Update-Note: Enabling TLS 1.3 now enables both draft-23 and draft-28
by default, in preparation for cycling all to draft-28.
Change-Id: I9405f39081f2e5f7049aaae8a9c85399f21df047
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28304
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Hopefully this is the last of it before we can hide the struct. We're
missing peer_sha256 accessors, and some test wants to mutate the ticket
in a test client.
Change-Id: I1a30fcc0a1e866d42acbc07a776014c9257f7c86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28268
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We forgot to do this in our original implementation on general ecosystem
grounds. It's also mandated starting draft-26.
Just to avoid unnecessary turbulence, since draft-23 is doomed to die
anyway, condition this on our draft-28 implementation. (We don't support
24 through 27.)
We'd actually checked this already on the Go side, but the spec wants a
different alert.
Change-Id: I0014cda03d7129df0b48de077e45f8ae9fd16976
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This is done by adding two new tagged data types to the shim's
transcript: one for the serialized handoff, and another for the
serialized handback.
Then, the handshake driver in |TLSFuzzer| is modified to be able to
drive a handoff+handback sequence in the same way as was done for
testing: by swapping |BIO|s into additional |SSL| objects. (If a
particular transcript does not contain a serialized handoff, this is a
no-op.)
Change-Id: Iab23e4dc27959ffd3d444adc41d40a4274e83653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27204
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All CBC ciphers in TLS are broken and insecure. TLS 1.2 introduced
AEAD-based ciphers which avoid their many problems. It also introduced
new CBC ciphers based on HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 that share the same
flaws as the original HMAC-SHA1 ones. These serve no purpose. Old
clients don't support them, they have the highest overhead of all TLS
ciphers, and new clients can use AEADs anyway.
Remove them from libssl. This is the smaller, more easily reverted
portion of the removal. If it survives a week or so, we can unwind a lot
more code elsewhere in libcrypto. This removal will allow us to clear
some indirect calls from crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c, aligning with
the recommendations here:
https://github.com/HACS-workshop/spectre-mitigations/blob/master/crypto_guidelines.md#2-avoid-indirect-branches-in-constant-time-code
Update-Note: The following cipher suites are removed:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Change-Id: I7ade0fc1fa2464626560d156659893899aab6f77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chrome needs to support renegotiation at TLS 1.2 + HTTP/1.1, but we're
free to shed the handshake configuration at TLS 1.3 or HTTP/2.
Rather than making config shedding implicitly disable renegotiation,
make the actual shedding dependent on a combination of the two settings.
If config shedding is enabled, but so is renegotiation (including
whether we are a client, etc.), leave the config around. If the
renegotiation setting gets disabled again after the handshake,
re-evaluate and shed the config then.
Bug: 123
Change-Id: Ie833f413b3f15b8f0ede617991e3fef239d4a323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27904
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|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
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Chromium has some code which reaches into this field for memory
accounting.
This fixes a bug in doc.go where this line-wrapping confuses it. doc.go
needs a bit of a rewrite, but this is a bit better.
Change-Id: Ic9cc2c2fe9329d7bc366ccf91e0c9a92eae08ed2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27764
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Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
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This reflects the change to add the key type into the constant. The old
constants are left around for now as legacy aliases and will be removed
later.
Change-Id: I67f1b50c01fbe0ebf4a2e9e89d3e7d5ed5f5a9d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27486
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Update-Note: I believe everything relying on this overload has since
been updated.
Change-Id: I7facf59cde56098e5e3c79470293b67abb715f4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27485
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Conscrypt need this function right now. They ought to be fixed up to not
need this but, in the meantime, this API is also provided by OpenSSL and
will clear one most consumer reaching into SSL_SESSION.
Bumping the API since Conscrypt often involves multi-sided stuff.
Change-Id: I665ca6b6a17ef479133c29c23fc639f278128c69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27405
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Change-Id: I7298c878bd2c8187dbd25903e397e8f0c2575aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26846
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This changes the contract for split handshakes such that on the
receiving side, the connection is to be driven until it returns
|SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK|, rather than until SSL_do_handshake() returns
success.
Change-Id: Idd1ebfbd943d88474d7c934f4c0ae757ff3c0f37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26864
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Checking |initial_handshake_complete| was a mistake—it's not true for
False Start connections at the time when Chrome wants to measure whether
PQ padding was used or not.
