Just the negotiation portion as everything else is external. This feature is
used in WebRTC.
Change-Id: Iccc3983ea99e7d054b59010182f9a56a8099e116
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2310
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Prior to this change, BoringSSL maintained a 2-byte buffer for alerts,
and would support reassembly of fragmented alerts.
NSS does not support fragmented alerts, nor would any reasonable
implementation produce them. Remove fragmented alert handling and
produce an error if a fragmented alert has ever been encountered.
Change-Id: I31530ac372e8a90b47cf89404630c1c207cfb048
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All of NSS, upstream OpenSSL, SChannel, and Secure Transport require, on the
client, that the ServerHello version match the session's version on resumption.
OpenSSL's current behavior is incompatible with all of these. Fall back to a
full handshake on the server instead of mismatch.
Add a comment on the client for why we are, as of
30ddb434bf, not currently enforcing the same in
the client.
Change-Id: I60aec972d81368c4ec30e2fd515dabd69401d175
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Clients all consistently reject mismatches. If a different version was
negotiated, a server should ignore the resumption. This doesn't actually affect
current tests. We really want to be making this change in BoringSSL (and then
upstream), but get the Go half into shape first.
Change-Id: Ieee7e141331d9e08573592e661889bd756dccfa9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2243
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These'll get removed once most of renego support is gone, but this is to prove
removing the warning alert from the previous commit still prevents legacy
renegotiations.
Change-Id: I7d9d95e1d4c5d23d3b6d170938a5499a65f2d5ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2236
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Ensure that the client rejects it with UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, not by attempting to
decode it.
Change-Id: Ifc5613cf1152e0f7dcbee73e05df1ef367dfbfd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2232
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
At the record layer, DTLS maintains a window of seen sequence numbers to detect
replays. Add tests to cover that case. Test both repeated sequence numbers
within the window and sequence numbers past the window's left edge. Also test
receiving sequence numbers far past the window's right edge.
Change-Id: If6a7a24869db37fdd8fb3c4b3521b730e31f8f86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2221
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support to the Go code for renegotiation as a client,
meaning that we can test BoringSSL's renegotiation as a server.
Change-Id: Iaa9fb1a6022c51023bce36c47d4ef7abee74344b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2082
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
pskKeyAgreement is now a wrapper over a base key agreement.
Change-Id: Ic18862d3e98f7513476f878b8df5dcd8d36a0eac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only the three plain PSK suites for now. ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 will
be in a follow-up.
Change-Id: Iafc116a5b2798c61d90c139b461cf98897ae23b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both as client and as server. Also tests that ALPN causes False Start to kick
in.
Change-Id: Ib570346f3c511834152cd2df2ef29541946d3ab4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1753
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise the child is busy waiting for its second handshake.
Change-Id: Ic613eeb04c5d6c1ec1e1bbcb13946d3ac31d05f1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Notably, this would have caught ed8270a55c
(although, apart from staring at code coverage, knowing to set resumeSession on
the server test isn't exactly obvious). Perhaps we should systematically set it
on all extension server tests; ClientHello extension parsing happens after
resumption has been determined and is often sensitive to it.
Change-Id: Ie83f294a26881a6a41969e9dbd102d0a93cb68b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These were added in TLS 1.2. They are like the standard AES-CBC cipher suites,
but use different HMACs.
Change-Id: Ib89ddebd1aa398b1347f8285f5d827068b1bd181
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This check got refactored in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and broke in the process. Fix this
and add a test. Otherwise things like client auth can get slightly confused; it
will try to sign the MD5/SHA-1 hash, but the TLS 1.2 cipher suite may not use
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT, so those digests won't be available.
Based on upstream's 226751ae4a1f3e00021c43399d7bb51a99c22c17.
Change-Id: I5b864d3a696f3187b849c53b872c24fb7df27924
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1696
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If this is part of SSL_OP_ALL, we should have a test for it.
