The SNI extension may be ACKed by the server. This is kind of pointless,
but make sure we cover these codepaths.
Change-Id: I14b25ab865dd6e35a30f11ebc9027a1518bbeed9
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Change-Id: I878dfb9f5d3736c3ec0d5fa39052cca58932dbb7
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Change-Id: I38cd04fa40edde4e4dd31fdc16bbf92985430198
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The recent rewrite didn't account for the OID being missing but the NID
present.
Change-Id: I335e52324c62ee3ba849c0c385aaf86123a8ffbb
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ssl_get_new_session would stash a copy of the configured hostname
into the SSL_SESSION on the server. Servers have no reason to
configuring that anyway, but, if one did, we'd leak when filling in
the client-supplied SNI later.
Remove this code and guard against this by remembering to OPENSSL_free
when overwriting that field (although it should always be NULL).
Reported-By: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib901b5f82e5cf818060ef47a9585363e05dd9932
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I believe these are now unused.
Change-Id: I438da3d56ca598260fe0f5698ccb6649bd97b859
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Using the arg parameter does not work well. This is purely an
SSL_CTX-level callback, not an SSL-level one.
Change-Id: Ib968807efbe7dd08e71cea1c4d8034a52c729d45
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With the CRYPTO_BUFFER stuff, this API is now slightly more complex. Add
some tests as a sanity-check.
Change-Id: I9da20e3eb6391fc86ed215c5fabec71aa32ef56f
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It is hard to control what flags consumers may try to build us with.
Account for someone adding _GNU_SOURCE to the build line.
Change-Id: I4c931da70a9dccc89382ce9100c228c29d28d4bf
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This is purely to support curl, which now has HTTPS proxy support that,
sadly, uses the BIO SSL. Don't use the BIO SSL for anything else.
Change-Id: I9ef6c9773ec87a11e0b5a93968386ac4b351986d
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The TLS 1.2 and 1.3 state machines do the exact same thing at the
beginning. Let them process the ClientHello extensions, etc., and
finalize the certificate in common code. Once we start picking
parameters, we begin to diverge. Everything before this point is
arguably part of setting up the configuration, which is
version-agnostic.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I293ea3087ecbc3267bd8cdaa011c98d26a699789
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The version negotiation logic was a little bizarrely wedged in the
middle of the state machine. (We don't support server renegotiation, so
have_version is always false here.)
BUG=128
Change-Id: I9448dce374004b92e8bd5172c36a4e0eea51619c
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This option allows a file containing PEM root certificates to be given.
It causes the server's certificate to be verified against those roots.
Change-Id: Iaa92581d5834e436bcedf9d4088f7204abc6b95b
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Intel SDE is a tool that can simulate many different Intel chips. This
lets us test whether our CPUID-guarding is correct and would have
caught, for example, this morning's ChaCha20-Poly1305 problem.
Change-Id: I39de2bedb1c29b48b02ba30c51fdce57a5cbe640
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We can implement this with the SSL stack's public API fine.
Change-Id: Ia95c9174d7b850b7fed89046d3c351c970855cf3
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This change guards the ChaCha20-Poly1305 asm on having SSE4.1. The
pinsrb instruction that it uses requires this, which I didn't notice,
and so this would fail on Core 2 and older chips.
BUG=chromium:688384
Change-Id: I177e3492782a1a9974b6df29d26fc4809009ad48
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The current X25519 assembly has a 352-byte stack frame and saves the
regsiters at the bottom. This means that the CFI information cannot be
represented in the “compact” form that MacOS seems to want to use (see
linked bug).
The stack frame looked like:
360 CFA
352 return address
⋮
56 (296 bytes of scratch space)
48 saved RBP
40 saved RBX
32 saved R15
24 saved R14
16 saved R13
8 saved R12
0 (hole left from 3f38d80b dropping the superfluous saving of R11)
Now it looks like:
352 CFA
344 return address
336 saved RBP
328 saved RBX
320 saved R15
312 saved R14
304 saved R13
296 saved R12
⋮
0 (296 bytes of scratch space)
The bulk of the changes involve subtracting 56 from all the offsets to
RSP when working in the scratch space. This was done in Vim with:
'<,'>s/\([1-9][0-9]*\)(%rsp)/\=submatch(1)-56."(%rsp)"/
BUG=176
Change-Id: I022830e8f896fe2d877015fa3ecfa1d073207679
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It has no other callers, now that the handshake is written elsewhere.
Change-Id: Ib04bbdc4a54fc7d01405d9b3f765fa9f186244de
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These are unused. BIO_puts is implemented genericly.
