Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11581
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11080
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This gives us a sigalg-based API for configuring signing algorithms.
Change-Id: Ib746a56ebd1061eadd2620cdb140d5171b59bc02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
[Rebased and tests added by davidben.]
In doing so, regenerate the test RSA certificate to be 2048-bit RSA.
RSA-PSS with SHA-512 is actually too large for 1024-bit RSA. Also make
the sigalg test loop test versions that do and don't work which subsumes
the ecdsa_sha1 TLS 1.3 test.
For now, RSA-PKCS1 is still allowed because NSS has yet to implement
RSA-PSS and we'd like to avoid complicated interop testing.
Change-Id: I686b003ef7042ff757bdaab8d5838b7a4d6edd87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8613
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I'd meant to change the other -latest to -13 when I merged this, but we
may as well group the two together anyway. Also remove ticket_age as
that's likely to go away in PR#503.
Change-Id: Ibb2f447e344d0b13c937291de69ace37ac9a5e8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8567
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The signing logic itself still depends on pre-hashed messages and will be fixed
in later commits.
Change-Id: I901b0d99917c311653d44efa34a044bbb9f11e57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8545
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Code search confirms they're never used externally either.
Change-Id: Id90bc15e18555dcfd757b318ab7e2d3ca7c31661
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8540
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
As part of the SignatureAlgorithm change in the TLS 1.3 specification,
the existing signature/hash combinations are replaced with a combined
signature algorithm identifier. This change maintains the existing APIs
while fixing the internal representations. The signing code currently
still treats the SignatureAlgorithm as a decomposed value, which will be
fixed as part of a separate CL.
Change-Id: I0cd1660d74ad9bcf55ce5da4449bf2922660be36
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8480
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is easier to deploy, and more obvious. This commit reverts a few
pieces of e25775bc, but keeps most of it.
Change-Id: If8d657a4221c665349c06041bb12fffca1527a2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The 'elliptic_curves' extension is being renamed to 'supported_groups'
in the TLS 1.3 draft, and most of the curve-specific methods are
generalized to groups/group IDs.
Change-Id: Icd1a1cf7365c8a4a64ae601993dc4273802610fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7955
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Only ECDHE-based ciphers are implemented. To ease the transition, the
pre-standard cipher shares a name with the standard one. The cipher rule parser
is hacked up to match the name to both ciphers. From the perspective of the
cipher suite configuration language, there is only one cipher.
This does mean it is impossible to disable the old variant without a code
change, but this situation will be very short-lived, so this is fine.
Also take this opportunity to make the CK and TXT names align with convention.
Change-Id: Ie819819c55bce8ff58e533f1dbc8bef5af955c21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
QUIC code references the TXT macro. Also get rid of
TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 which wasn't renamed for some reason.
Change-Id: I0308e07104b3cec394d748f3f1146bd786d2ace2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
WebRTC can't roll into Chromium without picking up the iOS build fix, but we
can't roll BoringSSL forwards because WebRTC also depends on the previously
exposed ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite constants.
Define the old constants again.
Change-Id: If8434a0317e42b3aebe1bc1c5a58ed97a89a0230
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6382
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change reduces unnecessary copying and makes the pre-RFC-7539
nonces 96 bits just like the AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and RFC 7539
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. Also, all the symbols related to
the pre-RFC-7539 cipher suites now have "_OLD" appended, in
preparation for adding the RFC 7539 variants.
Change-Id: I1f85bd825b383c3134df0b6214266069ded029ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Now tls1.h is just a pile of protocol constants with no more circular
dependency problem.
I've preserved SSL_get_servername's behavior where it's simultaneously a
lookup of handshake state and local configuration. I've removed it from
SSL_get_servername_type. It got the logic wrong anyway with the order of
the s->session check.
(Searching through code, neither is used on the client, but the
SSL_get_servername one is easy.)
Change-Id: I61bb8fb0858b07d76a7835bffa6dc793812fb027
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6298
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)
Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.
Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This also removes support for the “old” Channel ID extension.
Change-Id: I1168efb9365c274db6b9d7e32013336e4404ff54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5462
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are new as of 1.0.2, not terribly useful of APIs, and are the only
reason we have to retain so many NIDs in the TLS_SIGALGS structure.
Change-Id: I7237becca09acc2ec2be441ca17364f062253893
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5347
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Having them spread between ssl.h and tls1.h isn't terribly enlightening.
