In addition, make use of bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX in |SpeedHashChunk|,
otherwise the ctx doesn't get destroyed on failure.
Change-Id: I5828080cb9f4eb7c77cc2ff185d9aa8135311385
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Change-Id: Iceed87c194201d28c4a51b1c19a59fe2f20b6a5e
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https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10522 didn't actually do what
it was supposed to do. In fact, it appears, not paying attention to it,
we've managed to make RSA verify slower than ECDSA verify. Oops.
Did 32000 RSA 2048 verify (same key) operations in 1016746us (31473.0 ops/sec)
Did 5525 RSA 2048 verify (fresh key) operations in 1067209us (5177.1 ops/sec)
Did 8957 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1078570us (8304.5 ops/sec)
The difference is in setting up the BN_MONT_CTX, either computing R^2 or n0.
I'm guessing R^2. The current algorithm needs to be constant-time, but we can
split out a variable-time one if necessary.
Change-Id: Ie064a0e464aaa803815b56a6734bc9e2becef1a7
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Change-Id: I7298c878bd2c8187dbd25903e397e8f0c2575aa4
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This includes a point validation, which figures into the overall cost of
an ECDH operation. If, say, point validation is slow because it uses
generic code, we'd like it to show up in benchmarks.
(Later I'd like to replace this mess with a simple byte-oriented ECDH
API. When that happens, I'll update the benchmark accordingly.)
Change-Id: If8c33542d4b40572aac0a71ea2f658e7bc501f4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26969
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
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Upgrade-Note: SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment) on the server
should switch to SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(tls13_experiment2).
(Configuring any TLS 1.3 variants on the server enables all variants,
so this is a no-op. We're just retiring some old experiments.)
Change-Id: I60f0ca3f96ff84bdf59e1a282a46e51d99047462
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Change-Id: I60dc085fa02c152adb12a505b453fe8f84670d8b
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Because the handshake returns early, it should query SSL_in_early_data.
Change-Id: I64d4c0e8de753832207d5c198c50d660f87afac6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22945
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This introduces a wire change to Experiment2/Experiment3 over 0RTT, however
as there is never going to be a 0RTT deployment with Experiment2/Experiment3,
this is valid.
Change-Id: Id541d195cbc4bbb3df7680ae2a02b53bb8ae3eab
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Change-Id: I76a87ebf2f8be731d6da2381710c1caa60298f6e
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We end up writing these switch cases everywhere. Let consumers decompose
these a bit. The original thought was folks should write switch-cases so
they handle everything they support, but that's a pain. As long as
algorithm preferences are always configured, we can still add new
dimensions because folks won't be asked to sign algorithms that depend
on dimensions they don't understand.
Change-Id: I3dd7f067f2c55212f0201876546bc70fee032bcf
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Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
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Our build logic needed to revised and and clang implements more warnings
than MSVC, so GTest needed more fixes.
Bug: 200
Change-Id: I84c5dd0c51079dd9c990e08dbea7f9022a7d6842
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21204
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Add a simple dumb webserver that responds with the session status for
any GET request. This option is intended to be used with -loop to
generate automated responses to requests and serves two purposes: (1)
test that application data from clients can be decrypted, (2) test that
clients can decrypt data from the server and (3) early data indicator.
Change-Id: I2b8374ca7b8db4c8effab42e86b5e3139d9466e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20305
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Make PrintConnectionInfo write to a BIO rather than stderr.
This prepares for writing connection details to the peer.
Change-Id: I88147952712da57f9a2a1e464371075df156741f
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Mirrors the same functionality that is present in the client tool.
Tested by connecting the client with the server tool, verified that the
generated keylogs are identical.
Change-Id: Ic40b0ecb920383e01d7706574faf11fdb5c3fc7a
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SSL_state_string_long and SSL_state_string are often used for debugging
purposes. The latter's 6-letter codes are absurd, but
SSL_state_string_long is plausible. So we don't lose this when
converging state machines or switching to TLS 1.3, add this to TLS 1.3.
Bug: 128
Change-Id: Iec6529a4d9eddcf08bc9610137b4ccf9ea2681a6
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Change-Id: I69157b5e2527a2f92fc7b4b924a36e3399d043db
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I needed to toy with a server that renegotiated recently and this was
useful.
Change-Id: Id4e2adaaa2ecfc1c434a3bae199efb2fdacc41bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19344
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Change-Id: I09d6b05675b82ed04a9665c64b632d1a156fa977
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18985
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There are still a ton of them, almost exclusively complaints that
function declaration and definitions have different parameter names. I
just fixed a few randomly.
Change-Id: I1072f3dba8f63372cda92425aa94f4aa9e3911fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18706
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This implements PR #1051
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1051).
Local experiments were not able to replicate the claims in the PR, but
implement this anyway for comparison purposes.
Change-Id: Ic9baf5e671f9a44565020466a553dd08f5ec0f1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17844
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TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
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For testing purposes.
