Change-Id: I3bc1e46fb94104c4ae31c1c98fa0d5a931e5f954
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13974
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Update the X509v3 name parsing to allow multiple xn-- international
domain name indicators in a name. Previously, only allowed one at
the beginning of a name, which was wrong.
(Imported from upstream's 31d1d3741f16bd80ec25f72dcdbf6bbdc5664374)
Change-Id: I93f1db7a5920305569af23f9f2b30ab5cc226521
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It has no more callers.
Change-Id: I587ccb3b63810ed167febf7a65ba85106d17a300
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13911
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Icb01cd3ff88eb3fa8a7d7a1e9ead568ba20eb748
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13965
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
These are only used by crypto/asn1 and not externally.
Change-Id: I2e6a28828fd81a4e3421eed1e98f0a65197f4b88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13868
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The two non-trivial changes are:
1. The public API now queries it out of the session. There is a long
comment over the old field explaining why the state was separate, but
this predates EMS being forbidden from changing across resumption. It
is not possible for established_session and the socket to disagree on
EMS.
2. Since SSL_HANDSHAKE gets reset on each handshake, the check that EMS
does not change on renego looks different. I've reworked that function a
bit, but it should have the same effect.
Change-Id: If72e5291f79681381cf4d8ceab267f76618b7c3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13910
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This lets us trim another two pointers of per-connection state.
Change-Id: I2145d529bc25b7e24a921d01e82ee99f2c98867c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13804
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This effectively reverts b9824e2417. This
error seems to have mostly just caused confusion in logs and the
occasional bug around failing to ERR_clear_error. Consumers tend to
blindly call SSL_shutdown when tearing down an SSL (to avoid
invalidating sessions). This means handshake failures trigger two
errors, which is screwy.
Go back to the old behavior where SSL_shutdown while SSL_in_init
silently succeeds.
Change-Id: I1fcfc92d481b97c840847dc39afe59679cd995f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13909
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Node has since been patched.
Change-Id: If25eecabfc83ef9fd36c531c9ca9db2911de010e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13908
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Noticed this comparing our and upstream's ASN.1 code. Somehow I missed
this line in cb852981cd. This change is a
no-op as our only ASN1_EX_COMBINE field is an ASN1_CHOICE which does not
read aclass.
Change-Id: I011f2f6eadd3939ec5f0b346c4eb7d14e406e3cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13833
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
asn1_template_noexp_d2i call ASN1_item_ex_free(&skfield,...) on error.
Reworked error handling in asn1_item_ex_combine_new:
- call ASN1_item_ex_free and return the correct error code if
ASN1_template_new failed.
- dont call ASN1_item_ex_free if ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE failed.
Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i and x509_name_encode.
(Imported from upstream's 748cb9a17f4f2b77aad816cf658cd4025dc847ee.)
I believe the tasn1_new.c change is a no-op since we have no
ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE hooks anymore. I'm not sure what the commit message is
referring to with ASN1_template_new. It also seems odd as
ASN1_item_ex_free should probably be able to survive *pval being NULL.
Whatever.
We'd previously tried to fix x509_name_ex_d2i, but I think ours wasn't
quite right. (This thing is a mess...) I've aligned that function with
upstream.
Change-Id: Ie71521cd8a1ec357876caadd13be1ce247110f76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13831
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imported from upstream's 1222d273d36277f56c3603a757240c386d55f318.)
We'd fixed half of these, but the other half are probably unreachable
from code that ran under malloc tests, so we never noticed. It's
puzzling why upstream did both this and
166e365ed84dfabec3274baf8a9ef8aa4e677891. It seems you only need one of
them.
Change-Id: I08074358134180c6661600b66958ba861e7726fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13832
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=129
Change-Id: Id7a92285601ff4276f4015eaee290bf77aa22b47
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13628
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
If copy fails, we shouldn't call cleanup. Also remove some pointless
NULL checks after EVP_PKEY_up_ref.
See also upstream's 748cb9a17f4f2b77aad816cf658cd4025dc847ee.
Change-Id: I2acb6892cde1ab662ca6a620d87179f9be609cba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13830
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These were added in an attempt to deal with the empty vs. NULL confusion
in PKCS#12. Instead, PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt already treated
NULL special. Since we're stuck with supporting APIs like those anyway,
Chromium has been converted to use that feature. This cuts down on the
number of APIs we need to decouple from crypto/asn1.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie2d4798d326c5171ea5d731da0a2c11278bc0241
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13885
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=129
Change-Id: I603054193a20c2bcc3ac1724f9b29d6384d9f62a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13626
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is handy when "offset(%reg)" is a perl variable.
(Imported from upstream's 1cb35b47db8462f5653803501ed68d33b10c249f.)
Change-Id: I2f03907a7741371a71045f98318e0ab9396a8fc7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13906
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
.cfi_{start|end}proc and .cfi_def_cfa were not tracked.
(Imported from upstream's 88be429f2ed04f0acc71f7fd5456174c274f2f76.)
Change-Id: I6abd480255218890349d139b62f62144b34c700d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13905
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imports upstream's 384e6de4c7e35e37fb3d6fbeb32ddcb5eb0d3d3f. Changes to
P-256 assembly dropped because we're so different there.)
- harmonize handlers with guidelines and themselves;
- fix some bugs in handlers;
Change-Id: Ic0b6a37bed6baedc50448c72fab088327f12898d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13782
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TEST_P didn't work without fixing the suppression, so I went ahead and
fixed it across the entire project.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I5fe417f720040b627acfb3ed2063afdc85dfa908
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13824
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13865
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imported from upstream's 7e12cdb52e3f4beff050caeecf3634870bb9a7c4.)
