Since only the consumers knows whether an EC key will be used for
ECDSA or ECDHE, it is part of the FIPS policy for the consumer to
check the validity of the generated key before signing with it.
Change-Id: Ie250f655c8fcb6a59cc7210def1e87eb958e9349
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14745
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This moves the kinv computation next to k generation and adds a check for group
size as per 186-4 B.5.2.
Change-Id: I8744080d3961bc9e29054985280fc835e3f1e25c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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It's not obvious how to make ASAN happy with the integrity test but this
will let us test FIPS-only code with ASAN at least.
Change-Id: Iac983787e04cb86a158e4416c410d9b2d1e5e03f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS prescribes a slightly different key generation algorithm than we
use. Specifically:
- Rather than using BN_RAND_TOP_TWO (so using 1.5 as an upper bound for
sqrt(2)), it prescribes using sqrt(2) itself. To avoid unnecessary
squaring, we do a comparison against a hard-coded approximation for
sqrt(2) good enough for the largest FIPS key size. I went ahead and
made it constant-time since it was easy, but all this is far from
constant-time.
- FIPS requires a check that |p-q| is sufficiently large.
- FIPS requires a check that d is sufficiently large.
- BN_generate_prime_ex adds some delta to clear a table of prime
numbers. FIPS does not specify any of that, so implement a separate
routine here.
The primality test itself will be aligned in a follow-up. For now, it is
left unchanged, except that trial division is turned back on. That makes
things faster and is analogous the original algorithm's delta-munging
logic.
Change-Id: If32f0635bfb67a8c4740dedd7781d00647bbf60b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, inject-hash would run the FIPS module in order to trigger a
failure and then extract the calculated hash value from the output. This
makes cross-compiling difficult because the build process needs to run a
binary for the target platform.
This change drops this step. Instead, inject-hash.go parses the object
file itself and calculates the hash without needing to run the module.
Change-Id: I2593daa03094b0a17b498c2e8be6915370669596
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14964
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The FIPS RSA generation algorithm is unkind to keys with funny bit
sizes. Odd numbers of bits are especially inconvenient, but the sqrt(2)
bound is much simpler if the key size is a multiple of 128 (thus giving
prime sizes a multiple of 64, so the sqrt(2) bound is easier to work
with).
Also impose a minimum RSA key size. 255-bit RSA is far too small as it
is and gives small enough primes that the p-q FIPS bound (2^(n/2-100))
starts risking underflow.
Change-Id: I4583c90b67385e53641ccee9b29044e79e94c920
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is just some idle cleanup. The padding functions already must
handle size checks. Swap out the error code in the low-level portions to
keep that unchanged.
Also remove an old TODO(fork) about constant-time-ness. Signature
verification padding checks don't need to be constant time, and
decryption ones should be resolved now.
Change-Id: I20e7affdb7f2dce167a304afe707bfd537dd412a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I9f7f1dd609c38d1f4be536daff94a4ba002582d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14888
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Later CLs will unwind the rest of multiprime RSA support. Start with key
generation.
Change-Id: Id20473fd55cf32c27ea4a57f2d2ea11daaffedeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That file was getting too huge and we only need to de-static a single
function to do it.
Change-Id: Ie2c0bc90a7e538a74318c364a136c337ce8d9bbb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14884
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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As a precursor to removing the code entirely later, disable the protocol
by default. Callers must use SSL_CTX_set_min_version to enable it.
This change also makes SSLv3_method *not* enable SSL 3.0. Normally
version-specific methods set the minimum and maximum version to their
version. SSLv3_method leaves the minimum at the default, so we will
treat it as all versions disabled. To help debugging, the error code is
switched from WRONG_SSL_VERSION to a new NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED.
This also defines OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 and OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD to kick in
any no-ssl3 build paths in consumers which should provide a convenient
hook for any upstreaming changes that may be needed. (OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
existed in older versions of OpenSSL, so in principle one may encounter
an OpenSSL with the same settings.)
