EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT makes more sense than
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT here.
Change-Id: I0dbdc91bab59843d5c04f2d0e97600fe7644753e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If y is zero, there is no point with odd y, so the odd bit may not be
set, hence EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT. This code instead computed the
Kronecker symbol of x and changed the error code to
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT if not a square.
As the comment says, this was (intended to be) unreachable. But it
seems x was a typo for tmp1. It dates to before upstream's
6fb60a84dd1ec81953917e0444dab50186617432, when BN_mod_sqrt gave
garbage if its input was not square. Now it emits BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE.
Upstream's 48fe4d6233ac2d60745742a27f820dd88bc6689d then mapped
BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE to EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT.
Change-Id: Id9e02fa1c154b61cc0c3a768c9cfe6bd9674c378
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12463
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Zero only has one allowed square root, not two.
Change-Id: I1dbd2137a7011d2f327b271b267099771e5499c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12461
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
Change-Id: Ib8a1fe185224ff02ed4ce53a0109e60d934e96b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12401
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This prevents a compiler warning from breaking ppc64le build.
Change-Id: I6752109bd02c6d078e656f89327093f8fb13a125
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12363
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change contains a C implementation of SHA-1 for POWER using
AltiVec. It is almost as fast as the scalar-only assembly implementation
for POWER/POWERPC family in OpenSSL but it is easier to maintain and it
allows error checking with tools like ASAN.
This is tested only for ppc64le. It may nor may not work for other
platforms in the POWER/POWERPC familiy.
Before:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~30 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~140 MB/s
After:
SHA-1 @ 16 bytes: ~70 MB/s
SHA-1 @ 8K: ~480 MB/s
Change-Id: I790352e86d9c0cc4e1e57d11c5a0aa5b0780ca6b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12203
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Otherwise the run_tests target sometimes gets confused.
Change-Id: If49e945bf5137c68db4927ab0f9845d25be63bac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12315
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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A BN_ULONG[P256_LIMBS] can't represent a negative number and
bn_set_words won't produce one. We only need to compare against P.
Change-Id: I7bd1c9e8c162751637459f23f3cfc56884d85864
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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RT#4625
(Imported from upstream's e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf.)
Add a test in ec_test to cover the ecp_nistz256_points_mul change. Also
revise the low-level infinity tests to cover the changes in
ecp_nistz256_point_add. Upstream's 'infty' logic was also cleaned up to
be simpler and take advantage of the only cases where |p| is infinity.
Change-Id: Ie22de834bf79ecb6191e824ad9fc1bd6f9681b8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12225
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As a client, we must tolerate this to avoid interoperability failures
with allowed server behaviors.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I9c40a2a048282e2e63ab5ee1d40773fc2eda110a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We were using a fully-qualified name for nearly everything anyway.
Change-Id: Ia32c68975ed4126feeab7b420f12b726ad6b89b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12226
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The other field operations have an explicit _mont suffix to denote their
inputs and outputs are in the Montgomery domain, aside from
ecp_nistz256_neg which works either way. Do the same here.
Change-Id: I63741adaeba8140e29fb0b45dff72273e231add7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The file is util-64.c in BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I51891103254ae1541ea4c30f92c41d5d47c2ba55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12223
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For the most part, this is with random test data which isn't
particularly good. But we'll be able to add more interesting test
vectors as they come up.
Change-Id: I9c50db7ac2c4bf978d4901000ab32e3642aea82b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12222
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Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.
(Imported from upstream's b62b2454fadfccaf5e055a1810d72174c2633b8f and
d3034d31e7c04b334dd245504dd4f56e513ca115.)
See also this thread.
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-dev/2016-August/008179.html
Change-Id: I3731f949e2e2ef539dec656c58f1820cc09a56a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11409
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I0e1d79e85a2d20ab4105b81d39cdbbd692ba67da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12221
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We don't support big-endian so this could only slow down whatever
platforms weren't listed in the #if.
Change-Id: Ie36f862663d947f591dd4896e6a2ab19122bbc0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12202
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The Poly1305 state defined in the header file is just a 512-byte buffer.
The vector code aligns to 64 bytes but the non-vector code did not.
Since we have lots of space to spare, this change causes the non-vector
code to also align to 64 bytes.
Change-Id: I77e26616a709e770d6eb23df47d9e292742625d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12201
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some old assemblers can't cope with r0 in address. It's actually
sensible thing to do, because r0 is shunted to 0 in address arithmetic
and by refusing r0 assembler effectively makes you understand that.
(Imported from upstream's a54aba531327285f64cf13a909bc129e9f9d5970.)
This also pulls in a trailing whitespace fix from upstream's
609b0852e4d50251857dbbac3141ba042e35a9ae.
Change-Id: Ieec0bc8d24b98f86ce4fc9ee6ce5126d127cf452
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12188
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj() function leaks an ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
object on an error path.
(Imported from upstream's fe71bb3ad97ed01ccf92812891cc2bc3ef3dce76.)
Thanks to Jinguang Dong for pointing out the bug.
Change-Id: I2c14662bb03b0cf957bd277bda487f05f07e89e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12185
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Imported from upstream's 2a7dd548a6f5d6f7f84a89c98323b70a2822406e and
9ebcbbba81eba52282df9ad8902f047e2d501f51.)
This is only in the ADX assembly codepath which we do not enable. See
$addx = 0 at the top of the file. Nonetheless, import the test vector
and fix since we still have the code in there.
Upstream's test vector only compares a*b against b*a. The expected
answer was computed using Python.
Change-Id: I3a21093978c5946d83f2d6f4f8399f69d78202cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12186
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Fuzzer mode explores the handshake, but at the cost of losing coverage
on the record layer. Add a separate build flag and client/server
corpora for this mode.
