Chromium does not like static initializers, and the CPU logic uses one to
initialize CPU bits. However, the crypto library lacks an explicit
initialization function, which could complicate (no compile-time errors)
porting existing code which uses crypto/, but not ssl/.
Add an explicit CRYPTO_library_init function, but make it a no-op by default.
It only does anything (and is required) if building with
BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER.
Change-Id: I6933bdc3447fb382b1f87c788e5b8142d6f3fe39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These were added in TLS 1.2. They are like the standard AES-CBC cipher suites,
but use different HMACs.
Change-Id: Ib89ddebd1aa398b1347f8285f5d827068b1bd181
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
04dbb7f1d1 added tests for the pqueue
functions. However, when building as a shared library, the test binary
needs access to the raw pqueue functions which require them to be
exported.
Change-Id: Iffb22fec491082ff43f06a7119560610425cf20e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1711
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update SSL_OP_ALL to account for SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG being gone,
and update ssl3_setup_write_buffer to account for SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
rather than the now defunct SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.
Also remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is to allow for a buggy peer
which pads CBC with N bytes of value N rather than N+1 bytes of value N. This
quirk has been broken since CBC padding checks became constant-time, as
demonstrated by this attempt at a test. (Instead of just decrementing
padding_length, it needs to also keep track of a separate padding_value and not
decrement that one.)
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1690/
(The quirk would also fall over anyway if the buggy client ever did a session
resumption; then the server speaks first rather than the client, and the quirk
triggered on reading the first encrypted record from the peer.)
Change-Id: I19942dc629a47832aead77a46bb50e0b0a9780b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1694
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Configures the SSL stack to log session information to a BIO. The intent is to
support NSS's SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. Add support for the same
environment variable to tool/client.cc.
Tested against Wireshark 1.12.0.
BUG=393477
Change-Id: I4c231f9abebf194eb2df4aaeeafa337516774c95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1699
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Id77fb7c904cbfe8172466dff20b6a715d90b806c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1710
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only MD5 CBC-mode cipher suites are TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5,
TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5, and TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5. We do not
support those, and it seems quite safe to assume that list will not grow.
No current cipher suites use SHA-224 or SHA-512 MACs. We can restore those
cases if that ever changes, but hopefully any future cipher suites we care
about will be using the AEAD construction.
Change-Id: I7f2d30238e2156a59b5fed1e48fabe6660fc9b67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1697
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This check got refactored in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and broke in the process. Fix this
and add a test. Otherwise things like client auth can get slightly confused; it
will try to sign the MD5/SHA-1 hash, but the TLS 1.2 cipher suite may not use
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT, so those digests won't be available.
Based on upstream's 226751ae4a1f3e00021c43399d7bb51a99c22c17.
Change-Id: I5b864d3a696f3187b849c53b872c24fb7df27924
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1696
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Switch all of SRTP code to the standard return value convention with two
exceptions. Unfortunately, OpenSSL exposed API with the wrong error code. Keep
the public API flipped and document.
Change-Id: I43ac82513f4f52bb36a0b54aba9b9e0fa285730e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1691
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If this is part of SSL_OP_ALL, we should have a test for it.
Change-Id: Ia72422beb2da6434726e78e174f3416f90f7c897
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1695
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Those codepaths are never hit.
Change-Id: Ib6908ebe90ab667774785298fdc3f96acc4b50df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1693
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't a header file that makes sense to export; any compilation unit which
includes it will gain a bunch of static arrays.
Change-Id: Ic698b74bdf758506a53d4eba19ab8b0f49a11ef7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1692
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Denis Denisov for running the analysis.
Change-Id: I80810261e013423e746fd8d8afefb3581cffccc0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1701
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Denis Denisov for noting that |host_name| could be used while
uninitialised in the resumption case.
While in the area, this change also renames |servername_done| to
something more reasonable and removes a documented value that was never
used. Additionally, the SNI ack was only sent when not resuming so
calculating whether it should be sent when processing ClientHello
extensions (which is after s->hit has been set) is superfluous.
Lastly, since SNI is only acked by servers, there's no need to worry
about the SNI callback returning NOACK in the client case.
Change-Id: Ie4ecfc347bd7afaf93b12526ff9311cc45da4df6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reorder the tests in all_tests.sh to be in alphabetical order.
Change-Id: Idc6df6ab4a25709312a6f58635061bb643582c70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the
SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no
responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on
the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session
resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume.
Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted
in the future if we implement RFC 6961.
Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Maintain a handshake buffer in prf.go to implement TLS 1.2 client auth. Also
use it for SSL 3. This isn't strictly necessary as we know the hash functions,
but Go's hash.Hash interface lacks a Copy method.
Also fix the server-side tests which failed to test every TLS version.
Change-Id: I98492c334fbb9f2f0f89ee9c5c8345cafc025600
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Useful for parsing things when you don't know what tag to expect (e.g. a
CHOICE). Also allow its operands to be NULL, so that it can be used to skip
arbitrary elements.
Delete CBS_ASN1_ANY which wasn't doing anything.