Change-Id: I96a8f2f568eb77b2537b3a774b2f7108bd67dd0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14031
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Change-Id: I92419b7d2d8ded8f4868588ad3c24b70ac7f7b1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14864
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Change-Id: I3134b2ed1b2000bf2413c066c6560832c0ff03ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14704
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The built-in CMake support seems to basically work, though it believes
you want to build a fat binary which doesn't work with how we build
perlasm. (We'd need to stop conditioning on CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR at
all, wrap all the generated assembly files in ifdefs, and convince the
build to emit more than one. Probably not worth bothering for now.)
We still, of course, need to actually test the assembly on iOS before
this can be shipped anywhere.
BUG=48
Change-Id: I6ae71d98d706be03142b82f7844d1c9b02a2b832
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14645
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These two functions behave identically if the input is a word, which is
true if bits <= BN_BITS2. This also matches upstream's version of the
function. I'm guessing the patch was originally submitted as we have it,
perhaps because we didn't notice BN_get_word at the time, and it got
switched to the existing BN_get_word function in review.
Change-Id: I7847e3086aab871c5aa28e15fae6f89c964862d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14331
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't like uninitialized function-level static consts and
Android complains we're casting away a volatile.
Change-Id: I7c53de45cff9fa2ef298f015cf3f5ecca82194d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14807
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This restores the original version of delocate.go, with the subsequent
bugfixes patched in. With this, the FIPS module builds with GCC and
Clang, with and without optimizations. I did patch over a variant of the
macro though, since it was otherwise really wordy.
Playing games with sections was a little overly clever and relied on the
compiler not performing a number of optimizations. Clang blew threw all
of those assumptions.
Change-Id: Ib4da468a5925998457994f9e392cf0c04573fe91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14805
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes two issues in clang.
- clang emits callq instead of call.
- clang emits .cfi_endproc after .size for the dummy functions. This
causes it to get confused as there is no matching .cfi_startproc.
Don't bother trying to omit the dummy functions.
Alas, clang seems to compile the DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION hooks in a way
that brings the .rel.ro back AND isn't honoring the noinline. We'll
probably need to go back to the original CL's setup there.
Change-Id: Ic21ea99e54a93cdc739e4f67dc308d83083607d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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In typical style I forgot to push a new revision before
landing fd49993c3b. That change accidently
dropped patchset eight when I squashed David's changes in, so this
restores that and fixes a couple of 80-char issues in a Python script.
Change-Id: I7e9338a715c68ae5c89d9d1f7d03782b99af2aa8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14784
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This is the only single-shot hash function which pretends it has a
failure case.
Change-Id: Ibf45e197eafc63c368be3783dfeec8ccb95589ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=187
Change-Id: I5775ce0886041b0c12174a7d665f3af1e8bce511
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14505
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14449
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On malloc error, CRYPTO_set_ex_data may fail. (See upstream's
62f488d31733e5dc77b339f905b44f165550e47d.)
It also failed to copy the reserved slots when we revised the app-data
machinery, although this is unreachable as EC_KEY is the only thing
which uses this function and EC_KEY has no reserved slots. (We probably
can/should also take CRYPTO_dup_ex_data out of there, as it's a little
bit weird...)
Change-Id: I60bbc301f919d4c0ee7fff362f979f6ec18d73b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14604
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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(Thanks to Sam Panzer for the patch.)
At least some linkers will drop constructor functions if no symbols from
that translation unit are used elsewhere in the program. On POWER, since
the cached capability value isn't a global in crypto.o (like other
platforms), the constructor function is getting discarded.
The C++11 spec says (3.6.2, paragraph 4):
It is implementation-defined whether the dynamic initialization of a
non-local variable with static storage duration is done before the
first statement of main. If the initialization is deferred to some
point in time after the first statement of main, it shall occur
before the first odr-use (3.2) of any function or variable defined
in the same translation unit as the variable to be initialized.
Compilers appear to interpret that to mean they are allowed to drop
(i.e. indefinitely defer) constructors that occur in translation units
that are never used, so they can avoid initializing some part of a
library if it's dropped on the floor.
