Remove the existing md5_test and sha1_test. They now are all covered by
digest_test. For good measure, test the one-shot functions too.
Change-Id: I8e144cc563fb8817144e26cbd2e10c15642464ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also add a few other assertions.
Change-Id: Iae0c65802f4d05c7585e2790be5295f478e1f614
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2210
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Two leaks can happen: if idx is -1, the newly allocated entry may not be freed.
Also, for X509_PURPOSE_add, if only one BUF_strdup succeeds, it will leak.
Restructure both so that the allocations happen ahead of time and are properly
cleaned up. This avoids leaving an existing entry in a half-broken state.
Found (sort of) by scan-build; because of all the indirections and DYNAMIC
flags, it doesn't actually realize the leak's been fixed.
Change-Id: I5521889bd14e007b3f62b6a4906d7c346698b48c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2209
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If it fails to be added to the list, the input should be freed. Found (sort of)
by scan-build; because of all the indirections and DYNAMIC flags, it doesn't
actually realize the leak's been fixed.
Change-Id: Idca10964e1ffb2ace1cea7f88d94693205d70d5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2208
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
s->s3 is never NULL if an ssl3_* function is called, and we'll crash later
anyway. (This also makes scan-build stop believing it can be NULL.)
Change-Id: Ibf8433bd4d945f9bf5416d72946102a9e50d2787
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2206
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Appease clang scan-build a bit. I'm not sure it's actually worth silencing all
of them because some of them look like preserving invariants between local
variables, but some are clearly pointless or can be restructured slightly.
Change-Id: I0bc81e2589bb402ff3ef0182d7a8921e31b85052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2205
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Check the return value while we're here. This avoids some arithmetic and
appease scan-build's dead assignment flagger.
Change-Id: If3615076e091eb44b9e3e9d50cd64f80e645337e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2204
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's ef908777218bd4a362dbe9cebb8e18fa8ab384cf.)
Change-Id: Id9b288d230cc9d8ab308690a18e687e2132e3293
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2168
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 267e6f3cc0)
Change-Id: I99cfd0196b9625449c50494562c44f57f09fed17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2167
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This stopped being a sample program a bit ago.
Change-Id: I23301fd71a373f995847dcfd64346bd262811f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This got lost in the initial commit. Add a test for d2i_AutoPrivateKey.
BUG=crbug.com/428671
Change-Id: Ib4f6114b03536edcfe3b1720a513f57f748e81d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2130
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Without SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY, even blocking mode will return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_{READ|WRITE} in the event of a renegotiation.
The comments in the code speak only of "nasty problems" unless this is
done. The original commit that added SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
(54f10e6adc) gives a little more detail:
The [...] behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and
s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read.
Without the -nbio flag, s_client will use select() to find when the
socket is readable and then call SSL_read with a blocking socket.
However, this will still block in the event of an incomplete record, so
the delay is already unbounded. This it's very unclear what the point of
this behaviour ever was.
Perhaps if the read and write paths were different sockets where the
read socket was non-blocking but the write socket was blocking. But that
seems like an implausible situation to worry too much about.
Change-Id: I9d9f2526afc2e0fd0e5440e9a047f419a2d61afa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2140
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only alias, EVP_PKEY_RSA2, is handled programmatically. ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS and
ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC are then unused and unexported and can be removed.
Change-Id: I990650636bac3b802c8b439257c67ce7a3f8bc70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never used, upstream or downstream. The 64-bit value is wrong anyway for
LLP64 platforms.
Change-Id: I56afc51f4c17ed3f1c30959b574034f181b5b0c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2123
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some archaeology: it was added in upstream's
ee1d9ec019. This seems to come from upstream's
arrangement where an EVP_MD can specify both the signing algorithm and the
message digest. (Most of the usual hash algorithms were tied to RSA.)
The flag is set on EVP_MDs that should use the EVP_PKEY's method table in
EVP_Sign* rather than the one attached to the EVP_MD (there's also
required_pkey_type to filter on EVP_PKEY to prevent a mismatch). Without the
flag, the old codepath is hit where they're tied together.
Interestingly, EVP_md5 does not have the flag, but I suppose this is because no
one would sign ECDSA + MD5. EVP_DigestSign* also postdates this and doesn't use
the legacy mechanism anyway. Upstream also has, e.g., EVP_ecdsa(). Although
those too have since also gained the flag in
bce1af7762.
Let's get rid of these TODOs. We don't have the old codepath. It's unclear if
upstream really does either at this point.
Note: EVP_PKEY_RSA_method in upstream is actually a macro that expands to three
fields, which is why it's so difficult to figure out what's going on with those
structs.
Change-Id: I1aea4d3f79f1eb1755063bb96c1c65276c6e3643
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2122
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code isn't compiled in. It seems there was some half-baked logic for a
7-byte alert that includes more information about handshake messages
retransmit.
No such alert exists, and the code had a FIXME anyway. If it gets resurrected
in DTLS 1.3 or some extension, we can deal with it then.
Change-Id: I8784ea8ee44bb8da4b0fe5d5d507997526557432
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code was dead as ssl3_get_client_certificate no longer allows a
ClientHello; the hash would be reset, but then the handshake would fail anyway.
Change-Id: Ib98e6a319c048c263d7ee3a27832ea57bdd0e2ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support to the Go code for renegotiation as a client,
meaning that we can test BoringSSL's renegotiation as a server.