Change-Id: I51757e00f3e02129666ee1ce31c30d63f1bcbe74
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26444
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On reflection, I think we'll need to note whether dummy PQ padding was
echoed on a given connection. Otherwise measurements in Chrome will be
mixed with cases where people have MITM proxies that ignored the
extension, or possibly Google frontends that haven't been updated.
Therefore this change will be used to filter latency measurements in
Chrome to only include those where the extension was echoed and we'll
measure at levels of 1 byte (for control), 400 bytes, and 1100 bytes.
This also makes it an error if the server didn't echo an extension of
the same length as was sent.
Change-Id: Ib2a0b29cfb8719a75a28f3cf96710c57d88eaa68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26284
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SSLv3_method, SSLv3_client_method, and SSLv3_server_method produce
SSL_CTXs which fail every handshake. They appear no longer necessary for
compatibility, so remove them.
SSLv3 is still accessible to callers who explicitly re-enable SSLv3 on a
TLS_method, but that will be removed completely later this year.
Meanwhile, clear out a weird hack we had here.
Update-Note: I believe there are no more callers of these functions. Any
that were were already non-functional as these methods haven't been
unable to handshake for a while now.
Change-Id: I622f785b428ab0ceab77b5a9db05b2b0df28145a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26004
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The private key callback may not push one of its own (it's possible to
register a custom error library and whatnot, but this is tedious). If
the callback does not push any, we report SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. This is not
completely wrong, as "syscall" really means "I don't know, something you
gave me, probably the BIO, failed so I assume you know what happened",
but most callers just check errno. And indeed cert_cb pushes its own
error, so this probably should as well.
Update-Note: Custom private key callbacks which push an error code on
failure will report both that error followed by
SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED. Callbacks which did not push any
error will switch from SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL to SSL_ERROR_SSL with
SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED.
Change-Id: I7e90cd327fe0cbcff395470381a3591364a82c74
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25544
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Split handshakes allows the handshaking of a TLS connection to be
performed remotely. This encompasses not just the private-key and ticket
operations – support for that was already available – but also things
such as selecting the certificates and cipher suites.
The the comment block in ssl.h for details. This is highly experimental
and will change significantly before its settled.
Change-Id: I337bdfa4c3262169e9b79dd4e70b57f0d380fcad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25387
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
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This adds support for sending the quic_transport_parameters
(draft-ietf-quic-tls) in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions, as well as
reading the value sent by the peer.
Bug: boringssl:224
Change-Id: Ied633f557cb13ac87454d634f2bd81ab156f5399
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Since SSL{,_CTX}_set_custom_verify take a |mode| parameter that may be
|SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, it should do what it says on the tin, which is to
perform verification and ignore the result.
Change-Id: I0d8490111fb199c6b325cc167cf205316ecd4b49
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Mono's legacy TLS 1.0 stack, as a server, does not implement any form of
resumption, but blindly echos the ClientHello session ID in the
ServerHello for no particularly good reason.
This is invalid, but due to quirks of how our client checked session ID
equality, we only noticed on the second connection, rather than the
first. Flaky failures do no one any good, so break deterministically on
the first connection, when we realize something strange is going on.
Bug: chromium:796910
Change-Id: I1f255e915fcdffeafb80be481f6c0acb3c628846
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Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
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This extension will be used to measure the latency impact of potentially
sending a post-quantum key share by default. At this time it's purely
measuring the impact of the client sending the key share, not the server
replying with a ciphertext.
We could use the existing padding extension for this but that extension
doesn't allow the server to echo it, so we would need a different
extension in the future anyway. Thus we just create one now.
We can assume that modern clients will be using TLS 1.3 by the time that
PQ key-exchange is established and thus the key share will be sent in
all ClientHello messages. However, since TLS 1.3 isn't quite here yet,
this extension is also sent for TLS 1.0–1.2 ClientHellos. The latency
impact should be the same either way.
Change-Id: Ie4a17551f6589b28505797e8c54cddbe3338dfe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24585
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This function maps |X509_V_ERR_*| to SSL alarm codes. It's used
internally when certs are verified with X509_verify_cert(), and is
helpful to callers who want to call that function, but who also want
to report its errors in a less implementation-dependent way.
