BUG=187
Change-Id: I5775ce0886041b0c12174a7d665f3af1e8bce511
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14505
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14449
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, extract it from the certificate, which is what everyone was
doing anyway. A follow-up change will take advantage of this cleanup to
deduplicate code between signing and verifying for which keys are good
for which signature algorithms.
BUG=188
Change-Id: Ic3f83a6477e8fa53e5e7233f4545f4d2c4b58d01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14565
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We received an external request to add an option to undo the check added
in 3e51757de2.
Change-Id: Ifdd4b07705f2fa3d781d775d5cd139ea72d36734
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14644
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Thanks to Sam Panzer for the patch.)
At least some linkers will drop constructor functions if no symbols from
that translation unit are used elsewhere in the program. On POWER, since
the cached capability value isn't a global in crypto.o (like other
platforms), the constructor function is getting discarded.
The C++11 spec says (3.6.2, paragraph 4):
It is implementation-defined whether the dynamic initialization of a
non-local variable with static storage duration is done before the
first statement of main. If the initialization is deferred to some
point in time after the first statement of main, it shall occur
before the first odr-use (3.2) of any function or variable defined
in the same translation unit as the variable to be initialized.
Compilers appear to interpret that to mean they are allowed to drop
(i.e. indefinitely defer) constructors that occur in translation units
that are never used, so they can avoid initializing some part of a
library if it's dropped on the floor.
This change makes the hardware capability value for POWER a global in
crypto.c, which should prevent the constructor function from being
ignored.
Change-Id: I43ebe492d0ac1491f6f6c2097971a277f923dd3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14664
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This moves the early data switch to CERT to make this
|SSL_set_SSL_CTX|-proof.
Change-Id: Icca96e76636d87578deb24b2d507cabee7e46a4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14545
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There are a few test vectors which were not imported from djb's. Mirror
those. Also as RFC 8032 uses a slightly different private key
representation, document this in curve25519.h.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I119381168ba1af9b332365fd8f974fba41759d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14445
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of a previous iteration of the SSL client certificate
bridging logic in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ifa8e15cc970395f179e2f6db65c97a342af5498d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously we only needed to be able to serve P-224 certificates, but
now we anticipate a need to be able to connect and validate them also.
Since this requires advertising support for P-224 in the handshake, we
need to support P-224 ECDHE too.
P-224 support is disabled by default and so clients need to both set the
enabled curves explicitly and set a maximum version of TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: Idc69580f47334e0912eb431a0db0e78ee2eb5bbe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14225
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=76
Change-Id: I68bc1dce13af9155b385a7b589480aacf02ec0db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14380
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT, so we gracefully decline 0-RTT
as a server and forbid their combination as a client. We'll keep this
logic around until Channel ID is removed.
Channel ID will be replaced by tokbind which currently uses custom
extensions. Those will need additional logic to work with 0-RTT.
This is not implemented yet so, for now, fail if both are ever
configured together at all. A later change will allow the two to
combine.
BUG=183
Change-Id: I46c5ba883ccd47930349691fb08074a1fab13d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14370
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These will be used by Chromium's crypto::ECPrivateKey to work with
EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structures.
Note this comes with a behavior change: PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt
will no longer preserve PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo attributes. However, those
functions are only called by Chromium which does not care. They are also
called by the PEM code, but not in a way which exposes attributes.
The PKCS#12 PFX code is made to use PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key
because it's cleaner (no more tossing X509_SIG around) and to ease
decoupling that in the future.
crypto/pkcs8's dependency on the legacy ASN.1 stack is now limited to
pkcs8_x509.c.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I173e605d175e982c6b0250dd22187b73aca15b1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14215
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The padding check functions will need to tweak their calling conventions
and the constant-time helpers, so leaving those alone for now. These
were the easy ones.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ia00e41e26a134de17d56be3def5820cb042794e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14265
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This isn't strictly necessary for Chromium yet, but we already have a
decoupled version of hash algorithm parsing available. For now, don't
export it but eventually we may wish to use it for OCSP.
