SSL_ST_BEFORE isn't a possible state anymore. It seems this state meant the
side wasn't known, back in the early SSLeay days. Now upstream guesses
(sometimes incorrectly with generic methods), and we don't initialize until
later. SSL_shutdown also doesn't bother to call ssl3_shutdown at all if the
side isn't initialized and SSL_ST_BEFORE isn't the uninitialized state, which
seems a much more sensible arrangement.
Likewise, because bare SSL_ST_BEFOREs no longer exist, SSL_in_init implies
SSL_in_before and there is no need to check both.
Change-Id: Ie680838b2f860b895073dabb4d759996e21c2824
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's an undefined one not used anywhere. The others ought to be const. Also
move the forward declaration to ssl.h so we don't have to use the struct name.
Change-Id: I76684cf65255535c677ec19154cac74317c289ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All serialization functions take point format as input, and
asn1_form is never used.
Change-Id: Ib1ede692e815ac0c929e3b589c3a5869adb0dc8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2511
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
According to rfc5480 and rfc4492 the hybrid format is not allowed
neither in certificates or the tls protocol.
Change-Id: I1d3fb5bef765bc7b58d29bdd60e15247fac4dc7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2510
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some code predated the RFCs themselves, but the RFCs now exist. Also remove
now obsolete comments and some unused #defines.
See upstream's cffeacd91e70712c99c431bf32a655fa1b561482. (Though this predates
it; I just remembered I never uploaded it.)
Change-Id: I5e56f0ab6b7f558820f72e84dfdbc71a8c23cb91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2475
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ClientHello record is padded to 1024 bytes when
fastradio_padding is enabled. As a result, the 3G cellular radio
is fast forwarded to DCH (high data rate) state. This mechanism
leads to a substantial redunction in terms of TLS handshake
latency, and benefits mobile apps that are running on top of TLS.
Change-Id: I3d55197b6d601761c94c0f22871774b5a3dad614
The files should round-trip now. This corrects some discrepancies between
obj_mac.h and obj_mac.num which were also present in upstream. There seems to
be a mismerge in upstream's eebd5e5dd7dff58297ea52e1c21df8fccd593965.
(The discrepancy is harmless; those OIDs are not in obj_xref.txt.)
Change-Id: I1f6cda016533ec3182750310f9936f7e072b54a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2474
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It just inserts extra flushes everywhere and isn't used.
Change-Id: I082e4bada405611f4986ba852dd5575265854036
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2456
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use it in ssl3_cert_verify_hash so signing a pre-TLS-1.2 handshake hash can go
through RSA_sign and be intercepted via RSA_METHOD appropriately. This avoids
Windows needing to intercept sign_raw. (CAPI keys cannot provide sign_raw,
unless the input size happens to be that of NID_md5_sha1.)
Also use it in processing ServerKeyExchange to avoid special-casing RSA.
BUG=crbug.com/437023
Change-Id: Ia07433f468b75fdf7bfc8fa90c9751639b2478e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2420
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
first_packet is a temporary connection-global flag set for the duration of some
call and then queried from other code. This kind of logic is too difficult to
reason through. It also incorrectly treats renegotiate ClientHellos as
pre-version-negotiation records. This eliminates the need to query
enc_write_ctx (which wasn't EVP_AEAD-aware anyway).
Instead, take a leaf from Go TLS's book and add a have_version bit. This is
placed on s->s3 as it is connection state; s->s3 automatically gets reset on
SSL_clear while s doesn't.
This new flag will also be used to determine whether to do the V2ClientHello
sniff when the version-locked methods merge into SSLv23_method. It will also
replace needing to condition s->method against a dummy DTLS_ANY_VERSION value
to determine whether DTLS version negotiation has happened yet.
Change-Id: I5c8bc6258b182ba4ab175a48a84eab6d3a001333
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2442
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If SSL_clear is called before SSL_set_{connect,accept}_state (as SSL_new does
internally), s->state will get set prematurely. Likewise, s->server is set
based on the method's ssl_accept hook, but client SSL's may be initialized from
a generic SSL_METHOD too.
Since we can't easily get rid of the generic SSL_METHODs, defer s->state and
s->server initialization until the side is known.
Change-Id: I0972e17083df22a3c09f6f087011b54c699a22e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2439
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's unused. Also per the previous commit message, it historically had a bug
anyway.
Change-Id: I5868641e7938ddebbc0ffd72d218c81cd17c7739
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2437
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It should already be assigned, as of upstream's
b31b04d951e9b65bde29657e1ae057b76f0f0a73. I believe these assignments are part
of the reason it used to appear to work. Replace them with assertions. So the
assertions are actually valid, check in SSL_connect / SSL_accept that they are
never called if the socket had been placed in the opposite state. (Or we'd be
in another place where it would have appeared to work with the handshake
functions fixing things afterwards.)
Now the only places handshake_func is set are in SSL_set_{connect,accept}_state
and the method switches.
Change-Id: Ib249212bf4aa889b94c35965a62ca06bdbcf52e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2432
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We intend to deprecate the version-locked methods and unify them. Don't expose
that there's a method swap. (The existing version-locked methods will merely be
a shorthand for configuring minimum/maximum versions.)