Change-Id: I2900cce2eb631489f0947c317beafafd3ea57a75
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TLS 1.3 includes a server-random-based anti-downgrade signal, as a
workaround for TLS 1.2's ServerKeyExchange signature failing to cover
the entire handshake. However, because TLS 1.3 draft versions are each
doomed to die, we cannot deploy it until the final RFC. (Suppose a
draft-TLS-1.3 client checked the signal and spoke to a final-TLS-1.3
server. The server would correctly negotiate TLS 1.2 and send the
signal. But the client would then break. An anologous situation exists
with reversed roles.)
However, it appears that Cisco devices have non-compliant TLS 1.2
implementations[1] and copy over another server's server-random when
acting as a TLS terminator (client and server back-to-back).
Hopefully they are the only ones doing this. Implement a
measurement-only version with a different value. This sentinel must not
be enforced, but it will tell us whether enforcing it will cause
problems.
[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25168.html
Bug: 226
Change-Id: I976880bdb2ef26f51592b2f6b3b97664342679c8
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Upgrade-Note: SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment) on the server
should switch to SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment2).
(Configuring any TLS 1.3 variants on the server enables all variants,
so this is a no-op. We're just retiring some old experiments.)
Change-Id: I60f0ca3f96ff84bdf59e1a282a46e51d99047462
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QUIC will need to derive keys at this point. This also smooths over a
part of the server 0-RTT abstraction. Like with False Start, the SSL
object is largely in a functional state at this point.
Bug: 221
Change-Id: I4207d8cb1273a1156e728a7bff3943cc2c69e288
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We can probably do this globally at this point since the cipher
requirements are much more restrict than they were in the beginning.
(Firefox, in particular, has done so far a while.) For now add a flag
since some consumer wanted this.
I'll see about connecting it to a Chrome field trial after our breakage
budget is no longer reserved for TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Ib61dd5aae2dfd48b56e79873a7f3061a7631a5f8
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After much procrastinating, we finally moved Chromium to the new stuff.
We can now delete this. This is a breaking change for
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD consumers, but it should be trivial (remove some
unused fields in the struct). I've bumped BORINGSSL_API_VERSION to ease
any multi-sided changes that may be needed.
Change-Id: I9fe562590ad938bcb4fcf9af0fadeff1d48745fb
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We were only running a random subset of TLS 1.3 tests with variants and
let a lot of bugs through as a result.
- HelloRetryRequest-EmptyCookie wasn't actually testing what we were
trying to test.
- The second HelloRetryRequest detection needs tweaks in draft-22.
- The empty HelloRetryRequest logic can't be based on non-empty
extensions in draft-22.
- We weren't sending ChangeCipherSpec correctly in HRR or testing it
right.
- Rework how runner reads ChangeCipherSpec by setting a flag which
affects the next readRecord. This cuts down a lot of cases and works
correctly if the client didn't send early data. (In that case, we
don't flush CCS until EndOfEarlyData and runner deadlocks waiting for
the ChangeCipherSpec to arrive.)
Change-Id: I559c96ea3a8b350067e391941231713c6edb2f78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23125
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This introduces a wire change to Experiment2/Experiment3 over 0RTT, however
as there is never going to be a 0RTT deployment with Experiment2/Experiment3,
this is valid.
Change-Id: Id541d195cbc4bbb3df7680ae2a02b53bb8ae3eab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22744
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We end up writing these switch cases everywhere. Let consumers decompose
these a bit. The original thought was folks should write switch-cases so
they handle everything they support, but that's a pain. As long as
algorithm preferences are always configured, we can still add new
dimensions because folks won't be asked to sign algorithms that depend
on dimensions they don't understand.
Change-Id: I3dd7f067f2c55212f0201876546bc70fee032bcf
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Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22164
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Change-Id: I63b9972034fdc85bf2d23e7d46516755855fafbe
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We still have more links to cut for ssl.h to not pull in x509.h (notably
pem.h), but this resolves some easy ones. I've kept the constants the
same just in case, but nowhere are the constants mixed up by callers or
passed from one to the other in the functions' implementations. They're
completely independent.
Change-Id: Ic0896283378b5846afd6422bfe740951ac552f0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21704
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
It's no longer needed in the public header at all, now that we've hidden
the SSL_CTX struct.
