This gives coverage over needing to fragment something over multiple
records.
Change-Id: I2373613608ef669358d48f4e12f68577fa5a40dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 doesn't support renegotiation in the first place, but so callers
don't report TLS 1.3 servers as missing it, always report it as
(vacuously) protected against this bug.
BUG=chromium:680281
Change-Id: Ibfec03102b2aec7eaa773c331d6844292e7bb685
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13046
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
08b65f4e31 introduced a memory leak and
also got enums confused. Also fix a codepath that was missing an error
code.
Thanks to OSS-Fuzz which appears to have found it in a matter of hours.
Change-Id: Ia9e926c28a01daab3e6154d363d0acda91209a22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13104
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds support for setting 0-RTT mode on tickets minted by
BoringSSL, allowing for testing of the initial handshake knowledge.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ic199842c03b5401ef122a537fdb7ed9e9a5c635a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12740
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
As long as we still have this code, we should make sure it doesn't
regress.
Change-Id: I0290792aedcf667ec49b251d747ffbc141c0cec4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13053
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The write path for TLS is going to need some work. There are some fiddly
cases when there is a write in progress. Start adding tests to cover
this logic.
Later I'm hoping we can extend this flag so it drains the unfinished
write and thus test the interaction of read/write paths in 0-RTT. (We
may discover 1-RTT keys while we're in the middle of writing data.)
Change-Id: Iac2c417e4b5e84794fb699dd7cbba26a883b64ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Channel ID is already enabled on the SSL. This dates to
49c7af1c42 which converted an instance of
tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new to it, but tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new
meant "if Channel ID is enabled, use the new one", not "enable Channel
ID".
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for catching this.
Change-Id: I2d5a82b930ffcbe5527a62a9aa5605ebb71a6b9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13042
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream accidentally started rejecting server-sent point formats in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/2133. Our own test coverage
here is also lacking, so flesh it out.
Change-Id: I99059558bd28d3a540c9687649d6db7e16579d29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12979
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Ie4c566c29c20faac7a9a5e04c88503fc2e1ff4db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12970
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12684
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were only asserting on the shim-side error code.
Change-Id: Idc08c253a7723a2a7fd489da761a56c72f7a3b96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12923
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It should probably have a TLS 1.3 in the name to be clear that's what
it's testing.
Change-Id: I50b5f503a8038715114136179bde83e7da064e9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12961
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The loop is getting a little deeply nested and hard to read.
Change-Id: I3a99fba54c2f352850b83aef91ab72d5d9aabfb8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12685
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Also fix the error code. It's a missing extension, not an unexpected
one.
Change-Id: I48e48c37e27173f6d7ac5e993779948ead3706f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12683
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
So we can report it cleanly out of DevTools, it should behave like
SSL_get_curve_id and be reported on resumption too.
BUG=chromium:658905
Change-Id: I0402e540a1e722e09eaebadf7fb4785d8880c389
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12694
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Also test that TLS 1.3 can be resumed at a different curve.
Change-Id: Ic58e03ad858c861958b7c934813c3e448fb2829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12692
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Nothing calls this anymore. DHE is nearly gone. This unblocks us from
making key_exchange_info only apply to the curve.
Change-Id: I3099e7222a62441df6e01411767d48166a0729b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12691
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I1c7a71d84e1976138641f71830aafff87f795f9d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12706
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This avoids needing a extra state around client certificates to avoid
calling the callbacks twice. This does, however, come with a behavior
change: configuring both callbacks won't work. No consumer does this.
(Except bssl_shim which needed slight tweaks.)
Change-Id: Ia5426ed2620e40eecdcf352216c4a46764e31a9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12690
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Iaac633616a54ba1ed04c14e4778865c169a68621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12703
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Right now the only way to set an OCSP response is SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response
however this assumes that all the SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the
same OCSP response, which is wrong.
This is similar to the OpenSSL "function" SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
the main difference being that this doesn't take ownership of the OCSP buffer.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own response,
a CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: I3a0697f82b805ac42a22be9b6bb596aa0b530025
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12660
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This was useful when we were transitioning NPN off in Chromium, but now
there are no callers remaining.
Change-Id: Ic619613d6d475eea6bc258c4a90148f129ea4a81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12637
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We've taken to writing bssl::UniquePtr in full, so it's not buying
us much.
Change-Id: Ia2689366cbb17282c8063608dddcc675518ec0ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12628
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Ida26e32a700c68e1899f9f6ccff73e2fa5252313
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12633
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This allows a consumer to disable Channel ID (for instance, it may be
enabled on the SSL_CTX and later disabled on the SSL) without reaching
into the SSL struct directly.
