A lot of consumers of obj.h only want the NID values. Others didn't need
it at all. This also removes some OBJ_nid2sn and OBJ_nid2ln calls in EVP
error paths which isn't worth pulling a large table in for.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: Id6dff578f993012e35b740a13b8e4f9c2edc0744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I6267c9bfb66940d0b6fe5368514210a058ebd3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7494
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Both sides' signature and Finished checks still occur, but the results
are ignored. Also, all ciphers behave like the NULL cipher.
Conveniently, this isn't that much code since all ciphers and their size
computations funnel into SSL_AEAD_CTX.
This does carry some risk that we'll mess up this code. Up until now, we've
tried to avoid test-only changes to the SSL stack.
There is little risk that anyone will ship a BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE build
for anything since it doesn't interop anyway. There is some risk that we'll end
up messing up the disableable checks. However, both skipped checks have
negative tests in runner (see tests that set InvalidSKXSignature and
BadFinished). For good measure, I've added a server variant of the existing
BadFinished test to this CL, although they hit the same code.
Change-Id: I37f6b4d62b43bc08fab7411965589b423d86f4b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move it into ssl->s3 so it automatically behaves correctly on SSL_clear.
ssl->version is still a mess though.
Change-Id: I17a692a04a845886ec4f8de229fa6cf99fa7e24a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This removes the various non-PRF checks from SSL3_ENC_METHOD so that can
have a clearer purpose. It also makes TLS 1.0 through 1.2's
SSL3_ENC_METHOD tables identical and gives us an assert to ensure
nothing accesses the version bits before version negotiation.
Accordingly, ssl_needs_record_splitting was reordered slightly so we
don't rely on enc_method being initialized to TLS 1.2
pre-version-negotiation.
This leaves alert_value as the only part of SSL3_ENC_METHOD which may be
accessed before version negotiation.
Change-Id: If9e299e2ef5511b5fa442b2af654eed054c3e675
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6842
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's not much point in putting those in the interface as the
final_finished_mac implementation is itself different between SSL 3.0
and TLS.
Change-Id: I76528a88d255c451ae008f1a34e51c3cb57d3073
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6838
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Move the actual SSL_AEAD_CTX swap into the record layer. Also revise the
intermediate state we store between setup_key_block and
change_cipher_state. With SSL_AEAD_CTX_new abstracted out, keeping the
EVP_AEAD around doesn't make much sense. Just store enough to partition
the key block.
Change-Id: I773fb46a2cb78fa570f00c0a89339c15bbb1d719
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6832
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
That we're half and half is really confusing.
Change-Id: I1c2632682e8a3e63d01dada8e0eb3b735ff709ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This uses ssl3_read_bytes for now. We still need to dismantle that
function and then invert the handshake state machine, but this gets
things closer to the right shape as an intermediate step and is a large
chunk in itself. It simplifies a lot of the CCS/handshake
synchronization as a lot of the invariants much more clearly follow from
the handshake itself.
Tests need to be adjusted since this changes some error codes. Now all
the CCS/Handshake checks fall through to the usual
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD codepath. Most of what used to be a special-case
falls out naturally. (If half of Finished was in the same record as the
pre-CCS message, that part of the handshake record would have been left
unconsumed, so read_change_cipher_spec would have noticed, just like
read_app_data would have noticed.)
Change-Id: I15c7501afe523d5062f0e24a3b65f053008d87be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6642
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The keylog BIO is internally synchronized by the SSL_CTX lock, but an
application may wish to log keys from multiple SSL_CTXs. This is in
preparation for switching Chromium to use a separate SSL_CTX per profile
to more naturally split up the session caches.
It will also be useful for routing up SSLKEYLOGFILE in WebRTC. There,
each log line must be converted to an IPC up from the renderer
processes.
This will require changes in Chromium when we roll BoringSSL.
BUG=458365,webrtc:4417
Change-Id: I2945bdb4def0a9c36e751eab3d5b06c330d66b54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6514
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ssl.h should be first. Also two lines after includes and the rest of the
file.
Change-Id: Icb7586e00a3e64170082c96cf3f8bfbb2b7e1611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5892
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.
ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.
Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)
The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)
The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A memory BIO is internally a BUF_MEM anyway. There's no need to bring
BIO_write into the mix. BUF_MEM is size_t clean.
Change-Id: I4ec6e4d22c72696bf47c95861771013483f75cab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5616
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The handshake hash is initialized from the buffer as soon as the cipher
is known. When adding a message to the transcript, independently update
the buffer and rolling hash, whichever is active. This avoids the
complications around dont_free_handshake_buffer and EMS.
