cryptography.io wants things exposed out of EVP_get_cipherby* including,
sadly, ECB mode.
Change-Id: I9bac46f8ffad1a79d190cee3b0c0686bf540298e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28464
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Make it clear this is not a pristine full copy of all of Wycheproof as a
library.
Change-Id: I1aa5253a1d7c696e69b2e8d7897924f15303d9ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28188
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data_plus_mac_size is secret. Values derived from it cannot quite be
safely divided by md_block_size because SHA-384 ciphers prevent that
field from being constant. We know the value is a power of two, so do
the strength reduction by hand.
Change-Id: Id62ab9e646f4e21d507a7059cfe84d49bbb986e6
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The Bluetooth Mesh spec uses both apparently. Also extract a pile of
test vectors from that document (thanks to Kyle Lund for showing me
which to extract).
Change-Id: I04a04fafb7386ca28adfe1446fa388e841778931
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26324
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Having it in base.h pollutes the global namespace a bit and, in
particular, causes clang to give unhelpful suggestions in consuming
projects.
Change-Id: I6ca1a88bdd1701f0c49192a0df56ac0953c7067c
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We would set it to block_size rather than zero. This doesn't cause
problems (the code behaves correctly with either value), but it is a
tiny missed optimization.
Change-Id: Ic751352750cc7ef74aa25a6cc96da82007199941
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Fixes failed compile with [-Werror=implicit-fallthrough=], which is
default on gcc-7.x on distributions like fedora.
Enabling no implicit fallthrough for more than just clang as well to
catch this going forward.
Change-Id: I6cd880dac70ec126bd7812e2d9e5ff804d32cadd
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20564
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Windows provides _aligned_malloc, so we could provide an
|OPENSSL_aligned_malloc| in the future. However, since we're still
trying to get the zeroisation change landed everywhere, a self-contained
change seems easier until that has settled down.
Change-Id: I47bbd811a7fa1758f3c0a8a766a1058523949b7f
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Allocations by |OPENSSL_malloc| are prefixed with their length.
|OPENSSL_free| zeros the allocation before calling free(), eliminating
the need for a separate call to |OPENSSL_cleanse| for sensitive data.
This change will be followed up by the cleanup in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/19824.
Change-Id: Ie272f07e9248d7d78af9aea81dacec0fdb7484c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19544
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crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
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The memcpy of a pointer looks like a typo, though it isn't. Instead,
transcribe what the functions expect into a union and let C fill it in.
Change-Id: Iba4c824295e8908c5bda68ac35673040a8cff116
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18744
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Similarly, add EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len which computes the exact tag length
for required by EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter.
Change-Id: I069b0ad16fab314fd42f6048a3c1dc45e8376f7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change updates the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD to be able to process
|extra_in| data. It does this by encrypting the extra data byte-by-byte
(because extra data should be very small). Both the generic and assembly
code is updated to be able to include this extra ciphertext in the
Poly1305 calculation.
Change-Id: I751ed31fb7e1f4db6974e9ed31721a43177cf8cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17465
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This tag doesn't actually do anything, except cause UBSan to point out
that malloc doesn't align that tightly. malloc does, however, appear to
align up to 16-bytes, which is the actual alignment requirement of that
code. So just replace 64 with 16.
When we're juggling less things, it'd be nice to see what toolchain
support for the various aligned allocators looks like. Or maybe someday
we can use C++ new which one hopes is smart enough to deal with all
this.
Change-Id: Idbdde66852d5dad25a044d4c68ffa3b3f213025a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17706
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Change-Id: I683481b12e66966729297466748f1869de0b913b
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These behave like EVP_AEAD_CTX_{seal,open} respectively, but receive
ciphertext and authentication tag as separate arguments, rather than one
contiguous out or in buffer.
Change-Id: Ia4f1b83424bc7067c55dd9e5a68f18061dab4d07
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16924
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In order to use AES-GCM-SIV in the open-source QUIC boxer, it needs to
be moved out from OPENSSL_SMALL. (Hopefully the linker can still discard
it in the vast majority of cases.)
Additionally, the input to the key schedule function comes from outside
and may not be aligned, thus we need to use unaligned instructions to
read it.
Change-Id: I02c261fe0663d13a96c428174943c7e5ac8415a7
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It shouldn't have been defined for variable-length nonces at all, but so
it goes. EVP_CIPHER rejected this by way of EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN
comparing <= 0, but the EVP_AEAD API did not.
I've done the test in a separate file on the assumption that aead_test
will become GTest shortly, at which point it will be easy to stick extra
tests into the same file as the FileTest ones.
Thanks to Daniel Bleichenbacher and Thanh Bui of Project Wycheproof for
the report.
Change-Id: Ic4616b39a1d7fe74a1f14fb58cccec2ce7c4f2f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16544
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
AES-GCM-SIV specifies that the counter is a 32-bit, unsigned number.
These test vectors are crafted to trigger a wrap-around and ensure that
corner of the spec is implemented correctly.
Change-Id: I911482ca0b6465a7623ee1b74a6cb1d5e54ddbea
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