may
freely stop the timer anytime before we next try to read something.)
The only place this fails is if we were the last to write a flight,
we'll have a stray timer. Clear it in a handshake completion hook.
Change-Id: I973c592ee5721192949a45c259b93192fa309edb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18864
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This would only come up if the peer didn't pack records together, but
it's free to handle. Notably OpenSSL has a bug where it does not pack
retransmits together.
Change-Id: I0927d768f6b50c62bacdd82bd1c95396ed503cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_get0_peer_certificates is documented to return NULL if the peer was
anonymous, but it actually returns a non-NULL empty list (except in SSL
3.0 where the Certificate message and thus ssl_parse_cert_chain is
skipped).
Make the implementation match the documentation.
Change-Id: Ib3e25d2155f316cc5e9eb3ab7f74b78e08b8a86b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18226
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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SSLECDHContext has the acronyms problem, so I went with SSLKeyShare to
match the TLS 1.3 terminology. It's also a little shorter. Accept and
Finish, for now, take raw output pointers in anticipation of some
bssl::Array and maybe bssl::CleansedArray types.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I427c7c0eac95704f3ad093676c504c2848f5acb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18265
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Originally GREASE was a client-only thing but, in TLS 1.3, we send some
bogus extensions in NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest. Sampling
from the client_random works fine, but better to use our own entropy
rather than the peer's.
Change-Id: Ic7317eb75a9024c677fcde8e62c73aff380294e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18144
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
I started by switching a couple fields to SSL_HANDSHAKE and then kept
following transitive bits.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I640dadd3558615fa38c7e8498d4efe7449b0658f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18245
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The previous attempt around the 'struct ssl_st' compatibility mess
offended OSS-Fuzz and UBSan because one compilation unit passed a
function pointer with ssl_st* and another called it with
bssl::SSLConnection*.
Linkers don't retain such types, of course, but to silence this alert,
instead make C-visible types be separate from the implementation and
subclass the public type. This does mean we risk polluting the symbol
namespace, but hopefully the compiler is smart enough to inline the
visible struct's constructor and destructor.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ia75a89b3a22a202883ad671a630b72d0aeef680e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Clear out some of the easy cases.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Icd5c246cb6bec4a96c72eccd6569235c3d030ebd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18204
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Clang for Windows does not like OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT inside a function
in C++. It complains that the struct is unused. I think we worked around
this in C previously by making it expand to C11 _Static_assert when
available.
But libssl is now C++ and assumes a C++11-capable compiler. Use real
static_assert.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I6aceb95360244bd2c80d194b80676483abb60519
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to SSL 3.0 legacy, TLS 1.0 through 1.2 allow ClientHello and
ServerHello messages to omit the extensions field altogether, rather
than write an empty field. We broke this in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/17704/ when we needed to a
second ServerHello parsing path.
Fix this and add some regression tests to explicitly test both the
omitted and empty extensions ClientHello and ServerHello cases.
Bug: chromium:743218
Change-Id: I8297ba608570238e19f12ea44a9fe2fe9d881d28
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This implements PR #1051
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1051).
Local experiments were not able to replicate the claims in the PR, but
implement this anyway for comparison purposes.
Change-Id: Ic9baf5e671f9a44565020466a553dd08f5ec0f1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17844
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic68252de7b3a8f90d60f052a3cb707730d5a2b16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17744
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
