We don't really gain much from this one, but consistency.
Change-Id: I3f830c6d1ad65263bd1cc09372a5b810a8f690c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is in preparation for using RAII in the unit tests. Those tests are built
in Chromium as well, but Chromium does not have C++11 library support across
all its toolchains. Compiler support is available, so add a partial
reimplementation of std::unique_ptr and std::move under crypto/test/. The
scopers for the crypto/ library are also moved there while the ones for ssl/
stay in ssl/test/.
Change-Id: I38f769acbc16a870db34649928575c7314b6e9f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Historically, OpenSSL has used callbacks for anything thread related,
but we don't actually have that many threading libraries to worry about:
just pthreads and Windows (I hope).
That suggests that it's quite reasonable to handle threading ourselves,
and eliminate the need for users to remember to install the thread
callbacks.
The first user of this would be ERR, which currently simulates
thread-local storage using a lock around a hash table keyed by the TID.
(Although I suspect that change will need some CMake work in order that
libpthread is automatically included with libcrypto when linking tests
etc, but not on Windows and without lots of ifs.)
Change-Id: I4dd088e3794506747f875c1f3e92b9bc6700fad2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4010
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MIPS64 confusingly sets __mips__, but it's not a 32-bit platform. This
change updates the defines in base.h to recognise MIPS64 based on both
__mips__ and __LP64__ being defined.
Change-Id: I220f5d9c8f1cd7d3089cc013348e6f95cdee76d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4093
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(system/keymaster is using them now.)
Change-Id: I8fba501005b9318b7d3a76bf1715fb772b23c49d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4092
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
gmtime_s first appeared in MSVCR80, but libmingwex has a helper function
that tries to find the symbol or falls back to an internal
implementation.
(Patch by Kenny Root.)
Change-Id: I96ef9cd7459d7e8202831a4e687dfbc055c9f50b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4091
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MinGW on Linux needs lowercase include files. On Windows this doesn't
matter since the filesystems are case-insensitive, but building
BoringSSL on Linux with MinGW has case-sensitive filesystems.
Change-Id: Id9c120d819071b041341fbb978352812d6d073bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
NEON_FUNCTIONAL is set by default in crypto.c. Chromium calls
|CRYPTO_set_NEON_functional| before |SSL_library_init| and thus the
getauxval path for CPU-feature detection was resetting the functional
flag, even on broken processors.
This change means that, apart from the default, only
|CRYPTO_set_NEON_functional| will change the NEON_FUNCTIONAL flag.
BUG=469511
Change-Id: I3d4dbbd9f4a5e33539f8559f90289e706ad17451
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4170
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This affects bignum and sha. Also now that we're passing the SSE2 flag, revert
the change to ghash-x86.pl which unconditionally sets $sse2, just to minimize
upstream divergence. Chromium assumes SSE2 support, so relying on it is okay.
See https://crbug.com/349320.
Note: this change needs to be mirrored in Chromium to take.