Change-Id: Iecf1b6736291de8c48ce1adbb7401963a120d122
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The Mac ld gets unhappy about "weird" unwind directives:
In chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl, $keyp is being pushed on the stack
(according to the comment) because it gets clobbered in the computation
somewhere. $keyp is %r9 which is not callee-saved (it's an argument
register), so we don't need to tag it with .cfi_offset.
In x25519-asm-x86_64.S, x25519_x86_64_mul saves %rdi on the stack.
However it too is not callee-saved (it's an argument register) and
should not have a .cfi_offset. %rdi also does not appear to be written
to anywhere in the function, so there's no need to save it at all.
(This does not resolve the "r15 is saved too far from return address"
errors. Just the non-standard register ones.)
BUG=176
Change-Id: I53f3f7db3d1745384fb47cb52cd6536aabb5065e
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
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This special-case is almost unexposed (the timeout is initialized to the
default) except if the caller calls SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0). Preserve
that behavior by mapping 0 to SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT in
SSL_CTX_set_timeout but simplify the internal state.
Change-Id: Ice03a519c25284b925f1e0cf485f2d8c54dc5038
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It is impossible to have to call dispatch_alert when writing application
data. Now that we don't send warning alerts through ssl3_send_alert, all
alerts are closure alerts, which means attempts to write will fail.
This prunes a lot of dead code, avoiding the re-entrancy in the write
path. With that gone, tracking alert_dispatch is much more
straightforward.
BUG=146
Change-Id: Ie5fe677daee71e463d79562f3d2cea822a92581d
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Fix this and add a test. Otherwise enabling TLS 1.3 will cause a server
to blow through its session cache.
Change-Id: I67edbc468faedfd94a6c30cf842af085a6543b50
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This change moves the interface between |X509| and |CRYPTO_BUFFER| a
little further out, towards the API.
Change-Id: I1c014d20f12ad83427575843ca0b3bb22de1a694
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13365
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The recent CRYPTO_BUFFER changes meant that |X509| objects passed to
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert would be |free|ed immediately. However,
some third-party code (at least serf and curl) continue to use the
|X509| even after handing over ownership.
In order to unblock things, keep the past |X509| around for a while to
paper over the issues with those libraries while we try and upstream
changes.
Change-Id: I832b458af9b265749fed964658c5c34c84d518df
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Change-Id: I44202457841f06a899e140f78ae8afa7ac720283
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This change serves to check that all our consumers can process assembly
with CFI directives in it.
For the first change I picked a file that's not perlasm to keep things
slightly simplier, but that might have been a mistake:
DJB's tooling always aligns the stack to 32 bytes and it's not possible
to express this in DWARF format (without using a register to store the
old stack pointer).
Since none of the functions here appear to care about that alignment, I
removed it from each of them. I also trimmed the set of saved registers
where possible and used the redzone for functions that didn't need much
stack.
Overall, this appears to have slightly improved the performance (by
about 0.7%):
Before:
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3023288us (15215.2 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3017315us (15245.3 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3015346us (15255.3 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3018609us (15238.8 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3019004us (15236.8 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3013135us (15266.5 ops/sec)
After:
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3007659us (15294.3 ops/sec)
Did 47000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3054202us (15388.6 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3008714us (15288.9 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3004740us (15309.1 ops/sec)
Did 46000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 3009140us (15286.8 ops/sec)
Did 47000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 3057518us (15371.9 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I31df11c45b2ea0bf44dde861d52c27f848331691
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Change-Id: I81a94be94103d3c763cd6b2c1b8196300808c6fe
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Move to explicit hashing everywhere, matching TLS 1.2 with TLS 1.3. The
ssl_get_message calls between all the handshake states are now all
uniform so, when we're ready, we can rewire the TLS 1.2 state machine to
look like the TLS 1.3 one. (ssl_get_message calls become an
ssl_hs_read_message transition, reuse_message becomes an ssl_hs_ok
transition.)
This avoids some nuisance in processing the ServerHello at the 1.2 / 1.3
transition.
The downside of explicit hashing is we may forget to hash something, but
this will fail to interop with our tests and anyone else, so we should
be able to catch it.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I01393943b14dfaa98eec2a78f62c3a41c29b3a0e
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This is kind of annoying (even new state is needed to keep the layering
right). As part of aligning the read paths of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
state machine, we'll want to move to states calling
ssl_hash_current_message when the process the message, rather than when
the message is read. Right now the TLS 1.2 optional message story
(reuse_message) depends on all messages preceded by an optional message
using ssl_hash_message. For instance, if TLS 1.2 decided to place
CertificateStatus before ServerKeyExchange, we would not be able to
handle it.
However, V2ClientHello, by being handled in the message layer, relies on
ssl_get_message-driven hashing to replace the usual ClientHello hash
with a hash of something custom. This switches things so rather than
ClientHellos being always pre-hashed by the message layer, simulated
ClientHellos no-op ssl_hash_current_message.
