Rename SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT to SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE and have this be the
point at which CCS_OK is set. The copy before ssl3_get_finished is redundant as
we never transition to SR_FINISHED directly.
Change-Id: I3eefeb821e7ae53d52dacc587fdc59de9ea9a667
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1297
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes the last case where the server generates an RSA key for the
ServerKeyExchange. Remove the code for this. Client support to accept them
still remains.
Leave the APIs for now, but they don't do anything anymore.
Change-Id: I84439e034cc575719f5bc9b3e501165e12b62107
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now the only case where temporary RSA keys are used on the server end is
non-signing keys.
Change-Id: I55f6c206e798dd28548c386fdffd555ccc395477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG and
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG. Neither of them have code that's even
enabled.
Change-Id: I866aabe1aa37e8ee145aaeaecaff6704c3ad21bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1284
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also fix a place where fixes for the condition for sending ServerKeyExchange in
s3_srvr.c were never propogated to d1_srvr.c. Tidy up that logic to use
ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange and simplify the PSK check.
Change-Id: Ie36d378f733e59a8df405bc869f2346af59bd574
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes support code for a "stream_mac" mode only used by GOST. Also get
rid of this
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
comment next to it. It's not actually related to GOST (dates to OpenSSL initial
commit), but isn't especially helpful at this point.
Change-Id: Ib13c6e27e16e0d1fb59ed0142ddf913b9abc20b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Without SSLv2, all cipher suite values are 2 bytes. Represent them as a
uint16_t and make all functions pass those around rather than pointers.
This removes SSL_CIPHER_find as it's unused.
Change-Id: Iea0b75abee4352a8333a4b8e39a161430ae55ea6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1259
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't retain curve IDs in serialized form; serialization only happens when
writing and reading from the wire. The internal representation is a uint16_t
which matches the range of the value and avoids all the checks for the first
byte being 0.
This also fixes a bug in tls1_check_ec_tmp_key's suite B logic; the || should
have been &&, though now it's gone.
This doesn't relieve some of the other assumptions about curve IDs:
tls1_set_curves still assumes that all curve IDs are under 32, and
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid still assumes 0 is not a valid curve ID. Add a
compile-time assert and a comment to document this. We're up to 28 now, so this
may well need to be revised sooner or later.
Remove SSL_get_shared_curve as it's new and unused API, using it in a loop is
O(N^3), and lets us simplify a function.
Change-Id: I82778cb82648d82f7b5de8c5341e0e1febdf5611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1256
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes one place where we set CCS_OK. ssl3_get_cert_verify already knows
whether or not to expect a CertificateVerify message, so there is no need to
look ahead and potentially read ChangeCipherSpec early.
Change-Id: I80f4ec218b073c1007b01dbe1e3bd529fb848d37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1293
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also fix some DTLS cookie bugs. rcvd_cookie is never referenced after being
saved (and the length isn't saved, so it couldn't be used anyway), and the
cookie verification failed to check the length.
For convenience, add a CBS_mem_equal helper function. Saves a bit of
repetition.
Change-Id: I187137733b069f0ac8d8b1bf151eeb80d388b971
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1174
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids duplicating the code to build the final premaster in PSK and
ECDHE_PSK. It also ports it to CBB for an initial trial of the API. Computing
the premaster secret now proceeds in four steps:
1. If a PSK key exchange (alg_a), look up the pre-shared key.
2. Compute the premaster secret based on alg_k. If PSK, it's all zeros.
3. If a PSK key exchange (alg_a), wrap the premaster in a struct with the
pre-shared key.
4. Use the possibly modified premaster to compute the master secret.
Change-Id: Ib511dd2724cbed42c82b82a676f641114cec5470
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only PSK cipher suite that computes the shared secret early is PSK. Also
there were two (unreachable because of earlier checks) codepaths where we're
exit this function without a master secret.
Change-Id: I3b64fc007b83c4bc46ddb6e14382fb285d8095f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1172
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
More consistent with ssl3_send_server_key_exchange and the message name.
Change-Id: If0f435a89bdf117297d349099708fff0bd5a6e98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids having to do the CBS_skip dance and is better about returning the
right alert.
Change-Id: Id84eba307d7c67269ccbc07a38d9044b6f4f7c6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1169
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also tidy up a little now that {RSA,ECDSA}_verify don't have two separate error
codes.
Change-Id: Id0e9248f63766771032a131fd96d86d2596ade32
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1168
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's current a void* and gets explicitly cast everywhere. Make it a uint8_t and
only add the casts when converting it come init_buf, which internally stores a
char*.
