Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13369
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Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.
This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.
BUG=chromium:682816
Change-Id: I2345d6db83441691fe0c1ab6d7c6da4d24777849
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13203
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commit def9b46801.
(I should have uploaded a new version before sending to the commit queue.)
Change-Id: Iaead89c8d7fc1f56e6294d869db9238b467f520a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13202
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Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.
This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.
Change-Id: Icd9c2117c657f3aa6df55990c618d562194ef0e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13201
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia6598ee4b2d4623abfc140d6a5c0eca4bcb30427
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13180
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The last one was an RC4 cipher and those are gone.
Change-Id: I3473937ff6f0634296fc75a346627513c5970ddb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13108
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
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This business with |ok| is unnecessary. This function is still rather a
mess, but this is a small improvement.
Change-Id: I28fdf1a3687fe6a9d58d81a22cf2f8e7ce5b9b2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12080
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This is only used in one place where we don't take advantage of it being
sorted anyway.
Change-Id: If6f0d04e975db903e8a93c57c869ea4964c0be37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12062
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is still rather a mess with how it's tied to SSL_AEAD_CTX_new
(probably these should get encapsulated in an SSL_AEAD struct), but this
avoids running the TLS 1.3 nonce logic on fake AEADs. This is impossible
based on cipher version checks, but we shouldn't need to rely on it.
It's also a little tidier since out_mac_secret_len is purely a function
of algorithm_mac.
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: Icc24d43c54a582bcd189d55958e2d232ca2db4dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11842
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ib499b3393962a4d41cf9694e055ed3eb869d91a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11504
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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cURL calls this function if |OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER| is in [0x10002003,
0x10002fff], which it now is for BoringSSL after 0aecbcf6.
Change-Id: I3f224f73f46791bd2232a1a96ed926c32740a6f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11461
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than clear variables and break out of a loop that just ends up
returning anyway, just return. This makes all the abort points
consistent in this function.
Change-Id: I51d862e7c60a9e967773f15a17480b783af8c456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11422
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Breaking from inside the inner loop doesn't do what the code wants.
Instead the outer loop will continue running and it's possible for it to
read off the end of the buffer. (Found with libFuzzer.)
Next change will update the other abort points in this code to match.
Change-Id: I006dca0cd4c31db1c4b5e84b996fe24b2f1e6c13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11421
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This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10940
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This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10801
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For now, they can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_RC4_TLS.
Of note, this means that `MEDIUM' is now empty.
Change-Id: Ic77308e7bd4849bdb2b4882c6b34af85089fe3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10580
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10447
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9043
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These are probably a good idea to ship so long as we have the PSK
callbacks at all, but they're not *completely* standard yet and Android
tests otherwise need updating to know about them. We don't care enough
about PSK to be in a rush to ship them, and taking them out is an easier
default action until then.
Change-Id: Ic646053d29b69a114e2efea61d593d5e912bdcd0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10225
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We'll enable them once we've gotten it working. For now, our TLS 1.3
believes there is no PSK.
Change-Id: I5ae51266927c8469c671844da9a0f7387c297050
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8760
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This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.
Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They were defined with the wrong MAC.
Change-Id: I531678dccd53850221d271c79338cfe37d4bb298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8422
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In TLS 1.3, the iv_length is equal to the explicit AEAD nonce length,
and is required to be at least 8 bytes.
Change-Id: Ib258f227d0a02c5abfc7b65adb4e4a689feffe33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8304
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is easier to deploy, and more obvious. This commit reverts a few
pieces of e25775bc, but keeps most of it.
Change-Id: If8d657a4221c665349c06041bb12fffca1527a2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL used to only forbid it on the server in plain PSK and allow it on the
client. Enforce it properly on both sides. My read of the rule in RFC 5246 ("A
non-anonymous server can optionally request a certificate") and in RFC 4279
("The Certificate and CertificateRequest payloads are omitted from the
response.") is that client auth happens iff we're certificate-based.
The line in RFC 4279 is under the plain PSK section, but that doesn't make a
whole lot of sense and there is only one diagram. PSK already authenticates
both sides. I think the most plausible interpretation is that this is for
certificate-based ciphers.