This just replaces one hack with another (V2ClientHello is inherently
nasty), but this hack should be more compatible with future plans.
BUG=128
Change-Id: If807ea749d91e306a37bb2362ecc69b84bf224c9
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Cargo-cult the way other Perlasm scripts do it.
Change-Id: I86aaf725e41b601f24595518a8a6bc481fa0c7fc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13382
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Perlasm requires the size suffix when targeting NASM and Yasm; without
it, the resulting .asm file has |imu| instead of |imul|.
Change-Id: Icb95b8c0b68cf4f93becdc1930dc217398f56bec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13381
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use the same quoting used in other files so that this file can be built
the same way as other files on platforms that require the other kind of
quoting.
Change-Id: I808769bf014fbfe526fedcdc1e1f617b3490d03b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13380
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This aligns the TLS 1.2 state machine closer with the TLS 1.3 state
machine. This is more work for the handshake, but ultimately the
plan is to take the ssl_get_message call out of the handshake (so it is
just the state machine rather than calling into BIO), so the parameters
need to be folded out as in TLS 1.3.
The WrongMessageType-* family of tests should make sure we don't miss
one of these.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I17a1e6177c52a7540b2bc6b0b3f926ab386c4950
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If an existing chain had a NULL placeholder for a leaf we could end up
trying to increment its reference count. That results in a crash at
configuration time. Found via the SSL_CTX API fuzzer.
BUG=oss-fuzz:480
Change-Id: I0ddc2cbde2e625015768f1bdc8da625e8a4f05fd
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This was originally changed so that flush_flight could forward BIO_write
errors as-is, but we can and probably should still map BIO_flush errors.
This is unlikely to matter (every relevant BIO likely just has a no-op
flush which returns one), but, e.g., our file BIO returns 0, not -1, on
error.
We possibly should also be mapping BIO_write errors, but I'll leave that
alone for now. It's primarily BIO_read where the BIO return value must
be preserved due to error vs. EOF.
(We probably can just remove the BIO_flush calls altogether, but since
the buffer BIO forwarded the flush signal it would be a user-visible
behavior change to confirm.)
Change-Id: Ib495cc5d043867cf964f99b7ee4535114f7b2230
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(I split this change off to minimise the noise in future diffs that
actually do something meaningful.)
Change-Id: I7a054dcfc90a44ab5bb89b8f46704e5e3410e524
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Otherwise we could pass a negative value into |d2i_X509|.
Change-Id: I52a35dd9648269094110b69eddd7667a56ec8253
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This change converts the |CERT| struct to holding certificates as binary
blobs, rather than in parsed form. The members for holding the parsed
form are still there, however, but are only used as a cache for the
event that someone asks us for a non-owning pointer to the parsed leaf
or chain.
Next steps:
* Move more functions in to ssl_x509.c
* Create an X509_OPS struct of function pointers that will hang off
the |SSL_METHOD| to abstract out the current calls to crypto/x509
operations.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: Ifa05d88c49a987fd561b349705c9c48f106ec868
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This resolves a TODO, trims per-connection memory, and makes more sense.
These masks have nothing to do with certificate configuration.
Change-Id: I783e6158e51f58cce88e3e68dfa0ed965bdc894c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13368
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These are completely unused, but for BIO_set_write_buffer_size which is
in some (unreachable) nginx codepath. Keep that around so nginx
continues to build, but otherwise delete it.
Change-Id: I1a50a4f7b23e5fdbc7f132900ecacd74e8775a7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13362
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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I don't think that this makes a difference, but it's a little more
consistent with what we've done previously. I made this change when
trying to get the DFSAN build working, although that issue turned out to
be unrelated.
Change-Id: I21041689c5df70ca2bddf33065d687763af8c3c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13361
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Until we've gotten it fully working, we should not mint any of these
SSL_SESSIONs, to avoid constraining future versions of our client code.
Notably, if any of our TLS 1.3 clients today serialized sessions, we
would need to rev the serialization format. Without opting into 0-RTT, a
TLS 1.3 client will create SSL_SESSIONs tagged as 0-RTT-capable but
missing important fields (ALPN, etc.). When that serialized session
makes its way to a future version of our client code, it would disagree
with the server about the ALPN value stored in the ticket and cause
interop failures.
I believe the only client code enabling TLS 1.3 right now is Chrome, and
the window is small, so it should be fine. But fix this now before it
becomes a problem.
Change-Id: Ie2b109f8d158017a6f3b4cb6169050d38a66b31c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13342
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I324743e7d1864fbbb9653209ff93e4da872c8d31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Idc93fdca2f1c5c23e4ba48c4efed2edbad1e857b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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