BUG=54
Change-Id: If460d38d48bd47a2b4a853779f210c0cf7ee236b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14211
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The |select_certificate_cb| return values are somewhat confusing due
to the fact that they don't match the |cert_cb| ones, despite the
similarities between the two callbacks (they both have "certificate" in
the name! well, sort of).
This also documents the error return value (-1) which was previously
undocumented, and it expands the |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|
documentation regarding retrial (by shamelessly copying from
|SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method|).
Also updates other scattered documentation that was missed by previous
changes.
Change-Id: Ib962b31d08e6475e09954cbc3c939988b0ba13f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14245
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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conf has the ability to expand variables in config files. Repeatedly doing
this can lead to an exponential increase in the amount of memory required.
This places a limit on the length of a value that can result from an
expansion.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this problem.
(Imported from upstream's 6a6213556a80ab0a9eb926a1d6023b8bf44f2afd. This
also import's upstream's ee1ccd0a41ad068957fe65ba7521e593b51bbad4 which
we had previously missed.)
Change-Id: I9be06a7e8a062b5adcd00c974a7b245226123563
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14316
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These too appear to be unused now that the core parsers use CBS. They
also were buggy as they silently ignored sign bits. This removes all
ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS definitions. (The code to use them still exists as
we're not ready to diverge on tasn_*. Current thinking is we'll
eventually just ditch the code rather than do so.)
Change-Id: I8d20e2989460dd593d62368cfbd083d5de1ee2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14324
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These have no consumers remaining. Upstream recently had a long series
of bugfixes for these types (2cbd4d98673d99cd7cb10715656b6d3727342e77,
e5afec1831248c767be7c5844a88535dabecc01a,
9abe889702bdc73f9490f611f54bf9c865702554,
2e5adeb2904dd68780fb154dbeb6e3efafb418bb). Rather than worry about this,
just remove the code.
Change-Id: I90f896aad096fc4979877e2006131e76c9ff023b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14323
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Change-Id: I6d07a8e146a925a14dbf5d11b4e8a57ef6eee39c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14244
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This was inadvertently dropped in
59015c365b. Python otherwise configures
P-256 if it assumes our OpenSSL predate's 1.0.2's multi-curve support.
This disables X25519, our preferred curve.
Change-Id: Ibf758583ea53e68c56667f16ee7096656bac719b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14208
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This change adds support for setting an |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD| which
allows a caller to control ticket encryption and decryption to a greater
extent than previously possible and also permits asynchronous ticket
decryption.
This change only includes partial support: TLS 1.3 work remains to be
done.
Change-Id: Ia2e10ebb3257e1a119630c463b6bf389cf20ef18
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14144
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This makes its purpose clearer. That the session cache is based on the
initial SSL_CTX is confusing (it's a remnant of OpenSSL's backwards
session resumption ordering), but we're probably stuck with it.
Relatedly, document SSL_set_SSL_CTX better.
Change-Id: I2832efc63f6c959c5424271b365825afc7eec5e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14204
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's more consistent to have the helper function do the check that
its every caller already performs. This removes the error code
SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS in favor of SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH.
Change-Id: I522239770dcb881d33d54616af386142ae41b29f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows a caller to configure a serving chain without dealing with
crypto/x509.
Change-Id: Ib42bb2ab9227d32071cf13ab07f92d029643a9a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14126
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We'll measure this value to guide what tolerance to use in the 0-RTT
anti-replay mechanism. This also fixes a bug where we were previously
minting ticket_age_add-less tickets on the server. Add a check to reject
all those tickets.
BUG=113
Change-Id: I68e690c0794234234e0d0500b4b9a7f79aea641e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14068
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Previously, the |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based methods always rejected
certificate chains because none of the current callbacks is suitable to
use. In the medium-term, we want an async callback for this but, for
now, we would like to get Chromium working. Chromium already installs a
no-op callback (except for the logic that was moved into BoringSSL in
a58baaf9e6) and so this hack will suffice
for Chromium.
