All CBC ciphers in TLS are broken and insecure. TLS 1.2 introduced
AEAD-based ciphers which avoid their many problems. It also introduced
new CBC ciphers based on HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 that share the same
flaws as the original HMAC-SHA1 ones. These serve no purpose. Old
clients don't support them, they have the highest overhead of all TLS
ciphers, and new clients can use AEADs anyway.
Remove them from libssl. This is the smaller, more easily reverted
portion of the removal. If it survives a week or so, we can unwind a lot
more code elsewhere in libcrypto. This removal will allow us to clear
some indirect calls from crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c, aligning with
the recommendations here:
https://github.com/HACS-workshop/spectre-mitigations/blob/master/crypto_guidelines.md#2-avoid-indirect-branches-in-constant-time-code
Update-Note: The following cipher suites are removed:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Change-Id: I7ade0fc1fa2464626560d156659893899aab6f77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It's hard to diagnose "20".
Change-Id: I57e8d0fb6e4937ddeca45b3645463ca0dc872ea6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27487
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This reflects the change to add the key type into the constant. The old
constants are left around for now as legacy aliases and will be removed
later.
Change-Id: I67f1b50c01fbe0ebf4a2e9e89d3e7d5ed5f5a9d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27486
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This changes the contract for split handshakes such that on the
receiving side, the connection is to be driven until it returns
|SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK|, rather than until SSL_do_handshake() returns
success.
Change-Id: Idd1ebfbd943d88474d7c934f4c0ae757ff3c0f37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26864
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSLv3_method, SSLv3_client_method, and SSLv3_server_method produce
SSL_CTXs which fail every handshake. They appear no longer necessary for
compatibility, so remove them.
SSLv3 is still accessible to callers who explicitly re-enable SSLv3 on a
TLS_method, but that will be removed completely later this year.
Meanwhile, clear out a weird hack we had here.
Update-Note: I believe there are no more callers of these functions. Any
that were were already non-functional as these methods haven't been
unable to handshake for a while now.
Change-Id: I622f785b428ab0ceab77b5a9db05b2b0df28145a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26004
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This change adds a couple of focused tests to ssl_test.cc, but also
programmically duplicates many runner tests in a split-handshake mode.
Change-Id: I9dafc8a394581e5daf1318722e1015de82117fd9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25388
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Since SSL{,_CTX}_set_custom_verify take a |mode| parameter that may be
|SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, it should do what it says on the tin, which is to
perform verification and ignore the result.
Change-Id: I0d8490111fb199c6b325cc167cf205316ecd4b49
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upgrade-Note: SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment) on the server
should switch to SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment2).
(Configuring any TLS 1.3 variants on the server enables all variants,
so this is a no-op. We're just retiring some old experiments.)
Change-Id: I60f0ca3f96ff84bdf59e1a282a46e51d99047462
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23784
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We end up writing these switch cases everywhere. Let consumers decompose
these a bit. The original thought was folks should write switch-cases so
they handle everything they support, but that's a pain. As long as
algorithm preferences are always configured, we can still add new
dimensions because folks won't be asked to sign algorithms that depend
on dimensions they don't understand.
Change-Id: I3dd7f067f2c55212f0201876546bc70fee032bcf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22524
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Node's default settings spell P-256 as prime256v1. This comes from
OpenSSL additionally allowing the long and short names of each curve's
NID. This works out to one additional name per curve for the ones we
support. To avoid depending on the giant OID table, this replicates the
names in libssl.
Change-Id: I456a2db6939eb6745e5a9d2f12cf6886e6265b9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22545
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Both of these changes have stuck in Chrome for quite a while now. Let's
clear them.
Change-Id: I13094451be2584ecaaf6b60eedefb7212b7bcde2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22226
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Now that we've gotten everything, test this by just making bssl_shim run
all errors twice. The manual tests added to ssl_test.cc may now be
removed.
Bug: 206
Change-Id: Iefa0eae83ba59b476e6b6c6f0f921d5d1b72cbfb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21886
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
While a fairly small hook, open_close_notify is pretty weird. It
processes things at the record level and not above. Notably, this will
break if it skips past a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate.
Instead, it can share the core part of SSL_read/SSL_peek, with slight
tweaks to post-handshake processing. Note this does require some tweaks
to that code. Notably, to retain the current semantics that SSL_shutdown
does not call funny callbacks, we suppress tickets.