There is one consumer of SSL_get_ssl_method in internal code, but it's just
some logging in test-only code. All it's doing is getting the version as a
string which should be SSL_get_version instead.
While here, also remove dead ssl_bad_method function. Also the bogus
ssl_crock_st forward-declaration. The forward declaration in base.h should be
perfectly sufficient.
Change-Id: I50480808f51022e05b078a285f58ec85d5ad7c8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2408
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
b9cc33a4d6 deleted its documentation rather than
SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA's.
Change-Id: I2e099a2dc498f145c5a3ccaac824edbda27f7e89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2407
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're mapped to the same value, which is the only reason the tests work right
now.
Change-Id: I22f6e3a6b3a2c88b0f92b6d261e86111b4172cd6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2406
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a bit of cleanup that probably should have been done at the same time
as 30ddb434bf.
For now, version negotiation is implemented with a method swap. It also
performs this swap on SSL_set_session, but this was neutered in
30ddb434bf. Rather than hackishly neuter it,
remove it outright. In addition, remove SSL_set_ssl_method. Now all method
swaps are internal: SSLv23_method switch to a version-specific method and
SSL_clear undoing it.
Note that this does change behavior: if an SSL* is created with one
version-specific method and we SSL_set_session to a session from a /different/
version, we would switch to the /other/ version-specific method. This is
extremely confusing, so it's unlikely anyone was actually expecting it.
Version-specific methods in general don't work well.
Change-Id: I72a5c1f321ca9aeb1b52ebe0317072950ba25092
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The data is owned by the SSL_SESSION, so the caller should not modify it. This
will require changes in Chromium, but they should be trivial.
Change-Id: I314718530c7d810f7c7b8852339b782b4c2dace1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2409
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't use |BIO_set_foo_buffer_size| when setting the
sizes of the buffers while making buffer pair. Since it
happens in pair.c we know the BIOs are BIO pairs and using
bio_ctrl here complicates setting external buffers. Also
zero out bio_bio_st during construction.
This fixes a problem that would happen if the default buffer
sizes were not set, since buf_externally_allocated was
not yet initialized.
Remove BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE and BIO_CTRL_RESET which are
not used for bio pairs.
Change-Id: I365091d5f44f6f1c5522c325a771bdf03d8fe950
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2370
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is only used for EAP-FAST which we apparently don't need to support.
Remove it outright. We broke it in 9eaeef81fa by
failing to account for session misses.
If this changes and we need it later, we can resurrect it. Preferably
implemented differently: the current implementation is bolted badly onto the
handshake. Ideally use the supplied callbacks to fabricate an appropriate
SSL_SESSION and resume that with as much of the normal session ticket flow as
possible.
The one difference is that EAP-FAST seems to require the probing mechanism for
session tickets rather than the sane session ID echoing version. We can
reimplement that by asking the record layer to probe ahead for one byte.
Change-Id: I38304953cc36b2020611556a91e8ac091691edac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2360
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit fixes a number of crashes caused by malloc failures. They
were found using the -malloc-test=0 option to runner.go which runs tests
many times, causing a different allocation call to fail in each case.
(This test only works on Linux and only looks for crashes caused by
allocation failures, not memory leaks or other errors.)
This is not the complete set of crashes! More can be found by collecting
core dumps from running with -malloc-test=0.
Change-Id: Ia61d19f51e373bccb7bc604642c51e043a74bd83
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2320
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both of these are newly-exported in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so they cannot be used by
current consumers.
This was added in upstream's 18d7158809c9722f4c6d2a8af7513577274f9b56 to
support custom selection of certificates. The intent seems to be that you
listen to cert_cb and use SSL_check_chain to lean on OpenSSL to process
signature algorithms list for you.
Unfortunately, the implementation is slightly suspect: it uses the same
function as the codepath which mutates and refers to the CERT_PKEY of the
matching type. Some access was guarded by check_flags, but this is too
complex. Part of it is also because the matching digest is selected early and
we intend to connect this to EVP_PKEY_supports_digest so it is no longer a
property of just the key type.
Let's remove the hook for now, to unblock removing a lot of complexity. After
cleaning up this area, a function like this could be cleaner to support, but
we already have a version of this: select_certificate_cb and
ssl_early_callback_ctx.
Change-Id: I3add425b3996e5e32d4a88e14cc607b4fdaa5aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is maintained just to distinguish whether the digest was negotiated or we
simply fell back to assuming SHA-1 support. No code is sensitive to this flag
and it adds complexity because it is set at a different time, for now, from the
rest of valid_flags.
The flag is new in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing external could be sensitive to it.
Change-Id: I9304e358d56f44d912d78beabf14316d456bf389
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2282
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is new in OpenSSL 1.0.2 so it isn't used anywhere. Cuts down slightly on
connection-global state associated with signature algorithm processing.
Repurposing the digest field to mean both "the digest we choose to sign with
this key" and "the digest the last signature we saw happened to use" is
confusing.
Change-Id: Iec4d5078c33e271c8c7b0ab221c356ee8480b89d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is intended for TLS client auth with Windows CAPI- and CNG-backed keys
which implement sign over sign_raw and do not support all hash functions. Only
plumbed through RSA for now.
Change-Id: Ica42e7fb026840f817a169da9372dda226f7d6fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2250
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also add functionality for setting external buffers to give the
caller better control of the buffers. This is typical needed if OS
sockets can outlive the bio pair.
