ssl_verify_* already ought to be checking this, so there's only a need
to check against the configured preferences.
Change-Id: I79bc771969c57f953278e622084641e6e20108e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8698
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than blindly select SHA-1 if we can't find a matching one, act as
if the peer advertised rsa_pkcs1_sha1 and ecdsa_sha1. This means that we
will fail the handshake if no common algorithm may be found.
This is done in preparation for removing the SHA-1 default in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I3584947909d3d6988b940f9404044cace265b20d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8695
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Instead have ssl3_cert_verify_hash output the hash, since it already
knows it. Also add a missing EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md call on the
client half. (Although, the call isn't actually necessary.)
Also remove now unnecessary static assert. Since EVP_md5_sha1 is an
EVP_MD itself, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE is required to fit it already.
Change-Id: Ief74fdbdf08e9f124679475bafba2f6f1d8fc687
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8692
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It still places the current message all over the place, but remove the
bizarre init_num/error/ok split. Now callers get the message length out
of init_num, which mirrors init_msg. Also fix some signedness.
Change-Id: Ic2e97b6b99e234926504ff217b8aedae85ba6596
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8690
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This machinery is so different between TLS and DTLS that there is no
sense in having them share structures. This switches us to maintaining
the full reassembled message in hm_fragment and get_message just lets
the caller read out of that when ready.
This removes the last direct handshake dependency on init_buf,
ssl3_hash_message.
Change-Id: I4eccfb6e6021116255daead5359a0aa3f4d5be7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8667
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Both DTLS and TLS still use it, but that will change in the following
commit. This also removes the handshake's knowledge of the
dtls_clear_incoming_messages function.
(It's possible we'll want to get rid of begin_handshake in favor of
allocating it lazily depending on how TLS 1.3 post-handshake messages
end up working out. But this should work for now.)
Change-Id: I0f512788bbc330ab2c947890939c73e0a1aca18b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8666
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
V2ClientHello is going to be ugly wherever we do it, but this hides it
behind the transport method table. It removes a place where the
handshake state machine reaches into ssl3_get_message's internal state.
ssl3_get_message will now silently translate V2ClientHellos into true
ClientHellos and manage the handshake hash appropriately.
Now the only accesses of init_buf from the handshake state machines are
to create and destroy the buffer.
Change-Id: I81467a038f6ac472a465eec7486a443fe50a98e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8641
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than have a separate codepath, just skip the message_complete
logic and parse what's in the buffer. This also cuts down on one input
to setting up a reuse_message; message_type is now only written to in
the get_message implementation.
Change-Id: I96689b5957a3f2548af9099ec4e53cabacdc395a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8640
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To match the Go side. That message will never be used for anything else,
so there's not much need to give it such a long name.
Change-Id: I3396c9d513d02d873e59cd8e81ee64005c5c706c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8620
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In order to delay the digest of the handshake transcript and unify
around message-based signing callbacks, a copy of the transcript is kept
around until we are sure there is no certificate authentication.
This removes support for SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD as a client in SSL 3.0.
Change-Id: If8999a19ca021b4ff439319ab91e2cd2103caa64
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8561
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We ended up switching this from a curve to a cipher suite, so the group
ID isn't used. This is in preparation for adding an API for the curve
ID, at which point leaving the protocol constants undefined seems
somewhat bad manners.
Change-Id: Icb8bf4594879dbbc24177551868ecfe89bc2f8c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8563
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL's SSL_OP_NO_* flags allow discontinuous version ranges. This is a
nuisance for two reasons. First it makes it unnecessarily difficult to answer
"are any versions below TLS 1.3 enabled?". Second the protocol does not allow
discontinuous version ranges on the client anyway. OpenSSL instead picks the
first continous range of enabled versions on the client, but not the server.
This is bizarrely inconsistent. It also doesn't quite do this as the
ClientHello sending logic does this, but not the ServerHello processing logic.
So we actually break some invariants slightly. The logic is also cumbersome in
DTLS which kindly inverts the comparison logic.
First, switch min_version/max_version's storage to normalized versions. Next
replace all the ad-hoc version-related functions with a single
ssl_get_version_range function. Client and server now consistently pick a
contiguous range of versions. Note this is a slight behavior change for
servers. Version-range-sensitive logic is rewritten to use this new function.
BUG=66
Change-Id: Iad0d64f2b7a917603fc7da54c9fc6656c5fbdb24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8513
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The signing logic itself still depends on pre-hashed messages and will be fixed
in later commits.
Change-Id: I901b0d99917c311653d44efa34a044bbb9f11e57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8545
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They're not necessary.
Change-Id: Ifeb3fae73a8b22f88019e6ef9f9ba5e64ed3cfab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8543
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
As part of the SignatureAlgorithm change in the TLS 1.3 specification,
the existing signature/hash combinations are replaced with a combined
signature algorithm identifier. This change maintains the existing APIs
while fixing the internal representations. The signing code currently
still treats the SignatureAlgorithm as a decomposed value, which will be
fixed as part of a separate CL.
Change-Id: I0cd1660d74ad9bcf55ce5da4449bf2922660be36
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8480
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows us to use CBB for all handshake messages. Now, SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
is responsible for implementing a trio of CBB-related hooks to assemble
handshake messages.
Change-Id: I144d3cac4f05b6637bf45d3f838673fc5c854405
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It has size 7. There's no need for a priority queue structure, especially one
that's O(N^2) anyway.
Change-Id: I7609794aac1925c9bbf3015744cae266dcb79bff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8437
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The pair was a remnant of some weird statefulness and also ChangeCipherSpec
having a "sequence number" to make the pqueue turn into an array.
Change-Id: Iffd82594314df43934073bd141faee0fc167ed5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8436
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Post-handshake retransmit in DTLS no longer needs that scratch space.
Change-Id: I2f070675d72426e61b19dab5bcac40bf62b8fd8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8434
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It is an explicit copy of something, but it's a lot easier to reason about than
the init_buf/init_num gynmastics we were previously doing. This is along the
way to getting init_buf out of here.
Change-Id: Ia1819ba9db60ef6db09dd60d208dbc95fcfb4bd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8432
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It doesn't really convey anything useful. Leave ssl_get_message alone for now
since it's called everywhere in the handshake and I'm about to tweak it
further.
Change-Id: I6f3a74c170e818f624be8fbe5cf6b796353406df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8430
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The payload comments aren't necessary now that our parsing code is readable in
itself. The check is impossible to hit.
Change-Id: Ib41ad606babda903a9fab50de3189f97e99cac2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8248
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.2 has a long series of optional messages within a flight. We really
should send and process these synchronously. In the meantime, the 'skip'
pattern is probably the best we can get away with. Otherwise we have too many
state transitions to think about. (The business with CCS, NPN, and ChannelID is
particularly a headache. Session tickets aren't great either.)
Change-Id: I84e391a6410046372cf9c6989be056a27606ad19
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8246
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the only codepath where ssl->version can get a garbage value, which is
a little concerning. Since, in all these cases, the peer is failing to connect
and speaks so low a version we don't even accept it anymore, there is probably
not much value in letting them distinguish protocol_version from a record-layer
version number mismatch, where enforced (which will give a version-related
error anyway).
Should we get a decode_error or so just before version negotiation, we'd have
this behavior already.
Change-Id: I9b3e5685ab9c9ad32a7b7e3129363cd1d4cdaaf4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8420
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Match the actual name of the type.
Change-Id: I0ad27196ee2876ce0690d13068fa95f68b05b0da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8187
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Give them much more reasonable names.
Change-Id: Id14d983ab3231da21a4f987e662c2e01af7a2cd6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8185
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