Change-Id: I9a6bba72c039e45ae5c0302a8a3dff7148cf1897
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13869
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13866
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
0-RTT requires matching the selected ALPN parameters against those in
the session. Stash the ALPN value in the session in TLS 1.3, so we can
recover it.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8668b287651ae4deb0bf540c0885a02d189adee0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13845
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I02e33a89345eaa935c06e3e6d88f7611049f1387
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13884
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=129
Change-Id: Ibbd6d0804a75cb17ff33f64d4cdf9ae80b26e9df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13867
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We've already converted err_test and forgot. Instead, recognize GTest
vs. normal tests by their contents. This hack can be removed later once
all the tests are converted.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Iaa56e0f3c316faaee5458a4bba9b977dc6efb1e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13844
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13864
Reviewed-by: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imports upstream's 3c274a6e2016b6724fbfe3ff1487efa2a536ece4.)
Change-Id: I2f0c0abff04decd347d4770e6d1d190f1e08afa0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13781
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's a30b0522cb937be54e172c68b0e9f5fa6ec30bf3.)
Change-Id: I6b9e67f97de935ecaaa9524943c6bdbe3540c0d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13780
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's abb8c44fbaf6b88f4f4879b89b32e423aa75617b.)
Note that the AVX512 code is disabled for now. This just reduces the
diff with upstream.
Change-Id: I61da414e53747ecc869f27883e6ab12c1f8513ff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13779
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's d89773d659129368a341df746476da445d47ad31.)
In order to minimize dependency on assembler version a number of
post-SSE2 instructions are encoded manually. But in order to simplify
the procedure only register operands are considered. Non-register
operands are passed down to assembler. Module in question uses pshufb
with memory operands, and old [GNU] assembler can't handle it.
Fortunately in this case it's possible skip just the problematic
segment without skipping SSSE3 support altogether.
Change-Id: Ic3ba1eef14170f9922c2cc69e0d57315e99a788b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13778
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We do pass -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 on the command line, so this just had the
effect of setting both values to 1 anyway.
Change-Id: Ia34714bb2fe51cc79d51ef9ee3ffe0354049ed0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13777
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commit 75b833cc81.
Sadly this needs to be redone because upstream never took this change.
Perhaps, once redone, we can try upstreaming it again.
Change-Id: Ic8aaa0728a43936cde1628ca031ff3821f0fbf5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13776
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's 3ba1ef829cf3dd36eaa5e819258d90291c6a1027.)
Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.
Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.
Change-Id: Ife42935319de79c6c76f8df60a76204c546fd1e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13775
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's ace05265d2d599e350cf84ed60955b7f2b173bc9.)
Change-Id: I151a03d662f7effe87f22fd9db7e0265368798b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13774
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's 6025001707fd65679d758c877200469d4e72ea88.)
Change-Id: I2f237d675b029cfc7ba3640aa9ce7248cc230013
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13773
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's b7f5503fa6e1feebec2ac12b8ddcb5b5672452a6.)
Change-Id: Ia8d2a8f71c97265d77ef8f6fc3cdfb7cf411c5ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13772
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upstream did this in 609b0852e4d50251857dbbac3141ba042e35a9ae and it's
easier to apply patches if we do also.
Change-Id: I5142693ed1e26640987ff16f5ea510e81bba200e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13771
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's 0a86f668212acfa6b48abacbc17b99c234eedf33.)
Change-Id: Ie31d99f8cc3e93b6a9c7c5daa066de96941b3f7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13770
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's 1bf80d93024e72628d4351c7ad19c0dfe635aa95.)
Change-Id: If1d61336edc7f63cdfd8ac14157376bde2651a31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13769
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501.)
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
Change-Id: Ie1e278eb5982f26e596783b3d7820a71295688ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13768
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This imports the changes to x86_64-xlate from upstream's
9c940446f614d1294fa197ffd4128206296b04da. It looks like it's a fix,
although it doesn't alter our generated asm at all. Either way, no point
in diverging from upstream on this point.
Change-Id: Iaedf2cdb9580cfccf6380dbc3df36b0e9c148d1c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13767
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This aligns us better with upstream's version of this file.
Change-Id: I771b6a6c57f2e11e30c95c7a5499c39575b16253
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13766
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imports upstream's a3b5684fc1d4f3aabdf68dcf6c577f6dd24d2b2d.)
CFI directives annotate instructions that are significant for stack
unwinding procedure. In addition to directives recognized by GNU
assembler this module implements three synthetic ones:
- .cfi_push annotates push instructions in prologue and translates to
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset (if needed) and .cfi_offset;
- .cfi_pop annotates pop instructions in epilogue and translates to
.cfi_adjust_cfs_offset (if needed) and .cfi_restore;
- .cfi_cfa_expression encodes DW_CFA_def_cfa_expression and passes it
to .cfi_escape as byte vector;
CFA expression syntax is made up mix of DWARF operator suffixes [subset
of] and references to registers with optional bias. Following example
describes offloaded original stack pointer at specific offset from
current stack pointer:
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp+40,deref,+8
Final +8 has everything to do with the fact that CFA, Canonical Frame
Address, is reference to top of caller's stack, and on x86_64 call to
subroutine pushes 8-byte return address.
Change-Id: Ic675bf52b5405000be34e9da31c9cf1660f4b491
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13765
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