Change-Id: Ie44b7b32b9e42f503c47b072e958507754136d72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14125
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is an API from OpenSSL 1.1.0 which is a little risky to add ahead
of bumping OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, but anything which currently builds
against BoringSSL already had an #ifdef due to the
ssl_cipher_preference_list_st business anyway.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION to make it easier to patch envoy for this.
BUG=6
Change-Id: If8307e30eb069bbd7dc4b8447b6e48e83899d584
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14067
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Everything has been updated to return the ECDSA curve.
Change-Id: Iee8fafb576c0ff92d9a47304d59cc607b5faa112
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14066
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This adds a CRYPTO_BUFFER getter for the peer certificate chain. Other
things we need for Chromium:
- Verification callback. Ultimately, we want an asynchronous one, but a
synchronous one will do for now.
- Configure client cert chain without X509
I've also removed the historical note about SSL_SESSION serialization.
That was years ago and we've since invalidated all serialized client
sessions.
BUG=671420
Change-Id: I2b3bb010f9182e751fc791cdfd7db44a4ec348e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14065
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Due to middlebox and ecosystem intolerance, short record headers are going to
be unsustainable to deploy.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I20fee79dd85bff229eafc6aeb72e4f33cac96d82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14044
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This function is a |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based method for getting the X.509
names from a CertificateRequest.
Change-Id: Ife26f726d3c1a055b332656678c2bc560b5a66ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14013
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This allows us to move the code from Chrome into BoringSSL itself.
BUG=126
Change-Id: I04b4f63008a6de0a58dd6c685c78e9edd06deda6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14028
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is the first part to fixing the SSL stack to be 2038-clean.
Internal structures and functions are switched to use OPENSSL_timeval
which, unlike timeval and long, are suitable for timestamps on all
platforms.
It is generally accepted that the year is now sometime after 1970, so
use uint64_t for the timestamps to avoid worrying about serializing
negative numbers in SSL_SESSION.
A follow-up change will fix SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb to use
OPENSSL_timeval. This will require some coordinating with WebRTC.
DTLSv1_get_timeout is left alone for compatibility and because it stores
time remaining rather than an absolute time.
BUG=155
Change-Id: I1a5054813300874b6f29e348f9cd8ca80f6b9729
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13944
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The DTLS stack has two very different APIs for handling timeouts. In
non-blocking mode, timeouts are driven externally by the caller with
DTLSv1_get_timeout. In blocking mode, timeouts are driven by the BIO by
calling a BIO_ctrl with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT.
The latter is never used by consumers, so remove support for it.
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT implicitly depends on struct timeval
being used for timestamps, which we would like to remove. Without this,
the only public API which relies on this is the testing-only
SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb which is BoringSSL-only and we can change at
our leisure.
BUG=155
Change-Id: Ic68fa70afab2fa9e6286b84d010eac8ddc9d2ef4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13945
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows a caller to get an |SSL_METHOD| that is free of crypto/x509.
Change-Id: I088e78310fd3ff5db453844784e7890659a633bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change converts the CA names that are parsed from a server's
CertificateRequest, as well as the CA names that are configured for
sending to clients in the same, to use |CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
The |X509_NAME|-based interfaces are turned into compatibility wrappers.
Change-Id: I95304ecc988ee39320499739a0866c7f8ff5ed98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13585
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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It has no more callers.
Change-Id: I587ccb3b63810ed167febf7a65ba85106d17a300
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13911
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Icb01cd3ff88eb3fa8a7d7a1e9ead568ba20eb748
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13965
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
These are only used by crypto/asn1 and not externally.
Change-Id: I2e6a28828fd81a4e3421eed1e98f0a65197f4b88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13868
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Node has since been patched.
Change-Id: If25eecabfc83ef9fd36c531c9ca9db2911de010e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13908
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These were added in an attempt to deal with the empty vs. NULL confusion
in PKCS#12. Instead, PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt already treated
NULL special. Since we're stuck with supporting APIs like those anyway,
Chromium has been converted to use that feature. This cuts down on the
number of APIs we need to decouple from crypto/asn1.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie2d4798d326c5171ea5d731da0a2c11278bc0241
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13885
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13865
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13866
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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