Rather than doing it right before outputing, treat this as a part of the
pipeline to finalize the certificate chain, and run it right after
cert_cb to modify the certificate configuration itself. This means
nothing else in the stack needs to worry about this case existing.
It also makes it easy to support in both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I6a088297a54449f1f5f5bb8b5385caa4e8665eb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12966
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Alas, wpa_supplicant relies on the auto-chaining feature, so we can't
easily remove it. Write tests for it to ensure it stays working.
These test currently do not work for TLS 1.3 because the feature is
broken in 1.3. A follow-up change will fix this.
BUG=70
Change-Id: I2c04f55b712d66f5af1556254a5b017ebc3244f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Notably, Conscrypt uses SSL_SESSION_get_version, so we should have tests
for it.
Change-Id: I670f1b1b9951f840f27cb62dd36ef4f05042c974
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12881
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OpenSSL includes a leaf certificate in a certificate chain when it's a
client, but doesn't when it's a server. This is also reflected in the
serialisation of sessions.
This change makes the internal semantics consistent: the leaf is always
included in the chain in memory, and never duplicated when serialised.
To maintain the same API, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain will construct a copy
of the chain without the leaf if needed.
Since the serialised format of a client session has changed, an
|is_server| boolean is added to the ASN.1 that defaults to true. Thus
any old client sessions will be parsed as server sessions and (silently)
discarded by a client.
Change-Id: Ibcf72bc8a130cedb423bc0fd3417868e0af3ca3e
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This reverts commits 5a6e616961 and
e8509090cf. I'm going to unify how the
chains are kept in memory between client and server first otherwise the
mess just keeps growing.
Change-Id: I76df0d94c9053b2454821d22a3c97951b6419831
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12701
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
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This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
The serialisation format of SSL_SESSIONs is also changed, in a backwards
compatible way. Previously, some sessions would duplicate the leaf
certificate in the certificate chain. These sessions can still be read,
but will be written in a way incompatible with older versions of the
code. This should be fine because the situation where multiple versions
exchange serialised sessions is at the server, and the server doesn't
duplicate the leaf certifiate in the chain anyway.
Change-Id: Id3b75d24f1745795315cb7f8089a4ee4263fa938
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12163
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Prior to 87eab4902d, due to some
confusions between configuration and connection state, SSL_clear had the
side effect of offering the previously established session on the new
connection.
wpa_supplicant relies on this behavior, so restore it for TLS 1.2 and
below and add a test. (This behavior is largely incompatible with TLS
1.3's post-handshake tickets, so it won't work in 1.3. It'll act as if
we configured an unresumable session instead.)
Change-Id: Iaee8c0afc1cb65c0ab7397435602732b901b1c2d
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: Iec0e597af37137270339e9754c6e08116198899e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12581
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Due to recent changes, changing the SSL session timeout from cert_cb is
not possible anymore since the new |SSL_SESSION| is initialized *after*
cert_cb is run. The alternative would be using |SSL_CTX_set_timeout| but
the specific |SSL_CTX| could be shared by multiple |SSL|s.
Setting a value on a per-connection basis is useful in case timeouts
need to be calculated dynamically based on specific certificate/domain
information that would be retrieved from inside cert_cb (or other
callbacks).
It would also be possible to set the value to 0 to prevent session
resumption, which is not otherwise doable in the handshake callbacks.
Change-Id: I730a528c647f83f7f77f59b5b21d7e060e4c9843
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Change-Id: I3a5d949eec9241ea43da40ce23e0e7f2a25e30e5
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This aligns with ec_test which has a ForEachCurve helper and avoids
writing these loops all the time. As a bonus, these tests start working
in DTLS now.
Change-Id: I613fc08b641ddc12a819d8a1268a1e6a29043663
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12380
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The former has always worked. The latter is new to the revised
processing order.
Change-Id: I993d29ccaca091725524847695df4d1944b609cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11848
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Change-Id: I0767cd4801924170ce13b8143a9586485b8f78af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12280
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The distinction for full handshakes is not meaningful (the timestamp is
currently the start of the handshake), but for renewed sessions, we
currently retain the timestamp of the original issuance.
Instead, when minting or receiving tickets, adjust session->time and
session->timeout so that session->time is the ticket issuance time.
This is still not our final TLS 1.3 behavior (which will need a both
renewable and non-renewable times to honor the server ticket lifetime),
but it gets us closer and unblocks handling ticket_age_add from TLS 1.3
draft 18 and sends the correct NewSessionTicket lifetime.
This fixes the ticket lifetime hint which we emit on the server to
mirror the true ticket lifetime. It also fixes the TLS 1.3 server code
to not set the ticket lifetime hint. There is no need to waste ticket
size with it, it is no longer a "hint" in TLS 1.3, and even in the TLS
1.3 code we didn't fill it in on the server.
Change-Id: I140541f1005a24e53e1b1eaa90996d6dada1c3a1
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TLS 1.3 clarifies that a ticket lifetime of zero means the session is
unusable. We don't currently pay attention to that field (to be fixed in
later changes) but, in preparation for this, switch the >= to a >.
Change-Id: I0e67a0d97bc8def04914f121e84d3e7a2d640d2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12102
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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A renewed session does not refresh the timeout. Add tests for this in
preparation for future changes which will revise this logic.
Specifically, TLS 1.3 draft 18's ticket_age_add logic will require some
tweaks in lifetime tracking to record when the ticket was minted. We'll
also likely wish to tweak the parameters for 1.3 to account for (a)
ECDHE-PSK means we're only worried about expiring a short-circuited
authentication rather than forward secrecy and (b) two hours is too
short for a QUIC 0-RTT replacement.