Change-Id: I2fc6ddbeb52f000487627b433b9cdd7a4cde37a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21684
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit 9a4876e193 broke NGINX builds with
BoringSSL due to this missing include (OpenSSL builds work fine):
src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c: In function ‘ngx_ssl_session_ticket_key_callback’:
src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c:3065:13: error: implicit declaration of function ‘HMAC_Init_ex’; did you mean ‘SHA1_Init’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key[0].hmac_key, size, digest, NULL) != 1) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~
Change-Id: Ie7170f05034d5fd8c85d1948b4ab9c9bb8447d13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Alex Gaynor for reporting this.
Change-Id: I983ecb33cf017160f82582cc79e71f8ae7b30b99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21744
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This frees us up to make SSL_CTX a C++ type and avoids a lot of
protrusions of otherwise private types into the global namespace.
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I8a0624a53a4d26ac4a483fa270c39ecdd07459ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21584
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The only difference is whether there's an alert to send back, but we'll
need to allow an "error without alert" in several cases anyway:
1. If the server sees an HTTP request or garbage instead of a
ClientHello, it shouldn't send an alert.
2. Resurfaced errors.
Just make zero signal no alert for now. Later on, I'm thinking we might
just want to put the alert into the outgoing buffer and make it further
uniform.
This also gives us only one error state to keep track of rather than
two.
Bug: 206
Change-Id: Ia821d9f89abd2ca6010e8851220d4e070bc42fa1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21286
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around
our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some
difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong.
Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can
break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility
version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then
conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this
function.
This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds
enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is
this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be
especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some
growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we
converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream.
It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all
projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but
did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes.
Specifically:
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct.
- X509_get0_signature is now const-correct.
For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload
hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working.
This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote
that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384.
Bug: 91
Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Querying versions is a bit of a mess between DTLS and TLS and variants
and friends. Add SSL_SESSION_is_single_use which informs the caller
whether the session should be single-use.
Bug: chromium:631988
Change-Id: I745d8a5dd5dc52008fe99930d81fed7651b92e4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20844
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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SSL_CTX_sessions is the only think making us expose LHASH as public API
and nothing uses it. Nothing can use it anyway as it's not thread-safe.
I haven't actually removed it yet since SSL_CTX is public, but once the
types are opaque, we could trim the number of symbols ssl.h pulls in
with some work.
Relatedly, fix thread safety of SSL_CTX_sess_number.
Change-Id: I75a6c93509d462cd5ed3ce76c587f0d1e7cd0797
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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draft-ietf-quic-tls needs access to the cipher's PRF hash to size its
keys correctly.
Change-Id: Ie4851f990e5e1be724f262f608f7195f7ca837ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20624
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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base.h pulls in all the forward declarations, so this isn't needed. We
should also remove bio.h and buf.h, but cURL seems to depend on those.
Code search suggests this one is okay though.
case:yes content:\bHMAC content:openssl/ssl.h -content:openssl/hmac.h
Change-Id: Id91686bd134649245855025940bc17f82823c734
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20364
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Right now we report the per-connection value during the handshake and
the per-session value after the handshake. This also trims our tickets
slightly by removing a largely unused field from SSL_SESSION.
Putting it on SSL_HANDSHAKE would be better, but sadly a number of
bindings-type APIs expose it after the handshake.
Change-Id: I6a1383f95da9b1b141b9d6adadc05ee1e458a326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20064
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Bug: 128
Change-Id: Ief3779b1c43dd34a154a0f1d2f94d0da756bc07a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19144
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Consumers have been switched to the new ones.
Change-Id: I7a8ec6308775a105a490882c97955daed12a2c2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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They both can be moderately large. This should hopefully relieve a little
memory pressure from both connections to hosts which serve SCTs and
TLS 1.3's single-use tickets.
Change-Id: I034bbf057fe5a064015a0f554b3ae9ea7797cd4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19584
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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ssl is all that's left. Will do that once that's at a quiet point.
Change-Id: Ia183aed5671e3b2de333def138d7f2c9296fb517
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19564
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The ticket encryption key is rotated automatically once every 24 hours,
unless a key has been configured manually (i.e. using
|SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys|) or one of the custom ticket encryption
methods is used.
