This change will cause getrandom to be used in preference to
/dev/urandom when supported by the kernel.
This will also cause BoringSSL-using processes to block until the
entropy pool is initialised on systems that support getrandom(2).
Change-Id: I2d3a17891502c85884c77138ef0f3a719d7ecfe6
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There only needs to be a single place where we do the generic
initialisation. All the processor-specific implementations can just
return early.
Change-Id: Ifd8a9c3bd7bec1ee8307aaa7bbeb9afe575e8a47
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Previously, gcm.c contained a lot of workarounds for cases where BSWAP8
wasn't defined. Rather than handle this in each place, just make it
always available.
While we're here, make these macros inline functions instead and rename
them to something less likely to collide.
Change-Id: I9f2602f8b9965c63a86b177a8a084afb8b53a253
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CRYPTO_ghash_init exposes the (often hardware accelerated) internals for
evaluating GHASH. These can be used for evaluating POLYVAL[1] on
platforms where we don't have dedicated code for it.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-02#section-3
Change-Id: Ida49ce4911f8657fa384b0bca968daa2ac6b26c1
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The key is only needed during initialisation because after that point it
is implicit in the table of powers. So no need to keep it around. There
was a non-specific “haunted house” comment about not changing this, but
I've successfully tested with all the assembly versions so I think that
comment is no longer true.
Change-Id: Id110156afb528904f114d9a4ff2440e03a1a69b8
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The GCM code has lots of cases of big-endian support left over from
OpenSSL. Since we don't support big-endian systems, drop that code.
Change-Id: I28eb95a9c235c6f705a145fbea72e7569dad2c70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12476
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j and md_size are public values, so this can just be done directly. (If
they weren't, we'd have worse problems.) This makes the loop look the
same as the rotation loop below.
Change-Id: Ic75550ad4e40b2015668cb12c26ca2d20bd285b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12474
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Some declarations can be moved closer to use, etc.
Change-Id: Ifa9a51ad77639b94020b15478af234c82466390f
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Although we ignore all but the first identity, keep clients honest by
parsing the whole thing. Also explicitly check that the binder and
identity counts match.
Change-Id: Ib9c4caae18398360f3b80f8db1b22d4549bd5746
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BUG=101
Change-Id: Ia1edbccee535b0bc3a0e18465286d5bcca240035
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This change imports sha256-armv4.pl from upstream at rev 8d1ebff4. This
includes changes to remove the use of adrl, which is not supported by
Clang.
Change-Id: I429e7051d63b59acad21601e40883fc3bd8dd2f5
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This code wants something which can represent -128..127 or so, not
something about characters.
Change-Id: Icdbfec370317a5e03803939a3b8d1555f8efff1d
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clang-format mangled this a little.
Change-Id: Ic4d8de0e1f6e926efbe8d14e390fe874b4a7cdcb
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The compiler should be plenty smart enough to decide whether to inline a
static function called only once. We don't need to resort to so
unreadable a ternary chain.
Change-Id: Iacc8e0c4147fc69008806a0cc36d9e632169601a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12466
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Change-Id: I3350ff0e4ffe7495a83211b89c675a0125fb2f06
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EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT makes more sense than
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT here.
Change-Id: I0dbdc91bab59843d5c04f2d0e97600fe7644753e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12464
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If y is zero, there is no point with odd y, so the odd bit may not be
set, hence EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT. This code instead computed the
Kronecker symbol of x and changed the error code to
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT if not a square.
As the comment says, this was (intended to be) unreachable. But it
seems x was a typo for tmp1. It dates to before upstream's
6fb60a84dd1ec81953917e0444dab50186617432, when BN_mod_sqrt gave
garbage if its input was not square. Now it emits BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE.
Upstream's 48fe4d6233 then mapped
BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE to EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT.
Change-Id: Id9e02fa1c154b61cc0c3a768c9cfe6bd9674c378
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12463
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Zero only has one allowed square root, not two.
Change-Id: I1dbd2137a7011d2f327b271b267099771e5499c3
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This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
Change-Id: Ib8a1fe185224ff02ed4ce53a0109e60d934e96b3
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This prevents a compiler warning from breaking ppc64le build.
Change-Id: I6752109bd02c6d078e656f89327093f8fb13a125
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12363
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This change contains a C implementation of SHA-1 for POWER using
AltiVec. It is almost as fast as the scalar-only assembly implementation
for POWER/POWERPC family in OpenSSL but it is easier to maintain and it
allows error checking with tools like ASAN.
This is tested only for ppc64le. It may nor may not work for other
platforms in the POWER/POWERPC familiy.
Before:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~30 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~140 MB/s
After:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~70 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~480 MB/s
Change-Id: I790352e86d9c0cc4e1e57d11c5a0aa5b0780ca6b
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Otherwise the run_tests target sometimes gets confused.