Change-Id: I500f0c522011ce76e9a9bce5d7b43c93d9d11457
Prior to this change, BoringSSL maintained a 2-byte buffer for alerts,
and would support reassembly of fragmented alerts.
NSS does not support fragmented alerts, nor would any reasonable
implementation produce them. Remove fragmented alert handling and
produce an error if a fragmented alert has ever been encountered.
Change-Id: I31530ac372e8a90b47cf89404630c1c207cfb048
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's not much point in retaining the identity hint in the SSL_SESSION. This
avoids the complexity around setting psk_identity hint on either the SSL or the
SSL_SESSION. Introduce a peer_psk_identity_hint for the client to store the one
received from the server.
This changes the semantics of SSL_get_psk_identity_hint; it now only returns
the value configured for the server. The client learns the hint through the
callback. This is compatible with the one use of this API in conscrypt (it
pulls the hint back out to pass to a callback).
Change-Id: I6d9131636b47f13ac5800b4451436a057021054a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2213
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is an experimental flag that dates back to SSLeay 0.8.1b or earlier. It's
never set internally and never set in consumers.
Change-Id: I922583635c9f3d8d93f08f1707531ad22a26ae6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
r and s are scalars, not EC coordinates.
Change-Id: I46a20215d3c602559c18c74a1da9a91543ea73ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2240
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Parameters like these should not change between 32-bit and 64-bit. 64 is also
the value recommended in RFC 6347, section 4.1.2.6. Document those fields while
I'm here.
Change-Id: I8481ee0765ff3d261a96a2e1a53b6ad6695b2d42
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2222
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was added in http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2033 to support
a mode where a DTLS socket would statelessly perform the ClientHello /
HelloVerifyRequest portion of the handshake, to be handed off to a socket
specific to this peer address.
This is not used by WebRTC or other current consumers. If we need to support
something like this, it would be cleaner to do the listen portion (cookieless
ClientHello + HelloVerifyRequest) externally and then spin up an SSL instance
on receipt of a cookied ClientHello. This would require a slightly more complex
BIO to replay the second ClientHello but would avoid peppering the DTLS
handshake state with a special short-circuiting mode.
Change-Id: I7a413932edfb62f8b9368912a9a0621d4155f1aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2220
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One of them was never implemented upstream or downstream. The other no longer
works in BoringSSL. They're not used within BoringSSL (this still compiles),
even in X509_INFO, and do not appear to be used by consumers. If they were, we
would like to know via a compile failure.
This removes the last consumer within BoringSSL of the ASN.1 parsing macros.
Change-Id: Ifb72b1fcd0a4f7b3e6b081486f8638110872334b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2203
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the existing md5_test and sha1_test. They now are all covered by
digest_test. For good measure, test the one-shot functions too.
Change-Id: I8e144cc563fb8817144e26cbd2e10c15642464ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Without SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY, even blocking mode will return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_{READ|WRITE} in the event of a renegotiation.
The comments in the code speak only of "nasty problems" unless this is
done. The original commit that added SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
(54f10e6adce56eb2e59936e32216162aadc5d050) gives a little more detail:
The [...] behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and
s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read.
Without the -nbio flag, s_client will use select() to find when the
socket is readable and then call SSL_read with a blocking socket.
However, this will still block in the event of an incomplete record, so
the delay is already unbounded. This it's very unclear what the point of
this behaviour ever was.
Perhaps if the read and write paths were different sockets where the
read socket was non-blocking but the write socket was blocking. But that
seems like an implausible situation to worry too much about.
Change-Id: I9d9f2526afc2e0fd0e5440e9a047f419a2d61afa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2140
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code isn't compiled in. It seems there was some half-baked logic for a
7-byte alert that includes more information about handshake messages
retransmit.
No such alert exists, and the code had a FIXME anyway. If it gets resurrected
in DTLS 1.3 or some extension, we can deal with it then.
Change-Id: I8784ea8ee44bb8da4b0fe5d5d507997526557432
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is no longer used but, by retaining it, we might miss cases where
code is still testing against it.
Change-Id: I40ed47e41f903aaf2c5e5354d4348f8890021382
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2110
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X509_NAME is one of the symbols that collide with wincrypt.h. Move it to x509.h
so libraries which only use the pure-crypto portions of BoringSSL without X.509
needn't have to resolve the collision.
Change-Id: I057873498e58fe4a4cf264356f9a58d7a15397b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was already almost there. Just a malloc failure away. now all the
EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}* functions may be used without worrying about -1 return
values.
Change-Id: I96a9750b300010615979bd5f1522b1d241764665
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Deprecate the old two-pass version of the function. If the ticket is too long,
replace it with a placeholder value but keep the connection working.
Change-Id: Ib9fdea66389b171862143d79b5540ea90a9bd5fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2011
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old ones inverted their return value. Add SSL_(CTX_)set_srtp_profiles which
return success/failure correctly and deprecate the old functions. Also align
srtp.h with the new style since it's very short.
When this rolls through, we can move WebRTC over to the new ones.
Change-Id: Ie55282e8858331910bba6ad330c8bcdd0e38f2f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2060
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No more need for all the macros. For now, this still follows the two-pass i2d_*
API despite paying a now-unnecessary malloc. The follow-on commit will expose a
more reasonable API and deprecate this one.