Note this requires tweaks in consumers' fuzzer build definitions.
BUG=111
Change-Id: I1026dc7301645e165a761068a1daad6eedc9271e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12108
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In https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/11920/2, I addressed a
number of comments but then forgot to upload the change before
submitting it. This change contains the changes that should have been
included in that commit.
Change-Id: Ib70548e791f80abf07a734e071428de8ebedb907
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12160
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This function allows callers to unpack an Ed25519 “seed” value, which is
a 32 byte value that contains sufficient information to build a public
and private key from.
Change-Id: Ie5d8212a73e5710306314b4f8a93b707665870fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12040
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The naming breaks layering, but it seems we're stuck with it. We don't
seem to have bothered making first-party code call it BIO_print_errors
(I found no callers of BIO_print_errors), so let's just leave it at
ERR_print_errors.
Change-Id: Iddc22a6afc2c61d4b94ac555be95079e0f477171
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11960
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I87cbc12aeb399646c6426b7a099dbf13aafc2532
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11983
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d2i_X509_from_buffer parses an |X509| from a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| but ensures
that the |X509_CINF.enc| doesn't make a copy of the encoded
TBSCertificate. Rather the |X509| holds a reference to the given
|CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
Change-Id: I38a4e3d0ca69fc0fd0ef3e15b53181844080fcad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11920
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Change-Id: I0aab9c94fcfa58b9cd46eaf716d9317f532f79a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11850
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Tagging non-pointer return types const doesn't do anything and makes
some compilers grumpy. Thanks to Daniel Hirche for the report.
Change-Id: I157ddefd8f7e604b4d8317ffa2caddb8f0dd89de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11849
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Neither branch of the |if| statement is expected to touch |data_len|.
Clarify this by moving |data_len| after the |if| statement.
Change-Id: Ibbc81e5b0c006882672df18442a6e7987064ca6d
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This patch changes the urandom PRNG to read one byte from the
getrandom(2) Linux syscall on initialization in order to find any
unexpected behavior.
Change-Id: I8ef676854dc361e4f77527b53d1a14fd14d449a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8681
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These structures allow for blobs of data (e.g. certificates) to be
deduplicated in memory.
Change-Id: Iebfec90b85d55565848a178b6951562b4ccc083e
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At some point, we'll forget to look in the commit message.
Change-Id: I3153aab679209f4f11f56cf3f883c4c74a17af1d
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clang-cl now supports enough of `#pragma intrinsic` that
it can use SecureZeroMemory() without an explicit intrin.h include.
This reverts https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/8320/
BUG=chromium:592745
Change-Id: Ib766133f1713137bddd07654376a3b4888d4b0fb
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I missed these in the last round.
Change-Id: I9b47216eef87c662728e454670e9e516de71ca21
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Change-Id: I51e5a7dac3ceffc41d3a7a57157a11258e65bc42
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11721
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Unhandled critical CRL extensions were not detected if they appeared
after the handled ones. (Upstream GitHub issue 1757). Thanks to John
Chuah for reporting this.
(Imported from upstream's 3ade92e785bb3777c92332f88e23f6ce906ee260.)
This additionally adds a regression test for this issue, generated with
der-ascii. The signatures on the CRLs were repaired per notes in
https://github.com/google/der-ascii/blob/master/samples/certificates.md
Change-Id: I74a77f92710e6ef7f46dcde5cb6ae9350084ddcb
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It's possible that a BIO implementation could return a negative number
(say -1) for BIO_CTRL_PENDING or BIO_CTRL_WPENDING. Assert that this
doesn't happen and map it to zero if it happens anyway in NDEBUG builds.
Change-Id: Ie01214e80ff19acc1c7681a1125bbbf2038679c3
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Nodejs 6.9.0 calls this function.
Change-Id: I375f222cb819ebcb9fdce0a0d63df6817fa2dcae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11625
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This code reportedly upsets VC++'s static analysis. Make it clear that,
yes, we want to count backwards.
Change-Id: I5caba219a2b87750d1a9d69b46d336a98c5824c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11624
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Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
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We have bool here. Also the comments were a mix of two styles.
Change-Id: I7eb6814b206efa960ae7e6e1abc14d64be6d61cf
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This reverts commit 7b9bbd9639. This seems
to cause some problem linking with gold in Chromium:
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'free'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'malloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'realloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: error: treating warnings as errors
The same error in https://crbug.com/368351 implies we're actually
causing the compiler to make some assumptions it shouldn't make. The
obvious fix of marking things as visible causes crashes when built with
ASan (ASan's malloc interceptors and ours are conflicting somehow).
Revert this for now. We should study how ASan's interceptors work and
figure out how to make these two coexist.
BUG=655938
Change-Id: Iaad245d1028c442bd924d46519b20115d37a57c4
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This clears the last of Android's build warnings from BoringSSL. These
pragmas aren't actually no-ops, but it just means that MinGW consumers
(i.e. just Android) need to explicitly list the dependency (which they
do).
There may be something to be said for removing those and having everyone
list dependencies, but I don't really want to chase down every
consumer's build files. Probably not worth the trouble.
Change-Id: I8fcff954a6d5de9471f456db15c54a1b17cb937a
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This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
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Change-Id: Id8099cc3a250e36e62b8a48e74706b75e5fa127c
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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This finally removes the last Android hack. Both Chromium and Android
end up needing this thing (Chromium needs it for WebCrypto but currently
uses the EVP_AEAD version and Android needs it by way of
wpa_supplicant).
On the Android side, the alternative is we finish upstream's
NEED_INTERNAL_AES_WRAP patch, but then it just uses its own key-wrap
implementation. This seems a little silly, considering we have a version
of key-wrap under a different API anyway.