Change-Id: I28bed129e46ed37ee1ce378d5c3bd0738fc1177f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1163
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
NPNServerTest in runner.go provides test coverage.
Change-Id: I5503ccbc4270e7f9f42ebc30c21e8077a430cf9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1162
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Server client certificate tests provide test coverage.
Change-Id: I272b8099675f2a747f3ca878327c5f0b6936a988
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1160
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Introduce a ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key to save the repeated
NULL/PSK/RSA_PSK[*] check. Don't allow skipping to ServerKeyExchange when
expecting Certificate; the messages expected are determined by the cipher
suite. The ssl3_get_server_public_key call is already guarded.
As the previous test demonstrates, this is safe because of the
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm call, but avoid the looseness in the parsing
there.
[*] NB: we don't implement RSA_PSK, and OpenSSL has never implemented it.
Change-Id: I0571e6bcbeb8eb883f77878bdc98d1aa3a287cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1156
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This drops the bits of logic that allowed Certificate messages to be optional
for a KRB5 cipher suite.
Change-Id: I2a71b7c13d7e76f4f5542d4074169f80f3617240
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1154
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG is not included in SSL_OP_ALL.
Change-Id: I1635ad2721ed2742b1dff189d68bfc67a1c840a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1102
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Building without RSA support is unreasonable. Changes were made by
running
find . -type f -name *.c | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
find . -type f -name *.h | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
using unifdef 2.10 and some newlines were removed manually.
Change-Id: Iea559e2d4b3d1053f28a4a9cc2f7a3d1f6cabd61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1095
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
dc9b141127 added a default case when importing
the patch but accidentally falls through all the time.
Change-Id: Ieb9beeb9e3ffcf77f2842841eda7d28a62fe8072
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1073
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found no users of the functions which control the feature. (Also I don't
particularly want to port all of that to CBS...)
Change-Id: I55da42c44d57252bd47bdcb30431be5e6e90dc56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
(Imported from upstream's 77719aefb8f549ccc7f04222174889615d62057b)
Make sure there is an extra 4 bytes for server done message when
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is defined.
PR#3361
(Imported from upstream's 856a4585d6f7a856b90c93792cf1c1ed968d4a4b)
PSK identity hint can be stored in SSL_CTX and in SSL/SSL_SESSION,
similar to other TLS parameters, with the value in SSL/SSL_SESSION
taking precedence over the one in SSL_CTX. The value in SSL_CTX is
shared (used as the default) between all SSL instances associated
with that SSL_CTX, whereas the value in SSL/SSL_SESSION is confined
to that particular TLS/SSL connection/session.
The existing implementation of TLS-PSK does not correctly distinguish
between PSK identity hint in SSL_CTX and in SSL/SSL_SESSION. This
change fixes these issues:
1. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint does nothing and returns "success" when
the SSL object does not have an associated SSL_SESSION.
2. On the client, the hint in SSL_CTX (which is shared between
multiple SSL instances) is overwritten with the hint received from
server or reset to NULL if no hint was received.
3. On the client, psk_client_callback is invoked with the hint from
SSL_CTX rather than from current SSL/SSL_SESSION (i.e., the one
received from the server). Issue #2 above masks this issue.
4. On the server, the hint in SSL/SSL_SESSION is ignored and the hint
from SSL_CTX is sent to the client.
5. On the server, the hint in SSL/SSL_SESSION is reset to the one in
SSL_CTX after the ClientKeyExchange message step.
This change fixes the issues by:
* Adding storage for the hint in the SSL object. The idea being that
the hint in the associated SSL_SESSION takes precedence.
* Reading the hint during the handshake only from the associated
SSL_SESSION object.
* Initializing the hint in SSL object with the one from the SSL_CTX
object.
* Initializing the hint in SSL_SESSION object with the one from the
SSL object.
* Making SSL_use_psk_identity_hint and SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
set/get the hint to/from SSL_SESSION associated with the provided
SSL object, or, if no SSL_SESSION is available, set/get the hint
to/from the provided SSL object.
* Removing code which resets the hint during handshake.
This change implements equal-preference groups of cipher suites. This
allows, for example, a server to prefer one of AES-GCM or ChaCha20
ciphers, but to allow the client to pick which one. When coupled with
clients that will boost AES-GCM in their preferences when AES-NI is
present, this allows us to use AES-GCM when the hardware exists and
ChaCha20 otherwise.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
