The callback arguments are required to be NULL.
Change-Id: I266ec46efdaca411a7f0c2b645883b2c5bec1c96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5160
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change causes the generated assembly files for ARM and AArch64 to
have #if guards for __arm__ and __aarch64__, respectively. Since
building on ARM is only supported for Linux, we only have to worry about
GCC/Clang's predefines.
Change-Id: I7198eab6230bcfc26257f0fb6a0cc3166df0bb29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I mistakenly believed that only RDSEED could fail. However, the Intel
manuals state that RDRAND can fail too.
I can't actually observe it failing, even with all cores running RDRAND in a
tight loop. In any case, the ChaCha20 masking means that it wouldn't be
a big deal anyway.
Still, this change tests the carry flag after RDRAND and the code falls
back to |CRYPTO_sysrand| if RDRAND has a hiccup. (The Intel manuals
suggest[1] calling RDRAND in a loop, ten times, before considering it to
have failed. But a single failure appears to be such a rare event that
the complexity in the asm code doesn't seem worth it.)
This change also adds an asm function to fill a buffer with random data.
Otherwise the overhead of calling |CRYPTO_rdrand|, and bouncing the data
in and out of memory starts to add up.
Thanks to W. Mark Kubacki, who may have reported this. (There's some
confusion in the bug report.)
Before:
Did 6148000 RNG (16 bytes) operations in 1000080us: 98.4 MB/s
Did 649000 RNG (256 bytes) operations in 1000281us: 166.1 MB/s
Did 22000 RNG (8192 bytes) operations in 1033538us: 174.4 MB/s
After:
Did 6573000 RNG (16 bytes) operations in 1000002us: 105.2 MB/s
Did 693000 RNG (256 bytes) operations in 1000127us: 177.4 MB/s
Did 24000 RNG (8192 bytes) operations in 1028466us: 191.2 MB/s
[1] Intel Reference Manual, section 7.3.17.1.
Change-Id: Iba7f82e844ebacef535472a31f2dd749aad1190a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5180
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They'll probably stay that way too, so document it as being an ignored
parameter.
Change-Id: Iff385715f5413290a7186c38ea9ef2dd4fce9b38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5175
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
AES-GCM should have a 12-byte nonce. However, non-standard nonce sizes
are defined by NIST and, although they are a bad idea, people have used
them because they've confused an IV with an nonce and passed in a
16-byte nonce.
This change adds a test for this.
Change-Id: If1efa1aaa19f0119ad4cab9a02a6417c040f45b2
Android >= L requires that binaries be position independent. However,
this is only enabled with API level 16 or above. Since developers are
likely to have modern Android versions, suggest API level 16 in the
BUILDING file to save someone in the future having to figure this out.
Change-Id: I66db7228e3d6fef0aa8dcfcfff67a71cb630a2b9
Rather than rely on Chromium to query SSL_initial_handshake_complete in the
callback (which didn't work anyway because the callback is called afterwards),
move the logic into BoringSSL. BoringSSL already enforces that clients never
offer resumptions on renegotiation (it wouldn't work well anyway as client
session cache lookup is external), so it's reasonable to also implement
in-library that sessions established on a renegotiation are not cached.
Add a bunch of tests that new_session_cb is called when expected.
BUG=501418
Change-Id: I42d44c82b043af72b60a0f8fdb57799e20f13ed5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5171
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
b4d65fda70 was written concurrently with
my updating runner to handle -resource-dir (in
7c803a65d5) and thus it didn't include the
needed change for the test that it added to handle it.
This change fixes that added test so that it can run with -resource-dir.
Change-Id: I06b0adfb3fcf3f11c061fe1c8332a45cd7cd2dbc
Also implement it without reference to crypto/asn1 or fake ASN1_INTEGERs and
add a test. Some platform crypto APIs only give back the key size, and not the
encoded signature length. No sense in implementing it twice.
BUG=347404,499653
Change-Id: I9aa27d52674375f8b036e57bb5850f091c9b25dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds a new API, SSL_set_private_key_method, which allows the consumer to
customize private key operations. For simplicity, it is incompatible with the
multiple slots feature (which will hopefully go away) but does not, for now,
break it.
The new method is only routed up for the client for now. The server will
require a decrypt hook as well for the plain RSA key exchange.