It also doesn't make much sense to leave the EVP_AEAD API around if we
don't want people to use it and Chromium's the only consumer. Remove it
and I'll switch Chromium to the new---er, old--- APIs next roll.
Change-Id: I23a89cda25bddb6ac1033e4cd408165f393d1e6c
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We have CBS_get_asn1 / CBS_get_asn1_element, but not the "any" variants
of them. Without this, a consumer walking a DER structure must manually
CBS_skip the header, which is a little annoying.
Change-Id: I7735c37eb9e5aaad2bde8407669bce5492e1ccf6
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This is just to reduce the diff with upstream's files so it's easier to
tell what's going on. Upstream's files have lots and lots of trailing
whitespace. We were also missing a comment.
Change-Id: Icfc3b52939823a046a3744fd8e619b5bd6160715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11408
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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If asn1_item_ex_combine_new fails in one of the ASN1_template_new calls
just before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST call, ASN1_item_ex_free will free the
temporary object which ultimately calls ASN1_OP_FREE_POST. This means
that ASN1_OP_FREE_POST needs to account for zero-initialized objects.
Change-Id: I56fb63bd5c015d9dfe3961606449bc6f5b1259e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11403
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Change-Id: Ia020ea08431859bf268d828b5d72715295de26e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11401
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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They just need a different name for the real malloc implementations.
Change-Id: Iee1aac1133113d628fd3f9f1ed0335d66c6def24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11400
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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In order to align ppc64le with the existing code, 4467e59b changed the
prefix for both the ARM and ppc64le AES assembly code to be “aes_hw_”.
However, it didn't update aes.c as well.
Change-Id: I8e3c7dea1c49ddad8a613369af274e25d572a8fd
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This change adds AES and GHASH assembly from upstream, with the aim of
speeding up AES-GCM.
The PPC64LE assembly matches the interface of the ARMv8 assembly so I've
changed the prefix of both sets of asm functions to be the same
("aes_hw_").
Otherwise, the new assmebly files and Perlasm match exactly those from
upstream's c536b6be1a (from their master branch).
Before:
Did 1879000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000428us (1878196.1 ops/sec): 30.1 MB/s
Did 61000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006660us (60596.4 ops/sec): 81.8 MB/s
Did 11000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1072649us (10255.0 ops/sec): 84.0 MB/s
Did 1665000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000591us (1664016.6 ops/sec): 26.6 MB/s
Did 52000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006971us (51640.0 ops/sec): 69.7 MB/s
Did 8840 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1013294us (8724.0 ops/sec): 71.5 MB/s
After:
Did 4994000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000017us (4993915.1 ops/sec): 79.9 MB/s
Did 1389000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000073us (1388898.6 ops/sec): 1875.0 MB/s
Did 319000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000101us (318967.8 ops/sec): 2613.0 MB/s
Did 4668000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000149us (4667304.6 ops/sec): 74.7 MB/s
Did 1202000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000646us (1201224.0 ops/sec): 1621.7 MB/s
Did 269000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1002804us (268247.8 ops/sec): 2197.5 MB/s
Change-Id: Id848562bd4e1aa79a4683012501dfa5e6c08cfcc
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One of Chromium's toolchains can't handle this for some reason. See also
empty_crls and empty in TestVerify.
Change-Id: I5e6a849f3042288da2e406882ae5cfec249a86ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11340
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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We used upstream's reformat script, but they had stuck hyphens
everywhere to tell indent to leave a comment alone. Fix this one since
it was especially hard to read.
Change-Id: I9f43bd57dbcf66b79b775ad10ee67867d815ed33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11243
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but,
on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and
X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers
are all 1.2.
The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS
1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections.
Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing
interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the
answer is no.
Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one
group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with
GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the
TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT),
so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky
operation.
Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't
done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's
together, even.
Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3
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Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11129
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The MinGW setup on Android already defines this stat macro.
Change-Id: Ia8e89195c06ec01d4b5a2fa7357fb8d2d500aa06
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11124
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
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Android uses MinGW for some host tools on Windows. That toolchain
doesn't support the #pragma tricks we use for thread-local destructors,
but does appear to support pthreads.
This also lets us remove the INIT_ONCE workaround, although that's
removable anyway since Android's MinGW is now new enough.
Change-Id: I8d1573923fdaac880a50d84acbebbf87461c50d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11125
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C99 decided that, like PRI* macros, UINT64_C and friends should be
conditioned on __STDC_CONSTANT_MACROS in C++. C++11 then decided this
was ridiculous and overruled this decision. However, Android's headers
in older NDKs mistakenly followed the C99 rules for C++, so work around
this.
This fixes the android_arm bots.
Change-Id: I3b49e8dfc20190ebfa78876909bd0dccd3e210ea
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Android currently implements this manually (see NativeBN_putULongInt) by
reaching into BIGNUM's internals. BN_ULONG is a somewhat unfortunate API
anyway as the size is platform-dependent, so add a platform-independent
way to do this.
The other things Android needs are going to need more work, but this
one's easy.
BUG=97
Change-Id: I4af4dc29f9845bdce0f0663c379b4b5d3e1dc46e
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Code acting generically on an EVP_AEAD_CTX may wish to get at the
underlying EVP_AEAD.
Change-Id: I9cc905522ba76402bda4c255aa1488158323b02c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11085
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
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Since gcm_test now contains variable decls in for loops it needs
-std=c11. However, tests are compiled with C++ test_support files in
Bazel, which doesn't work with -std=c11.
Change-Id: Ife18c2d80b01448bb3b7ee2728412289bf749bd9
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This function (actually a macro in OpenSSL) is used by several projects
(e.g. OpenResty, OpenVPN, ...) so it can useuful to provide it for
compatibility.