Change-Id: I0f1edd09151e7fcb5aee2742ef8600fbd7080df6
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TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
HTTP/2 requires TLS 1.2 so the negotiated version should be available
during the ALPN callback.
Change-Id: Iea332808b531a6e5c917de5b8c8917c0aa7428a1
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HTTP/2 places requirements on the cipher suite. So that servers can
decline HTTP/2 when these requirements aren't met, defer ALPN
negotiation.
See also b/32553041.
Change-Id: Idbcf049f9c8bda06a8be52a0154fe76e84607268
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11982
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were only testing one side.
Change-Id: Ieb755e27b235aaf1317bd2c8e5fb374cb0ecfdb3
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This shouldn't happen, but it is good to check to avoid the potential
underflow in ssl_session_is_time_valid.
This required tweaking the mock clock in bssl_shim to stop going back in
time.
Change-Id: Id3ab8755139e989190d0b53d4bf90fe1ac203022
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11841
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We currently preferentially sign the largest hash available and
advertise such a preference for signatures we accept. We're just as
happy with SHA-256 and, all else equal, a smaller hash would be epsilon
more performant. We also currently claim, in TLS 1.3, we prefer P-384
over P-256 which is off.
Instead order SHA-256 first, next the larger SHA-2 hashes, and leave
SHA-1 at the bottom. Within a hash, order ECDSA > RSA-PSS > RSA-PKCS1.
This has the added consequence that we will preferentially pair P-256
with SHA-256 in signatures we generate instead of larger hashes that get
truncated anyway.
Change-Id: If4aee068ba6829e8c0ef7948f56e67a5213e4c50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11821
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11621
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There were some logic errors that were revealed by testing at TLS 1.3.
Also explicitly test GetClientHelloLen at TLS 1.2 (rather than relying
on the default) since the TLS 1.3 ClientHello is too large.
Change-Id: I907cb6ac04b40f845e99593bad06739132ca56b2
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Change-Id: Ib499b3393962a4d41cf9694e055ed3eb869d91a2
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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Breaking from inside the inner loop doesn't do what the code wants.
Instead the outer loop will continue running and it's possible for it to
read off the end of the buffer. (Found with libFuzzer.)
Next change will update the other abort points in this code to match.
Change-Id: I006dca0cd4c31db1c4b5e84b996fe24b2f1e6c13
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This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.
Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
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We were never really testing this.
Change-Id: Ia953870053d16d3994ae48172017d384c7bc3601
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Upstream makes 0 mean "min/max supported version". Match that behavior,
although call it "default" instead. It shouldn't get you TLS 1.3 until
we're ready to turn it on everywhere.
BUG=90
Change-Id: I9f122fceb701b7d4de2ff70afbc1ffdf370cb97e
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The old numbers violate a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2 to not
advertise anonymous (0x0700 ends in 0x00). The spec has been updated
with new allocations which avoid these.
BUG=webrtc:6342
Change-Id: Ia5663ada98fa1ebf0f8a7f50fe74a0e9206c4194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream added these functions after we did but decided to change the
names slightly. I'm not sure why they wanted to add the "proto" in
there, but align with them nonetheless so the ecosystem only has one set
of these functions.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Ia9863c58c9734374092051f02952b112806040cc
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
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This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
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Change-Id: I676d7fb00d63d74946b96c22ae2705072033c5f7
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
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Add a test that RSA-PSS is available in TLS 1.2 by default, both for
signing and verifying. Note that if a custom SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD is
used and it sets signing preferences, it won't use RSA-PSS if it doesn't
know about it. (See *-Sign-Negotiate-* tests.)
Change-Id: I3776a0c95480188a135795f7ebf31f2b0e0626cc
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The early callback needs to run before even version negotiation has been
resolved.
Change-Id: Ibb449ccec07dedef19b7827400ef318fa2f422c0
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For now, they can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_RC4_TLS.
Of note, this means that `MEDIUM' is now empty.
Change-Id: Ic77308e7bd4849bdb2b4882c6b34af85089fe3cc
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peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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Extend the DTLS mock clock to apply to sessions too and test that
resumption behaves as expected.
Change-Id: Ib8fdec91b36e11cfa032872b63cf589f93b3da13
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We almost forgot to handle this in TLS 1.3, so add a test for it.
Change-Id: I28600325d8fb6c09365e909db607cbace12ecac7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9093
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We'll need to update it on occasion, but we should not update our
default ClientHello without noticing.
Change-Id: I19ca52fdbe10e3ac14413fecd16be2e58af5a1f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9075
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
SSL_set_bio is a nightmare.
In f715c42322, we noticed that, among
other problems, SSL_set_bio's actual behavior did not match how
SSL_set_rfd was calling it due to an asymmetry in the rbio/wbio
handling. This resulted in SSL_set_fd/SSL_set_rfd calls to crash. We
decided that SSL_set_rfd's believed semantics were definitive and
changed SSL_set_bio.
Upstream, in 65e2d672548e7c4bcb28f1c5c835362830b1745b, decided that
SSL_set_bio's behavior, asymmetry and all, was definitive and that the
SSL_set_rfd crash was a bug in SSL_set_rfd. Accordingly, they switched
the fd callers to use the side-specific setters, new in 1.1.0.
Align with upstream's behavior and add tests for all of SSL_set_bio's
insanity. Also export the new side-specific setters in anticipation of
wanting to be mostly compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: Iceac9508711f79750a3cc2ded081b2bb2cbf54d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