Change-Id: If49e945bf5137c68db4927ab0f9845d25be63bac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12315
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A BN_ULONG[P256_LIMBS] can't represent a negative number and
bn_set_words won't produce one. We only need to compare against P.
Change-Id: I7bd1c9e8c162751637459f23f3cfc56884d85864
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RT#4625
(Imported from upstream's e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf.)
Add a test in ec_test to cover the ecp_nistz256_points_mul change. Also
revise the low-level infinity tests to cover the changes in
ecp_nistz256_point_add. Upstream's 'infty' logic was also cleaned up to
be simpler and take advantage of the only cases where |p| is infinity.
Change-Id: Ie22de834bf79ecb6191e824ad9fc1bd6f9681b8b
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As a client, we must tolerate this to avoid interoperability failures
with allowed server behaviors.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I9c40a2a048282e2e63ab5ee1d40773fc2eda110a
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We were using a fully-qualified name for nearly everything anyway.
Change-Id: Ia32c68975ed4126feeab7b420f12b726ad6b89b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12226
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The other field operations have an explicit _mont suffix to denote their
inputs and outputs are in the Montgomery domain, aside from
ecp_nistz256_neg which works either way. Do the same here.
Change-Id: I63741adaeba8140e29fb0b45dff72273e231add7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12224
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The file is util-64.c in BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I51891103254ae1541ea4c30f92c41d5d47c2ba55
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For the most part, this is with random test data which isn't
particularly good. But we'll be able to add more interesting test
vectors as they come up.
Change-Id: I9c50db7ac2c4bf978d4901000ab32e3642aea82b
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Change-Id: I0e1d79e85a2d20ab4105b81d39cdbbd692ba67da
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We don't support big-endian so this could only slow down whatever
platforms weren't listed in the #if.
Change-Id: Ie36f862663d947f591dd4896e6a2ab19122bbc0d
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The Poly1305 state defined in the header file is just a 512-byte buffer.
The vector code aligns to 64 bytes but the non-vector code did not.
Since we have lots of space to spare, this change causes the non-vector
code to also align to 64 bytes.
Change-Id: I77e26616a709e770d6eb23df47d9e292742625d7
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Some old assemblers can't cope with r0 in address. It's actually
sensible thing to do, because r0 is shunted to 0 in address arithmetic
and by refusing r0 assembler effectively makes you understand that.
(Imported from upstream's a54aba531327285f64cf13a909bc129e9f9d5970.)
This also pulls in a trailing whitespace fix from upstream's
609b0852e4.
Change-Id: Ieec0bc8d24b98f86ce4fc9ee6ce5126d127cf452
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12188
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The ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj() function leaks an ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
object on an error path.
(Imported from upstream's fe71bb3ad97ed01ccf92812891cc2bc3ef3dce76.)
Thanks to Jinguang Dong for pointing out the bug.
Change-Id: I2c14662bb03b0cf957bd277bda487f05f07e89e7
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(Imported from upstream's 2a7dd548a6 and
9ebcbbba81eba52282df9ad8902f047e2d501f51.)
This is only in the ADX assembly codepath which we do not enable. See
$addx = 0 at the top of the file. Nonetheless, import the test vector
and fix since we still have the code in there.
Upstream's test vector only compares a*b against b*a. The expected
answer was computed using Python.
Change-Id: I3a21093978c5946d83f2d6f4f8399f69d78202cf
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Fuzzer mode explores the handshake, but at the cost of losing coverage
on the record layer. Add a separate build flag and client/server
corpora for this mode.
Note this requires tweaks in consumers' fuzzer build definitions.
BUG=111
Change-Id: I1026dc7301645e165a761068a1daad6eedc9271e
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In https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/11920/2, I addressed a
number of comments but then forgot to upload the change before
submitting it. This change contains the changes that should have been
included in that commit.
Change-Id: Ib70548e791f80abf07a734e071428de8ebedb907
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This function allows callers to unpack an Ed25519 “seed” value, which is
a 32 byte value that contains sufficient information to build a public
and private key from.
Change-Id: Ie5d8212a73e5710306314b4f8a93b707665870fd
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The naming breaks layering, but it seems we're stuck with it. We don't
seem to have bothered making first-party code call it BIO_print_errors
(I found no callers of BIO_print_errors), so let's just leave it at
ERR_print_errors.
Change-Id: Iddc22a6afc2c61d4b94ac555be95079e0f477171
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Change-Id: I87cbc12aeb399646c6426b7a099dbf13aafc2532
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d2i_X509_from_buffer parses an |X509| from a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| but ensures
that the |X509_CINF.enc| doesn't make a copy of the encoded
TBSCertificate. Rather the |X509| holds a reference to the given
|CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
Change-Id: I38a4e3d0ca69fc0fd0ef3e15b53181844080fcad
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Change-Id: I0aab9c94fcfa58b9cd46eaf716d9317f532f79a2
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Adam Langley
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Steven Valdez
Doug Kwan
Jinguang Dong
Ladar Levison