Change-Id: I50ec63e65afbd455ad3bcd2f1ae3c782d9e8f9d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2000
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Do away with all those unreadable macros. Also fix many many memory leaks in
the SSL_SESSION reuse case. Add a number of helper functions in CBS to help
with parsing optional fields.
Change-Id: I2ce8fd0d5b060a1b56e7f99f7780997fabc5ce41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1998
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Companion to CBS_get_asn1_uint64. Also add tests for both the parsing and the
serializing.
Change-Id: Ic5e9a0089c88b300f874712d0e9964cb35a8c40b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1999
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was there since OpenSSL's initial commit and doesn't appear to serve any
purpose anymore. There's also an instance in x509_vfy.h, but this does not
actually appear to be a no-op because the headers include each other.
Change-Id: I6dee04538bdb3fd91a5da3c71c9d0027443b6bbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2020
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's no need to store them on the session. They're temporary handshake
state and weren't serialized in d2i_SSL_SESSION anyway.
Change-Id: I830d378ab49aaa4fc6c4c7a6a8c035e2263fb763
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1990
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Intended to make parsing ASN.1 structures with OPTIONAL elements easier. (Just
attempting to parse the next tag doesn't distinguish between a malformed CBS
which has now been partially advanced and an optional tag mismatch.)
Change-Id: Idceb3dfd6ec028e87e1bc5aaddcec177b0c32150
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1995
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The same library code applies for both the error and the function, so modules
cannot easily report errors from each other. Switch evp/algorithm.c's error
codes to the EVP library. Remove the original error codes so it's obvious some
changes are needed.
- X509_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED -> EVP_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED -> EVP_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
(Actually, the X509 version of this error code doesn't exist in OpenSSL. It should
have been ASN1.)
- ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM -> EVP_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
- ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE -> EVP_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE
- ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM -> EVP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
Change-Id: I05b1a05b465d800c85f7d63ca74588edf40847b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Implementations of ENGINEs often don't want to implement every function.
This change adds an error code for those situations.
Change-Id: Id6b7eace36d06ffad7f347f556d942d447d8a2fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1920
Reviewed-by: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Factor the AlgorithmIdentifier portions of ASN1_item_sign and ASN1_item_verify
out. This makes it possible to initialize a signature context from an
AlgorithmIdentifier without needing the data parsed into an ASN1_ITEM/void*
pair and reserialized.
Change-Id: Idc2e06b1310a3f801aa25de323d39d2b7a44ef50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1916
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Verified that nothing uses it.
Change-Id: I1755144129e274f3d1680ddb8cb12273070eb078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1912
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT got mispelled into ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT and
duplicated.
Change-Id: If123ef848ffe68afa021f5f3e3fb08eac92c5f94
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1911
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I misunderstood the OpenSSL semantics here. When receiving an error data
pointer via ERR_get_error_line_data and friends, although the error is
cleared, OpenSSL retains ownership of the data pointer. It's kept in the
cleared error until another error overrides it, or the whole error queue
is cleared.
It's pretty odd to have live pointers in empty errors so this change
allows an error queue to retain one data pointer. Thus the pointer
returned from ERR_get_error_line_data is valid until the next call to
ERR_get_error_line_data, or until the queue is freed.
From reviewing uses of the API, this is sufficient for all of them.
Change-Id: I73cb8e9c792452ae3c1a934ac8bbe8b5353b65b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The minimum buffer size requirements on some were off.
Change-Id: I3eabe3dc352e4333efedb40aa071daa2f2ea0db2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1902
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fill in some missing "and returns 1" documentation. Really they all do but some
of _Final functions have codepaths to guard against user error.
Change-Id: I16e12ec20ab59e3ba6deaa4cfd67574ed0a56652
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1901
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The corresponding constants are ints, so these should match. This
appeases MSVC on some Chromium DCHECK.
Change-Id: I7a5db41fa072c2850841a102917163af5e90d860
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1867
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes the need to track the client cipher list in the SSL_SESSION. It
also eliminates a field in SSL_SESSION that wasn't serialized by
i2d_SSL_SESSION. It's only used to implement SSL_get_shared_ciphers which is
only used by debug code.
Moreover, it doesn't work anyway. The SSLv2 logic pruned that field to the
common ciphers, but the SSLv3+ logic just stores the client list as-is. I found
no internal callers that were actually compiled (if need be we can stub in
something that always returns the empty string or so).
Change-Id: I55ad45964fb4037fd623f7591bc574b2983c0698
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1866
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows is much pickier about dllimport/dllexport. Declare it on
the declaration, not the definition. Also ensure that the declaration
precedes the definition. Finally, remove a stray OPENSSL_EXPORT.
Change-Id: Id50b9de5acbe5adf1b15b22dd60b7a5c13a80cce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1862
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We patch bugs into the runner implementation for testing, not our own.
Change-Id: I0a8ac73eaeb70db131c01a0fd9c84f258589a884
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reduces the delta for getting Android to compile and avoids having
Android carry around diffs to upstream versions of tcpdump.
Change-Id: I7f4cbb22b7a0f246bbebe960ca2139f0f42e14a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1830
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In order to minimise the upstream diffs needed for bits of Android to
build with BoringSSL, this change implements the old style PKCS#12
functions as wrappers around the modern parser.
