Commit Graph

31 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Adam Langley
2e839244b0 Remove old ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.

This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.

BUG=chromium:682816

Change-Id: I2345d6db83441691fe0c1ab6d7c6da4d24777849
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13203
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-01-19 23:27:54 +00:00
Adam Langley
5322010405 Revert "Remove old ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD."
This reverts commit def9b46801.

(I should have uploaded a new version before sending to the commit queue.)

Change-Id: Iaead89c8d7fc1f56e6294d869db9238b467f520a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13202
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-01-19 23:07:06 +00:00
Adam Langley
def9b46801 Remove old ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.

This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.

Change-Id: Icd9c2117c657f3aa6df55990c618d562194ef0e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13201
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-01-19 22:54:50 +00:00
Matthew Braithwaite
651aaefb44 Remove CECPQ1 (experimental post-quantum key agreement).
Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-12-09 19:16:56 +00:00
Steven Valdez
a833c357ed Update to TLS 1.3 draft 18.
This is the squash of the following CLs:
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12021/9
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12022/9
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12107/19
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12141/22
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12181/33

The Go portions were written by Nick Harper

BUG=112

Change-Id: I375a1fcead493ec3e0282e231ccc8d7c4dde5063
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12300
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-11-15 06:57:21 +00:00
Steven Valdez
803c77a681 Update crypto negotation to draft 15.
BUG=77

Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-10-06 14:37:09 +00:00
Nick Harper
0b3625bcfd Add support for TLS 1.3 PSK resumption in Go.
Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8991
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-08-02 19:37:07 +00:00
David Benjamin
4528e2b477 Take DHE ciphers out of 1.3 in Go.
We have no intention of implementing FFDHE and the DHE ciphers currently
don't work in the 1.3 handshake anyway. Cipher suite negotiation is to
be refactored in the spec so these cipher values won't be used for FFDHE
anyway.

Change-Id: I51547761d70a397dc3dd0391b71db98189f1a844
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8874
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-07-27 22:37:02 +00:00
Nick Harper
b41d2e41b1 Implement basic TLS 1.3 client handshake in Go.
[Originally written by nharper and then revised by davidben.]

Most features are missing, but it works for a start. To avoid breaking
the fake TLS 1.3 tests while the C code is still not landed, all the
logic is gated on a global boolean. When the C code gets in, we'll
set it to true and remove this boolean.

Change-Id: I6b3a369890864c26203fc9cda37c8250024ce91b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8601
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-07-07 23:28:27 +00:00
Nick Harper
60edffd2a5 Change SignatureAndHashAlgorithm to SignatureScheme in Go.
TLS 1.3 defines a new SignatureScheme uint16 enum that is backwards
compatible on the wire with TLS1.2's SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. This
change updates the go testing code to use a single signatureAlgorithm
enum (instead of 2 separate signature and hash enums) in preparation for
TLS 1.3. It also unifies all the signing around this new scheme,
effectively backporting the change to TLS 1.2.

For now, it does not distinguish signature algorithms between 1.2 and
1.3 (RSA-PSS instead of RSA-PKCS1, ECDSA must match curve types). When
the C code is ready make a similar change, the Go code will be updated
to match.

[Originally written by nharper, tweaked significantly by davidben.]

Change-Id: If9a315c4670755089ac061e4ec254ef3457a00de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8450
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-07-06 20:19:07 +00:00
Nick Harper
1fd39d84cf Add TLS 1.3 record layer to go implementation.
This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.

Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-06-21 21:43:40 +00:00
Steven Valdez
3084e7b87d Adding ECDHE-PSK GCM Ciphersuites.
Change-Id: Iecf534ca0ebdcf34dbf4f922f5000c096a266862
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8101
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-06-02 21:27:16 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite
053931e74e CECPQ1: change from named curve to ciphersuite.
This is easier to deploy, and more obvious.  This commit reverts a few
pieces of e25775bc, but keeps most of it.

Change-Id: If8d657a4221c665349c06041bb12fffca1527a2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-26 19:42:35 +00:00
David Benjamin
37489902ba Implement draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04 in Go.
This will be used to test the C implementation against.

Change-Id: I2d396d27630937ea610144e381518eae76f78dab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:33:54 +00:00
David Benjamin
e3203923b5 Rename the Go ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation.
In preparation for implementing the RFC 7539 variant to test against.

Change-Id: I0ce5e856906e00925ad1d849017f9e7fda087a8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6683
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:24:00 +00:00
Adam Langley
dc7e9c4043 Make the runner tests a go “test”
This change makes the runner tests (in ssl/test/runner) act like a
normal Go test rather than being a Go binary. This better aligns with
some internal tools.

Thus, from this point onwards, one has to run the runner tests with `go
test` rather than `go run` or `go build && ./runner`.

This will break the bots.