Change-Id: Ia0cbd0b9f4527f1b091dd2083a5d8c7efb2bac65
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21885
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Enough were to make record processing idempotent (we either consume a
record or we don't), but some errors would cause us to keep processing
records when we should get stuck.
This leaves errors in the layer between the record bits and the
handshake. I'm hoping that will be easier to resolve once they do not
depend on BIO, at which point the checks added in this CL may move
around.
Bug: 206
Change-Id: I6b177079388820335e25947c5bd736451780ab8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21366
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
To make sure I don't break it later on.
Change-Id: I0a326800593cd3196efaf2ec9f4042935ecf8eb8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21864
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This is analogous to the Go stack's handshakeErr field. Since it's quite
common for callers to run two I/O operations in parallel[*] like
SSL_read and SSL_write (or SSL_read and SSL_do_handshake for client
0-RTT). Accordingly, the new handshake state machine jams itself up on
handshake error, but to fully work with such callers, we should also
replay the error state.
This doesn't yet catch all cases (there are some parts of the read flow
which need to be fixed). Those will be resolved in later changes.
[*] Not actually in parallel, of course, but logically in parallel on a
non-blocking socket.
Bug: 206
Change-Id: I5a4d37a258b9e3fc555b732938b0528b839650f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21285
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
I was just passing by.
Change-Id: I0212b4a1a3fd2ad24d7157181cd55a92263a3727
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20904
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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SSL_CTX_sessions is the only think making us expose LHASH as public API
and nothing uses it. Nothing can use it anyway as it's not thread-safe.
I haven't actually removed it yet since SSL_CTX is public, but once the
types are opaque, we could trim the number of symbols ssl.h pulls in
with some work.
Relatedly, fix thread safety of SSL_CTX_sess_number.
Change-Id: I75a6c93509d462cd5ed3ce76c587f0d1e7cd0797
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
draft-ietf-quic-tls needs access to the cipher's PRF hash to size its
keys correctly.
Change-Id: Ie4851f990e5e1be724f262f608f7195f7ca837ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20624
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The Java client implementation of the 3SHAKE mitigation incorrectly
rejects initial handshakes when all of the following are true:
1. The ClientHello offered a session.
2. The session was successfully resumed previously.
3. The server declines the session.
4. The server sends a certificate with a different SAN list than in the
previous session.
(Note the 3SHAKE mitigation is to reject certificates changes on
renegotiation, while Java's logic applies to initial handshakes as
well.)
The end result is long-lived Java clients break on some certificate
rotations. Fingerprint Java clients and decline all offered sessions.
This avoids (2) while still introducing new sessions to clear any
existing problematic sessions.
See also b/65323005.
Change-Id: Ib2b84c69b5ecba285ffb8c4d03de5626838d794e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20184
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The new_session_cb callback should not be run if SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
is off.
Change-Id: I1ab320f33688f186b241d95c81775331a5c5b1a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20065
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Right now we report the per-connection value during the handshake and
the per-session value after the handshake. This also trims our tickets
slightly by removing a largely unused field from SSL_SESSION.
Putting it on SSL_HANDSHAKE would be better, but sadly a number of
bindings-type APIs expose it after the handshake.
Change-Id: I6a1383f95da9b1b141b9d6adadc05ee1e458a326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20064
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
That's the last of it!
Change-Id: I93d1f5ab7e95b2ad105c34b24297a0bf77625263
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19784
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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That function actually got a little complicated after the CRYPTO_BUFFER
work.
Change-Id: Ib679a9f2bcc2c974fe059af49805b8200e77bd03
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19764
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Easy bit of test coverage.
Change-Id: I0362fca926d82869b512e3c40dc53d6dc771dfc8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19724
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Consumers have been switched to the new ones.
Change-Id: I7a8ec6308775a105a490882c97955daed12a2c2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I2fe57cd500e8408ae15164070afe4b081a5daab0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19404
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The ticket encryption key is rotated automatically once every 24 hours,
unless a key has been configured manually (i.e. using
|SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys|) or one of the custom ticket encryption
methods is used.
Change-Id: I0dfff28b33e58e96b3bbf7f94dcd6d2642f37aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Other projects are starting to use them. Having two APIs for the same
thing is silly, so deprecate all our old ones.