Change-Id: If195232c83f21e011e25318178bb45186de707e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7942
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I6267c9bfb66940d0b6fe5368514210a058ebd3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7494
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is in preparation for adding AES_256_GCM in Chromium below AES_128_GCM.
For now, AES_128_GCM is preferable over AES_256_GCM for performance reasons.
While I'm here, swap the order of 3DES and RC4. Chromium has already disabled
RC4, but the default order should probably reflect that until we can delete it
altogether.
BUG=591516
Change-Id: I1b4df0c0b7897930be726fb8321cee59b5d93a6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7296
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Besides avoiding the -Wformat-nonliteral warning, it is easier to
review (changes to) the code when the format string is passed to the
function as a literal.
Change-Id: I5093ad4494d5ebeea3f2671509b916cd6c5fb173
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6908
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We don't actually have an API to let you know if the value is legal to
interpret as a curve ID. (This was kind of a poor API. Oh well.) Also add tests
for key_exchange_info. I've intentionally left server-side plain RSA missing
for now because the SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD abstraction only gives you bytes and
it's probably better to tweak this API instead.
(key_exchange_info also wasn't populated on the server, though due to a
rebasing error, that fix ended up in the parent CL. Oh well.)
Change-Id: I74a322c8ad03f25b02059da7568c9e1a78419069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6783
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only ECDHE-based ciphers are implemented. To ease the transition, the
pre-standard cipher shares a name with the standard one. The cipher rule parser
is hacked up to match the name to both ciphers. From the perspective of the
cipher suite configuration language, there is only one cipher.
This does mean it is impossible to disable the old variant without a code
change, but this situation will be very short-lived, so this is fine.
Also take this opportunity to make the CK and TXT names align with convention.
Change-Id: Ie819819c55bce8ff58e533f1dbc8bef5af955c21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format packing them tightly made newlines inconsistent which
wasn't very helpful.
Change-Id: I46a787862ed1f5b0eee101394e24c779b6bc652b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Trim the cipher table further. Those values are entirely determined by
algorithm_enc.
Change-Id: I355c245b0663e41e54e62d15903a4a9a667b4ffe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6516
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS is the same as HIGH (but for CHACHA20), so those are redundant.
Likewise, MEDIUM vs HIGH was just RC4. Remove those in favor of
redefining those legacy rules to mean this.
One less field to keep track of in each cipher.
Change-Id: I2b2489cffb9e16efb0ac7d7290c173cac061432a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6515
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's redundant with other cipher properties. We can express these in code.
Cipher rule matching gets a little bit complicated due to the confusing legacy
protocol version cipher rules, so add some tests for it. (It's really hard to
grep for uses of them, so I've kept them working to be safe.)
Change-Id: Ic6b3fcd55d76d4a51b31bf7ae629a2da50a7450e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3072f884be77b8646e90d316154b96448f0cf2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6520
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a few things that will be kind of a nuisance and possibly not worth it
(crypto/asn1 dumps a lot of undeclared things, etc.). But it caught some
mistakes. Even without the warning, making sure to include the externs before
defining a function helps catch type mismatches.
Change-Id: I3dab282aaba6023e7cebc94ed7a767a5d7446b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts most of commit 271777f5ac. The old
ChaCha20-Poly1305, though being transitioned to the old name, should not change
in behavior. This also avoids adding a special-case to SSL_AEAD_CTX.
Also revert the name change to SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305. The one consumer
for that function doesn't need to distinguish the old and new variants, so
avoid unnecessary turbulence.
Change-Id: I5a6f97fccc5839d4d25e74e304dc002329d21b4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change reduces unnecessary copying and makes the pre-RFC-7539
nonces 96 bits just like the AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and RFC 7539
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. Also, all the symbols related to
the pre-RFC-7539 cipher suites now have "_OLD" appended, in
preparation for adding the RFC 7539 variants.
Change-Id: I1f85bd825b383c3134df0b6214266069ded029ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
They're really not all that helpful, considering they're each used
exactly once. They're also confusing as it is ALMOST the case that
SSL_TXT_FOO expands to "FOO", but SSL_TXT_AES_GCM expand "AESGCM" and
the protocol versions have lowercase v's and dots.
Change-Id: If78ad8edb0c024819219f61675c60c2a7f3a36b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6307
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