However, depending on the semantics of the BIO type (e.g. BIO_pair), the
return value can be meaningless, which might explain why it was removed.
Change-Id: I0e432c92222c267eb994d32b0bc28e999c4b40a7
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The stuff around i being reused for |len| rounded to a number of blocks
is a little weird.
Change-Id: I6f07a82fe84d077062e5b34ce75cc68250be8a4a
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I hear our character set includes such novel symbols as '+'.
Change-Id: I96591a563317e71299748a948d68a849e15b5d60
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This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
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Really the only thing we should be doing with these ciphers is hastening
their demise, but it was the weekend and this seemed like fun.
EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac needs to rotate a buffer by a secret amount. (It
extracts the MAC, but rotated.) We have two codepaths for this. If
CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined (always on), we make some assumptions
abuot cache lines, play games with volatile, and hope that doesn't leak
anything. Otherwise, we do O(N^2) work to constant-time select the
rotation incidences.
But we can do O(N lg N). Rotate by powers of two and constant-time
select by the offset's bit positions. (Handwaivy lower-bound: an array
position has N possible values, so, armed with only a constant-time
select, we need O(lg N) work to resolve it. There's N array positions,
so O(N lg N).)
A microbenchmark of EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac shows this is 27% faster than
the old one, but still 32% slower than the in-place version.
in-place:
Did 15724000 CopyFromMAC operations in 20000744us (786170.8 ops/sec)
N^2:
Did 8443000 CopyFromMAC operations in 20001582us (422116.6 ops/sec)
N lg N:
Did 10718000 CopyFromMAC operations in 20000763us (535879.6 ops/sec)
This results in the following the CBC ciphers. I measured
AES-128-CBC-SHA1 and AES-256-CBC-SHA384 which are, respectively, the
cipher where the other bits are the fastest and the cipher where N is
largest.
in-place:
Did 2634000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 10000739us (263380.5 ops/sec): 4.2 MB/s
Did 1424000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10002782us (142360.4 ops/sec): 192.2 MB/s
Did 531000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10002460us (53086.9 ops/sec): 434.9 MB/s
N^2:
Did 2529000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 10001474us (252862.7 ops/sec): 4.0 MB/s
Did 1392000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10006659us (139107.4 ops/sec): 187.8 MB/s
Did 528000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10001276us (52793.3 ops/sec): 432.5 MB/s
N lg N:
Did 2531000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) open operations in 10003057us (253022.7 ops/sec): 4.0 MB/s
Did 1390000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10003287us (138954.3 ops/sec): 187.6 MB/s
Did 531000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10002448us (53087.0 ops/sec): 434.9 MB/s
in-place:
Did 1249000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (16 bytes) open operations in 10001767us (124877.9 ops/sec): 2.0 MB/s
Did 879000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10009244us (87818.8 ops/sec): 118.6 MB/s
Did 344000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10025897us (34311.1 ops/sec): 281.1 MB/s
N^2:
Did 1072000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (16 bytes) open operations in 10008090us (107113.3 ops/sec): 1.7 MB/s
Did 780000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10007787us (77939.3 ops/sec): 105.2 MB/s
Did 333000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10016332us (33245.7 ops/sec): 272.3 MB/s
N lg N:
Did 1168000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (16 bytes) open operations in 10007671us (116710.5 ops/sec): 1.9 MB/s
Did 836000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (1350 bytes) open operations in 10001536us (83587.2 ops/sec): 112.8 MB/s
Did 339000 AES-256-CBC-SHA384 (8192 bytes) open operations in 10018522us (33837.3 ops/sec): 277.2 MB/s
TLS CBC performance isn't as important as it was before, and the costs
aren't that high, so avoid making assumptions about cache lines. (If we
care much about CBC open performance, we probably should get the malloc
out of EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record at the end.)
Change-Id: Ib8d8271be4b09e5635062cd3b039e1e96f0d9d3d
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For consistency and to avoid a pedantic GCC warning (even though it's
mostly old legacy code).
Change-Id: Iea63eb0a82ff52914adc33b83e48450f4f6a49ef
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In OpenSSL, they're used in the 32-bit x86 Blowfish, CAST, DES, and RC5
assembly bits. We don't have any of those.
Change-Id: I36f22ca873842a200323cd3f398d2446f7bbabca
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(Imported from upstream's 2a20b6d9731488bcb500e58a434375f59fb9adcc)
Change-Id: If3db4dac3d4cd675cf7854c4e154823d25d00eb9
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(Imported from upstream's a404656a8b40d9f1172e5e330f7e2d9d87cabab8)
Change-Id: I4ddebfbaeab433bae7c1393a8258d786801bb633
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Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
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These test vectors include the k value, so we can get a deterministic
test.
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
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This removes all but the generic C RC4 implementation. At this point we
want to optimize for size/simplicity rather than speed.
See also upstream's 3e9e810f2e047effb1056211794d2d12ec2b04e7 which
removed the RC4_CHUNK code and standardized on RC4_INDEX. A
since-removed comment says that it was implemented for "pre-21164a Alpha
CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions" and helps with SPARC and
MIPS.
This also removes all the manual loop unrolling.
Change-Id: I91135568483260b2e1e675f190fb00ce8f9eff3d
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This and the following commits will import NIST's ECC test vectors.
Right now all our tests pass if I make P-224 act like P-521, which is
kind of embarrassing. (Other curves are actually tested, but only
because runner.go tests them against BoGo.)
Change-Id: Id0b20451ebd5f10f1d09765a810ad140bea28fa0
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Change-Id: I85216184f9277ce0c0caae31e379b638683e28c5
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We may need to implement high tag number form someday. CBS_get_asn1 has
an unsigned output to allow for this, but CBB_add_asn1 takes a uint8_t
(I think this might be my fault). Fix that which also fixes a
-Wconversion warning.