Change-Id: I0dfff28b33e58e96b3bbf7f94dcd6d2642f37aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This loosens the earlier restriction to match Channel ID. Both may be
configured and offered, but the server is obligated to select only one
of them. This aligns with the current tokbind + 0-RTT draft where the
combination is signaled by a separate extension.
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I786102a679999705d399f0091f76da236be091c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19124
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Other projects are starting to use them. Having two APIs for the same
thing is silly, so deprecate all our old ones.
Change-Id: Iaf6b6995bc9e4b624140d5c645000fbf2cb08162
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows us to fix another consumer that directly accesses SSL_CTX.
I've made ssl_test use it for test coverage, though we're okay with
ssl_test depending on ssl/internal.h.
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I464325e3faa9f0194bbd357fbb31a996afc0c2e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18964
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
WebRTC will need this (probably among other things) to lose crypto/x509
at some point.
Bug: chromium:706445
Change-Id: I988e7300c4d913986b6ebbd1fa4130548dde76a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There was a typo (then => the), but I think this is clearer, albeit
longer.
Change-Id: Ic95368a1bea1feba9d6a00029bbfb5b8ffd260ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18747
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There are still a ton of them, almost exclusively complaints that
function declaration and definitions have different parameter names. I
just fixed a few randomly.
Change-Id: I1072f3dba8f63372cda92425aa94f4aa9e3911fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18706
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Similarly, add EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len which computes the exact tag length
for required by EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter.
Change-Id: I069b0ad16fab314fd42f6048a3c1dc45e8376f7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The value returned by |SSL_get_servername| is owned by the |SSL*|, which
might be surprising if someone stashes it away and expects to be able to
use it later.
Change-Id: I7b61d1dd0d3d0bf035bbcc9ffdbea10c33296f59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18444
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
OpenSSL allows spaces, commas and semi-colons to be used as separators
in cipher strings, in addition to the usual colons.
This change documents that spaces cannot be used in equal-preference
groups and forbids these alternative separators in strict mode.
Change-Id: I3879e25aed54539c281511627e6a282e9463bdc3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18424
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a C++ interface for encrypting and decrypting TLS application
data records in-place, wrapping the existing C API in tls_record.cc.
Also add bssl::Span, a non-owning reference to a contiguous array of
elements which can be used as a common interface over contiguous
container types (like std::vector), pointer-length-pairs, arrays, etc.
Change-Id: Iaa2ca4957cde511cb734b997db38f54e103b0d92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18104
Commit-Queue: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The previous attempt around the 'struct ssl_st' compatibility mess
offended OSS-Fuzz and UBSan because one compilation unit passed a
function pointer with ssl_st* and another called it with
bssl::SSLConnection*.
Linkers don't retain such types, of course, but to silence this alert,
instead make C-visible types be separate from the implementation and
subclass the public type. This does mean we risk polluting the symbol
namespace, but hopefully the compiler is smart enough to inline the
visible struct's constructor and destructor.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ia75a89b3a22a202883ad671a630b72d0aeef680e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is needed to switch Chromium's SSLServerSocket and parts of
Conscrypt to CRYPTO_BUFFER.
Bug: 54
Change-Id: Iacd417970607bc1a162057676b576956a3bdfa3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This implements PR #1051
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1051).
Local experiments were not able to replicate the claims in the PR, but
implement this anyway for comparison purposes.
Change-Id: Ic9baf5e671f9a44565020466a553dd08f5ec0f1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17844
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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As of 958346a5e7, the callback is called
multiple times.
Change-Id: I40dafeb9f14de7d016644313ef137a0c85f0a24d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17725
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: I3de3c48a1de59c2b8de348253ce62a648aa6d6eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17327
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is a bit verbose, but this API is goofy and causes a lot of
confusion. This may be clearer.
Change-Id: I9affff99b838958058e56ee3062521421c9accc5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17645
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This has come up a few times and our docs aren't great. This hopefully
describes the sharp edges better.
Change-Id: I5d4044449f74ec116838fd1bba629cd90dc0d1ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I819a5b565e4380f3d816a2e4a68572935c612eae
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17564
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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WatchGuard's bug is very distinctive. Report a dedicated error code out
of BoringSSL so we can better track this.
