This reverts commit 7b9bbd9639. This seems
to cause some problem linking with gold in Chromium:
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'free'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'malloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'realloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: error: treating warnings as errors
The same error in https://crbug.com/368351 implies we're actually
causing the compiler to make some assumptions it shouldn't make. The
obvious fix of marking things as visible causes crashes when built with
ASan (ASan's malloc interceptors and ours are conflicting somehow).
Revert this for now. We should study how ASan's interceptors work and
figure out how to make these two coexist.
BUG=655938
Change-Id: Iaad245d1028c442bd924d46519b20115d37a57c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11604
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Data allocated in one fuzzer iteration and then freed in the next
complicates the leak checker. Avoid this by dropping hidden global state
at the end of each run.
Change-Id: Ice79704f2754a6b1f40e288df9b97ddd5b3b97d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11600
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3476d3ba7cf90e023f6ad2ff9264a31c59a74e6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Some new tests needed to be suppressed.
Change-Id: I4474d752c338a18440efb213e0795ae81ad754fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11583
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11581
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11565
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11412
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They take a const pointer. See
http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#building
BUG=chromium:655016
Change-Id: Id6c7584c7a875e822b1fbff72163c888d02a9f44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11580
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These too must be rejected. Test both unknown extensions and extensions
in the wrong context.
Change-Id: I54d5a5060f9efc26e5e4d23a0bde3c0d4d302d09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11501
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This clears the last of Android's build warnings from BoringSSL. These
pragmas aren't actually no-ops, but it just means that MinGW consumers
(i.e. just Android) need to explicitly list the dependency (which they
do).
There may be something to be said for removing those and having everyone
list dependencies, but I don't really want to chase down every
consumer's build files. Probably not worth the trouble.
Change-Id: I8fcff954a6d5de9471f456db15c54a1b17cb937a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11573
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MinGW has two different versions of printf. We want the format string
warnings to match. This silences some warnings in the Android build.
See:
https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/wiki2/gnu%20printf/
Note this assumes that, for external calls of these functions, the build
configuration of the consumer and BoringSSL match in this regard. (But
it doesn't actually matter because the issue is only on XP.)
Change-Id: I7f12ad2fc94130edd984feac5914f8ca6c88b8d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11572
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This was a remnant of the old cipher suite setup.
Change-Id: Ibc79b81200a52d45fbd69b9c04060c38ad4707f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11564
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Id8099cc3a250e36e62b8a48e74706b75e5fa127c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11566
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only save them at TLS 1.0 through 1.2. This saves 104 bytes of
per-connection memory.
Change-Id: If397bdc10e40f0194cba01024e0e9857d6b812f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11571
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We need to retain a pair of Finished messages for renegotiation_info.
SSL 3.0's is actually larger than TLS 1.2's (always 12 bytes). Take
renegotiation out in preparation for trimming them to size.
Change-Id: I2e238c48aaf9be07dd696bc2a6af75e9b0ead299
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11570
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only need one copy, not two. This trims 130 bytes of per-connection
memory.
Change-Id: I334aa7b1f8608e72426986bfa68534d416f3bda9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11569
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
tls-unique isn't defined at TLS 1.3 yet. (Given that it was too small in
1.2, they may just define a new one entirely?) SSL_get_(peer_)finished
doesn't work at 1.3 and is only used in lieu of computing tls-unique,
also undefined at SSL 3.0.
This is in preparation for trimming the copies of the Finished messages
we retain.
Change-Id: Iace99f2baea92c511c4041c592300dfbbe7226e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11568
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_HANDSHAKE is dropped after the handshake, so I've removed the logic
around smaller sizes. It's much simpler when we can use CBS_stow and
CBB_finish without extra bounds-checking.
Change-Id: Idafaa5d69e171aed9a8759f3d44e52cb01c40f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now not only the pointers but also the list itself is released after the
handshake completes.
Change-Id: I8b568147d2d4949b3b0efe58a93905f77a5a4481
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11528
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's weird and makes things more confusing. Only use it for local
preferences as there is a default. Peer preferences can be read
directly. Also simplify the logic for requiring a non-empty peer group
list for ECDHE. The normal logic will give us this for free.
Change-Id: I1916155fe246be988f20cbf0b1728380ec90ff3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11527
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is now only ever called as a client, so there are no peer
preferences to check against. It is also now only called on peer curves,
so it only needs to be compared against local preferences.
Change-Id: I87f5b10cf4fe5fef9a9d60aff36010634192e90c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11526
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions are only called once. It ends up being not much code if
just done inline.
