It used to give a sensible answer ("no") before version negotiation.
Change-Id: I85b778a48cca7a4b66a81384eb18c447982875d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8900
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Alas, we will need a version fallback for TLS 1.3 again.
This deprecates SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV. Rather than supplying a
boolean, have BoringSSL be aware of the real maximum version so we can
change the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade logic to kick in, even when
max_version is set to 1.2.
The fallback version replaces the maximum version when it is set for
almost all purposes, except for downgrade protection purposes.
BUG=chromium:630165
Change-Id: I4c841dcbc6e55a282b223dfe169ac89c83c8a01f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8882
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It really should take a few more parameters and save a bit of
long-winded initialization work.
Change-Id: I2823f0aa82be39914a156323f6f32b470b6d6a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8876
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
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Change-Id: I92425d7c72111623ddfbe8391f2d2fa88f101ef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8818
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Share a bit more of it between TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Change-Id: I43c9dbf785a3d33db1793cffb0fdbd3af075cc89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8849
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This reverts commit 69f40dff83. I'm not
sure why the CQ didn't catch it while the bots didn't, but I'll look
into it after the QUIC BoF.
Change-Id: Ia187787c86aab082b9cffe0c86c828805dfc212d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8870
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'll need to update it on occasion, but we should not update our
default ClientHello without noticing.
Change-Id: Id9c4734f8e3f8c66b757a82ca123ce949bbcd02e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8845
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8811
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I55ab20c3add6e504522f3bb7e75aeed7daa0aad7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8851
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This adds three more formats to the SSLKEYLOGFILE format to support TLS
1.3:
EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <early_traffic_secret>
HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <handshake_traffic_secret>
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 <client_random> <traffic_secret_0>
(We don't implement 0-RTT yet, so only the second two are implemented.)
Motivations:
1. If emitted the non-traffic secrets (early, handshake, and master) or
the IKMs, Wireshark needs to maintain a handshake hash. I don't
believe they need to do this today.
2. We don't store more than one non-traffic secret at a time and don't
keep traffic secrets for longer than needed. That suggests three
separate lines logged at different times rather than one line.
3. If 0-RTT isn't used, we probably won't even compute the early traffic
secret, so that further suggests three different lines.
4. If the handshake didn't get far enough to complete, we won't have an
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 to log at all. That seems like exactly when
Wireshark would be handy, which means we want to log secrets as they
are computed.
MT from NSS has ACK'd over email that this format would be acceptable
for them, so let's go with it.
Change-Id: I4d685a1355dff4d4bd200310029d502bb6c511f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8841
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Every flush but the last is always immediately followed by a read. Add a
combined wait mode to make things simpler. Unfortunately, both flights
we have (the state machine doesn't write the first ClientHello) are
followed immediately by a state change, which means we still need some
state in between because we must run code after write_message but before
read_message.
(This way to fix that is to get rid of the buffer BIO, change
write_message to write_flight, and allow things like init_message /
finish_message / init_message / finish_message / set_write_state /
init_message / finish_message / write_flight.)
Change-Id: Iebaa388ccbe7fcad48c1b2256e1c0d3a7c9c8a2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8828
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We never had coverage for that codepath.
Change-Id: Iba1b0a3ddca743745773c663995acccda9fa6970
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8827
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I0fdd6db9ea229d394b14c76b6ba55f6165a6a806
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8826
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I8577100ef8c7c83ca540f37dadd451263f9f37e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8823
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is basically the same as BadECDHECurve-TLS13. That the client picks
a share first but the server picks the curve type means there's less
redundancy to deal with.
Change-Id: Icd9a4ecefe8e0dfaeb8fd0b062ca28561b05df98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8817
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Iad572f44448141c5e2be49bf25b42719c625a97a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8812
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I1132103bd6c8b01c567b970694ed6b5e9248befb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8816
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We already check for ciphers == NULL earlier in the function.
Change-Id: I0e676816d891e1d24cf45cab449c4d3915ec54ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8815
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
Change-Id: I5ed0f4033f011186f020ea46940160c7639f688b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8793
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
Change-Id: I280c3ca8f1d8e0981b6e7a499acb7eceebe43a0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8792
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Keep our C implementation honest.
Change-Id: I9e9e686b7f730b61218362450971afdd82b0b640
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8782
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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It tests the same thing right now with Fake TLS 1.3, but we'll need this
tested in real TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Iacd32c2d4e56d341e5709a2ccd80fed5d556c94d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8783
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This way we can test them at TLS 1.3 as well. The tests for extensions
which will not exist in TLS 1.3 are intentionally skipped, though the
commit which adds TLS 1.3 will want to add negative tests for them.
Change-Id: I41784298cae44eb6c27b13badae700ad02f9c721
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8788
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is legal to enforce and we can keep our server honest.