The function to read all the contents of a BIO could almost be a utility
function but I'll wait until there are two uses for it first.
The important change from the original functions is that these will
always read the complete buffer/BIO/FILE passed in. Based on a survey of
uses of d2i_PKCS12 that I found, this appears to be universally what
callers want anyway.
Change-Id: I3f5b84e710b161d975f91f4d16c83d44371368d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1791
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android requested that the wpa_supplicant go upstream. This change adds
some dummy functions and reinstates DSA_dup_DH in order to make the diff
smaller and easier for upstream.
Change-Id: I77ac271b8652bae5a0bbe16afde51d9096f3dfb5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This gives inappropriate_fallback and close_notify sent during the handshake
error strings. It'd also avoid having to write
case SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
in Chromium.
Change-Id: I42123d5452eb7843ead883d112e58b3f087d3067
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium does not like static initializers, and the CPU logic uses one to
initialize CPU bits. However, the crypto library lacks an explicit
initialization function, which could complicate (no compile-time errors)
porting existing code which uses crypto/, but not ssl/.
Add an explicit CRYPTO_library_init function, but make it a no-op by default.
It only does anything (and is required) if building with
BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER.
Change-Id: I6933bdc3447fb382b1f87c788e5b8142d6f3fe39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
04dbb7f1d1 added tests for the pqueue
functions. However, when building as a shared library, the test binary
needs access to the raw pqueue functions which require them to be
exported.
Change-Id: Iffb22fec491082ff43f06a7119560610425cf20e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1711
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update SSL_OP_ALL to account for SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG being gone,
and update ssl3_setup_write_buffer to account for SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
rather than the now defunct SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.
Also remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is to allow for a buggy peer
which pads CBC with N bytes of value N rather than N+1 bytes of value N. This
quirk has been broken since CBC padding checks became constant-time, as
demonstrated by this attempt at a test. (Instead of just decrementing
padding_length, it needs to also keep track of a separate padding_value and not
decrement that one.)
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1690/
(The quirk would also fall over anyway if the buggy client ever did a session
resumption; then the server speaks first rather than the client, and the quirk
triggered on reading the first encrypted record from the peer.)
Change-Id: I19942dc629a47832aead77a46bb50e0b0a9780b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1694
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Configures the SSL stack to log session information to a BIO. The intent is to
support NSS's SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. Add support for the same
environment variable to tool/client.cc.
Tested against Wireshark 1.12.0.
BUG=393477
Change-Id: I4c231f9abebf194eb2df4aaeeafa337516774c95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1699
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Switch all of SRTP code to the standard return value convention with two
exceptions. Unfortunately, OpenSSL exposed API with the wrong error code. Keep
the public API flipped and document.
Change-Id: I43ac82513f4f52bb36a0b54aba9b9e0fa285730e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1691
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't a header file that makes sense to export; any compilation unit which
includes it will gain a bunch of static arrays.
Change-Id: Ic698b74bdf758506a53d4eba19ab8b0f49a11ef7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1692
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Denis Denisov for running the analysis.
Change-Id: I80810261e013423e746fd8d8afefb3581cffccc0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1701
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Denis Denisov for noting that |host_name| could be used while
uninitialised in the resumption case.
While in the area, this change also renames |servername_done| to
something more reasonable and removes a documented value that was never
used. Additionally, the SNI ack was only sent when not resuming so
calculating whether it should be sent when processing ClientHello
extensions (which is after s->hit has been set) is superfluous.
Lastly, since SNI is only acked by servers, there's no need to worry
about the SNI callback returning NOACK in the client case.
Change-Id: Ie4ecfc347bd7afaf93b12526ff9311cc45da4df6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reorder the tests in all_tests.sh to be in alphabetical order.
Change-Id: Idc6df6ab4a25709312a6f58635061bb643582c70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the
SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no
responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on
the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session
resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume.
Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted
in the future if we implement RFC 6961.
Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Useful for parsing things when you don't know what tag to expect (e.g. a
CHOICE). Also allow its operands to be NULL, so that it can be used to skip
arbitrary elements.
Delete CBS_ASN1_ANY which wasn't doing anything.
Change-Id: I56413e68b4f2e13860ea3e55373d5830713d7e5c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1661
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't pollute the embedder's namespace with a session_ctx macro. It looks like
the difference was that, without TLS extensions, session_ctx was ctx rather
than initial_ctx. Now it's always initial_ctx. Retain the semantics of
switching SSL_CTX's out after the fact, until/unless we decide to replace that
with something less scary-sounding.
Change-Id: Ie5df5138aec25218ca80031cf645671968b8a54a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1663
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get all this stuff out of the way.
- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA
Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)
Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This moves CertificateVerify digest processing to the new
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE flag. It also refactors it similarly to
ssl3_send_cert_verify and moves that logic to a common ssl3_cert_verify_hash
function to compute the handshake hash.
This removes a large chunk of duplicate (and divergent!) logic between TLS and
DTLS. It also removes TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE.
Change-Id: Ia63c94f7d76d901bc9c4c33454fbfede411adf63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1633
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This replaces the special-case in ssl3_get_message for Channel ID. Also add
ssl3_hash_current_message to hash the current message, taking TLS vs DTLS
handshake header size into account.