Simply leaving room in tag representation will still cause troubles
because the class and constructed bits overlap with bits for tag numbers
above 31. Probably the cleanest option would be to shift them to the top
3 bits of a u32 and thus not quite match the DER representation. Then
CBS_get_asn1 and CBB_add_asn1 will internally munge that into the DER
representation and consumers may continue to write things like:
tag_number | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
I haven't done that here, but in preparation for that, document that
consumers need to use the values and should refrain from assuming the
correspond to DER.
Change-Id: Ibc76e51f0bc3b843e48e89adddfe2eaba4843d12
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Some, very recent, versions of Clang now support `.arch`. Allow them to
see these directives with BORINGSSL_CLANG_SUPPORTS_DOT_ARCH.
BUG=39
Change-Id: I122ab4b3d5f14502ffe0c6e006950dc64abf0201
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nginx consumes these error codes without #ifdefs. Continue to define
them for compatibility, even though we never emit them.
BUG=95
Change-Id: I1e991987ce25fc4952cc85b98ffa050a8beab92e
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958aaf1ea1, imported from upstream, had an
off-by-one error. Reproducing the failure is fairly easy as it can't
even serialize 1. See also upstream's
099e2968ed3c7d256cda048995626664082b1b30.
Rewrite the function completely with CBB and add a basic test.
BUG=chromium:639740
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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Change-Id: I2e1ee319bb9852b9c686f2f297c470db54f72279
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I found an earlier reference for an algorithm for the optimized
computation of n0 that is very similar to the one in the "Montgomery
Multiplication" paper cited in the comments. Add a reference to it.
Henry S. Warren, Jr. pointed out that his "Montgomery Multiplication"
paper is not a chapter of his book, but a supplement to the book.
Correct the reference to it.
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This was causing some Android breakage. The real bug is actually
entirely in Android for getting its error-handling code wrong and not
handling multiple errors. I'll fix that. (See b/30917411.)
That said, BN_R_NO_INVERSE is a perfectly legitimate reason for those
operations to fail, so ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR isn't really a right thing
to push in front anyway. We're usually happy enough with single-error
returns (I'm still a little skeptical of this queue idea), so let's just
leave it at that.
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If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.
Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
don't overflow buffer.
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
CVE-2016-2182
(Imported from upstream's e36f27ddb80a48e579783bc29fb3758988342b71.)
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RT#4530
(Imported from upstream's 7123aa81e9fb19afb11fdf3850662c5f7ff1f19c.)
We've yet to enable this code, but this confirms that we do indeed need
to get our future all-variants stuff working on Windows as well as
Linux and find an AVX2-capable CI setup on each.
The crash here is caused by some win64-only code using %rax as a frame
pointer (perlasm injects a mov rax,rsp in the prologue of every win64
function).
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Check for error return in BN_div_word().
(Imported from upstream's d871284aca5524c85a6460119ac1b1e38f7e19c6.)
This function is only called from crypto/obj to convert strings like
"1.2.3.4.5" to OIDs. We may wish to see about rewriting it just so it's
out of the way.
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These functions are unused. Upstream recently needed to limit recursion
depth on this function in 81f69e5b69b8e87ca5d7080ab643ebda7808542c. It
looks like deeply nested BER constructed strings could cause unbounded
stack usage. Delete the function rather than import the fix.
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These are never used internally or externally. Upstream had some
bugfixes to them recently. Delete them instead.
Change-Id: I44a6cce1dac2c459237f6d46502657702782061b
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(Imported from upstream's b10c10422a9ec4db426be3ef99031f0807d2ded0,
ff8b6b92f44c682ad78f60c32ec154e0bfabebb2, and
134ab5139a8d41455a81d9fcc31b3edb8a4b2f5c.)
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The weird function thing is a remnant of OpenSSL and I think something
weird involving Windows and symbols exported from dlls. These aren't
exposed in the public API, so have everything point to the tables
directly.
This is in preparation for making built-in EC_GROUPs static. (The static
EC_GROUPs won't be able to call a function wrapper.)
BUG=20
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The old one was written somewhat weirdly.
Change-Id: I414185971a7d70105fded558da6d165570429d31
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A lot of codepaths are unreachable since the EC_GROUP is known to be
blank.
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By using memcpy, GCC can already optimise things so that the compiled
code is identical on x86-64. Thus we don't need to worry about having
different versions for platforms with, and without, strict alignment.
(Thanks to Emil Mikulic.)
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I didn't look into whether this was reachable, but I assume not. Still,
better to be robust here becasue DH groups are commonly under some
amount of attacker control.
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
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Since we are eliminating DHE support in TLS, this is just a waste of
bytes.
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This more accurately reflects the documented contract for
|BN_mod_inverse_odd|.
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In OpenSSL 1.1.0, this API has been renamed to gain a BN prefix. Now
that it's no longer squatting on a namespace, provide the function so
wpa_supplicant needn't carry a BoringSSL #ifdef here.
BUG=91
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The name of this has been annoying me every time I've seen it over the
past couple of days. Having a flag with a negation in the name isn't
always bad, but I think this case was.
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This gets cURL building against both BoringSSL as it is and BoringSSL
with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER set to 1.1.0.
BUG=91
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The old one was rather confusing. Switch to returning 1/0 for whether
the padding is publicly invalid and then add an output argument which
returns a constant_time_eq-style boolean.
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Add the following cases:
- Maximal padding
- Maximal padding with each possible byte position wrong.
