Keep internal callers up-to-date with deprecations.

Change-Id: I7ee171afc669592d170f83bd4064857d59332878
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4640
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: Ic2339b771d949a555b8d05a3b24dc2e990b9d8d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4555
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Finally, the ssl stack.

Change-Id: Iea10e302825947da36ad46eaf3e8e2bce060fde2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4518
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Match the other internal headers.

Change-Id: Iff7e2dd06a1a7bf993053d0464cc15638ace3aaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.

(Imported from upstream's 2c3823491d8812560922a58677e3ad2db4b2ec8d.)

Change-Id: I97c7bb306d6f3c18597850db9f08023b2ef74839
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4042
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

I believe this is a remnant of DSA. The logic strangely fails to check for
failure and then goes out of its way to ERR_clear_error. I believe this is so
that keys that are missing parameters silently move on. This dates to
upstream's dfeab0689f69c0b4bd3480ffd37a9cacc2f17d9c, which is SSLeay 0.9.1b. At
that time, EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters only did anything for DSA. (Now it only
does anything for ECDSA.)

My read is that this comes from DSA in PKIX's "optional domain parameters"
craziness. RFC 3279 says:

   If the DSA domain parameters are omitted from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
   AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using a
   signature algorithm other than DSA, then the subject's DSA domain parameters
   are distributed by other means.

This was probably part of some weird thing where, if your certificate is
missing parameters, the server would know what to use based on the private key.

(Also this was making the malloc tests unhappy.)

Change-Id: I8d8122a9f50a19e2bbe067f311a8e2d30774935c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I7dc264f7e29b3ba8be4c717583467edf71bf8dd9

No current use of ssl_cert_type passes a NULL EVP_PKEY, so it can be simplified
a little.

Change-Id: I2052cc3b6069cd30e4685ba8a6d0014016a4d712
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

It doesn't depend on the cipher now that export ciphers are gone. It need only
be called once. Also remove the valid bit; nothing ever reads it. Its output is
also only used within a function, so make mask_k and mask_a local variables.

So all the configuration-based checks are in one place, change the input
parameter from CERT to SSL and move the PSK and ECDHE checks to the mask
computation. This avoids having to evaluate the temporary EC key for each
cipher.

The remaining uses are on the client which uses them differently (disabled
features rather than enabled ones). Those too may as well be local variables,
so leave a TODO.

Change-Id: Ibcb574341795d4016ea749f0290a793eed798874
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Remove all the logic managing key types that aren't being used anymore.

Change-Id: I101369164588048e64ba1c84a6b8aac8f3a221cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Avoid needing to manually increment the reference count and using the right
lock, both here and in Chromium.

Change-Id: If116ebc224cfb1c4711f7e2c06f1fd2c97af21dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1415
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Reference counting should be internal to the type, otherwise callers need to
know which lock to use.

Change-Id: If4d805876a321ef6dece115c805e605584ff311e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1414
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Custom RSA and ECDSA keys may not expose the key material. Plumb and "opaque"
bit out of the *_METHOD up to EVP_PKEY. Query that in ssl_rsa.c to skip the
sanity checks for certificate and key matching.

Change-Id: I362a2d5116bfd1803560dfca1d69a91153e895fc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1255
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Building without RSA support is unreasonable. Changes were made by
running

find . -type f -name *.c | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
find . -type f -name *.h | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA

using unifdef 2.10 and some newlines were removed manually.

Change-Id: Iea559e2d4b3d1053f28a4a9cc2f7a3d1f6cabd61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1095
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Found no users of the functions which control the feature. (Also I don't
particularly want to port all of that to CBS...)

Change-Id: I55da42c44d57252bd47bdcb30431be5e6e90dc56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

If we need an extension, we can implement it in-library.

Change-Id: I0eac5affcd8e7252b998b6c86ed2068234134b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Initial fork from f2d678e6e8 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)