crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
There are still a ton of them, almost exclusively complaints that
function declaration and definitions have different parameter names. I
just fixed a few randomly.
Change-Id: I1072f3dba8f63372cda92425aa94f4aa9e3911fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18706
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
We've got three versions of DATA_TOO_LARGE and two versions of
DATA_TOO_SMALL with no apparent distinction between them.
Change-Id: I18ca2cb71ffc31b04c8fd0be316c362da4d7daf9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17529
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Public and private RSA keys have the same type in OpenSSL, so it's
probably prudent for us to catch this case with an error rather than
crash. (As we do if you, say, configure RSA-PSS parameters on an Ed25519
EVP_PKEY.) Bindings libraries, in particular, tend to hit this sort of
then when their callers do silly things.
Change-Id: I2555e9bfe716a9f15273abd887a8459c682432dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17325
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This change allows blinding to be disabled without also having to remove
|e|, which would disable the CRT and the glitch checks. This is to
support disabling blinding in the FIPS power-on tests.
(Note: the case where |e| isn't set is tested by RSATest.OnlyDGiven.)
Change-Id: I28f18beda33b1687bf145f4cbdfd37ce262dd70f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17146
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only place it is used is EC_KEY_{dup,copy} and no one calls that
function on an EC_KEY with ex_data. This aligns with functions like
RSAPublicKey_dup which do not copy ex_data. The logic is also somewhat
subtle in the face of malloc errors (upstream's PR 3323).
In fact, we'd even changed the function pointer signature from upstream,
so BoringSSL-only code is needed to pass this pointer in anyway. (I
haven't switched it to CRYPTO_EX_unused because there are some callers
which pass in an implementation anyway.)
Note, in upstream, the dup hook is also used for SSL_SESSIONs when those
are duplicated (for TLS 1.2 ticket renewal or TLS 1.3 resumption). Our
interpretation is that callers should treat those SSL_SESSIONs
equivalently to newly-established ones. This avoids every consumer
providing a dup hook and simplifies the interface.
(I've gone ahead and removed the TODO(fork). I don't think we'll be able
to change this API. Maybe introduce a new one, but it may not be worth
it? Then again, this API is atrocious... I've never seen anyone use argl
and argp even.)
BUG=21
Change-Id: I6c9e9d5a02347cb229d4c084c1e85125bd741d2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This has since been done.
Change-Id: I498f845fa4ba3d1c04a5892831be4b07f31536d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16124
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