BUG=347404
Change-Id: I35d69095c29134c34c2af88c613ad557d6957614
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Turns out the safer/simpler method still wasn't quite right. :-)
session->sess_cert isn't serialized and deserialized, which is poor. Duplicate
it manually for now. Leave a TODO to get rid of that field altogether as it's
not especially helpful. The certificate-related fields should be in the
session. The others probably have no reason to be preserved on resumptions at
all.
Test by making bssl_shim.cc assert the peer cert chain is there or not as
expected.
BUG=501220
Change-Id: I44034167629720d6e2b7b0b938d58bcab3ab0abe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To account for the changes in ticket renewal, Chromium will need to listen for
new_session_cb to determine whether the handshake produced a new session.
Chromium currently never caches sessions produced on a renegotiation. To retain
that behavior, it'll need to know whether new_session_cb is initial or not.
Rather than maintain duplicate state and listen for SSL_HANDSHAKE_DONE, it's
simpler to just let it query ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete.
BUG=501418
Change-Id: Ib2f2541460bd09cf16106388e9cfdf3662e02681
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5126
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Platform crypto APIs for PKCS#1 RSA signatures vary between expecting the
caller to prepend the DigestInfo prefix (RSA_sign_raw) and prepending it
internally (RSA_sign). Currently, Chromium implements sign or sign_raw as
appropriate. To avoid needing both variants, the new asynchronous methods will
only expose the higher-level one, sign.
To satisfy ports which previously implemented sign_raw, expose the DigestInfo
prefix as a utility function.
BUG=347404
Change-Id: I04c397b5e9502b2942f6698ecf81662a3c9282e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
(Imported from upstream's 9bc3665ac9)
Change-Id: I2091b2d1b691c177d58dc7960e2e7eb4c97b1f69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If gdb is attached, it's convenient to be able to continue running.
Change-Id: I3bbb2634d05a08f6bad5425f71da2210dbb80cfe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds flags to runner to allow it to be sufficiently
configured that it can run from any directory.
Change-Id: I82c08da4ffd26c5b11637480b0a79eaba0904d38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5130
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 9dcab127e1. The root problem
is dtls1_read_bytes is wrong, but we can get the right behavior now and add a
regression test for it before cleaning it up.
Change-Id: I4e5c39ab254a872d9f64242c9b77b020bdded6e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5123
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 27c76b9b8010b536687318739c6f631ce4194688, CVE-2015-1791.
Rather than write a dup function, serializing and deserializing the object is
simpler. It also fixes a bug in the original fix where it never calls
new_session_cb to store the new session (for clients which use that callback;
how clients should handle the session cache is much less clear).
The old session isn't pruned as we haven't processed the Finished message yet.
RFC 5077 says:
The server MUST NOT assume that the client actually received the updated
ticket until it successfully verifies the client's Finished message.
Moreover, because network messages are asynchronous, a new SSL connection may
have began just before the client received the new ticket, so any such servers
are broken regardless.
Change-Id: I13b3dc986dc58ea2ce66659dbb29e14cd02a641b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5122
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Mirrors SSL_SESSION_to_bytes. It avoids having to deal with object-reuse, the
non-size_t length parameter, and trailing data. Both it and the object-reuse
variant back onto an unexposed SSL_SESSION_parse which reads a CBS.
Note that this changes the object reuse story slightly. It's now merely an
optional output pointer that frees its old contents. No d2i_SSL_SESSION
consumer in Google that's built does reuse, much less reuse with the assumption
that the top-level object won't be overridden.
Change-Id: I5cb8522f96909bb222cab0f342423f2dd7814282
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We had aarch64 handled twice, which was a mistake.
Change-Id: Id27fc86cb701a87c11c54b98534108f87e49262d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5131
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change amends generate_build_files.py so that Bazel output includes
rules for the (no-Go) tests.
Change-Id: I0c8dca599d6f828191eb665332af3193c650bc1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5102
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The binaries for these already have underscores in, best to have the
source files match.
Change-Id: I32a419f32ec7786fe2537d061eb0706a7bc73f4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds ‘android-standalone’ and ‘bazel’ targets to the
build-file generation script. It also allows multiple build outputs to
be written in one invocation, which saves the cost of Perl to build all
the assembly files multiple times.