Change-Id: Iaa9fb1a6022c51023bce36c47d4ef7abee74344b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2082
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
bl and bh are never used by macros if either BN_UMULT_LOHI or
BN_UMULT_HIGH are defined.
Change-Id: I7fdd45014a6b78cc586b5223396e09bc213608a5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2105
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium's doesn't have built-in support for ml64.exe. Seems easier to
just build consistently with Yasm on both Win32 and Win64. (This will
require an equivalent change in Chromium's build, but keep upstream
and downstream builds consistent.)
Also don't set CMAKE_ASM_NASM_COMPILER explicitly; cmake's default
ASM_NASM behavior will search for both nasm or yasm in %PATH%. Leave
it unset so it can be overwritten on the command-line to point to
a particular yasm. Update BUILDING accordingly.
Verified the tests still pass.
Change-Id: I7e434be474b5b2d49e3bafbced5b41cc0246bd00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us run bssl speed at least. bssl client is currently compiled
out until we clean up our socket story on Windows and get it working.
Change-Id: Ib1dc0d0e0a6eed7544207e7bbe138503731fda67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
generic.c still needs to include generic implementations in Win64.
Those are currently done with inline assembly and won't work on
MSVC.
Change-Id: Ifeb5470872d8c97b2ccffeae6f3ccb5661051de3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2102
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Minor change, but they're the users of the old API left within
BoringSSL.
Change-Id: Ic24e0d006c97fa5265abc3373d3f98aa8d2f8b1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is no longer used but, by retaining it, we might miss cases where
code is still testing against it.
Change-Id: I40ed47e41f903aaf2c5e5354d4348f8890021382
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2110
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although x86masm.pl exists, upstream's documentation suggest only x86nasm.pl is
supported. Yasm seems to handle it fine with a small change.
Change-Id: Ia77be57c6b743527225924b2b398f2f07a084a7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2092
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were building the NASM flavor with MASM which is why it didn't work. Get the
MASM output working: cpuid and cmove are not available in MASM unless the file
declares .686. Also work around MASM rejecting a very long line in SHA-256.
The follow-up change will get the NASM flavor working. We should probably use
that one as it's documented as supported upstream. But let's make this one
functional too.
Change-Id: Ica69cc042a7250c7bc9ba9325caab597cd4ce616
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2091
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Win32 still has assembly issues and bssl wants to select() on both sockets and
stdin (doesn't work on Windows). But this is a start.
Change-Id: Iafc5215be281aed836c5ac2dc8b379399848a2c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If generating the master secret or applying the PSK post-processing fails,
we'll double-free all the ECDH state.
Change-Id: Id52931af73bdef5eceb06f7e64d32fdda629521e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2063
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Like ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, it is split into three parts:
- If PSK, query the PSK and write out the PSK identity.
- Compute the base pre-master secret.
- If PSK, compute the final pre-master secret.
This also fixes some double-frees on malloc failures in the ECDHE case. And it
avoids using the handshake output buffer to start the premaster secret.
Change-Id: I8631ee33c1e9c19604b3dcce2c676c83893c308d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2062
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
pskKeyAgreement is now a wrapper over a base key agreement.
Change-Id: Ic18862d3e98f7513476f878b8df5dcd8d36a0eac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The current implementation switches the order of other_secret and psk;
other_secret is first. Fix it and rewrite with CBB instead. The server half got
fixed on accident in a prior refactor.
Change-Id: Ib52a756aadd66e4bf22c66794447f71f4772da09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only the three plain PSK suites for now. ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 will
be in a follow-up.
Change-Id: Iafc116a5b2798c61d90c139b461cf98897ae23b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X509_NAME is one of the symbols that collide with wincrypt.h. Move it to x509.h
so libraries which only use the pure-crypto portions of BoringSSL without X.509
needn't have to resolve the collision.
Change-Id: I057873498e58fe4a4cf264356f9a58d7a15397b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was already almost there. Just a malloc failure away. now all the
EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}* functions may be used without worrying about -1 return
values.
Change-Id: I96a9750b300010615979bd5f1522b1d241764665
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Deprecate the old two-pass version of the function. If the ticket is too long,
replace it with a placeholder value but keep the connection working.
Change-Id: Ib9fdea66389b171862143d79b5540ea90a9bd5fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2011
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old ones inverted their return value. Add SSL_(CTX_)set_srtp_profiles which
return success/failure correctly and deprecate the old functions. Also align
srtp.h with the new style since it's very short.
When this rolls through, we can move WebRTC over to the new ones.
Change-Id: Ie55282e8858331910bba6ad330c8bcdd0e38f2f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2060
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Doing some archeaology, since the initial OpenSSL commit, key_arg has been
omitted from the serialization if key_arg_length was 0. Since this is an
SSLv2-only field and resuming an SSLv2 session with SSLv3+ is not possible,
there is no need to support parsing those sessions.
Interestingly, it is actually not the case that key_arg_length was only ever
set in SSLv2, historically. In the initial commit of OpenSSL, SSLeay 0.8.1b,
key_arg was used to store what appears to be the IV. That was then removed in
the next commit, an import of SSLeay 0.9.0b, at which point key_arg was only
ever set in SSLv3. That is old enough that there is certainly no need to
parse pre-SSLeay-0.9.0b sessions...
Change-Id: Ia768a2d97ddbe60309be20e2efe488640c4776d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2050
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Piotr Sikora