Bug: chromium:733223
Change-Id: Ia42abd8654e7987b1d43c63a4f454f35f6aa873b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17328
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Both Conscrypt and Netty have a lot of logic to map between the two
kinds of names. WebRTC needed an SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name for something.
Just have both in the library. Also deprecate SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name
in favor of SSL_CIPHER_standard_name, which matches upstream if built
with enable-ssl-trace. And, unlike SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name, this does
not require dealing with the malloc.
(Strangely this decreases bssl's binary size, even though we're carrying
more strings around. It seems the old SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name was
somewhat large in comparison. Regardless, a consumer that disliked 30
short strings probably also disliked the OpenSSL names. That would be
better solved by opaquifying SSL_CIPHER and adding a less stringy API
for configuring cipher lists. That's something we can explore later if
needed.)
I also made the command-line tool print out the standard names since
they're more standard. May as well push folks towards those going
forward.
Change-Id: Ieeb3d63e67ef4da87458e68d130166a4c1090596
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17324
Reviewed-by: Robert Sloan <varomodt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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These are not the true version filters due to SSL_OP_NO_* filters.
Change-Id: I4c2db967d885f7c1875a3e052c5b02ea8d612fe1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17266
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
It does not appear removing support for these is feasible right now. :-(
Change-Id: I99521ba6c141855b5140d98bce445d7e62415661
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17251
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Free code coverage. Also rename things in SSL_select_next_proto so it
works for NPN and ALPN. (I found some code which uses it for ALPN.)
Change-Id: I8d06b768f9484dc3eda1a20506ec84ec3ddbc883
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17206
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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BUG=76
Change-Id: If58a73da38e46549fd55f84a9104e2dfebfda43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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The only place it is used is EC_KEY_{dup,copy} and no one calls that
function on an EC_KEY with ex_data. This aligns with functions like
RSAPublicKey_dup which do not copy ex_data. The logic is also somewhat
subtle in the face of malloc errors (upstream's PR 3323).
In fact, we'd even changed the function pointer signature from upstream,
so BoringSSL-only code is needed to pass this pointer in anyway. (I
haven't switched it to CRYPTO_EX_unused because there are some callers
which pass in an implementation anyway.)
Note, in upstream, the dup hook is also used for SSL_SESSIONs when those
are duplicated (for TLS 1.2 ticket renewal or TLS 1.3 resumption). Our
interpretation is that callers should treat those SSL_SESSIONs
equivalently to newly-established ones. This avoids every consumer
providing a dup hook and simplifies the interface.
(I've gone ahead and removed the TODO(fork). I don't think we'll be able
to change this API. Maybe introduce a new one, but it may not be worth
it? Then again, this API is atrocious... I've never seen anyone use argl
and argp even.)
BUG=21
Change-Id: I6c9e9d5a02347cb229d4c084c1e85125bd741d2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Instead of a script which generates macros, emit static inlines in
individual header (or C files). This solves a few issues with the
original setup:
- The documentation was off. We match the documentation now.
- The stack macros did not check constness; see some of the fixes in
crypto/x509.
- Type errors did not look like usual type errors.
- Any type which participated in STACK_OF had to be made partially
public. This allows stack types to be defined an internal header or
even an individual file.
- One could not pass sk_FOO_free into something which expects a function
pointer.
Thanks to upstream's 411abf2dd37974a5baa54859c1abcd287b3c1181 for the
idea.
Change-Id: Ie5431390ccad761c17596b0e93941b0d7a68f904
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16087
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We returned the wrong type, but with a typedef which made it void*. In
C++, void* to T* doesn't implicitly convert, so it doesn't quite work
right. Notably, Node passes it into sk_SSL_COMP_zero. The sk_* macros
only weakly typecheck right now, but a pending CL converts them to
proper functions.
Change-Id: I635d1e39e4f4f11b2b7bf350115a7f1b1be30e4f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16447
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I7d8f9098038a82b29ab0eff8a3258975d8804a68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16264
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
I think I've finally cleared this out. Everything should be using
upstream's longer 'proto' names now.
Change-Id: I6ab283dca845fdc184f3764223d027acba59ca91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16086
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
When writing tests and BoGo isn't available, it is useful to be able to
configure the set of signature algorithms accepted on the verify side.
Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ic873189da7f8853e412acd68614df9d9a872a0c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15125
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14886
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
