It's conditioned in OpenSSL on client offer, not server accept.
Change-Id: Iae5483a33d9365258446ce0ae34132aeb4a92c66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28545
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is so Chromium can verify the session before offering it, rather
than doing it after the handshake (at which point it's too late to punt
the session) as we do today. This should, in turn, allow us to finally
verify certificates off a callback and order it correctly relative to
CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3.
(It will also order "correctly" in TLS 1.2, but this is useless. TLS 1.2
does not bind the CertificateRequest to the certificate at the point the
client needs to act on it.)
Bug: chromium:347402
Change-Id: I0daac2868c97b820aead6c3a7e4dc30d8ba44dc4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28405
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Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
Change-Id: I2f99711783456bfb7324e9ad972510be8a95e845
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28404
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Callers should not mutate these.
Update-Note: I believe I've fixed up everything. If I missed one, the
fix should be straightforward.
Change-Id: Ifbce4961204822f57502a0de33aaa5a2a08b026d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28266
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Update-Note: Enabling TLS 1.3 now enables both draft-23 and draft-28
by default, in preparation for cycling all to draft-28.
Change-Id: I9405f39081f2e5f7049aaae8a9c85399f21df047
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28304
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Hopefully this is the last of it before we can hide the struct. We're
missing peer_sha256 accessors, and some test wants to mutate the ticket
in a test client.
Change-Id: I1a30fcc0a1e866d42acbc07a776014c9257f7c86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28268
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gRPC builds on Debian Jessie, which has GCC 4.9.2, and builds with
-Wtype-limits, which makes it warn about code intended for 64-bit
systems when building on 32-bit systems.
We have tried to avoid these issues with Clang previously by guarding
with “sizeof(size_t) > 4”, but this version of GCC isn't smart enough to
figure that out.
Change-Id: I800ceb3891436fa7c81474ede4b8656021568357
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28247
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We forgot to do this in our original implementation on general ecosystem
grounds. It's also mandated starting draft-26.
Just to avoid unnecessary turbulence, since draft-23 is doomed to die
anyway, condition this on our draft-28 implementation. (We don't support
24 through 27.)
We'd actually checked this already on the Go side, but the spec wants a
different alert.
Change-Id: I0014cda03d7129df0b48de077e45f8ae9fd16976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28124
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This is done by adding two new tagged data types to the shim's
transcript: one for the serialized handoff, and another for the
serialized handback.
Then, the handshake driver in |TLSFuzzer| is modified to be able to
drive a handoff+handback sequence in the same way as was done for
testing: by swapping |BIO|s into additional |SSL| objects. (If a
particular transcript does not contain a serialized handoff, this is a
no-op.)
Change-Id: Iab23e4dc27959ffd3d444adc41d40a4274e83653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27204
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Found by fuzzing.
Change-Id: I831f7869b16486eef7ac887ee199450e38461086
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28044
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Along the way, check the version against the cipher to make sure the
combination is possible.
(Found by fuzzing: a bad version trips an assert.)
Change-Id: Ib0a284fd5fd9b7ba5ceba63aa6224966282a2cb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27265
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(It complains that the comparison is always false with NDK r17 beta 2.)
Change-Id: I6b695fd0e86047f0c1e4267290e63db3184a958a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28025
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https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944 inadvertently caused
SHA256 and SHA384 aliases to be rejected in
SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list. While this is the desired end state, in
case the removal needs to be reverted, we should probably defer this to
post-removal cleanup.
Otherwise we might update someone's "ALL:!SHA256" cipher string to
account for the removal, and then revert the removal underneath them.
Change-Id: Id516a27a2ecefb5871485d0ae18067b5bbb536bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28004
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are also not needed after the handshake.
Change-Id: I5de2d5cf18a3783a6c04c0a8fe311069fb51b939
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27986
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The TLS 1.3 client logic used ctx instead. This is all moot as
SSL_set_SSL_CTX on a client really wouldn't work, but we should be
consistent. Unfortunately, this moves moving the pointer back to SSL
from SSL_CONFIG.
Change-Id: I45f8241e16f499ad416afd5eceb52dc82af9c4f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27985
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All CBC ciphers in TLS are broken and insecure. TLS 1.2 introduced
AEAD-based ciphers which avoid their many problems. It also introduced
new CBC ciphers based on HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 that share the same
flaws as the original HMAC-SHA1 ones. These serve no purpose. Old
clients don't support them, they have the highest overhead of all TLS
ciphers, and new clients can use AEADs anyway.