One subtlety with this flag is that a message intended to be processed with
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE cannot follow an optional message
(reprocessed with reuse_message, etc.). There is an assertion to that effect.
If need be, we can loosen it to requiring that the preceeding optional message
also pass SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE and then maintain some state to
perform the more accurate assertion, but this is sufficient for now.
Change-Id: If8c87342b291ac041a35885b9b5ee961aee86eab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1630
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
wpa_supplicant needs this in order to get the order of the coordinate
field, apparently so that they can hash to a point.
Change-Id: I92d5df7b37b67ace5f497c25f53f16bbe134aced
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This only applies to RC4, but it is still used by some Android code.
Change-Id: I4cf86269ffb7a230576da1bb2bfef7e1d4f234d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Sadly this is needed by wpa_supplicant for NTLM hashes.
Change-Id: I1c362c676a11ee01f301ff6fbd33d0669396ea23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes several of the problems with the old API.
- Padding was completely ignored.
- ='s in the middle of the input were accepted.
- It tries to be helpful and strips leading/trailing whitespace.
Change-Id: I99b9d5e6583f7eaf9bf0b6ee9ca39799811b58dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1602
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is cleaner than the OpenSSL code was, at least, but it's hardly
beautiful due to the "standard" that it's trying to implement. (See
[1].)
The references from the PKCS#8 code to various ciphers have digests have
been made into function pointer references rather than NIDs so that the
linker will be able to drop RC2 code for binaries that don't call PKCS#8
or #12 functions.
A bug that crashed OpenSSL/BoringSSL when parsing a malformed PKCS#8
structure has been fixed too.
See https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pfx.html
Change-Id: Iaa1039e04ed7877b90792835e8ce3ebc3b29f89e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1592
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, the ASN.1 functions in bytestring were capable of processing
indefinite length elements when the _ber functions were used. That works
well enough for PKCS#3, but NSS goes a bit crazy with BER encoding and
PKCS#12. Rather than complicate the core bytestring functions further,
the BER support is removed from them and moved to a separate function
that converts from BER to DER (if needed).
Change-Id: I2212b28e99bab9fab8c61f80d2012d3e5a3cc2f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1591
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As useless as it might seem, the certificates in PKCS#12 files appear to
always be encrypted with 40-bit RC2. OpenSSL, NSS and Windows are all
the same on this point. Thus, in order to be able to import PKCS#12
files we need RC2 support.
RC2 has deliberately not been added to EVP_get_cipherbynid so that the
linker can drop the RC2 code unless the PKCS#12 functions are actually
called.
Change-Id: I5b2062fdf78cb622a8038c326da01aac8fb58962
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1590
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise, in C, it becomes a K&R function declaration which doesn't actually
type-check the number of arguments.
Change-Id: I0731a9fefca46fb1c266bfb1c33d464cf451a22e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1582
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It doesn't appear to have ever been implemented on the client. The server code
stopped working anyway because it now skips the ssl_get_message call, so we
never cash in on the reuse_message, attempt to reprocess the repeated
ClientHello, and reject it thinking it's a second MS SGC restart.
Change-Id: Id536846e08460143f6fc0a550bdcc1b26b506b04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1580
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
DSA is not connected up to EVP, so it wouldn't work anyway. We shouldn't
advertise a cipher suite we don't support. Chrome UMA data says virtually no
handshakes end up negotiating one of these.
Change-Id: I874d934432da6318f05782ebd149432c1d1e5275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1566
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are the variants where the CA signs a Diffie-Hellman keypair. They are
not supported by Chrome on NSS.
Change-Id: I569a7ac58454bd3ed1cd5292d1f98499012cdf01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the fixed_ecdh case, it wasn't even implemented, but there was stub code for
it. It complicates the ClientKeyExchange (the client parameters become implicit
in the certificate) and isn't used.
Change-Id: I3627a37042539c90e05e59cd0cb3cd6c56225561
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1563
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This also removes the 'LOW' strength class.
Change-Id: Iffd2356dadb4a4875c1547a613d51061101358fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
NULL, SRP, CAMELLIA, export ciphers, SSLv2, IDEA, and SEED are gone. Unknown
directives are silently ignored in the parser, so there is no need to retain
their masks and entries in the cipher suite aliases.
Change-Id: If43b9cbce56b3e1c401db764b88996940452a300
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change exports SSL_cutthrough_complete and EVP_EncodedLength (which
were missed below) and also exports all ASN.1 "item" values because
Android needs that.
Change-Id: I6d10f935bb52ed6d682607a4016dd2b87758e3de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1557
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: If7752709727fe33ba38a9d414089253bb2f89ea2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1558
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change removes the old ASN.1 functions (ASN1_seq_unpack and
ASN1_seq_pack) which have always been disabled in BoringSSL.
It also removes code enabled by OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION, which
we have never used.
Change-Id: I1fe323abf945a8a5828a04cc195c072e100a5095
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1556
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change extracts two, common parts of RSA_decrypt and RSA_sign into
a function called |private_transform|. It also allows this to be
overridden in a method, which is convenient for opaque keys that only
expose the raw RSA transform as it means that the padding code from
BoringSSL can be easily reimplemented.