- When the input is not publicly too short to find a MAC, but the
unpadded value is too short. (This tests that
EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding and EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac coordinate
correctly. EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding promises to also consider it
invalid padding if there is no room for a MAC.)
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Change-Id: I44bc5979cb8c15ad8c4f9bef17049312b6f23a41
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Use a separate |size_t| variable for all logic that happens after the
special casing of the negative values of the signed parameter, to
minimize the amount of mixed signed/unsigned math used.
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There is a comment "Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
be non-negative". Reorganize the code to make it more clear that that
is actually the case, especially in the case where sLen == -1.
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Initial stab at moving contents of scoped_types.h into
include/openssl/c++ and into the |bssl| namespace.
Started with one file. Will do the remaining ones once this looks good.
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This makes it easier to understand the |sLen|-related logic.
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The old implementation had a lot of size_t/int confusion. It also
accepted non-minimally-encoded OIDs. Unlike the old implementation, the
new one does not fall back to BIGNUMs and does not attempt to
pretty-print OIDs with components which do not fit in a uint64_t. Add
tests for these cases.
With this new implementation, hopefully we'll have a much easier time
enabling MSVC's size_t truncation warning later.
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This eliminates duplicate logic.
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BN_mod_inverse_odd was always being used on 64-bit platforms and was being used
for all curves with an order of 450 bits or smaller (basically, everything but
P-521). We generally don't care much about minor differences in the speed of
verifying signatures using curves other than P-256 and P-384. It is better to
always use the same algorithm.
This also allows |bn_mod_inverse_general|, |bn_mod_inverse_no_branch|, and
|BN_mod_inverse| to be dropped from programs that can somehow avoid linking in
the RSA key generation and RSA CRT recovery code.
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The main RSA public modulus size of concern is 2048 bits.
bn_mod_inverse_odd is already used for public moduli of 2048 bits and
smaller on 64-bit platforms, so for 64-bit it is a no-op. For 32-bit
x86, this seems to slightly decrease the speed of RSA signing, but not
by a lot, and plus we don't care about RSA signing performance much on
32-bit platforms. It's better to have all platforms using the same
algorithms.
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This is a step towards exposing |bn_mod_inverse_odd| for use outside
of crypto/bn/gcd.c.
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This is in preparation for factoring out the binary Euclidean
implementation (the one used for odd numbers that aren't too big) for
direct use from outside of crypto/bn/gcd.c. The goal is to make the
resultant |BN_mod_inverse_odd|'s signature similar to
|BN_mod_inverse_blinded|. Thus, the logic for reducing the final result
isn't factored out because that yet-to-be-created |BN_mod_inverse_odd|
will need to do it itself.
Change-Id: Iaecb79fb17d13c774c4fb6ade8742937780b0006
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This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got
bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this.
BUG=22
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Fix non-standard variable names, return value convention, unsigned vs
size_t, etc. This also fixes one size_t truncation warning.
BUG=22
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OBJ_obj2txt's implementation is kind of scary. Also it casts between int
and size_t a lot. In preparation for rewriting it, add a test.
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We'd gotten rid of the macros, but not the underlying asn1_GetSequence
which is unused. Sadly this doesn't quite get rid of ASN1_(const_)?CTX.
There's still some code in the rest of crypto/asn1 that uses it.
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|BN_mod_exp_mont| uses |BN_nnmod| so it seems like
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| should too. Further, I created
these test vectors by doing the math by hand, and the tests
passed for |BN_mod_exp_mont| but failed for
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| without this change.
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Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we
don't have negative zeros lying around.
Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing.
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BUG=59
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If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
(Imported from upstream's 325da8231c8d441e6bb7f15d1a5a23ff63c842e5 and
3dc160e9be6dcaeec9345fbb61b1c427d7026103.)
Change-Id: I8c722663b979dfe08728d091697d8b8204dc265c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8947
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Negative zeros are nuts, but it will probably be a while before we've
fixed everything that can create them. Fix both to consistently print
'-0' rather than '0' so failures are easier to diagnose (BN_cmp believes
the values are different.)
Change-Id: Ic38d90601b43f66219d8f44ca085432106cf98e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9073
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Simplify the calculation of the Montgomery constants in
|BN_MONT_CTX_set|, making the inversion constant-time. It should also
be faster by avoiding any use of the |BIGNUM| API in favor of using
only 64-bit arithmetic.
Now it's obvious how it works. /s
Change-Id: I59a1e1c3631f426fbeabd0c752e0de44bcb5fd75
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A caller using EVP_Digest* which a priori knows tighter bounds on the
hash function used (perhaps because it is always a particular hash) can
assume the function will not write more bytes than the size of the hash.
The letter of the rules before vaguely[*] allowed for more than
EVP_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes written which made for some unreasonable code in
Chromium. Officially clarify this and add tests which, when paired with
valgrind and ASan prove it.
BUG=59
[*] Not really. I think it already promised the output length will be
both the number of bytes written and the size of the hash and the size
of the hash is given by what the function promises to compute. Meh.
Change-Id: I736d526e81cca30475c90897bca896293ff30278
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9066
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We managed to mix two comment styles in the Go license headers and
copy-and-paste it throughout the project.
Change-Id: Iec1611002a795368b478e1cae0b53127782210b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9060
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Yo dawg I herd you like blinding so I put inversion blinding in your
RSA blinding so you can randomly mask your random mask.
This improves upon the current situation where we pretend that
|BN_mod_inverse_no_branch| is constant-time, and it avoids the need to
exert a lot of effort to make a actually-constant-time modular
inversion function just for RSA blinding.
Note that if the random number generator weren't working correctly then
the blinding of the inversion wouldn't be very effective, but in that
case the RSA blinding itself would probably be completely busted, so
we're not really losing anything by relying on blinding to blind the
blinding.