Change-Id: Iaf6b6995bc9e4b624140d5c645000fbf2cb08162
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows us to fix another consumer that directly accesses SSL_CTX.
I've made ssl_test use it for test coverage, though we're okay with
ssl_test depending on ssl/internal.h.
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I464325e3faa9f0194bbd357fbb31a996afc0c2e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18964
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Similarly, add EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len which computes the exact tag length
for required by EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter.
Change-Id: I069b0ad16fab314fd42f6048a3c1dc45e8376f7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL allows spaces, commas and semi-colons to be used as separators
in cipher strings, in addition to the usual colons.
This change documents that spaces cannot be used in equal-preference
groups and forbids these alternative separators in strict mode.
Change-Id: I3879e25aed54539c281511627e6a282e9463bdc3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18424
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_get0_peer_certificates is documented to return NULL if the peer was
anonymous, but it actually returns a non-NULL empty list (except in SSL
3.0 where the Certificate message and thus ssl_parse_cert_chain is
skipped).
Make the implementation match the documentation.
Change-Id: Ib3e25d2155f316cc5e9eb3ab7f74b78e08b8a86b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18226
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is a C++ interface for encrypting and decrypting TLS application
data records in-place, wrapping the existing C API in tls_record.cc.
Also add bssl::Span, a non-owning reference to a contiguous array of
elements which can be used as a common interface over contiguous
container types (like std::vector), pointer-length-pairs, arrays, etc.
Change-Id: Iaa2ca4957cde511cb734b997db38f54e103b0d92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18104
Commit-Queue: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I started by switching a couple fields to SSL_HANDSHAKE and then kept
following transitive bits.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I640dadd3558615fa38c7e8498d4efe7449b0658f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18245
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The previous attempt around the 'struct ssl_st' compatibility mess
offended OSS-Fuzz and UBSan because one compilation unit passed a
function pointer with ssl_st* and another called it with
bssl::SSLConnection*.
Linkers don't retain such types, of course, but to silence this alert,
instead make C-visible types be separate from the implementation and
subclass the public type. This does mean we risk polluting the symbol
namespace, but hopefully the compiler is smart enough to inline the
visible struct's constructor and destructor.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ia75a89b3a22a202883ad671a630b72d0aeef680e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is needed to switch Chromium's SSLServerSocket and parts of
Conscrypt to CRYPTO_BUFFER.
Bug: 54
Change-Id: Iacd417970607bc1a162057676b576956a3bdfa3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The in_group check is redundant and test an extremely absurd corner of
the syntax.
Change-Id: Ia54bcd7cda7ba05415d3a250ee93e1acedcc43d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17542
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_set_max_proto_version(TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION) worked unintentionally.
Fix that. Also add an error when it fails.
Change-Id: I1048fede7b163e1c170e17bf4370b468221a7077
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17525
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These broke at some point. Add a test for them.
Change-Id: Ie45869e07d9615ae33aae4613f6d9b996af39528
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17330
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Both Conscrypt and Netty have a lot of logic to map between the two
kinds of names. WebRTC needed an SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name for something.
Just have both in the library. Also deprecate SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name
in favor of SSL_CIPHER_standard_name, which matches upstream if built
with enable-ssl-trace. And, unlike SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name, this does
not require dealing with the malloc.
(Strangely this decreases bssl's binary size, even though we're carrying
more strings around. It seems the old SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name was
somewhat large in comparison. Regardless, a consumer that disliked 30
short strings probably also disliked the OpenSSL names. That would be
better solved by opaquifying SSL_CIPHER and adding a less stringy API
for configuring cipher lists. That's something we can explore later if
needed.)
I also made the command-line tool print out the standard names since
they're more standard. May as well push folks towards those going
forward.
Change-Id: Ieeb3d63e67ef4da87458e68d130166a4c1090596
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17324
Reviewed-by: Robert Sloan <varomodt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These are not the true version filters due to SSL_OP_NO_* filters.
Change-Id: I4c2db967d885f7c1875a3e052c5b02ea8d612fe1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17266
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Free code coverage. Also rename things in SSL_select_next_proto so it
works for NPN and ALPN. (I found some code which uses it for ALPN.)
Change-Id: I8d06b768f9484dc3eda1a20506ec84ec3ddbc883
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17206
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
