- In base.h, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined, include
boringssl_prefix_symbols.h
- In all .S files, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined, include
boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h
- In base.h, BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN and BSSL_NAMESPACE_END are
defined with appropriate values depending on whether
BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined; these macros are used in place
of 'namespace bssl {' and '}'
- Add util/make_prefix_headers.go, which takes a list of symbols
and auto-generates the header files mentioned above
- In CMakeLists.txt, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX and BORINGSSL_PREFIX_SYMBOLS
are defined, run util/make_prefix_headers.go to generate header
files
- In various CMakeLists.txt files, add "global_target" that all
targets depend on to give us a place to hook logic that must run
before all other targets (in particular, the header file generation
logic)
- Document this in BUILDING.md, including the fact that it is
the caller's responsibility to provide the symbol list and keep it
up to date
- Note that this scheme has not been tested on Windows, and likely
does not work on it; Windows support will need to be added in a
future commit
Change-Id: If66a7157f46b5b66230ef91e15826b910cf979a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31364
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have a successful TLS 1.3 deployment, in spite of non-compliant
middleboxes everywhere, so now let's get this optimization in. It would
have been nice to test with this from the beginning, but sadly we forgot
about it. Ah well. This shaves 63 bytes off the server's first flight,
and then another 21 bytes off the pair of NewSessionTickets.
So we'll more easily notice in case of anything catastrophic, tie this
behavior to draft 28.
Update-Note: This slightly tweaks our draft-28 behavior.
Change-Id: I4f176a919bf7181239d6ebb31e7870f12364e0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28744
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSLv3_method, SSLv3_client_method, and SSLv3_server_method produce
SSL_CTXs which fail every handshake. They appear no longer necessary for
compatibility, so remove them.
SSLv3 is still accessible to callers who explicitly re-enable SSLv3 on a
TLS_method, but that will be removed completely later this year.
Meanwhile, clear out a weird hack we had here.
Update-Note: I believe there are no more callers of these functions. Any
that were were already non-functional as these methods haven't been
unable to handshake for a while now.
Change-Id: I622f785b428ab0ceab77b5a9db05b2b0df28145a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26004
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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RC4 is gone. The only remaining exception was the dumb SSL_eNULL cipher,
which works fine in DTLS. It doesn't seem worth the trouble to retain
this special-case.
Change-Id: I31023b71192808e4d21e82109255dc4d6d381df8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22467
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This reverts commit 75d43b5785. Chatting
with EKR, there is some reason to believe that doing this might cause
more middlebox issues. Since we're still in the middle of working
towards viable deployment in the first place, revert this.
We can experiment with this later. I should have arranged for this to be
controlled more carefully anyway.
Change-Id: I0c8bf578f9d7364e913894e1bf3c2b8123dfd770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22204
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This does not affect TLS 1.2 (beyond Channel ID or NPN) but, in TLS 1.3,
we send several encrypted handshake messages in a row. For the server,
this means 66 wasted bytes in TLS 1.3. Since OpenSSL has otherwise used
one record per message since the beginning and unencrypted overhead is
less interesting, leave that behavior as-is for the time being. (This
isn't the most pressing use of the breakage budget.) But TLS 1.3 is new,
so get this tight from the start.
Change-Id: I64dbd590a62469d296e1f10673c14bcd0c62919a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22068
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This finally clears most of the SSL_clear special-cases.
Change-Id: I00fc240ccbf13f4290322845f585ca6f5786ad80
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21947
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
While a fairly small hook, open_close_notify is pretty weird. It
processes things at the record level and not above. Notably, this will
break if it skips past a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate.
Instead, it can share the core part of SSL_read/SSL_peek, with slight
tweaks to post-handshake processing. Note this does require some tweaks
to that code. Notably, to retain the current semantics that SSL_shutdown
does not call funny callbacks, we suppress tickets.
Change-Id: Ia0cbd0b9f4527f1b091dd2083a5d8c7efb2bac65
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21885
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This gets us closer to exposing BIO-free APIs. The next step is probably
to make the experimental bssl::OpenRecord function call a split out core
of ssl_read_impl.