Note that this will require changes to the Chromium GYP files when its
rolled out because “boringssl_lib_sources” has been broken into
“boringssl_crypto_sources” and “boringssl_ssl_sources”.
Change-Id: Icfe9678d08fba74fd215cf92521831e9cdc265da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5070
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per malloc(3):
The UNIX 98 standard requires malloc(), calloc(), and realloc() to set
errno to ENOMEM upon failure. Glibc assumes that this is done (and the
glibc versions of these routines do this); if you use a private malloc
implementation that does not set errno, then certain library routines may
fail without having a reason in errno.
Notably, thread_test otherwise fails an assertion deep in glibc.
Change-Id: Ia2c0ab306987476e7d6570d4bbf04a2641398925
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5111
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_copy can fail on malloc failure. The case in crypto/rsa was causing the
malloc tests in all_tests.go to infinite loop.
Change-Id: Id5900512013fba9960444d78a8c056aa4314fb2d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5110
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some of the documentation had the right explanation but the incorrect
function names attached.
Change-Id: I7b479dae6d71a5ac7bc86df5a3890508c3b3d09f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When cross-compiling for Windows on a Linux system, the filesystem is
case sensitive and so #includes with uppercase characters cause errors.
Change-Id: I6fe6d677887ce84ba8b2c3136cf2c70998d96e81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5060
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If we're going to have PSK and use standard cipher suites, this might be
the best that we can do for the moment.
Change-Id: I35d9831b2991dc5b23c9e24d98cdc0db95919d39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the best PSK cipher suite, but it's non-standard and nobody is
using it. Trivial to bring back in the future if we have need of it.
Change-Id: Ie78790f102027c67d1c9b19994bfb10a2095ba92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5051
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of DSA support. It's not possible to parse out an incomplete
public key for the more reasonable X.509 key types.
Change-Id: I4f4c7b9d3795f5f0635f80a4cec9ca4c778e6c69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5050
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most of the logic was redundant with checks already made in
ssl3_get_server_certificate. The DHE check was missing an ECDHE half
(and was impossible). The ECDSA check allowed an ECDSA certificate for
RSA. The only non-redundant check was a key usage check which,
strangely, is only done for ECDSA ciphers.
(Although this function called X509_certificate_type and checked sign
bits, those bits in X509_certificate_type are purely a function of the
key type and don't do anything.)
Change-Id: I8df7eccc0ffff49e4cfd778bd91058eb253b13cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5047
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The NULL checks later on notice, but failing with
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS on accident is confusing.
Require that the message be non-empty.
Change-Id: Iddfac6a3ae6e6dc66c3de41d3bb26e133c0c6e1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5046
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The current logic requires each key exchange extract the key. It also
leaves handling X509_get_pubkey failure to the anonymous cipher suite
case which has an escape hatch where it goes back to check
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm.
Instead, get the key iff we know we have a signature to check.
Change-Id: If7154c7156aad3b89489defe4c1d951eeebf0089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5045
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This doesn't even change behavior. Unlike local configuration, the peer
can never have multiple certificates anyway. (Even with a renego, the
SESS_CERT is created anew.)
This does lose the implicit certificate type check, but the certificate
type is already checked in ssl3_get_server_certificate and later checked
post-facto in ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm (except that one seems to
have some bugs like it accepts ECDSA certificates for RSA cipher suites,
to be cleaned up in a follow-up). Either way, we have the certificate
mismatch tests for this.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I437bb723bb310ad54ee4150eda67c1cfe43377b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In doing so, check for malloc failures and use scopers as appropriate.
This should clear rsa_test for use with malloc tests. Also replace the
SetKey macro and exploded RSA keys with a DER RSAPrivateKey structure.
Much less tedious.
Change-Id: I3ce092ef67e7ac2af74f509abbdf84b7f2b6d45d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5043
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We shouldn't have protocol constraints that are sensitive to whether
data is returned synchronously or not.
Per https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4112/, the original
limitation was to avoid OpenSSL ABI changes. This is no longer a
concern.
Add tests for the sync and async case. Send the empty records in two
batches to ensure the count is reset correctly.
Change-Id: I3fee839438527e71adb83d437879bb0d49ca5c07
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Matt Braithwaite
Adam Langley
Adam Langley
David Benjamin
William Hesse
Kenny Root