Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
(Imported from upstream's e677e8d13595f7b3287f8feef7676feb301b0e8a.)
Change-Id: I5faefc190568504bb5895ed9816a6d80432cfa45
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4048
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, if SIGILL was received between the signal handler being
installed and before the sigsetjmp, the process would longjmp to a
random location.
Change-Id: I9e6143a17ff3db0e1b00ece68fce161801461010
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3950
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Noticed these as I was poking around.
Change-Id: I93833a152583feced374c9febf7485bec7abc1c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3973
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This too isn't version-specific. This removes the final difference between TLS
and DTLS SSL3_ENC_METHODs and we can fold them together. (We should be able to
fold away the version-specific differences too, but all in due time.)
Change-Id: I6652d3942a0970273d46d28d7052629c81f848b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes test flakiness on Windows.
BUG=467767
Change-Id: Ie69b5b43ddd524aadb15c53705f6ec860e928786
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4001
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Allocate and free ASN.1 string types directly instead of going through
the ASN.1 item code.
(Imported from upstream's 3d6aa6d441fe8124d247dffee5c68c2e5efd8258.)
Change-Id: I617283e67071a792f219ed08f19078afc223e2f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.
This behavior was broken in upstream's
904348a4922333106b613754136305db229475ea, resulting in the opposite time
comparison behavior.
PR#3706
(Imported from upstream's da27006df06853a33b132133699a7aa9d4277920.)
Change-Id: I9c1c28ba21d82ff4b587e33b262f46be4e846ff9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4043
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
(Imported from upstream's 2c3823491d8812560922a58677e3ad2db4b2ec8d.)
Change-Id: I97c7bb306d6f3c18597850db9f08023b2ef74839
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4042
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Td4 is an array of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not
representable in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't
shift into the sign bit of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32
whenever we're shifting left by 24.
(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)
Caught by -fsanitize=shift
Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
(Imported from upstream's 8b37e5c14f0eddb10c7f91ef91004622d90ef361.)
Change-Id: Id0f98d1d65738533c6ddcc3c21bc38b569d74793
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When printing out an ASN.1 structure, if the type is an item template don't
fall through and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
(Imported from upstream's 5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa.)
Change-Id: Ica39757792cbf3f83879953b67838927ddbdb809
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fixed assorted missing return value checks in v3_cpols.c
(Imported from upstream's c5f2b5336ab72e40ab91e2ca85639f51fa3178c6.)
Change-Id: I95e4157fc689201ca32e1c8e51d04801ba478685
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4008
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
(Imported from upstream's 34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00.)
Change-Id: Ia43cdc73b5f1d16e6fc907b5aaf13c9df5a9958c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4007
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
(Imported from upstream's 9e488fd6ab)
Change-Id: Icbb13cd00d0ec5529871b678b0bcc465956a7572
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4006
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
(Imported from upstream's 8c5a7b33c6269c3bd6bc0df6b4c22e4fba03b485.)
Change-Id: I0b392991ce8170dc418e93003af256d535d1e2e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b.)
Our RAND_bytes secretly can't actually fail, but we should propagate the check
upwards.
Change-Id: Ieaaea98dad00bf73b1c0a42c039507d76b10ac78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4003
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 0b142f022e2c5072295e00ebc11c5b707a726d74.)
Modified further because these ought to just be BIO_puts.
Change-Id: I8b70d70d0f626bb19b455adb4f0e08bacf453c1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4002
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Thanks to William Hesse.)
Change-Id: I8479663250546a5ec0a024f80e50541f91d833bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4020
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They do not quite measure the same value for EC keys. "size" is a really weird
notion to generalize on so we should document what it means for each key type.
EVP_PKEY_size's meaning is most tied to signatures, thanks to EVP_SignFinal
implicitly using it as output bounds.
Change-Id: I7504c142818f8f90f8bcf6891c97a6adaf2d574e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4000
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C99 doesn't, technically, allow empty statements. Thus if a #define'ed
function ends in a semicolon, and the use of it also ends in a
semicolon, then the compiler sees “;;” at the end.
Since a choice has to be made, I prefer that the semicolon exist at the
“callsite” of a #define'ed fuction. But I haven't gone and changed
everything to follow that in this patch.
Change-Id: I1343e52a5ac6255db49aa053048d0df3225bcf43
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3890
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Firstly, it was odd that AES-NI was a special case. Secondly, I have a
need coming up for being able to get the block function and not create a
GCM context.
Change-Id: Ie87de5e7ea42dc042d302c5eafecbc6af03c714b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
At least the linker can discard this function in the cases where nobody
is calling it.
Change-Id: I30050e918e6bc1dd9c97cc70f3a56408701abebc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Because NTLM authentication is still a thing.
Change-Id: I3308a8431c82f0b614e09ce3e5efac1526881f1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows the current RC4 state of an SSL* to be extracted. We have
internal uses for this functionality.