This change makes the hardware capability value for POWER a global in
crypto.c, which should prevent the constructor function from being
ignored.
Change-Id: I43ebe492d0ac1491f6f6c2097971a277f923dd3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14664
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This was a mess. HMAC_CTX_copy_ex would avoid having to cleanup and init
the HMAC_CTX repeatedly, but even that is unnecessary. hctx_tpl was just
to reuse the key. Instead, HMAC_CTX already can be reset with the same
key. (Alas, with a slightly odd API, but so it goes.) Do that, and use
goto err to cleanup the error-handling.
Thanks to upstream's b98530d6e09f4cb34c791b8840e936c1fc1467cf for
drawing attention to this. (Though we've diverged significantly from
upstream with all the heap-allocated bits, so I didn't use the change
itself.)
While I'm here, tidy up some variable names and cite the newer RFC.
Change-Id: Ic1259f46b7c5a14dc341b8cee385be5508ac4daf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14605
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These static output buffers are a legacy from a time before processes
had threads. This change drops support and callers who were depending on
this (of which there are hopefully none) will crash.
Change-Id: I7b8eb3440def507f92543e55465f821dfa02c7da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14528
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Change-Id: I32b37306265e89afca568f20bfba2e04559c4f0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14527
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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and relying on a compiler to generate code for unaligned access. Both gcc
and llvm currently do that but llvm is going to change to generate code for
aligned access. The change in llvm will break SHA-1 on POWER without this fix.
Change-Id: If9393968288cf94b684ad340e3ea295e03174aa9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14378
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are a few test vectors which were not imported from djb's. Mirror
those. Also as RFC 8032 uses a slightly different private key
representation, document this in curve25519.h.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I119381168ba1af9b332365fd8f974fba41759d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14445
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is a remnant of a previous iteration of the SSL client certificate
bridging logic in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ifa8e15cc970395f179e2f6db65c97a342af5498d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is slightly tidier than casting through function pointers. (Also
more defined? But we cast T* => void* within a function pointer all over
the place, so that's probably a lost cause.)
Change-Id: I8f435906f3066d1377eababf940e3db34c626acd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14313
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only need the size_t ones now.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ie6935656bbc4bd2b602b8fad78effc401c493416
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14312
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Not that this is remotely necessary since the code bounds to 1MB, the
caller bounds to INT_MAX (due to EVP_CIPHER) and the grandcaller bounds
to 16k (due to TLS).
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ia75990a30bac26ca617532630340ff94a88e4e20
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14311
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is redundant because these "AEAD"s are not meant to be used outside
of TLS, but since we've moved them into their own layer, they should
check internally.
Change-Id: Ieb3541b2e494902527c2bb56a816cef620cb237b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14310
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This makes it a bit easier to see what is what.
Change-Id: I0f73f6ffa84bd30de3efcbf2bd34e1d3a889d1ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14309
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=22
Change-Id: I9f392eef44e83efb4b13931acb2a3c642cbf1f29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14308
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=22
Change-Id: I5bfa543c261623d125e7a25cea905e3b90b0c014
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14307
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These will be used in follow-up commits. The _s names are taken from
upstream, to ease importing code. I've also promoted the CONSTTIME_*
macros from the test. None of them are really necessary except
~0u cannot substitute for CONSTTIME_TRUE_S on 64-bit platforms, so
having the macros seems safer.
Once everything is converted, I expect the unsigned versions can be
removed, so I've made the _8 and _int functions act on size_t rather
than unsigned. The users of these functions basically only believe that
array indices and bytes exist.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I987bfb0c708dc726a6f2afcb05b6619bbd600564
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14306
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This pulls in upstream's 0822d41b6d54132df96c02cc6f6fa9b179378351 and a
portion of a285992763f3961f69a8d86bf7dfff020a08cef9. The former, in
particular, fixes a crash on iOS.
Change-Id: I3c083975d8d11e58b5a2919fcabbf83628f36340
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14383
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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This ends up under half the size of the original file.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Idec69d9517bd57cee6b3b83bc0cce05396565b70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14305
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