bssl speed numbers:
SSE2:
Did 552 RSA 2048 signing operations in 3007814us (183.5 ops/sec)
Did 19003 RSA 2048 verify operations in 3070779us (6188.3 ops/sec)
Did 72 RSA 4096 signing operations in 3055885us (23.6 ops/sec)
Did 4650 RSA 4096 verify operations in 3024926us (1537.2 ops/sec)
Without SSE2:
Did 350 RSA 2048 signing operations in 3042021us (115.1 ops/sec)
Did 11760 RSA 2048 verify operations in 3003197us (3915.8 ops/sec)
Did 46 RSA 4096 signing operations in 3042692us (15.1 ops/sec)
Did 3400 RSA 4096 verify operations in 3083035us (1102.8 ops/sec)
SSE2:
Did 16407000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 3000141us (5468743.0 ops/sec): 87.5 MB/s
Did 4367000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 3000436us (1455455.1 ops/sec): 372.6 MB/s
Did 185000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 3002666us (61611.9 ops/sec): 504.7 MB/s
Did 9444000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 3000052us (3147945.4 ops/sec): 50.4 MB/s
Did 2283000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 3000457us (760884.1 ops/sec): 194.8 MB/s
Did 89000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 3016024us (29509.0 ops/sec): 241.7 MB/s
Did 5550000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 3000350us (1849784.2 ops/sec): 29.6 MB/s
Did 1820000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 3001039us (606456.6 ops/sec): 155.3 MB/s
Did 93000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 3007874us (30918.8 ops/sec): 253.3 MB/s
Without SSE2:
Did 10573000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 3000261us (3524026.7 ops/sec): 56.4 MB/s
Did 2937000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 3000621us (978797.4 ops/sec): 250.6 MB/s
Did 123000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 3033202us (40551.2 ops/sec): 332.2 MB/s
Did 5846000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 3000294us (1948475.7 ops/sec): 31.2 MB/s
Did 1377000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 3000335us (458948.8 ops/sec): 117.5 MB/s
Did 54000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 3027962us (17833.8 ops/sec): 146.1 MB/s
Did 2075000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 3000967us (691443.8 ops/sec): 11.1 MB/s
Did 638000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 3000576us (212625.8 ops/sec): 54.4 MB/s
Did 30000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 3042797us (9859.3 ops/sec): 80.8 MB/s
BUG=430237
Change-Id: I47d1c1ffcd71afe4f4a192272f8cb92af9505ee1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4130
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- Pull in a trimmed down version of vs_toolchain.py from Chromium.
- Drop in toolchain_vs2013.hash from Chromium to use Chromium's
current toolchain.
- Add a very hacky vs_env.py to pull in Visual Studio. This is
loosely based off a handful of lines of Chromium's
tools/clang/scripts/update.py. This (and vs_toolchain.py) depends
on gyp which is now pulled in via DEPS.
BUG=430237
Change-Id: Ic29cbb15e19a99616cfe778d0778b9a71c45338a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3900
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Partly inspired by the new state exposed in
dc3da93899, stress this codepath by spamming our
poor shim with warning alerts.
Change-Id: I876c6e52911b6eb57493cf3e1782b37ea96d01f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4112
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This exposes the features needed to mimic Chrome's ClientHello, which is useful
in testing. Also use bssl_shim's scopers for SSL objects.
Change-Id: Icb88bb00c0a05c27610134d618f466a24f7f757a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4113
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Google C++ style allows these. It's also considerably less tedious and
error-prone than defining an out-of-line constructor.
Change-Id: Ib76ccf6079be383722433046ac5c5d796dd1f525
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4111
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was failing only on 32-bit for some reason. Part of TestConfig wasn't
getting initialized.
Change-Id: I2a3747a347a47b47e2357f34d32f8db86d6cc629
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4110
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not actually CRYPTO_add_locked, despite the name. I guess they just needed
a name that didn't clash with CRYPTO_add.
Change-Id: I3fdee08bf75e9a4e1b5e75630707c0be5792599b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4102
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Within the library, only ssl_update_cache read them, so add a dedicated field
to replace that use.
The APIs have a handful of uninteresting callers so I've left them in for now,
but they now always return zero.
Change-Id: Ie4e36fd4ab18f9bff544541d042bf3c098a46933
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I'm guessing a previous iteration used dlsym to look up the real malloc.
Change-Id: I18be9ef4db4ed059400074c8507d4e2fea882fbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Quite a few functions reported wrong function names when pushing
to the error stack.
Change-Id: I84d89dbefd2ecdc89ffb09799e673bae17be0e0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4080
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both on the client and the server.
Change-Id: I9892c6dbbb29938154aba4f53b10e8b5231f9c47
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4071
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Align with upstream's renames from a while ago. These names are considerably
more standard. This also aligns with upstream in that both "ECDHE" and "EECDH"
are now accepted in the various cipher string parsing bits.
Change-Id: I84c3daeacf806f79f12bc661c314941828656b04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is really just scar tissue with https://crbug.com/468889 being the real
underlying problem. But the test is pretty easy.
Change-Id: I5eca18fdcbde8665c0e6c3ac419a28152647d66f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A casual grep would suggest this function has the same problems as
CVE-2015-0291, but the structure is memset to 0, so the calls are unnecessary.
Also use BUF_memdup rather than an OPENSSL_malloc + mempcy pair.