BUG=492371
Change-Id: I3b1065796a50fd1be5d42ead7210c2f253ef0aca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to remove the confusing EVP_PKEY argument to the
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD wrapper functions. It also simplifies some of the
book-keeping around the CERT structure, as well as the API for
configuring certificates themselves. The current one is a little odd as
some functions automatically route to the slot while others affect the
most recently touched slot. Others still (extra_certs) apply to all
slots, making them not terribly useful.
Consumers with complex needs should use cert_cb or the early callback
(select_certificate_cb) to configure whatever they like based on the
ClientHello.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: Ice29ffeb867fa4959898b70dfc50fc00137f01f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The distinction was not well-enforced in the code. In fact, it wasn't
even possible to use the RSA_SIGN slot because ssl_set_pkey and
ssl_set_cert would always use the RSA_ENC slot.
A follow-up will fold away the mechanism altogether, but this is an easy
initial simplfication.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I66b5bf3e6dc243dac7c75924c1c1983538e49060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
After the custom key method support, the EVP_PKEY parameter is somewhat
confusing (to be resolved with the certificate slots removal) as it must
always refer to a private key. ssl3_cert_verify_hash is sometimes used
with the peer's public key. If custom keys were supported on the server,
this would break.
Fix this by passing a pkey_type parameter and letting the caller decide
whether this uses SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD or not.
Change-Id: I673b92579a84b4561f28026ec0b1c78a6bfee440
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5341
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds a new API, SSL_set_private_key_method, which allows the consumer to
customize private key operations. For simplicity, it is incompatible with the
multiple slots feature (which will hopefully go away) but does not, for now,
break it.
The new method is only routed up for the client for now. The server will
require a decrypt hook as well for the plain RSA key exchange.
BUG=347404
Change-Id: I35d69095c29134c34c2af88c613ad557d6957614
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I55dc3d87a9571901abd2bbaf268871a482cf3bc5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4983
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This still needs significant work, especially the close_notify half, but
clarify the interface and get *_read_bytes out of SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
read_bytes is an implementation detail of those two and get_message
rather than both an implementation detail of get_message for handshake
and a (wholly inappropriate) exposed interface for the other two.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I7dd23869e0b7c3532ceb2e9dd31ca25ea31128e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4956
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Never send the time as a client. Always send it as a server.
Change-Id: I20c55078cfe199d53dc002f6ee5dd57060b086d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4829
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Nothing should call ssl3_setup_read_buffer or ssl3_setup_write_buffer unless it
intends to write into the buffer. This way buffer management can later be an
implementation detail of the record layer.
Change-Id: Idb0effba00e77c6169764843793f40ec37868b61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4687
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
s->packet points into the read buffer. It shouldn't leave a dangling pointer.
Change-Id: Ia7def2f50928ea9fca8cb0b69d614a92f9f47f57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4684
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per earlier review comment. The number is wrong anyway. (Neither version does
anything since init_buf is initialized to a large size and most functions don't
bother sizing it. Future work should rewrite all of this to use a CBB.)
Change-Id: I3b58672b328396459a34c6403f8bfb77c96efe9c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's only called for client certificates with NULL. The interaction with
extra_certs is more obvious if we handle that case externally. (We
shouldn't attach extra_certs if there is no leaf.)
Change-Id: I9dc26f32f582be8c48a4da9aae0ceee8741813dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The rest of ssl/ still includes things everywhere, but this at least fixes the
includes that were implicit from ssl/internal.h.
Change-Id: I7ed22590aca0fe78af84fd99a3e557f4b05f6782
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Match the other internal headers.
Change-Id: Iff7e2dd06a1a7bf993053d0464cc15638ace3aaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Compression is gone, so don't allow for compression overhead. With that fixed,
the second rr->length check in ssl3_get_record matches the length computation
which sizes the read buffer. The first is wrong and doesn't account for the
alignment padding. Move the second to the first.
Change-Id: I3f4f05de9fdf5c645ff24493bbfdf303dcc1aa90
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4236
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are redundant with the lower level ones in s3_pkt.c just before BIO_read.
Only the operation which actually failed an operation on the BIO should set
the wait state.
Not all failure paths in ssl3_read_bytes and dtls1_read_bytes set SSL_READING,
but those that don't leave the BIO in a retry state, so SSL_READING doesn't
matter.
Change-Id: I2ae064ecc8b2946cc8ae8f724be09dfe49e077b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Noticed these as I was poking around.
Change-Id: I93833a152583feced374c9febf7485bec7abc1c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3973
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It may fail because the BIO_write to the memory BIO can allocate.
Unfortunately, this bubbles up pretty far up now that we've moved the handshake
hash to ssl3_set_handshake_header.
Change-Id: I58884347a4456bb974ac4783078131522167e29d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3483
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found while diagnosing some crashes and hangs in the malloc tests. This (and
the follow-up) get us further but does not quite let the malloc tests pass
quietly, even without valgrind. DTLS silently ignores some malloc failures
(confusion with silently dropping bad packets) which then translate to hangs.