Change-Id: I56413e68b4f2e13860ea3e55373d5830713d7e5c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1661
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't pollute the embedder's namespace with a session_ctx macro. It looks like
the difference was that, without TLS extensions, session_ctx was ctx rather
than initial_ctx. Now it's always initial_ctx. Retain the semantics of
switching SSL_CTX's out after the fact, until/unless we decide to replace that
with something less scary-sounding.
Change-Id: Ie5df5138aec25218ca80031cf645671968b8a54a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1663
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get all this stuff out of the way.
- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA
Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)
Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We don't really want to expose this but the bytestring test calls this
function directly and, when linked against a shared library, thus needs
it to be in the dynamic symbol table.
Change-Id: Ife01da36fe142026a6a3e545cff746512b966ee6
This moves CertificateVerify digest processing to the new
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE flag. It also refactors it similarly to
ssl3_send_cert_verify and moves that logic to a common ssl3_cert_verify_hash
function to compute the handshake hash.
This removes a large chunk of duplicate (and divergent!) logic between TLS and
DTLS. It also removes TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE.
Change-Id: Ia63c94f7d76d901bc9c4c33454fbfede411adf63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1633
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream originally sampled the Finished message's hash at ChangeCipherSpec,
but our patches to add messages between the two complicated this. Move DTLS to
this path, but use the new SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE flag to avoid
special-casing message types in ssl3_get_message.
Change-Id: I9c8ddd9cc500c94dff2ec2f696f89d50ab01b3ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1632
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids needing the save the hash on the SSL* (and use some field for two
purposes). Instead, use the new SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE flag (which
actually was already used here, but at the time, pointlessly). Also fix a minor
bug where the hash would be recomputed in non-blocking mode because init_num
may stay zero for a few state machine iterations.
Change-Id: I3d8331cf3134c5f9a3eda9e988bba5bcebe40933
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1631
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This replaces the special-case in ssl3_get_message for Channel ID. Also add
ssl3_hash_current_message to hash the current message, taking TLS vs DTLS
handshake header size into account.
One subtlety with this flag is that a message intended to be processed with
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE cannot follow an optional message
(reprocessed with reuse_message, etc.). There is an assertion to that effect.
If need be, we can loosen it to requiring that the preceeding optional message
also pass SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE and then maintain some state to
perform the more accurate assertion, but this is sufficient for now.
Change-Id: If8c87342b291ac041a35885b9b5ee961aee86eab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1630
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change removes the previous OpenSSL/NSS hack in PKCS#12 parsing and
limits the hacks purely to the BER->DER conversion function, where they
belong.
PKCS#7 and #12 switch between implicit and explicit tags in different
places and sometimes only implicitly define that they are using implicit
tags. This change fixes a previous confusion where an implicit tag was
thought to be explicit.
Change-Id: Ib68c78cf2a1bfcbf90a296cb98313ab86ed2a1f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1640
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
wpa_supplicant needs this in order to get the order of the coordinate
field, apparently so that they can hash to a point.
Change-Id: I92d5df7b37b67ace5f497c25f53f16bbe134aced
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This only applies to RC4, but it is still used by some Android code.
Change-Id: I4cf86269ffb7a230576da1bb2bfef7e1d4f234d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Sadly this is needed by wpa_supplicant for NTLM hashes.
Change-Id: I1c362c676a11ee01f301ff6fbd33d0669396ea23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that only RSA and ECDSA certificates are supported, the server should just
reject non-signing ones outright, rather than allowing them to skip
CertificateVerify.
Change-Id: I7fe5ed3adde14481016ee841ed241faba18c26f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1609
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We may wish to pass data to the runner that contains NULs.
Change-Id: Id78dad0ad0b5b6d0537481c818e3febdf1740cc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1603
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes several of the problems with the old API.
- Padding was completely ignored.
- ='s in the middle of the input were accepted.
- It tries to be helpful and strips leading/trailing whitespace.
Change-Id: I99b9d5e6583f7eaf9bf0b6ee9ca39799811b58dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1602
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The return values are now 1/0, not 1/0/-1.
Change-Id: If65bb08a229c7944cb439ec779df461904d0ec19
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1607
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
09bd58d1f1 flipped a condition. Doing that
memset in the DTLS case breaks retransmits across a CCS and fails to memset in
the TLS case.
Strangely, it didn't break any tests, but I think that's a function of us
lacking renego tests. The sequence number doesn't seem to be used in the
initial handshake for TLS, so it stayed at zero. After a renego, that codepath
is relevant.
Change-Id: I369a524021857a82e181af7798c7a10fe6279550
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1601
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is cleaner than the OpenSSL code was, at least, but it's hardly
beautiful due to the "standard" that it's trying to implement. (See
[1].)
The references from the PKCS#8 code to various ciphers have digests have
been made into function pointer references rather than NIDs so that the
linker will be able to drop RC2 code for binaries that don't call PKCS#8
or #12 functions.
A bug that crashed OpenSSL/BoringSSL when parsing a malformed PKCS#8
structure has been fixed too.
See https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pfx.html
Change-Id: Iaa1039e04ed7877b90792835e8ce3ebc3b29f89e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1592
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