Change-Id: Id605374d99cff32e2dccb7f9b8a9da226faf7715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In verifying the fix for CVE-2015-0291, I noticed we don't actually have any
test coverage for full handshakes on renegotiation. All our tests always do
resumptions.
Change-Id: Ia9b701e8a50ba9353fefb8cc4fb86e78065d0b40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4050
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209
(Imported from upstream's 5e5d53d341fd9a9b9cc0a58eb3690832ca7a511f.)
Change-Id: Ic2e5dc5c96e316c55f76bedc6ea55b416be3287a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
(Imported from upstream's e677e8d13595f7b3287f8feef7676feb301b0e8a.)
Change-Id: I5faefc190568504bb5895ed9816a6d80432cfa45
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4048
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 34e3edbf3a10953cb407288101fd56a629af22f9. This fixes
CVE-2015-0291. Also bubble up malloc failures in tls1_set_shared_sigalgs. Tidy
up style a bit and remove unnecessary check (it actually is unnecessary; see
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4042).
Change-Id: Idfb31a90fb3e56ef6fe7701464748a5c1603f064
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4047
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I only imported half of upstream's c5f2b5336ab72e40ab91e2ca85639f51fa3178c6 on
accident.
Change-Id: Ice8185ca6770f915eb859e918f5db7d5ccdc7cc7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4045
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, if SIGILL was received between the signal handler being
installed and before the sigsetjmp, the process would longjmp to a
random location.
Change-Id: I9e6143a17ff3db0e1b00ece68fce161801461010
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3950
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Noticed these as I was poking around.
Change-Id: I93833a152583feced374c9febf7485bec7abc1c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3973
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This too isn't version-specific. This removes the final difference between TLS
and DTLS SSL3_ENC_METHODs and we can fold them together. (We should be able to
fold away the version-specific differences too, but all in due time.)
Change-Id: I6652d3942a0970273d46d28d7052629c81f848b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes test flakiness on Windows.
BUG=467767
Change-Id: Ie69b5b43ddd524aadb15c53705f6ec860e928786
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4001
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Allocate and free ASN.1 string types directly instead of going through
the ASN.1 item code.
(Imported from upstream's 3d6aa6d441fe8124d247dffee5c68c2e5efd8258.)
Change-Id: I617283e67071a792f219ed08f19078afc223e2f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.
This behavior was broken in upstream's
904348a4922333106b613754136305db229475ea, resulting in the opposite time
comparison behavior.
PR#3706
(Imported from upstream's da27006df06853a33b132133699a7aa9d4277920.)
Change-Id: I9c1c28ba21d82ff4b587e33b262f46be4e846ff9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4043
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
(Imported from upstream's 2c3823491d8812560922a58677e3ad2db4b2ec8d.)
Change-Id: I97c7bb306d6f3c18597850db9f08023b2ef74839
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4042
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Td4 is an array of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not
representable in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't
shift into the sign bit of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32
whenever we're shifting left by 24.
(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)
Caught by -fsanitize=shift
Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
(Imported from upstream's 8b37e5c14f0eddb10c7f91ef91004622d90ef361.)
Change-Id: Id0f98d1d65738533c6ddcc3c21bc38b569d74793
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When printing out an ASN.1 structure, if the type is an item template don't
fall through and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
(Imported from upstream's 5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa.)
Change-Id: Ica39757792cbf3f83879953b67838927ddbdb809
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fixed assorted missing return value checks in v3_cpols.c
(Imported from upstream's c5f2b5336ab72e40ab91e2ca85639f51fa3178c6.)
Change-Id: I95e4157fc689201ca32e1c8e51d04801ba478685
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4008
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
(Imported from upstream's 34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00.)
Change-Id: Ia43cdc73b5f1d16e6fc907b5aaf13c9df5a9958c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4007
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
(Imported from upstream's 9e488fd6ab2c295941e91a47ab7bcd346b7540c7)
Change-Id: Icbb13cd00d0ec5529871b678b0bcc465956a7572
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4006
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
(Imported from upstream's 8c5a7b33c6269c3bd6bc0df6b4c22e4fba03b485.)
Change-Id: I0b392991ce8170dc418e93003af256d535d1e2e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
