Based in part on upstream's cf75017bfd. This
situation really shouldn't be able to happen, but between no static asserts
that the minimum MTU is always large enough and a bug in reseting the MTU later
(to be fixed be a follow-up import from upstream), check these and return a
useful error code.
Change-Id: Ie853e5d35a6a7bc9c0032e74ae71529d490f4fe2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us fold away the SSLv3-specific generate_master_secret. Once SSLv3
uses AEADs, others will fold away as well.
Change-Id: I27c1b75741823bc6db920d35f5dd5ce71b6fdbb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2697
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix up the generate_master_secret parameter while we're here.
Change-Id: I1c80796d1f481be0c3eefcf3222f2d9fc1de4a51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2696
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The EVP_CIPHER codepath should no longer be used with TLS. It still exists for
DTLS and SSLv3. The AEAD construction in TLS does not allow for
variable-overhead AEADs, so stateful AEADs do not include the length in the ad
parameter. Rather the AEADs internally append the unpadded length once it is
known. EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls is modified to account for this.
Tests are added (and RC4-MD5's regenerated) for each of the new AEADs. The
cipher tests are all moved into crypto/cipher/test because there's now a lot of
them and they clutter the directory listing.
In ssl/, the stateful AEAD logic is also modified to account for stateful AEADs
with a fixed IV component, and for AEADs which use a random nonce (for the
explicit-IV CBC mode ciphers).
The new implementation fixes a bug/quirk in stateless CBC mode ciphers where
the fixed IV portion of the keyblock was generated regardless. This is at the
end, so it's only relevant for EAP-TLS which generates a MSK from the end of
the key block.
Change-Id: I2d8b8aa11deb43bde2fd733f4f90b5d5b8cb1334
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2692
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert in
response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and gives a better
error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial parameters.
BUG=https://crbug.com/446505
Change-Id: I34368712085a6cbf0031902daf2c00393783d96d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Tested manually by replacing SSLv23_method() with TLSv1_2_method() in
bssl_shim. This is a large chunk of code which is not run in SSLv23_method(),
but it will be run after unification. It's split out separately to ease review.
Change-Id: I6bd241daca17aa0f9b3e36e51864a29755a41097
It should already be assigned, as of upstream's
b31b04d951. I believe these assignments are part
of the reason it used to appear to work. Replace them with assertions. So the
assertions are actually valid, check in SSL_connect / SSL_accept that they are
never called if the socket had been placed in the opposite state. (Or we'd be
in another place where it would have appeared to work with the handshake
functions fixing things afterwards.)
Now the only places handshake_func is set are in SSL_set_{connect,accept}_state
and the method switches.
Change-Id: Ib249212bf4aa889b94c35965a62ca06bdbcf52e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2432
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Prior to this change, BoringSSL maintained a 2-byte buffer for alerts,
and would support reassembly of fragmented alerts.
NSS does not support fragmented alerts, nor would any reasonable
implementation produce them. Remove fragmented alert handling and
produce an error if a fragmented alert has ever been encountered.
Change-Id: I31530ac372e8a90b47cf89404630c1c207cfb048
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Deprecate the old two-pass version of the function. If the ticket is too long,
replace it with a placeholder value but keep the connection working.
Change-Id: Ib9fdea66389b171862143d79b5540ea90a9bd5fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2011
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No more need for all the macros. For now, this still follows the two-pass i2d_*
API despite paying a now-unnecessary malloc. The follow-on commit will expose a
more reasonable API and deprecate this one.
Change-Id: I50ec63e65afbd455ad3bcd2f1ae3c782d9e8f9d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2000
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Do away with all those unreadable macros. Also fix many many memory leaks in
the SSL_SESSION reuse case. Add a number of helper functions in CBS to help
with parsing optional fields.
Change-Id: I2ce8fd0d5b060a1b56e7f99f7780997fabc5ce41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1998
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This gives inappropriate_fallback and close_notify sent during the handshake
error strings. It'd also avoid having to write
case SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
in Chromium.
Change-Id: I42123d5452eb7843ead883d112e58b3f087d3067
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Configures the SSL stack to log session information to a BIO. The intent is to
support NSS's SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. Add support for the same
environment variable to tool/client.cc.
