BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14886
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Also remove TODO about post-handshake authentication. The only sensible
way to handle unexpected post-handshake authentication is a fatal error
(dropping them would cause a deadlock), and we treat all post-handshake
authentication as unexpected.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Ic92035b26ddcbcf25241262ce84bcc57b736b7a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14744
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This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way
to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature
algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly.
For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be
enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an
external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it.
(On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an
Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14450
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With public keys reliably extractable from SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD keys,
we can share the pkey/sigalg check between signing and verifying.
BUG=188
Change-Id: Ieb9382807781e48ffed720b27f450847d3fca788
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14566
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, extract it from the certificate, which is what everyone was
doing anyway. A follow-up change will take advantage of this cleanup to
deduplicate code between signing and verifying for which keys are good
for which signature algorithms.
BUG=188
Change-Id: Ic3f83a6477e8fa53e5e7233f4545f4d2c4b58d01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14565
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is an unhelpfully generic name. Rename it to match SSL_ECDH_CTX.
Unqualified "public key" is typically assumed to be the certificate.
Change-Id: I8ba8c3f2bb1343d1c006845a1110e833451c5a56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This moves the early data switch to CERT to make this
|SSL_set_SSL_CTX|-proof.
Change-Id: Icca96e76636d87578deb24b2d507cabee7e46a4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14545
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Remove another remnant of the SSL3_PROTOCOL_METHOD hook.
Change-Id: If6bf055e2ee318420e4c5c40b8eb5356eadda68c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14381
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ie894ea5d327f88e66b234767de437dbe5c67c41d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12960
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Once 0-RTT data is added to the current 0-RTT logic, the server will
trigger a write when processing incoming data via SSL_read. This means
SSL_read will block on transport write, which is something we've not
tried to avoid far (assuming no renegotiation).
The specification allows for tickets to be sent at half-RTT by
predicting the client Finished. By doing this we both get the tickets on
the wire sooner and avoid confusing I/O patterns. Moreover, we
anticipate we will need this mode for one of the QUIC stateless reject
patterns.
This is tested by always processing NewSessionTickets in the
ExpectHalfRTTData path on 0-RTT connections. As not other
implementations using BoGo may not do this, this is configurable via the
shim config.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ia0f56ae63f15078ff1cacceba972d2b99001947f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14371
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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This is a remnant of before we made the handshake write
flight by flight.
Change-Id: I94c0105bb071ffca9ff5aa4c4bf43311c750b49a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14369
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12921
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This shuffles a bit of the code around session resumption in TLS 1.3 to
make the async point cleaner to inject. It also fills in cipher and
tlsext_hostname more uniformly.
Filling in the cipher on resumption is a no-op as SSL_SESSION_dup
already copies it, but avoids confusion should we ever implement TLS
1.3's laxer cipher matching on the server. Not filling in
tlsext_hostname on resumption was an oversight; the relevant check isn't
whether we are resuming but whether we have a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill
things into.
Change-Id: Ic02eb079ff228ce4a4d3e0de7445e18cd367e8b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14205
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support for setting an |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD| which
allows a caller to control ticket encryption and decryption to a greater
extent than previously possible and also permits asynchronous ticket
decryption.
This change only includes partial support: TLS 1.3 work remains to be
done.
Change-Id: Ia2e10ebb3257e1a119630c463b6bf389cf20ef18
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14144
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This makes its purpose clearer. That the session cache is based on the
initial SSL_CTX is confusing (it's a remnant of OpenSSL's backwards
session resumption ordering), but we're probably stuck with it.
Relatedly, document SSL_set_SSL_CTX better.
Change-Id: I2832efc63f6c959c5424271b365825afc7eec5e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14204
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's more consistent to have the helper function do the check that
its every caller already performs. This removes the error code
SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS in favor of SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH.
Change-Id: I522239770dcb881d33d54616af386142ae41b29f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13964
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This in preparation of 0-RTT which needs the AEAD version as part of
early data, before the full version negotiation.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ief68bc69d794da6e55bb9208977b35f3b947273b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14104
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We'll measure this value to guide what tolerance to use in the 0-RTT
anti-replay mechanism. This also fixes a bug where we were previously
minting ticket_age_add-less tickets on the server. Add a check to reject
all those tickets.
BUG=113
Change-Id: I68e690c0794234234e0d0500b4b9a7f79aea641e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14068
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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It's only called from within that file.
Change-Id: I281c9eb1ea25d9cfbec492ba8a4d007f45ae2635
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14027
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to middlebox and ecosystem intolerance, short record headers are going to
be unsustainable to deploy.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I20fee79dd85bff229eafc6aeb72e4f33cac96d82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14044
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This is the first part to fixing the SSL stack to be 2038-clean.
Internal structures and functions are switched to use OPENSSL_timeval
which, unlike timeval and long, are suitable for timestamps on all
platforms.
It is generally accepted that the year is now sometime after 1970, so
use uint64_t for the timestamps to avoid worrying about serializing
negative numbers in SSL_SESSION.
A follow-up change will fix SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb to use
OPENSSL_timeval. This will require some coordinating with WebRTC.
DTLSv1_get_timeout is left alone for compatibility and because it stores
time remaining rather than an absolute time.
BUG=155
Change-Id: I1a5054813300874b6f29e348f9cd8ca80f6b9729
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13944
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This allows a caller to get an |SSL_METHOD| that is free of crypto/x509.
Change-Id: I088e78310fd3ff5db453844784e7890659a633bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than store CA names and only find out that they're unparsable
when we're asked for a |STACK_OF(X509_NAME)|, check that we can parse
them all during the handshake. This avoids changing the semantics with
the previous change that kept CA names as |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s.