One significant change here is that short RSA ciphertexts will no longer
be accepted. I think this is correct and OpenSSL has a comment about PGP
mistakenly stripping leading zeros. However, these is the possibility
that it could break something.
Change-Id: I258c5cbbf21314cc9b6e8d2a2b898fd9a440cd40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1554
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function was missed when the OPENSSL_EXPORT tags were first added.
Change-Id: Ia73555b8e7ca87f228a8ff9b281d7c401f1655a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1553
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Just use the normal API for them.
Change-Id: Ibb5988611a86e8d39abda1e02087523d98defb51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1555
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than switching the order of the ServerHello and HelloVerifyRequest
states and processing each twice, have the states follow the protocol order.
HelloVerifyRequest reading is optional and ServerHello is strict. Use the
send_cookie bit to determine whether we're expecting a cookie or not.
Fix the dtls1_stop_timer call in these states to consistently hit the end of a
server flight; the previous flight should not be cleared from the retransmit
buffer until the entire next flight is received. That said, OpenSSL doesn't
appear to implement the part where, on receipt of the previous peer flight, the
buffered flight is retransmitted. (With the exception of a SSL3_MT_FINISHED
special-case in dtls1_read_bytes.) So if the peer is also OpenSSL, this doesn't
do anything.
Also fix the DTLS test which wasn't actually asserting that the ClientHello
matched.
Change-Id: Ia542190972dbffabb837d32c9d453a243caa90b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I see no internal users and the existence of a THIRD version encoding
complicates all version-checking logic. Also convert another version check to
SSL_IS_DTLS that was missed earlier.
Change-Id: I60d215f57d44880f6e6877889307dc39dbf838f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us put the SSL_CIPHER table in the data section. For type-checking,
make STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) cast everything to const SSL_CIPHER*.
Note that this will require some changes in consumers which weren't using a
const SSL_CIPHER *.
Change-Id: Iff734ac0e36f9e5c4a0f3c8411c7f727b820469c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1541
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Of the remaining implementations left, ssl3_, dtls1_, and ssl23_, dtls1_ is
redundant and can be folded into ssl3_. ssl23_ actually isn't; it sets 5
minutes rather than 2 hours. Two hours seems to be what everything else uses
and seems a saner default. Most consumers seem to override it anyway
(SSL_CTX_set_timeout). But it is a behavior change.
The method is called at two points:
- SSL_get_default_timeout
- SSL_CTX_new
Incidentally, the latter call actually makes the former never called internally
and the value it returns a lie. SSL_get_default_timeout returns the default
timeout of the /current/ method, but in ssl_get_new_session, the timeout is
shadowed by session_timeout on the context. That is initialized when
SSL_CTX_new is called. So, unless you go out of your way to
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0), it always overrides. (And it actually used to a
difference because, for SSL23, the SSL_CTX's method is SSL23, but, when session
creation happens, the SSL's method is the version-specific one.)
Change-Id: I331d3fd69b726242b36492402717b6d0b521c6ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Those ciphers go through EVP_AEAD now.
Change-Id: Ia97af9960223724f041dc2c249def9e626fd03f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1520
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing can be depending on it yet. If we
really want a Suite B profile, it seems better to generate a configuration for
the rest of the system rather than pepper the codebase with checks.
Change-Id: I1be3ebed0e87cbfe236ade4174dcf5bbc7e10dd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android uses these for some conversions from Java formats. The code is
sufficiently bespoke that putting the conversion functions into
BoringSSL doesn't make a lot of sense, but the alternative is to expose
these ones.
Change-Id: If1362bc4a5c44cba4023c909e2ba6488ae019ddb
Several callers of EVP_EncodeBlock are doing ad-hoc versions of this
function without any overflow checks.
Change-Id: I4d0cad2347ea8c44b42465e8b14b2783db69ee8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android needs it. These functions were removed in the move to BoringSSL.
Change-Id: Ice24a0a1c390930cf07dbd00f72a3e12e6c241f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1510
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is needed by Android because it passes this string to a handshake
callback. It's implemented in Android's OpenSSL in this patch:
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssl.git/+/master/patches/0003-jsse.patch
(Note that it's called |SSL_authentication_method| there.)
I didn't format this function in OpenSSL style because it's crazy and
because we'll probably clang-format ssl/ soon.
Change-Id: I865540511b50859c339da5d76ce37810449aa444
Android needs this and it was patched into their OpenSSL in
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssl.git/+/master/patches/0003-jsse.patch
It appears that this is needed because javax.net.ssl.SSLEngine has it as
part of its interface and thus it's part of the Android API. No idea why
anything would ever want to disable that though.
Change-Id: I9c6279a961637f44936889edbe269b9d5c19746d
ssl23_get_client_hello has lots of remnants of SSLv2 support and remnants of an
even older SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option (see upstream's
d92f0bb6e9ed94ac0c3aa0c939f2565f2ed95935) which complicates the logic.
Split it into three states and move V2ClientHello parsing into its own
function. Port it to CBS and CBB to give bounds checks on the V2ClientHello
parse.
This fixes a minor bug where, if the SSL_accept call in ssl23_get_client_hello
failed, cb would not be NULL'd and SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP would get reported an
extra time.