Tested against Wireshark 1.12.0.
BUG=393477
Change-Id: I4c231f9abebf194eb2df4aaeeafa337516774c95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1699
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This moves CertificateVerify digest processing to the new
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE flag. It also refactors it similarly to
ssl3_send_cert_verify and moves that logic to a common ssl3_cert_verify_hash
function to compute the handshake hash.
This removes a large chunk of duplicate (and divergent!) logic between TLS and
DTLS. It also removes TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE.
Change-Id: Ia63c94f7d76d901bc9c4c33454fbfede411adf63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1633
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android needs this and it was patched into their OpenSSL in
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssl.git/+/master/patches/0003-jsse.patch
It appears that this is needed because javax.net.ssl.SSLEngine has it as
part of its interface and thus it's part of the Android API. No idea why
anything would ever want to disable that though.
Change-Id: I9c6279a961637f44936889edbe269b9d5c19746d
ssl23_get_client_hello has lots of remnants of SSLv2 support and remnants of an
even older SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option (see upstream's
d92f0bb6e9) which complicates the logic.
Split it into three states and move V2ClientHello parsing into its own
function. Port it to CBS and CBB to give bounds checks on the V2ClientHello
parse.
This fixes a minor bug where, if the SSL_accept call in ssl23_get_client_hello
failed, cb would not be NULL'd and SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP would get reported an
extra time.
It also unbreaks the invariant between s->packet, s->packet_length,
s->s3->rbuf.buf, and s->s3->rbuf.offset at the point the switch, although this
was of no consequence because the first ssl3_read_n call passes extend = 0
which resets s->packet and s->packet_length.
It also makes us tolerant to major version bumps in the ClientHello. Add tests
for TLS tolerance of both minor and major version bumps as well as the HTTP
request error codes.
Change-Id: I948337f4dc483f4ebe1742d3eba53b045b260257
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1455
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that the flag is set accurately, use it to enforce that the handshake and
CCS synchronization. If EXPECT_CCS is set, enforce that:
(a) No handshake records may be received before ChangeCipherSpec.
(b) There is no pending handshake data at the point EXPECT_CCS is set.
Change-Id: I04b228fe6a7a771cf6600b7d38aa762b2d553f08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1299
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL reason codes corresponding to alerts have special values. Teach
make_errors.go that values above 1000 are reserved (otherwise it will assign
new values in that namespace). Also fix all the existing reason codes which
corresponded to alerts.
Change-Id: Ieabdf8fd59f4802938616934e1d84e659227cf84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
More consistent with ssl3_send_server_key_exchange and the message name.
Change-Id: If0f435a89bdf117297d349099708fff0bd5a6e98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, public headers lived next to the respective code and there
were symlinks from include/openssl to them.
This doesn't work on Windows.
This change moves the headers to live in include/openssl. In cases where
some symlinks pointed to the same header, I've added a file that just
includes the intended target. These cases are all for backwards-compat.
Change-Id: I6e285b74caf621c644b5168a4877db226b07fd92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1180
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ClientHello and ServerHello are not allowed to include duplicate extensions.
Add a new helper function to check this and call as appropriate. Remove ad-hoc
per-extension duplicate checks which are no unnecessary.
Add runner.go tests to verify such message correctly rejected.
Change-Id: I7babd5b642dfec941459512869e2dd6de26a831c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Along the way, clean up the certificate types code to not have the
hard-coded fixed-size array.
Change-Id: If3e5978f7c5099478a3dfa37a0a7059072f5454a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If we need an extension, we can implement it in-library.
Change-Id: I0eac5affcd8e7252b998b6c86ed2068234134b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change implements equal-preference groups of cipher suites. This
allows, for example, a server to prefer one of AES-GCM or ChaCha20
ciphers, but to allow the client to pick which one. When coupled with
clients that will boost AES-GCM in their preferences when AES-NI is
present, this allows us to use AES-GCM when the hardware exists and
ChaCha20 otherwise.
This patch adds support for a different cipher list when the connection
is using TLS 1.1. This is intended to support the case where we want to
use AES with >= TLS 1.1 clients but RC4 otherwise because of the BEAST
attack.
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
David Benjamin
Alex Chernyakhovsky
Adam Langley