Change-Id: Ic124c4b253c8325751f49e7a4c021768620ea4b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3722
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This callback receives information about the ClientHello and can decide
whether or not to allow the handshake to continue.
Change-Id: I21be28335fa74fedb5b73a310ee24310670fc923
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3721
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Eliminate the possibility of multiple lock IDs having the same
value (CRYPTO_LOCK_FIPS2 and CRYPTO_LOCK_OBJ were both 40 prior to
this commit).
* Remove unused lock IDs.
* Automatically guarantee that lock IDs and lock names stay in sync.
Change-Id: If20e462db1285fa891595a7e52404ad011ff16f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3923
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The TLS AEADs require EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction now. The speed command
was never updated to account for this.
BUG=467762
Change-Id: I8c7d4566b51d54d91d17318b8f4813ad8f19c777
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3971
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows x64 uses the IL32P64 data model, which means that unsigned int
is 32 bits and size_t is 64 bits. Previously, the expression
|~(alignment - 1)| resulted in the 32-bit value 0xFFFFFFF0, which was
then extended to the 64-bit value 0x00000000FFFFFFF0 when promoted to
size_t. When the input pointer was masked with this value, the result
was a pointer that was usually way outside the boundaries of the array.
The new code casts |alignment| to size_t first prior to the bitwise
negation, resulting in the correct mask value of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0.
Change-Id: I04754aa9e1ce7a615c2b4c74051cfcca38dbb52f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3961
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This mostly[*] doesn't matter for TLS since the message would have been
rejected anyway, but, in DTLS, if the peer rejects our Finished, it will send
an encrypted alert. This will then cause it to hang, which isn't very helpful.
I've made the change on both TLS and DTLS so the two protocols don't diverge on
this point. It is true that we're accepting nominally encrypted and
authenticated alerts before Finished, but, prior to ChangeCipherSpec, the
alerts are sent in the clear anyway so an attacker could already inject alerts.
A consumer could only be sensitive to it being post-CCS if it was watching
msg_callback. The only non-debug consumer of msg_callback I've found anywhere
is some hostapd code to detect Heartbeat.
See https://code.google.com/p/webrtc/issues/detail?id=4403 for an instance
where the equivalent behavior in OpenSSL masks an alert.
[*] This does change behavior slightly if the peer sends a warning alert
between CCS and Finished. I believe this is benign as warning alerts are
usually ignored apart from info_callback and msg_callback. The one exception is
a close_notify which is a slightly new state (accepting close_notify during a
handshake seems questionable...), but they're processed pre-CCS too.
Change-Id: Idd0d49b9f9aa9d35374a9f5e2f815cdb931f5254
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3883
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
May as well use this convenience function when we can. A little tidier. Even
fixes a leak on malloc failure in eckey_type2param.
Change-Id: Ie48dd98f2fe03fa9911bd78db4423ab9faefc63d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3772
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream needs this to deal with size_t, but our low-level DES APIs take
size_t, so this is not a concern.
Change-Id: I9dc4c7248c5dd9515246a4b224147b932328a400
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3882
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix a few remnants of them being unsigned long. Also rename extremely unhelpful
variable names in SSL_get_error. i is now ret_code to match the header.
Change-Id: Ic31d6626bfe09c9e21c03691dfc716c5573833ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3881
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that much of EVP has been normalized to 0/1, a lot of code can just use
boolean operators. (As can some code which was already using them...)
Change-Id: I6bb17edfd6f67050bf1706d59d8f37df57535faa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3875
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No code within BoringSSL or Google (grep for EVP_PKEY_CTX_(ctrl|get|set)) is
sensitive to the various failure cases. Normalize it all to 0/1 for simplicity.
This does carry a slight risk: any new ctrl hooks we import from upstream that,
like EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md, return something other than success/failure
cannot be called directly via EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl. They instead need to
internally be routed through a struct like CBS and only called through the
wrappers. To that end, unexport EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl and require that callers use
the wrappers. No code in Google uses it directly and, if need be, switching to
the wrapper would be an incredibly upstreamable patch.
Change-Id: I3fd4e5a1a0f3d4d1c4122c52d4c74a5105b99cd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3874
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the only EVP_PKEY ctrl hook which returns something other than a
boolean.
Change-Id: Ic226aef168abdf72e5d30e8264a559ed5039a055
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3873
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes another place where we're internally sensitive to the
success/failure conditions.
Change-Id: I18fecf6457e841ba0afb718397b9b5fd3bbdfe4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3872
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All EVP_PKEY types return 1 on that. (It can go away entirely when
EVP_PKEY_HMAC is gone.) This removes a place internally where we're sensitive
to the failure code.
Change-Id: Ic6cda2da9337ba7ef1c66a18e40c5dcc44fcf840
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3871
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Brian Smith