Change-Id: Ic432b313a6f7994ff9f51436cffbe0c3686a6c7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is in preparation for simplifying tls1_check_group_id, called by
tls1_check_ec_cert, which, in turn, is in preparation for moving the
peer group list to SSL_HANDSHAKE.
It also helps with bug #55. Move the key usage check to the certificate
configuration sanity check. There's no sense in doing it late. Also
remove the ECDSA peer curve check as we configure certificates
externally. With only one certificate, there's no sense in trying to
remove it.
BUG=55
Change-Id: I8c116337770d96cc9cfd4b4f0ca7939a4f05a1a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11524
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11561
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib499b3393962a4d41cf9694e055ed3eb869d91a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11504
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Our implementation now expects draft 15.
Change-Id: I261a090763951110a6c9f03acfda4ae23cc14cfc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11502
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11500
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10763
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EnableAllCiphers is problematic since some (version, cipher)
combinations aren't even defined and crash. Instead, use the
SendCipherSuite bug to mask the true cipher (which is becomes arbitrary)
for failure tests. The shim should fail long before we get further.
This lets us remove a number of weird checks in the TLS 1.3 code.
This also fixes the UnknownCipher tests which weren't actually testing
anything. EnableAllCiphers is now AdvertiseAllConfiguredCiphers and
does not filter out garbage values.
Change-Id: I7102fa893146bb0d096739e768c5a7aa339e51a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11481
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Now android-standalone is the same as android.
Change-Id: If4cda2f43bea66309c4e5bbd6a62298de72b0e24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11411
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is another case where the specification failed to hammer things
down and OpenSSL messed it up as a result. Also fix the SCT test in TLS
1.3.
Change-Id: I47541670447d1929869e1a39b2d9671a127bfba0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11480
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The client/server split didn't actually make sense. We're interested in
whether the client will notice the bad version before anything else, so
ignore peer cipher preferences so all combinations work.
Change-Id: I52f84b932509136a9b39d93e46c46729c3864bfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11413
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This finally removes the last Android hack. Both Chromium and Android
end up needing this thing (Chromium needs it for WebCrypto but currently
uses the EVP_AEAD version and Android needs it by way of
wpa_supplicant).
On the Android side, the alternative is we finish upstream's
NEED_INTERNAL_AES_WRAP patch, but then it just uses its own key-wrap
implementation. This seems a little silly, considering we have a version
of key-wrap under a different API anyway.
It also doesn't make much sense to leave the EVP_AEAD API around if we
don't want people to use it and Chromium's the only consumer. Remove it
and I'll switch Chromium to the new---er, old--- APIs next roll.
Change-Id: I23a89cda25bddb6ac1033e4cd408165f393d1e6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11410
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
cURL calls this function if |OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER| is in [0x10002003,
0x10002fff], which it now is for BoringSSL after 0aecbcf6.
Change-Id: I3f224f73f46791bd2232a1a96ed926c32740a6f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11461
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have CBS_get_asn1 / CBS_get_asn1_element, but not the "any" variants
of them. Without this, a consumer walking a DER structure must manually
CBS_skip the header, which is a little annoying.
Change-Id: I7735c37eb9e5aaad2bde8407669bce5492e1ccf6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11404
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This is just to reduce the diff with upstream's files so it's easier to
tell what's going on. Upstream's files have lots and lots of trailing
whitespace. We were also missing a comment.
Change-Id: Icfc3b52939823a046a3744fd8e619b5bd6160715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11408
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ConflictingVersionNegotiation really should be about, say 1.1 and 1.2
since those may be negotiated via either mechanism. (Those two cases are
actually kinda weird and we may wish to change the spec. But, in the
meantime, test that we have the expected semantics.)
Also test that we ignore true TLS 1.3's number for now, until we use it,
and that TLS 1.3 suitably ignores ClientHello.version.
Change-Id: I76c660ddd179313fa68b15a6fda7a698bef4d9c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11407
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They weren't updated for the new version negotiation. (Though right now
they're just testing that we *don't* implement the downgrade detection
because it's a draft version.)
Change-Id: I4c983ebcdf3180d682833caf1e0063467ea41544
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11406
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise we panic. Thanks to EKR for reporting.
Change-Id: Ie4b6c2e18e1c77c7b660ca5d4c3bafb38a82cb6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11405
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than clear variables and break out of a loop that just ends up
returning anyway, just return. This makes all the abort points
consistent in this function.
Change-Id: I51d862e7c60a9e967773f15a17480b783af8c456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11422
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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