Remove them from libssl. This is the smaller, more easily reverted
portion of the removal. If it survives a week or so, we can unwind a lot
more code elsewhere in libcrypto. This removal will allow us to clear
some indirect calls from crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c, aligning with
the recommendations here:
https://github.com/HACS-workshop/spectre-mitigations/blob/master/crypto_guidelines.md#2-avoid-indirect-branches-in-constant-time-code
Update-Note: The following cipher suites are removed:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Change-Id: I7ade0fc1fa2464626560d156659893899aab6f77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chrome needs to support renegotiation at TLS 1.2 + HTTP/1.1, but we're
free to shed the handshake configuration at TLS 1.3 or HTTP/2.
Rather than making config shedding implicitly disable renegotiation,
make the actual shedding dependent on a combination of the two settings.
If config shedding is enabled, but so is renegotiation (including
whether we are a client, etc.), leave the config around. If the
renegotiation setting gets disabled again after the handshake,
re-evaluate and shed the config then.
Bug: 123
Change-Id: Ie833f413b3f15b8f0ede617991e3fef239d4a323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27904
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|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
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This is prefactoring for a coming change to the shim that will write
handoff and handback messages (which are serialized SSLConnection
objects) to the transcript.
This breaks the slightly tenuous ordering between the runner and the
shim. Fix the runner to wait until the shim has exited before
appending the transcript.
Change-Id: Iae34d28ec1addfe3ec4f3c77008248fe5530687c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27184
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Chromium has some code which reaches into this field for memory
accounting.
This fixes a bug in doc.go where this line-wrapping confuses it. doc.go
needs a bit of a rewrite, but this is a bit better.
Change-Id: Ic9cc2c2fe9329d7bc366ccf91e0c9a92eae08ed2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27764
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I don't think this lock is actually needed. If the process exited by the
time we call shim.Process.Kill(), then the test ultimately finished. If
not, wait() will return that the process died by a signal.
Change-Id: I668a86583aba16fd00e0cd05071acc13059a2c42
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27325
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
After e325c3f4712b23de688d2eea7d7549b65a610605, this typo bites and
causes SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs to return an empty stack.
Change-Id: I6aa7093d1ca4f3ba0f520a644b14de5b3a3ccaa6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27604
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This schism came up in passing again, and I realized we never added a
TLS-level test for this. Fix that.
Change-Id: I10f910bb5a975d6b3b73d99e7412ade35654fddb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27224
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This too is connection-level state to be reset on SSL_clear.
Change-Id: I071c9431c28a7d0ff3eb20c679784d4aa4c236a5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27490
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Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
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It's hard to diagnose "20".
Change-Id: I57e8d0fb6e4937ddeca45b3645463ca0dc872ea6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27487
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This reflects the change to add the key type into the constant. The old
constants are left around for now as legacy aliases and will be removed
later.
Change-Id: I67f1b50c01fbe0ebf4a2e9e89d3e7d5ed5f5a9d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27486
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Update-Note: I believe everything relying on this overload has since
been updated.
Change-Id: I7facf59cde56098e5e3c79470293b67abb715f4c
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These are connection state, so they should be reset on SSL_clear.
Change-Id: I861fe52578836615d2719c9e1ff0911c798f336e
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Conscrypt need this function right now. They ought to be fixed up to not
need this but, in the meantime, this API is also provided by OpenSSL and
will clear one most consumer reaching into SSL_SESSION.
Bumping the API since Conscrypt often involves multi-sided stuff.
Change-Id: I665ca6b6a17ef479133c29c23fc639f278128c69
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In the handoff+handback case, bssl_shim.cc creates 3 |SSL| objects:
one to receive the ClientHello, one to receive the handoff, and a
third one to receive the handback.
Before 56986f9, only the first of these received any configuration.
Since that commit, all 3 of them receive the same configuration. That
means that the handback message no longer needs to serialize as many
things.
N.B. even before 56986f9, not all of the fields were necessary. For
example, there was no reason to serialize |conf_max_version| and
|conf_min_version| in the handback, so far as I can tell.
This commit is mechanical: it simply removes everything that doesn't
cause any tests to fail. In the long run, I'll need to carefully
check for two possibilities:
- Knobs that affect the handshake after the server's first message it
sent. These are troublesome because that portion of the handshake
may run on a different |SSL|, depending on whether the handback is
early or late.
- Getters that may be called post-handshake, and that callers may
reasonably expect to reflect the value that was used during
handshake.
(I'm not sure that either case exists!)
Change-Id: Ibf6e0be6609ad6e83ab50e69199e9b2d51e59a87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27364
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(Found by fuzzing: a zero value causes an infinite loop.)