Change-Id: I771100f0ad8ed3c24e80dd859ec22463ef2a194f
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This also adds a missing OPENSSL_EXPORT.
Change-Id: I6c2400246280f68f51157e959438644976b1171b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9041
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There are many cases where we need |BN_rand_range| but with a minimum
value other than 0. |BN_rand_range_ex| provides that.
Change-Id: I564326c9206bf4e20a37414bdbce16a951c148ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8921
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Change-Id: I6d552d26b3d72f6fffdc4d4d9fc3b5d82fb4e8bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9010
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Fermat's Little Theorem is already used for the custom curve implementations.
Use it, for the same reasons, for the ec_montgomery-based implementations.
I tested the performance (only) on x86-64 Windows.
Change-Id: Ibf770fd3f2d3e2cfe69f06bc12c81171624ff557
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Zero is only a valid input to or output of |BN_mod_inverse| when the
modulus is one. |BN_MONT_CTX_set| actually depends on this, so test
that this works.
Change-Id: Ic18f1fe786f668394951d4309020c6ead95e5e28
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Some gerrit git hook says this is necessary.
Change-Id: I8a7a0a0e6732688c965b43824fe54b2db79a4919
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|BN_mod_inverse| is expensive and leaky. In this case, we can avoid
it completely by taking advantage of the fact that we already have
the two values that are supposed to be inverses of each other.
Change-Id: I2230b4166fb9d89c7445f9f7c045a4c9e4c377b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8925
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Besides reducing code duplication, also move the relative location of
the check of |count|. Previously, the code was generating a random
value and then terminating the loop without using it if |count| went
to zero. Now the wasted call to |BN_rand| is not made.
Also add a note about the applicability of the special case logic for
|range| of the form |0b100...| to RSA blinding.
Change-Id: Iaa33b9529f1665ac59aefcc8b371fa32445e7578
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8960
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One less random environment variable for us to be sensitive to. (We
should probably unwind all this proxy cert stuff. I don't believe they
are ever enabled.)
Change-Id: I74993178679ea49e60c81d8416e502cbebf02ec9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8948
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(Imported from upstream's a9b23465243b6d692bb0b419bdbe0b1f5a849e9c,
5e102f96eb6fcdba1db2dba41132f92fa492aea0, and
9bda72880113b2b2262d290b23bdd1d3b19ff5b3.)
Change-Id: Ib608acb86cc128cacf20811c21bf6b38b0520106
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8944
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tag2nbyte had -1 at 18th position, but underlying ASN1_mbstring_copy
supports NumericString. tag2nbyte is also used in do_print_ex which will
not be broken by setting 1 at 18th position of tag2nbyte
(Imported from upstream's bd598cc405e981de259a07558e600b5a9ef64bd6.)
Change-Id: Ie063afcaac8a7d5046cdb385059b991b92cd6659
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8946
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The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value.
In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not
noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules.
(Imported from upstream's c4210673313482edacede58d92e92c213d7a181a.)
svaldez and I stared at this for a while and we believe this change is
correct. It's also irrelevant because our only remaining ADB (ANY
DEFINED BY) table is POLICYQUALINFO which does not allow its selector to
be omitted. Also, if it did, it would be a slight change in behavior.
We'd switch from using POLICYQUALINFO's default_tt (filling in an
ASN1_ANY) to its null_tt (which doesn't exist, so error).
Change-Id: If6a929e3dafca18431775b01958d0dae1c09f3b4
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This imports upstream's b62e9bf5cbbe278b7e0017c9234999dae68ee867 and
c3bc7f498815b355533d96b54b9a09e030d4130c. This is a no-op since we don't
use the XTS bits though keep the files in sync so long as we have them.
Comparing to master, we're now up-to-date on that file except for
a285992763f3961f69a8d86bf7dfff020a08cef9. (I've left that alone since
that touches lots of files and we should probably get better test
configuration before importing something scary like #undef __thumb2__.)
Change-Id: Ie0556757c954ef559e03a6d62c940d5901ca704a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All other CBB_add_u<N> functions take a narrowed type, but not every
uint32_t may fit in a u24. Check for this rather than silently truncate.
Change-Id: I23879ad0f4d2934f257e39e795cf93c6e3e878bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8940
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It's only called in one place. The comment about stack-allocated BIOs no
longer applies.
Change-Id: I5a3cec30bcb46bf1ee2bffd6117485383520b314
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8902
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BN_mod_mul_montgomery has a problem where the modulus is much smaller
than one of the arguments. While bn_test.cc knows this and reduces the
inputs before testing |BN_mod_mul_montgomery|, none of the previous test
vectors actually failed without this. (Except those that passed negative
vaules.)
This change adds tests where M ≪ A and B.
Change-Id: I53b5188ea5fb5e48d0d197718ed33c644cde8477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8890
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers. Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.
(Imported from upstream's 0e76014e584ba78ef1d6ecb4572391ef61c4fb51.)
This is in master and not 1.0.2, but having a per-certificate signature
cache when this is a function of signature and issuer seems dubious at
best. Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni for pointing this change out to me.
(And for making the original change upstream, of course.)
Change-Id: Ie692d651726f14aeba6eaab03ac918fcaedb4eeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Revert 3f3358ac15. Add documentation
clarifying the misunderstanding that lead to the mistake, and make use
of the recently-added |bn_set_words|.