Deprecate the old APIs in favor of these.
BUG=6
Change-Id: I193bf94bc1f537e1a81602a39fc2b9a73f44c73b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12623
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: Iec0e597af37137270339e9754c6e08116198899e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12581
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I1e28ba84de59336cab432d1db3dd9c6023909081
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12625
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Ie46d45cdb07c692a789594e13040a1ce9d6cf83d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12640
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
finishedHash should keep a running secret and incorporate entropy as is
available.
Change-Id: I2d245897e7520b2317bc0051fa4d821c32eeaa10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12586
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Although we ignore all but the first identity, keep clients honest by
parsing the whole thing. Also explicitly check that the binder and
identity counts match.
Change-Id: Ib9c4caae18398360f3b80f8db1b22d4549bd5746
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12469
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=101
Change-Id: Ia1edbccee535b0bc3a0e18465286d5bcca240035
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12470
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
Change-Id: Ib8a1fe185224ff02ed4ce53a0109e60d934e96b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12401
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Previously the option to retain only the SHA-256 hash of client
certificates could only be set at the |SSL_CTX| level. This change makes
|SSL| objects inherit the setting from the |SSL_CTX|, but allows it to
be overridden on a per-|SSL| basis.
Change-Id: Id435934af3d425d5f008d2f3b9751d1d0884ee55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12182
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
Change-Id: Id40d851ccd87e06c46c6ec272527fd8ece8abfc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This simplifies a little code around EMS and PSK KE modes, but requires
tweaking the SNI code.
The extensions that are more tightly integrated with the handshake are
still processed inline for now. It does, however, require an extra state
in 1.2 so the asynchronous session callback does not cause extensions to
be processed twice. Tweak a test enforce this.
This and a follow-up to move cert_cb before resumption are done in
preparation for resolving the cipher suite before resumption and only
resuming on match.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- The legacy SNI callback happens before resumption.
- The ALPN callback happens before resumption.
- Custom extension ClientHello parsing callbacks also cannot depend on
resumption state.
- The DoS protection callback now runs after all the extension callbacks
as it is documented to be called after the resumption decision.
BUG=116
Change-Id: I1281a3b61789b95c370314aaed4f04c1babbc65f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
As a client, we must tolerate this to avoid interoperability failures
with allowed server behaviors.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I9c40a2a048282e2e63ab5ee1d40773fc2eda110a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Draft 18 sadly loosens the requirements to only requiring the PRF hash
stay fixed.
BUG=117
Change-Id: Ic94d53fd9cabaee611fcf36b0071558075e10728
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12310
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is generally much cleaner and makes it possible to implement the
more lax cipher matching in draft 18.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I595d7619d60bc92e598d75b43945286323c0b72b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12309
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It doesn't particular matter, but AcceptAnySession should only skip the
things that would cause us to note accept a ticket. ExpectTicketAge is
an assertion, not part of protocol logic. Accordingly, fix the text.
Change-Id: I3bea9c58f4d5f912308252ec8834f183287d632f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12308
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The version check should run if AcceptAnyVersion is *not* set.
Change-Id: I4c137564f91a86cb5e6a26e09fd4670cce8f1dcb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12307
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When debugging a flaky test, it's useful to be able to run a given test
over and over.
Change-Id: I1a7b38792215550b242eb8238214d873d41becb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12301
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The draft 18 implementation did not compute scts_requested correctly. As
a result, it always believed SCTs were requested. Fix this and add tests
for unsolicited OCSP responses and SCTs at all versions.
Thanks to Daniel Hirche for the report.
Change-Id: Ifc59c5c4d7edba5703fa485c6c7a4055b15954b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12305
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for catching this.
Change-Id: Id0a024d7f705519cfe76d350e0ef2688dbd11a22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12303
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Having that logic in two different places is a nuisance when we go to
add new checks like resumption stuff. Along the way, this adds missing
tests for the ClientHello cipher/session consistency check. (We'll
eventually get it for free once the cipher/resumption change is
unblocked, but get this working in the meantime.)
This also fixes a bug where the session validity checks happened in the
wrong order relative to whether tickets_supported or renew_ticket was
looked at. Fix that by lifting that logic closer to the handshake.
Change-Id: I3f4b59cfe01064f9125277dc5834e62a36e64aae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was removed a while ago. As of -18, the early data indication
extension is just a boolean.
Change-Id: I328b9abfafad326d4c2a3b5fe981af111f8401ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12302
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