Change-Id: I5fec4b8e5260312b22bcef21bd4db7a8a8149ad8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5234
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If we're going to have PSK and use standard cipher suites, this might be
the best that we can do for the moment.
Change-Id: I35d9831b2991dc5b23c9e24d98cdc0db95919d39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the best PSK cipher suite, but it's non-standard and nobody is
using it. Trivial to bring back in the future if we have need of it.
Change-Id: Ie78790f102027c67d1c9b19994bfb10a2095ba92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5051
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Nothing ever uses those structs. This to avoid having any structs in the
public header which use struct timeval.
In doing so, move the protocol version constants up to ssl.h so dtls1.h
may be empty. This also removes TLS1_get_version and TLS1_get_client_version
as they're unused and depend on TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR. This still lets tls1.h
be included independently from ssl.h (though I don't think anyone ever includes
it...).
Change-Id: Ieac8b90cf94f7f1e742a88bb75c0ee0aa4b1414c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Document them while I'm here. This adds a new 'preprocessor
compatibility section' to avoid breaking #ifdefs. The CTRL values
themselves are defined to 'doesnt_exist' to catch anything calling
SSL_ctrl directly until that function can be unexported completely.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: Ia157490ea8efe0215d4079556a0c7643273e7601
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4553
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Probably we'll want some simpler server-side API later. But, as things
stand, all consumers of these functions are #ifdef'd out and have to be
because the requisite OCSP_RESPONSE types are gone.
Change-Id: Ic82b2ab3feca14c56656da3ceb3651819e3eb377
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's unused, but for some old #ifdef branch in wpa_supplicant's EAP-FAST
hack, before SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb existed.
Change-Id: Ifc11fea2f6434354f756e04e5fc3ed5f1692025e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
“ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256” doesn't follow the standard naming
for OpenSSL: it was “-WITH-” in it and has a hyphen between “AES” and
“128”. This change fixes that.
Change-Id: I7465b1ec83e7d5b9a60d8ca589808aeee10c174e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4601
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix up the variable names. Also avoid the messy logic of checking whether the
label and context collide with the normal key expansion ones in the face of
adverserial inputs. Make that the caller's responsibility, just as it's already
the caller's responsibility to ensure that different calls don't overlap. (The
label should be a constant string in an IANA registry anyway.)
Change-Id: I062fadb7b6a18fa946b883be660ea9b3f0f6277c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4216
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some code predated the RFCs themselves, but the RFCs now exist. Also remove
now obsolete comments and some unused #defines.
See upstream's cffeacd91e. (Though this predates
it; I just remembered I never uploaded it.)
Change-Id: I5e56f0ab6b7f558820f72e84dfdbc71a8c23cb91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2475
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is only used for EAP-FAST which we apparently don't need to support.
Remove it outright. We broke it in 9eaeef81fa by
failing to account for session misses.
If this changes and we need it later, we can resurrect it. Preferably
implemented differently: the current implementation is bolted badly onto the
handshake. Ideally use the supplied callbacks to fabricate an appropriate
SSL_SESSION and resume that with as much of the normal session ticket flow as
possible.
The one difference is that EAP-FAST seems to require the probing mechanism for
session tickets rather than the sane session ID echoing version. We can
reimplement that by asking the record layer to probe ahead for one byte.
Change-Id: I38304953cc36b2020611556a91e8ac091691edac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2360
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both of these are newly-exported in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so they cannot be used by
current consumers.
This was added in upstream's 18d7158809 to
support custom selection of certificates. The intent seems to be that you
listen to cert_cb and use SSL_check_chain to lean on OpenSSL to process
signature algorithms list for you.
Unfortunately, the implementation is slightly suspect: it uses the same
function as the codepath which mutates and refers to the CERT_PKEY of the
matching type. Some access was guarded by check_flags, but this is too
complex. Part of it is also because the matching digest is selected early and
we intend to connect this to EVP_PKEY_supports_digest so it is no longer a
property of just the key type.
Let's remove the hook for now, to unblock removing a lot of complexity. After
cleaning up this area, a function like this could be cleaner to support, but
we already have a version of this: select_certificate_cb and
ssl_early_callback_ctx.
Change-Id: I3add425b3996e5e32d4a88e14cc607b4fdaa5aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the
SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no
responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on
the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session
resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume.
Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted
in the future if we implement RFC 6961.
Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get all this stuff out of the way.
- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA
Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)
Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Matthew Braithwaite
Steven Valdez
David Benjamin
David Benjamin
Brian Smith
Adam Langley
Adam Langley