Change-Id: I58814bace3db3b0b44e2dfe09c44918a4710c621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8831
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Our CBB patterns do not make it safe to use a CBB after any operation
failed. Suppose one does:
int add_to_cbb(CBB *cbb) {
CBB child;
return CBB_add_u8(cbb, 1) &&
CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) &&
CBB_add_u8(&child, 2) &&
/* Flush |cbb| before |child| goes out of scoped. */
CBB_flush(cbb);
}
If one of the earlier operations fails, any attempt to use |cbb| (except
CBB_cleanup) would hit a memory error. Doing this would be a bug anyway,
since the CBB would be in an undefined state anyway (wrote only half my
object), but the memory error is bad manners.
Officially document that using a CBB after failure is illegal and, to
avoid the memory error, set a poison bit on the cbb_buffer_st to prevent
all future operations. In theory we could make failure +
CBB_discard_child work, but this is not very useful and would require a
more complex CBB pattern.
Change-Id: I4303ee1c326785849ce12b5f7aa8bbde6b95d2ec
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
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prk should be a const parameter.
Change-Id: I2369ed9f87fc3c59afc07d3b667b86aec340052e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8810
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For now, skip the 1.2 -> 1.1 signal since that will affect shipping
code. We may as well enable it too, but wait until things have settled
down. This implements the version in draft-14 since draft-13's isn't
backwards-compatible.
Change-Id: I46be43e6f4c5203eb4ae006d1c6a2fe7d7a949ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upstream have added |EVP_PKEY_up_ref|, but their version returns an int.
Having this function with a different signature like that is dangerous
so this change aligns BoringSSL with upstream. Users of this function in
Chromium and internally should already have been updated.
Change-Id: I0a7aeaf1a1ca3b0f0c635e2ee3826aa100b18157
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8736
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
libssh2 expects this function.
Change-Id: Ie2d6ceb25d1b633e1363e82f8a6c187b75a4319f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than blindly select SHA-1 if we can't find a matching one, act as
if the peer advertised rsa_pkcs1_sha1 and ecdsa_sha1. This means that we
will fail the handshake if no common algorithm may be found.
This is done in preparation for removing the SHA-1 default in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I3584947909d3d6988b940f9404044cace265b20d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8695
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
Last month's canary for loop did not die in the coal mine of decrepit
toolchains. Make a note of this in STYLE.md so we know to start breeding
more of them. We can indeed declare index variables like it's 1999.
I haven't bothered to convert all of our for loops because that will be
tedious, but we can do it as we touch the code. Or if someone feels
really really bored.
BUG=47
Change-Id: Ib76c0767c1b509e825eac66f8c2e3ee2134e2493
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We usually put main at the end. There's now nothing interesting in the
function, so avoid having to declare every test at the top.
Change-Id: Iac469f41f0fb7d1f58d12dfbf651bf0d39f073d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8712
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
That removes the last of the bc stuff.
BUG=31
Change-Id: If64c974b75c36daf14c46f07b0d9355b7cd0adcb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8711
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Amazingly, this function actually has (not crypto-related) callers, despite
being pretty much useless for cryptography.
BUG=31
Change-Id: I440827380995695c7a15bbf2220a05ffb28d9335
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These were generated by running test_mod_exp_mont5 10 times. The values with
Montgomery representation 1 were generated separately so the test file could
preserve the comment. (Though, at 10,000 lines, no one's going to find it...)
BUG=31
Change-Id: I8e9d4d6d7b5f7d283bd259df10a1dbdc90b888cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8611
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Honestly, with this size of number, they're pretty bad test vectors.
test_mod_exp_mont5 will be imported in the next commit which should help.
This was done by taking test_mod_exp's generation, running it a few times
(since otherwise the modulus is always the same). I also ran it a few times
with the odd constraint removed since BN_mod_exp is supposed to support it,
even if it's not actually useful.
BUG=31
Change-Id: Id53953f0544123a5ea71efac534946055dd5aabc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8610
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
That one needs reduced inputs and the other ought to be also tested against
unreduced ones is a bit annoying. But the previous commit made sure BN_nnmod
has tests, and test_mont could stand to inherit test_mod_mul's test data (it
only had five tests originally!), so I merged them.
BUG=31
Change-Id: I1eb585b14f85f0ea01ee81537a01e07ced9f5d9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8608
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In preparation for converting test_mont and test_mod_mul to test vectors, make
test_mont less silly. We can certainly get away with doing more than five
tests. Also generate |a| and |b| anew each time. Otherwise the first BN_nmod is
destructive.
Change-Id: I944007ed7b6013a16d972cb7290ab9992c9360ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
No need for the special case and such.
Change-Id: If8fbc73eda0ccbaf3fd422e97c96fee6dc10b1ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8604
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Since the format no longer is readable by bc, compare it to Go's math/big
instead.
Change-Id: I34d37aa0c29c6f4178267858cb0d3941b4266b93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8603
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also, update the documentation about aliasing for |BN_usub|. It might
be better to find a way to factor out the shared logic between the
tests of these functions and the tests of |BN_add| and |BN_usub|, but
doing so would end up up creating a lot of parameters due to the many
distinct strings used in the messages.
Change-Id: Ic9d714858212fc92aa6bbcc3959576fe6bbf58c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8593
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also update the documentation for |BN_sub|.
Change-Id: I544dbfc56f22844f6ca08e9e472ec13e76baf8c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8592
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
|BN_mod_exp_mont| should be tested the same way as the other variants,
especially since it is exported.
Change-Id: I8c05725289c0ebcce7aba7e666915c4c1a841c2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8590
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In order to delay the digest of the handshake transcript and unify
around message-based signing callbacks, a copy of the transcript is kept
around until we are sure there is no certificate authentication.
This removes support for SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD as a client in SSL 3.0.
Change-Id: If8999a19ca021b4ff439319ab91e2cd2103caa64
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8561
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This file contains nothing but no-op functions. There's nothing to include.
Change-Id: I3a21207d6a47fab3a00c3f72011abef850ed7b27
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8541
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