Change-Id: I984fd88d85fb87616b5e806795c10334f4379744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27345
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The last-minute TLS 1.3 change was done partly for consistency with DTLS
1.3, where authenticating the record header is less obviously pointless
than in TLS. There, reconstructing it would be messy. Instead, pass in
the record header and let SSLAEADContext decide whether or not to
assemble its own.
(While I'm here, reorder all the flags so the AD and nonce ones are
grouped together.)
Change-Id: I06e65d526b21a08019e5ca6f1b7c7e0e579e7760
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Change-Id: I7298c878bd2c8187dbd25903e397e8f0c2575aa4
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This changes the contract for split handshakes such that on the
receiving side, the connection is to be driven until it returns
|SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK|, rather than until SSL_do_handshake() returns
success.
Change-Id: Idd1ebfbd943d88474d7c934f4c0ae757ff3c0f37
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NSS only enables compatibility mode on the server if the client
requested it by way of the session ID. This is slightly off as a client
has no way not to request it when offering a TLS 1.2 session, but it is
in the spec.
So our tests are usable for other stacks, send a fake session ID in the
runner by default. The existing EmptySessionID-TLS13* test asserts that
BoringSSL behaves as we expect it to on empty session IDs too. The
intent is that NSS will disable that test but can otherwise leave the
rest enabled.
Change-Id: I370bf90aba1805c2f6970ceee0d29ecf199f437d
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It has now been folded into ServerHello. Additionally, TLS 1.2 and TLS
1.3 ServerHellos are now more uniform, so we can avoid the extra
ServerHello parser.
Change-Id: I46641128c3f65fe37e7effca5bef4a76bf3ba84c
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Checking |initial_handshake_complete| was a mistake—it's not true for
False Start connections at the time when Chrome wants to measure whether
PQ padding was used or not.
Change-Id: I51757e00f3e02129666ee1ce31c30d63f1bcbe74
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26444
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On reflection, I think we'll need to note whether dummy PQ padding was
echoed on a given connection. Otherwise measurements in Chrome will be
mixed with cases where people have MITM proxies that ignored the
extension, or possibly Google frontends that haven't been updated.
Therefore this change will be used to filter latency measurements in
Chrome to only include those where the extension was echoed and we'll
measure at levels of 1 byte (for control), 400 bytes, and 1100 bytes.
This also makes it an error if the server didn't echo an extension of
the same length as was sent.
Change-Id: Ib2a0b29cfb8719a75a28f3cf96710c57d88eaa68
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In this round, Google servers will echo the extension in order to test
the latency of both parties sending a PQ key-agreement message.
The extension is sent (and echoed) for both full and resumption
handshakes. This is intended to mirror the overhead of TLS 1.3 (even
when using TLS 1.2), as a resumption in TLS 1.3 still does a fresh key
agreement.
Change-Id: I9ad163afac4fd1d916f9c7359ec32994e283abeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26185
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
SSLv3_method, SSLv3_client_method, and SSLv3_server_method produce
SSL_CTXs which fail every handshake. They appear no longer necessary for
compatibility, so remove them.
SSLv3 is still accessible to callers who explicitly re-enable SSLv3 on a
TLS_method, but that will be removed completely later this year.
Meanwhile, clear out a weird hack we had here.
Update-Note: I believe there are no more callers of these functions. Any
that were were already non-functional as these methods haven't been
unable to handshake for a while now.
Change-Id: I622f785b428ab0ceab77b5a9db05b2b0df28145a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26004
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We don't advertise compressed coordinates (and point format negotiation
was deprecated in TLS 1.3), so reject them. Both Internet Explorer and
Firefox appear to reject them already.
Later I hope to add an easier to use ECDH API that acts on bytes, not
EC_POINT. This clears the way for that API to only accept uncompressed
coordinates. Compressed coordinates never got deployed over NIST curves,
for better or worse. At this point, there is no sense in changing that
as new protocols should use curve25519.
Change-Id: Id2f1be791ddcf155d596f4eb0b79351766c5cdab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The private key callback may not push one of its own (it's possible to
register a custom error library and whatnot, but this is tedious). If
the callback does not push any, we report SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. This is not
completely wrong, as "syscall" really means "I don't know, something you
gave me, probably the BIO, failed so I assume you know what happened",
but most callers just check errno. And indeed cert_cb pushes its own
error, so this probably should as well.
Update-Note: Custom private key callbacks which push an error code on
failure will report both that error followed by
SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED. Callbacks which did not push any
error will switch from SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL to SSL_ERROR_SSL with
SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED.
Change-Id: I7e90cd327fe0cbcff395470381a3591364a82c74
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25544
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Steven Valdez
Adam Langley
Matthew Braithwaite