Change-Id: Ief06a671e0973d09d2883432b89a86259e346653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3482
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The |skip_message| variable was overly complex and, since we have at
least 32-bit ints, we know that a 24-bit value doesn't overflow an int.
Change-Id: I5c16fa979e1716f39cc47882c033bcf5bce3284c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2610
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No current use of ssl_cert_type passes a NULL EVP_PKEY, so it can be simplified
a little.
Change-Id: I2052cc3b6069cd30e4685ba8a6d0014016a4d712
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids needing a should_add_to_finished_hash boolean on do_write. The
logic in do_write was a little awkward because do_write would be called
multiple times if the write took several iterations. This also gets complex if
DTLS retransmits are involved. (At a glance, it's not obvious the
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED case actually works.)
Doing it as the handshake message is being prepared avoids this concern. It
also gives a natural point for the extended master secret logic which needs to
do work after the finished hash has been sampled.
As a bonus, we can remove s->d1->retransmitting which was only used to deal
with this issue.
Change-Id: Ifedf23ee4a6c5e08f960d296a6eb1f337a16dc7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2604
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That comment is wrong as of TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I900d5efc09d7468f2601d85f867833e43d046f6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2603
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David is heading out so I didn't want to block the previous batch of
changes for weeks. Thus I landed them as-is and this change tweaks a
couple of things that would normally have been addressed in code-review.
Change-Id: I2579dbc43d93fea34a52b4041f5511d70217aaf7
This makes SSLv23_method go through DTLS_ANY_VERSION's version negotiation
logic. This allows us to get rid of duplicate ClientHello logic. For
compatibility, SSL_METHOD is now split into SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD and a version.
The legacy version-locked methods set min_version and max_version based this
version field to emulate the original semantics.
As a bonus, we can now handle fragmented ClientHello versions now.
Because SSLv23_method is a silly name, deprecate that too and introduce
TLS_method.
Change-Id: I8b3df2b427ae34c44ecf972f466ad64dc3dbb171
SSL3_ENC_METHOD will remain version-specific while SSL_METHOD will become
protocol-specific. This finally removes all the version-specific portions of
SSL_METHOD but the version tag itself.
(SSL3_ENC_METHOD's version-specific bits themselves can probably be handled by
tracking a canonicalized protocol version. It would simplify version
comparisons anyway. The one catch is SSLv3 has a very different table. But
that's a cleanup for future. Then again, perhaps a version-specific method
table swap somewhere will be useful later for TLS 1.3.)
Much of this commit was generated with sed invocation:
s/method->ssl3_enc/enc_method/g
Change-Id: I2b192507876aadd4f9310240687e562e56e6c0b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2581
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 7a04b854d655785798d471df25ffd5036f3cc46b.)
This does not affect BoringSSL as ssl3_get_client_hello advances to yet another
state immediately after reading the message. But the state advance is correct.
It matches the normal exit for this function.
Change-Id: I8a664f2ad5f80beacbaf3e17a7786a5c9e8ef30e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2480
Reviewed-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use it in ssl3_cert_verify_hash so signing a pre-TLS-1.2 handshake hash can go
through RSA_sign and be intercepted via RSA_METHOD appropriately. This avoids
Windows needing to intercept sign_raw. (CAPI keys cannot provide sign_raw,
unless the input size happens to be that of NID_md5_sha1.)
Also use it in processing ServerKeyExchange to avoid special-casing RSA.
BUG=crbug.com/437023
Change-Id: Ia07433f468b75fdf7bfc8fa90c9751639b2478e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2420
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This code was dead as ssl3_get_client_certificate no longer allows a
ClientHello; the hash would be reset, but then the handshake would fail anyway.
Change-Id: Ib98e6a319c048c263d7ee3a27832ea57bdd0e2ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update SSL_OP_ALL to account for SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG being gone,
and update ssl3_setup_write_buffer to account for SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
rather than the now defunct SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.
Also remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is to allow for a buggy peer
which pads CBC with N bytes of value N rather than N+1 bytes of value N. This
quirk has been broken since CBC padding checks became constant-time, as
demonstrated by this attempt at a test. (Instead of just decrementing
padding_length, it needs to also keep track of a separate padding_value and not
decrement that one.)
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1690/
(The quirk would also fall over anyway if the buggy client ever did a session
resumption; then the server speaks first rather than the client, and the quirk
triggered on reading the first encrypted record from the peer.)
Change-Id: I19942dc629a47832aead77a46bb50e0b0a9780b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1694
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Configures the SSL stack to log session information to a BIO. The intent is to
support NSS's SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. Add support for the same
environment variable to tool/client.cc.
Tested against Wireshark 1.12.0.
BUG=393477
Change-Id: I4c231f9abebf194eb2df4aaeeafa337516774c95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1699
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