Change-Id: I0fc7a4e6ab01685347e7a5be0d0579f45b8a4818
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13969
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This change converts the CA names that are parsed from a server's
CertificateRequest, as well as the CA names that are configured for
sending to clients in the same, to use |CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
The |X509_NAME|-based interfaces are turned into compatibility wrappers.
Change-Id: I95304ecc988ee39320499739a0866c7f8ff5ed98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13585
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The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
The two non-trivial changes are:
1. The public API now queries it out of the session. There is a long
comment over the old field explaining why the state was separate, but
this predates EMS being forbidden from changing across resumption. It
is not possible for established_session and the socket to disagree on
EMS.
2. Since SSL_HANDSHAKE gets reset on each handshake, the check that EMS
does not change on renego looks different. I've reworked that function a
bit, but it should have the same effect.
Change-Id: If72e5291f79681381cf4d8ceab267f76618b7c3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13910
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This lets us trim another two pointers of per-connection state.
Change-Id: I2145d529bc25b7e24a921d01e82ee99f2c98867c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13804
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This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13865
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13864
Reviewed-by: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
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|SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| now takes an |SSL_CTX*|, from which it uses the
|X509_METHOD| and buffer pool. This is our API so we can do this.
This also requires adding an |SSL_CTX*| argument to |SSL_SESSION_new|
for the same reason. However, |SSL_SESSION_new| already has very few
callers (and none in third-party code that I can see) so I think we can
get away with this.
Change-Id: I1337cd2bd8cff03d4b9405ea3146b3b59584aa72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13584
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Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13369
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Right now the only way to set an SCT list is the per-context function
SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list. However this assumes that all the
SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the same SCT list, which is wrong.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own list, a
CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: Id20e6f128c33cf3e5bff1be390645441be6518c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13642
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As previously discussed, it turns out we don't actually need this, so
there's no point in keeping it.
Change-Id: If549c917b6bd818cd36948e37cb7839c8d122b1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13641
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It has no other callers, now that the handshake is written elsewhere.
Change-Id: Ib04bbdc4a54fc7d01405d9b3f765fa9f186244de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13540
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change moves the interface between |X509| and |CRYPTO_BUFFER| a
little further out, towards the API.
Change-Id: I1c014d20f12ad83427575843ca0b3bb22de1a694
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13365
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The recent CRYPTO_BUFFER changes meant that |X509| objects passed to
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert would be |free|ed immediately. However,
some third-party code (at least serf and curl) continue to use the
|X509| even after handing over ownership.
In order to unblock things, keep the past |X509| around for a while to
paper over the issues with those libraries while we try and upstream
changes.
Change-Id: I832b458af9b265749fed964658c5c34c84d518df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13480
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Move to explicit hashing everywhere, matching TLS 1.2 with TLS 1.3. The
ssl_get_message calls between all the handshake states are now all
uniform so, when we're ready, we can rewire the TLS 1.2 state machine to
look like the TLS 1.3 one. (ssl_get_message calls become an
ssl_hs_read_message transition, reuse_message becomes an ssl_hs_ok
transition.)
This avoids some nuisance in processing the ServerHello at the 1.2 / 1.3
transition.
The downside of explicit hashing is we may forget to hash something, but
this will fail to interop with our tests and anyone else, so we should
be able to catch it.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I01393943b14dfaa98eec2a78f62c3a41c29b3a0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13266
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This is kind of annoying (even new state is needed to keep the layering
right). As part of aligning the read paths of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
state machine, we'll want to move to states calling
ssl_hash_current_message when the process the message, rather than when
the message is read. Right now the TLS 1.2 optional message story
(reuse_message) depends on all messages preceded by an optional message
using ssl_hash_message. For instance, if TLS 1.2 decided to place
CertificateStatus before ServerKeyExchange, we would not be able to
handle it.
However, V2ClientHello, by being handled in the message layer, relies on
ssl_get_message-driven hashing to replace the usual ClientHello hash
with a hash of something custom. This switches things so rather than
ClientHellos being always pre-hashed by the message layer, simulated
ClientHellos no-op ssl_hash_current_message.
This just replaces one hack with another (V2ClientHello is inherently
nasty), but this hack should be more compatible with future plans.
BUG=128
Change-Id: If807ea749d91e306a37bb2362ecc69b84bf224c9
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This aligns the TLS 1.2 state machine closer with the TLS 1.3 state
machine. This is more work for the handshake, but ultimately the
plan is to take the ssl_get_message call out of the handshake (so it is
just the state machine rather than calling into BIO), so the parameters
need to be folded out as in TLS 1.3.
The WrongMessageType-* family of tests should make sure we don't miss
one of these.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I17a1e6177c52a7540b2bc6b0b3f926ab386c4950
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This change converts the |CERT| struct to holding certificates as binary
blobs, rather than in parsed form. The members for holding the parsed
form are still there, however, but are only used as a cache for the
event that someone asks us for a non-owning pointer to the parsed leaf
or chain.
Next steps:
* Move more functions in to ssl_x509.c
* Create an X509_OPS struct of function pointers that will hang off
the |SSL_METHOD| to abstract out the current calls to crypto/x509
operations.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: Ifa05d88c49a987fd561b349705c9c48f106ec868
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This resolves a TODO, trims per-connection memory, and makes more sense.
These masks have nothing to do with certificate configuration.
Change-Id: I783e6158e51f58cce88e3e68dfa0ed965bdc894c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13368
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I324743e7d1864fbbb9653209ff93e4da872c8d31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Alessandro Ghedini
Matthew Braithwaite
David Benjamin
Steven Valdez
Adam Langley
Adam Langley