Change-Id: Idd72c31e8e0c2b7ed9939dacd3b801dbd31710dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6009
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 17:10:45 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite
af096751e8 Restore the NULL-SHA ciphersuite. (Alas.)
Change-Id: Ia5398f3b86a13fb20dba053f730b51a0e57b9aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5791
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 22:18:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
f2aa1e1a71 Remove Go implementation of non-standard ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
The BoringSSL implementation was removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5051. No need to have the runner half
around.

Change-Id: I49857f4d01be161df89fb7df93a83240b6a8cb02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:43 +00:00
David Benjamin
ec4353498c Remove DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)

Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.

Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:25 +00:00
Adam Langley
5021b223d8 Convert the renegotiation extension to the new system.
This change also switches the behaviour of the client. Previously the
client would send the SCSV rather than the extension, but now it'll only
do that for SSLv3 connections.

Change-Id: I67a04b8abbef2234747c0dac450458deb6b0cd0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5143
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-07-01 19:30:53 +00:00
Adam Langley
85bc5601ee Add ECDHE-PSK-AES{128,256}-SHA cipher suites.
If we're going to have PSK and use standard cipher suites, this might be
the best that we can do for the moment.

Change-Id: I35d9831b2991dc5b23c9e24d98cdc0db95919d39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-09 18:10:42 +00:00
David Benjamin
e9a80ff8ce Add tests for CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphers.
This drops in a copy of a subset of golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305 to implement
Poly1305. Hopefully this will keep them from regression as we rework the record
layer.

Change-Id: Ic1e0d941a0a9e5ec260151ced8acdf9215c4b887
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4257
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-04-08 20:47:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
a3e894921e Test that we reject RSA ServerKeyExchange more thoroughly.
The old test just sent an empty ServerKeyExchange which is sufficient as we
reject the message early. But be more thorough and implement the actual
ephemeral key logic in the test server.

Change-Id: I016658762e4502c928c051e14d69eea67b5a495f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-02-26 21:26:37 +00:00
David Benjamin
226a872d2f Don't set client_version to the ServerHello version.
The client_version needs to be preserved, both for the RSA key exchange and
(when this codepath is used for TLS) for the SChannel renego workaround. Fix
the tests to enforce this so the cipher suite version tests catch this.

Change-Id: I0c42dc3ec4830f3724026b400e5066e7a7f1ee97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-12-11 18:49:42 +00:00
David Benjamin
2af684fa92 Add tests for ECDHE_PSK.
pskKeyAgreement is now a wrapper over a base key agreement.

Change-Id: Ic18862d3e98f7513476f878b8df5dcd8d36a0eac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-10-29 20:33:09 +00:00
David Benjamin
48cae08563 Add tests for PSK cipher suites.
Only the three plain PSK suites for now. ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 will
be in a follow-up.

Change-Id: Iafc116a5b2798c61d90c139b461cf98897ae23b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-10-29 20:32:21 +00:00
David Benjamin
f7768e43b2 Test SHA-256 and SHA-384 CBC-mode cipher suites.
These were added in TLS 1.2. They are like the standard AES-CBC cipher suites,
but use different HMACs.

Change-Id: Ib89ddebd1aa398b1347f8285f5d827068b1bd181
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-09-06 00:17:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
83c0bc94d7 Test-only DTLS implementation in runner.go.
Run against openssl s_client and openssl s_server. This seems to work for a
start, although it may need to become cleverer to stress more of BoringSSL's
implementation for test purposes.

In particular, it assumes a reliable, in-order channel. And it requires that
the peer send handshake fragments in order. Retransmit and whatnot are not
implemented. The peer under test will be expected to handle a lossy channel,
but all loss in the channel will be controlled. MAC errors, etc., are fatal.

Change-Id: I329233cfb0994938fd012667ddf7c6a791ac7164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-13 23:43:38 +00:00
David Benjamin
f4e5c4e106 runner: Implement DHE-RSA.
Use it to test DHE-RSA in BoringSSL.

Change-Id: I88f7bfa76507a6f60234d61d494c9f94b7df4e0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1377
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-04 20:12:58 +00:00
Adam Langley
ac61fa379f Implement TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support for the client.
With this change, calling SSL_enable_fallback_scsv on a client SSL* will
cause the fallback SCSV to be sent.

This is intended to be set when the client is performing TLS fallback
after a failed connection. (This only happens if the application itself
implements this behaviour: OpenSSL does not do fallback automatically.)

The fallback SCSV indicates to the server that it should reject the
connection if the version indicated by the client is less than the
version supported by the server.

See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02.

Change-Id: I478d6d5135016f1b7c4aaa6c306a1a64b1d215a6
2014-06-23 12:03:11 -07:00
Adam Langley
95c29f3cd1 Inital import.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 13:17:32 -07:00