Use a separate |size_t| variable for all logic that happens after the
special casing of the negative values of the signed parameter, to
minimize the amount of mixed signed/unsigned math used.

Change-Id: I4aeb1ffce47f889f340f9583684910b0fb2ca7c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9173
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

There is a comment "Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
be non-negative". Reorganize the code to make it more clear that that
is actually the case, especially in the case where sLen == -1.

Change-Id: I09a3dd99458e34102c42d8d3a2f22c16c684c673
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9172
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This makes it easier to understand the |sLen|-related logic.

Change-Id: I98da4f4f7c82d5481544940407e6cc6a963f7e5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9171
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

Fix non-standard variable names, return value convention, unsigned vs
size_t, etc. This also fixes one size_t truncation warning.

BUG=22

Change-Id: Ibe083db90e8dac45d64da9ead8f519dd2fea96ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9133
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Partially fixes build with -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations.

Change-Id: I6048f5b7ef31560399b25ed9880156bc7d8abac2
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

Change-Id: I0b5c661674fbcaf6b4d5b0ce7944459cd45606b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7466
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

All the signature algorithm logic depends on X509_ALGOR. This also
removes the X509_ALGOR-based EVP functions which are no longer used
externally. I think those APIs were a mistake on my part. The use in
Chromium was unnecessary (and has since been removed anyway). The new
X.509 stack will want to process the signatureAlgorithm itself to be
able to enforce policies on it.

This also moves the RSA_PSS_PARAMS bits to crypto/x509 from crypto/rsa.
That struct is also tied to crypto/x509. Any new RSA-PSS code would
have to use something else anyway.

BUG=499653

Change-Id: I6c4b4573b2800a2e0f863d35df94d048864b7c41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I7af2c87fe6e7513aa2603d5e845a4db87ab14fcc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7101
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

This check was fixed a while ago, but it could have been much simpler.

In the RSA key exchange, the expected size of the output is known, making the
padding check much simpler. There isn't any use in exporting the more general
RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2. (Without knowing the expected size, any
integrity check or swap to randomness or other mitigation is basically doomed
to fail.)

Verified with the valgrind uninitialized memory trick that we're still
constant-time.

Also update rsa.h to recommend against using the PKCS#1 v1.5 schemes.

Thanks to Ryan Sleevi for the suggestion.

Change-Id: I4328076b1d2e5e06617dd8907cdaa702635c2651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This was a mistake in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611.

Change-Id: Ifb5c52cc7571b6f1ada4af9b46eab1f9b080b4f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Remove the custom copy of those helpers.

Change-Id: I810c3ae8dbf7bc0654d3e9fb9900c425d36f64aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

RSA_PADDING_NONE is actually the important one for RSA_decrypt since OAEP isn't
used much and RSA_PKCS1_PADDING is unsafe to use due to timing constraints.
(The SSL stack uses RSA_PADDING_NONE and does the padding check separately.)

Change-Id: I5f9d168e7c34796a41bf01fc1878022742b63501
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5641
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Much of this was done automatically with
  find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/'
  find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+,  ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/'

BUG=468039

Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Finish up crypto, minus the legacy modules we haven't been touching much.

Change-Id: I0e9e1999a627aed5fb14841f8a2a7d0b68398e85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Everything else.

Change-Id: Iac02b144465b4e7b6d69ea22ff2aaf52695ae732

Including string.h in base.h causes any file that includes a BoringSSL
header to include string.h. Generally this wouldn't be a problem,
although string.h might slow down the compile if it wasn't otherwise
needed. However, it also causes problems for ipsec-tools in Android
because OpenSSL didn't have this behaviour.

This change removes string.h from base.h and, instead, adds it to each
.c file that requires it.

Change-Id: I5968e50b0e230fd3adf9b72dd2836e6f52d6fb37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3200
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

The use in s3_srvr.c doesn't care (it doesn't even have to be in bounds), but
it's good to have the value be initialized and not a function of the input.
(The old uninitialized case wasn't hit in s3_srvr.c because of the earlier
bounds check.)

Change-Id: Ib6b418b3c140aa564f8a46da3d34bb2b69f06195
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

RAND_pseudo_bytes just calls RAND_bytes now and only returns 0 or 1. Switch all
callers within the library call the new one and use the simpler failure check.
This fixes a few error checks that no longer work (< 0) and some missing ones.

Change-Id: Id51c79deec80075949f73fa1fbd7b76aac5570c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This resolves a pile of MSVC warnings in Chromium.

Change-Id: Ib9a29cb88d8ed8ec4118d153260f775be059a803
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I2096f760165f7aaa9b5d922a2e6d4d755365087b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1372
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Caught by clang scan-build.

Change-Id: I133d0338fe38172d687c02099d909366a59ee95b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1343
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Although the PKCS#1 padding check is internally constant-time, it is not
constant time at the crypto/ ssl/ API boundary. Expose a constant-time
RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2 function and integrate it into the
timing-sensitive portion of the RSA key exchange logic.

Change-Id: I6fa64ddc9d65564d05529d9b2985da7650d058c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Due to merging our patched 1.0.1 code with the 1.0.2 code, some parts of
upstream's 25f93585a7 didn't make it into
the code.

https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=397333

Change-Id: Iceb13e63a7ac91474fd39e7faad11fa52c56185d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1310
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

It's unused with SSLv2 gone. Also, being a decryption padding check, it really
should be constant-time and isn't.

Change-Id: I96be02cb50f9bf0229b9174eccd80fa338bf8e3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1254
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

More signed/unsigned issues, and some other missing checks.

Change-Id: Ib64429a609ca2d64b74a4744092aac67ad0af4e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1252
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This change adds a new function, BN_bn2bin_padded, that attempts, as
much as possible, to serialise a BIGNUM in constant time.

This is used to avoid some timing leaks in RSA decryption.

This change alters the processing of invalid, RSA pre-master secrets so
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.

This patch tweaks the OAEP padding check to be slightly more constant
time and rewrites the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check to the same end.

Initial fork from f2d678e6e8 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)