Change-Id: I4acebb43f708df8c52eb4e328da8ae3551362fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21865
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This removes the last place where non-app-data hooks leave anything
uncomsumed in rrec. (There is still a place where non-app-data hooks see
a non-empty rrec an entrance. read_app_data calls into read_handshake.
That'll be fixed in a later patch in this series.)
This should not change behavior, though some error codes may change due
to some processing happening in a slightly different order.
Since we do this in a few places, this adds a BUF_MEM_append with tests.
Change-Id: I9fe1fc0103e47f90e3c9f4acfe638927aecdeff6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21345
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These are common between TLS and DTLS so should not have the ssl3_
prefix. (TLS-only stuff should really have a tls_ prefix, but we still
have a lot of that one.)
This also fixes a stray reference to ssl3_send_client_key_exchange..
Change-Id: Ia05b360aa090ab3b5f075d5f80f133cbfe0520d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21346
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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That's the last of it!
Change-Id: I93d1f5ab7e95b2ad105c34b24297a0bf77625263
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19784
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Rather than init_msg/init_num, there is a get_message function which
either returns success or try again. This function does not advance the
current message (see the previous preparatory change). It only completes
the current one if necessary.
Being idempotent means it may be freely placed at the top of states
which otherwise have other asychronous operations. It also eases
converting the TLS 1.2 state machine. See
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/11n7LHsT3GwE34LAJIe3EFs4165TI4UR_3CqiM9LJVpI/edit?usp=sharing
for details.
The read_message hook (later to be replaced by something which doesn't
depend on BIO) intentionally does not finish the handshake, only "makes
progress". A follow-up change will align both TLS and DTLS on consuming
one handshake record and always consuming the entire record (so init_buf
may contain trailing data). In a few places I've gone ahead and
accounted for that case because it was more natural to do so.
This change also removes a couple pointers of redundant state from every
socket.
Bug: 128
Change-Id: I89d8f3622d3b53147d69ee3ac34bb654ed044a71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18806
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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WebRTC will need this (probably among other things) to lose crypto/x509
at some point.
Bug: chromium:706445
Change-Id: I988e7300c4d913986b6ebbd1fa4130548dde76a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
With on_handshake_complete, this can be managed internally by the TLS
code. The next commit will add a ton more calls to this function.
Change-Id: I91575d3e4bfcccbbe492017ae33c74b8cc1d1340
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18865
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Instead, the DTLS driver can detect these states implicitly based on
when we write flights and when the handshake completes. When we flush a
new flight, the peer has enough information to send their reply, so we
start a timer. When we begin assembling a new flight, we must have
received the final message in the peer's flight. (If there are
asynchronous events between, we may stop the timer later, but we may
freely stop the timer anytime before we next try to read something.)
The only place this fails is if we were the last to write a flight,
we'll have a stray timer. Clear it in a handshake completion hook.
Change-Id: I973c592ee5721192949a45c259b93192fa309edb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18864
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The previous attempt around the 'struct ssl_st' compatibility mess
offended OSS-Fuzz and UBSan because one compilation unit passed a
function pointer with ssl_st* and another called it with
bssl::SSLConnection*.
Linkers don't retain such types, of course, but to silence this alert,
instead make C-visible types be separate from the implementation and
subclass the public type. This does mean we risk polluting the symbol
namespace, but hopefully the compiler is smart enough to inline the
visible struct's constructor and destructor.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ia75a89b3a22a202883ad671a630b72d0aeef680e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This adds several utilities as replacements for new and delete and makes
bssl::UniquePtr work with our private types.
Later work can convert more incrementally. I did this one more
aggressively to see how it'd work. Unfortunately, in doing so, I needed
to remove the NULL SSL_AEAD_CTX "method" receiver trick to appease
clang. The null cipher is now represented by a concrete SSL_AEAD_CTX.
The long-lived references to SSL_AEAD_CTX are not yet in types with
constructors, so they still bare Delete rather than UniquePtr for now.
Though this does mean we may be able to move the sequence number into
SSLAEADContext later which is one less object for DTLS to carry around.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I506b404addafb692055d5709b0ca6d5439a4e6be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I2b0c87262a5a529ea264ea8ce2d11c2dba0ec1c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17766
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