It also unbreaks the invariant between s->packet, s->packet_length,
s->s3->rbuf.buf, and s->s3->rbuf.offset at the point the switch, although this
was of no consequence because the first ssl3_read_n call passes extend = 0
which resets s->packet and s->packet_length.
It also makes us tolerant to major version bumps in the ClientHello. Add tests
for TLS tolerance of both minor and major version bumps as well as the HTTP
request error codes.
Change-Id: I948337f4dc483f4ebe1742d3eba53b045b260257
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1455
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I908d207ccd3d529ec09c687effc2aeb4631127d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1470
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't have ssize_t, sadly. There's SSIZE_T, but defining an
OPENSSL_SSIZE_T seems worse than just using an int.
Change-Id: I09bb5aa03f96da78b619e551f92ed52ce24d9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not part of SSL_OP_ALL and is unused, so remove it. Add a test that
asserts the version check works.
Change-Id: I917516594ec5a4998a8316782f035697c33d99b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1418
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function serialises a PKCS#7 structure containing a number of
certificates.
Change-Id: Iaf15887e1060d5d201d5a3dd3dca8d51105ee6d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1431
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoid needing to manually increment the reference count and using the right
lock, both here and in Chromium.
Change-Id: If116ebc224cfb1c4711f7e2c06f1fd2c97af21dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1415
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A single va_list may not be used twice. Nothing calls BIO_vprintf and it just
(v)snprintfs into a buffer anyway, so remove it. If it's actually needed, we
can fiddle with va_copy and the lack of it in C89 later, but anything that
actually cares can just assemble the output externally.
Add a test in bio_test.c.
BUG=399546
Change-Id: Ia40a68b31cb5984d817e9c55351f49d9d6c964c1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1391
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The memory freelist maintained by OpenSSL claims to be a performance
optimization for platforms that have a slow malloc/free
implementation. This should not be the case on modern
linux/glibc. Remove the freelist as it poses a potential security
hazard of buffer-reuse that is of "initialized" memory that will not
be caught be tools such as valgrind.
Change-Id: I3cfa6a05f9bdfbbba7820060bae5a673dee43014
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TODO indicated that it was unused, and commented. Any existing users are already broken.
Change-Id: I75ebaf3f20015845d8c81eecffe2a4dfbdbe18e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1386
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I didn't mark these functions as OPENSSL_EXPORT in the first place
because I was hoping that they wouldn't be needed. However, WebRTC and
libjingle are using them.
Change-Id: I7a9de770a0a2213e99725b9b5ac7d3d13754ebfd
The original functions do an ascii_to_ucs2 transformation on the password.
Deprecate them in favor of making that encoding the caller's problem.
ascii_to_ucs2 doesn't handle, say, UTF-8 anyway. And with the original OpenSSL
function, some ciphers would do the transformation, and some wouldn't making
the text-string/bytes-string confusion even messier.
BUG=399121
Change-Id: I7d1cea20a260f21eec2e8ffb7cd6be239fe92873
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1347
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some phones have a buggy NEON unit and the Poly1305 NEON code fails on
them, even though other NEON code appears to work fine.
This change:
1) Fixes a bug where NEON was assumed even when the code wasn't compiled
in NEON mode.
2) Adds a second NEON control bit that can be disabled in order to run
NEON code, but not the Poly1305 NEON code.
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=341598
Change-Id: Icb121bf8dba47c7a46c7667f676ff7a4bc973625
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change marks public symbols as dynamically exported. This means
that it becomes viable to build a shared library of libcrypto and libssl
with -fvisibility=hidden.
On Windows, one not only needs to mark functions for export in a
component, but also for import when using them from a different
component. Because of this we have to build with
|BORINGSSL_IMPLEMENTATION| defined when building the code. Other
components, when including our headers, won't have that defined and then
the |OPENSSL_EXPORT| tag becomes an import tag instead. See the #defines
in base.h
In the asm code, symbols are now hidden by default and those that need
to be exported are wrapped by a C function.
In order to support Chromium, a couple of libssl functions were moved to
ssl.h from ssl_locl.h: ssl_get_new_session and ssl_update_cache.
Change-Id: Ib4b76e2f1983ee066e7806c24721e8626d08a261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium is no longer using it.
Change-Id: If56340627d2024ff3fb8561405dd0cfc6f4787cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1346
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Where possible, functions should return one for success and zero for
error. The use of additional negative values to indicate an error is,
itself, error prone.
This change fixes many EVP functions to remove the possibility of
negative return values. Existing code that is testing for <= 0 will
continue to function, although there is the possibility that some code
was differentiating between negative values (error) and zero (invalid
signature) for the verify functions and will now show the wrong error
message.
Change-Id: I982512596bb18a82df65861394dbd7487783bd3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1333
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PR#3272
(Imported from upstream's 14183e50e75f54c44df6be69670180860ac19550 and
802fdcda1ebc4241a8e02af0046ba2f5264f71f6)
Change-Id: Ied6183d938e320f953a18f6616890d88b74def3f
OIDs with one component don't have an encoding.
PR#2556 (Bug#1)
(Imported from upstream's ff4cfc4c588c41d5e8d2d530231bc36cbc525add and
65e4dca40cb15f3acc878e26d734ec93bd367dca)
Change-Id: I55b54f23e891abc2c1e0b2976531fba1f16070bb