Change-Id: Ied1b130e805bcf8cc5d1bd30a1ba5049d6f13a6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17665
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When testing against a browser, multiple connections will be made in
parallel. Keeping the same listening socket lets the other connections
queue up at least rather than fail with ECONNREFUSED. Of course, this is
still far from a realistic server.
Change-Id: I984fb29da4bf8808eb40938b12782dc1730f2e19
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Both Conscrypt and Netty have a lot of logic to map between the two
kinds of names. WebRTC needed an SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name for something.
Just have both in the library. Also deprecate SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name
in favor of SSL_CIPHER_standard_name, which matches upstream if built
with enable-ssl-trace. And, unlike SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name, this does
not require dealing with the malloc.
(Strangely this decreases bssl's binary size, even though we're carrying
more strings around. It seems the old SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name was
somewhat large in comparison. Regardless, a consumer that disliked 30
short strings probably also disliked the OpenSSL names. That would be
better solved by opaquifying SSL_CIPHER and adding a less stringy API
for configuring cipher lists. That's something we can explore later if
needed.)
I also made the command-line tool print out the standard names since
they're more standard. May as well push folks towards those going
forward.
Change-Id: Ieeb3d63e67ef4da87458e68d130166a4c1090596
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17324
Reviewed-by: Robert Sloan <varomodt@google.com>
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BUG=76
Change-Id: If58a73da38e46549fd55f84a9104e2dfebfda43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This imports upstream's scrypt implementation, though it's been heavily
revised. I lost track of words vs. blocks vs. bigger blocks too many
times in the original code and introduced a typedef for the fixed-width
Salsa20 blocks. The downside is going from bytes to blocks is a bit
trickier, so I took advantage of our little-endian assumption.
This also adds an missing check for N < 2^32. Upstream's code is making
this assumption in Integerify. I'll send that change back upstream. I've
also removed the weird edge case where a NULL out_key parameter means to
validate N/r/p against max_mem and nothing else. That's just in there to
get a different error code out of their PKCS#12 code.
Performance-wise, the cleanup appears to be the same (up to what little
precision I was able to get here), but an optimization to use bitwise
AND rather than modulus makes us measurably faster. Though scrypt isn't
a fast operation to begin with, so hopefully it isn't anyone's
bottleneck.
This CL does not route scrypt up to the PKCS#12 code, though we could
write our own version of that if we need to later.
BUG=chromium:731993
Change-Id: Ib2f43344017ed37b6bafd85a2c2b103d695020b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than adding a new mode to EVP_PKEY_CTX, upstream chose to tie
single-shot signing to EVP_MD_CTX, adding functions which combine
EVP_Digest*Update and EVP_Digest*Final. This adds a weird vestigial
EVP_MD_CTX and makes the signing digest parameter non-uniform, slightly
complicating things. But it means APIs like X509_sign_ctx can work
without modification.
Align with upstream's APIs. This required a bit of fiddling around
evp_test.cc. For consistency and to avoid baking details of parameter
input order, I made it eagerly read all inputs before calling
SetupContext. Otherwise which attributes are present depend a lot on the
shape of the API we use---notably the NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST tests for RSA
switch to failing before consuming an input, which is odd.
(This only matters because we have some tests which expect the operation
to abort the operation early with parameter errors and match against
Error. Those probably should not use FileTest to begin with, but I'll
tease that apart a later time.)
Upstream also named NID_Ed25519 as NID_ED25519, even though the
algorithm is normally stylized as "Ed25519". Switch it to match.
Change-Id: Id6c8f5715930038e754de50338924d044e908045
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In order to use AES-GCM-SIV in the open-source QUIC boxer, it needs to
be moved out from OPENSSL_SMALL. (Hopefully the linker can still discard
it in the vast majority of cases.)
Additionally, the input to the key schedule function comes from outside
and may not be aligned, thus we need to use unaligned instructions to
read it.
Change-Id: I02c261fe0663d13a96c428174943c7e5ac8415a7
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Since SSLv3 is disabled by default now this is not needed anymore, but
it makes enabling SSLv3 using -min-version impossible.
At some point this should be removed anyway (when SSLv3 support is
removed), so might as well do it now and fix this tiny problem.
Change-Id: Ie3f7453b5b5198f33fcc4d4294102f116b8843ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16404
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This is otherwise rather annoying when testing things against a browser
which will usually throw up a cert error or so.
Change-Id: Ia587efae65764430e39e3eb604e434b5919530cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15126
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Change-Id: Ie515386b7f3555a5acf42e37b49e9a831571cb4a
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15065
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Our test certificate files in ssl/test/runner (which I often use out of
laziness) are not specified in a way compatible with the bssl tool.
Change-Id: I216d9555242e6d4be75b8172579186398b862394
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14826
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Later CLs will unwind the rest of multiprime RSA support. Start with key
generation.
Change-Id: Id20473fd55cf32c27ea4a57f2d2ea11daaffedeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