Change-Id: I86ab796dcb51f88ab833fcf5b57aff40e14c7363
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8789
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This allows us to implement custom RSA-PSS-based keys, so the async TLS
1.3 tests can proceed. For now, both sign and sign_digest exist, so
downstreams only need to manage a small change atomically. We'll remove
sign_digest separately.
In doing so, fold all the *_complete hooks into a single complete hook
as no one who implemented two operations ever used different function
pointers for them.
While I'm here, I've bumped BORINGSSL_API_VERSION. I do not believe we
have any SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD versions who cannot update atomically,
but save a round-trip in case we do. It's free.
Change-Id: I7f031aabfb3343805deee429b9e244aed5d76aed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8786
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This makes custom private keys and EVP_PKEYs symmetric again. There is
no longer a requirement that the caller pre-filter the configured
signing prefs.
Also switch EVP_PKEY_RSA to NID_rsaEncryption. These are identical, but
if some key types are to be NIDs, we should make them all NIDs.
Change-Id: I82ea41c27a3c57f4c4401ffe1ccad406783e4c64
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8785
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This gives us a sigalg-based API for configuring signing algorithms.
Change-Id: Ib746a56ebd1061eadd2620cdb140d5171b59bc02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2f5c45e0e491f9dd25c2463710697599fea708ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8794
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Change-Id: I9ec1a8c87e29ffd4fabef68beb6d094aa7d9a215
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8795
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The server must switch the outgoing keys early so that client
certificate alerts are sent with the right keys. (Also so that half-RTT
data may be sent.)
Change-Id: Id5482c811aa0b747ab646453b3856a83f23d3f06
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8791
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EVP_PKT_SIGN is redundant with the RSA/EC check which, in turn, is
redundant with sigalgs processing. The type need only be checked in the
pre-1.2 case which was indeed missing an else.
The client half was likewise missing an else, though it's unreachable
due to leaf cert checks.
Change-Id: Ib3550f71a2120b38eacdd671d4f1700876bcc485
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8779
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is already duplicated between client and server and otherwise will
get duplicated yet again for TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Ia8a352f9bc76fab0f88c1629d08a1da4c13d2510
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8778
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This will get shared between TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Change-Id: I9c0d73a087942ac4f8f2075a44bd55647c0dd70b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8777
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 will go through very different code than everything else. Even
SSL 3.0 is somewhat special-cased now. Move the invalid signature tests
there and run at all versions.
Change-Id: Idd0ee9aac2939c0c8fd9af2ea7b4a22942121c60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8775
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These will all want to be shared with the TLS 1.3 handshake.
Change-Id: I4e50dc0ed2295d43c7ae800015d71c1406311801
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8776
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Between client and server, the second API behaves very very differently.
Change-Id: I2a6c3cab717466a2d67ae102810a5ecd99362d9e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8781
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I5addfb1e8ec97fc426ae8ca39769120856470451
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8780
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest code advertised the signing set, not the
verify set. It also wasn't saving the peer's signature algorithm.
Change-Id: I62247d5703e30d8463c92f3d597dbeb403b355ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8774
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ServerKeyExchange and SigningHash are both very 1.2-specific names.
Replace with names that fit both 1.2 and 1.3 (and are a bit shorter).
Also fix a reference to ServerKeyExchange in sign.go.
Change-Id: I25d4ff135cc77cc545f0f9e94014244d56a9e96b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8773
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The API is definitive and works in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Ifefa295bc792f603b297e796559355f66f668811
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8772
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The extension is not defined in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I5eb85f7142be7e11f1a9c0e4680e8ace9ac50feb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8771
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Resumption is not yet implemented.
Change-Id: I7c3df2912456a0e0d5339d7b0b1f5819f958e900
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The preceding client CA bug is actually almost unreachable since the
list is initialized to a non-NULL empty list. But if one tries hard
enough, a NULL one is possible.
Change-Id: I49e69511bf65b0178c4e0acdb887f8ba7d85faff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8769
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We must have mistranscribed this to CBB at some point. If the CA list is
empty, we must still include that field.
Change-Id: I341224d85c9073b09758517cdfa14893793ea0ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8767
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Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
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Tested against the C code.
Change-Id: I62639e1e46cd4f57625be5d4ff7f6902b318c278
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8768
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We need EnableAllCiphers to make progress so, temporarily, defer the PSK
error. Also flip a true/false bug in the OCSP stapling logic.
Change-Id: Iad597c84393e1400c42b8b290eedc16f73f5ed30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8766
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
deriveTrafficAEAD gets confused by the EnableAllCiphers bug. As a hack,
just return the nil cipher. We only need to progress far enough to read
the shim's error code.
Change-Id: I72d25ac463a03a0e99dd08c38a1a7daef1f94311
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8763
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