Change-Id: Ia72422beb2da6434726e78e174f3416f90f7c897
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1695
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Maintain a handshake buffer in prf.go to implement TLS 1.2 client auth. Also
use it for SSL 3. This isn't strictly necessary as we know the hash functions,
but Go's hash.Hash interface lacks a Copy method.
Also fix the server-side tests which failed to test every TLS version.
Change-Id: I98492c334fbb9f2f0f89ee9c5c8345cafc025600
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We may wish to pass data to the runner that contains NULs.
Change-Id: Id78dad0ad0b5b6d0537481c818e3febdf1740cc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1603
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To align with what Chrome sends on NSS, remove all 3DES cipher suites except
RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. This avoids having to order a PFS 3DES cipher
against a non-PFS 3DES cipher.
Remove the strength sort which wanted place AES_256_CBC ahead of AES_128_GCM
and is not especially useful (everything under 128 is either 3DES or DES).
Instead, explicitly order all the bulk ciphers. Continue to prefer PFS over
non-PFS and ECDHE over DHE.
This gives the following order in Chromium. We can probably prune it a bit
(DHE_DSS, DH_*) in a follow-up.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc14) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc13) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc15) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa2) Forward Secrecy* 128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x38) Forward Secrecy* 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x33) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x32) Forward Secrecy* 128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc011) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc007) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa4) 128
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa0) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9c) 128
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x37) 256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x36) 256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35) 256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x31) 128
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x30) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x5) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (0x4) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) 112
BUG=405091
Change-Id: Ib8dd28469414a4eb496788a57a215e7e21f8c37f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1559
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RFC 6347 changed the meaning of server_version in HelloVerifyRequest. It should
now always be 1.0 with version negotiation not happening until ServerHello. Fix
runner.go logic and remove #if-0'd code in dtls1_get_hello_verify.
Enforce this in the runner for when we get DTLS 1.2 tests.
Change-Id: Ice83628798a231df6bf268f66b4c47b14a519386
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1552
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than switching the order of the ServerHello and HelloVerifyRequest
states and processing each twice, have the states follow the protocol order.
HelloVerifyRequest reading is optional and ServerHello is strict. Use the
send_cookie bit to determine whether we're expecting a cookie or not.
Fix the dtls1_stop_timer call in these states to consistently hit the end of a
server flight; the previous flight should not be cleared from the retransmit
buffer until the entire next flight is received. That said, OpenSSL doesn't
appear to implement the part where, on receipt of the previous peer flight, the
buffered flight is retransmitted. (With the exception of a SSL3_MT_FINISHED
special-case in dtls1_read_bytes.) So if the peer is also OpenSSL, this doesn't
do anything.
Also fix the DTLS test which wasn't actually asserting that the ClientHello
matched.
Change-Id: Ia542190972dbffabb837d32c9d453a243caa90b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The missing SSL 3.0 client support in runner.go was fairly minor.
Change-Id: Ibbd440c9b6be99be08a214dec6b93ca358d8cf0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1516
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes some duplicate code in parsing command-line flags and, more
importantly, makes configuration available when constructing the SSL_CTX and
avoids a number of globals.
Change-Id: I26e2d2285b732f855a2c82752bc8e0db480c3b30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1502
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Run against openssl s_client and openssl s_server. This seems to work for a
start, although it may need to become cleverer to stress more of BoringSSL's
implementation for test purposes.
In particular, it assumes a reliable, in-order channel. And it requires that
the peer send handshake fragments in order. Retransmit and whatnot are not
implemented. The peer under test will be expected to handle a lossy channel,
but all loss in the channel will be controlled. MAC errors, etc., are fatal.
Change-Id: I329233cfb0994938fd012667ddf7c6a791ac7164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ssl23_get_client_hello has lots of remnants of SSLv2 support and remnants of an
even older SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option (see upstream's
d92f0bb6e9ed94ac0c3aa0c939f2565f2ed95935) which complicates the logic.
Split it into three states and move V2ClientHello parsing into its own
function. Port it to CBS and CBB to give bounds checks on the V2ClientHello
parse.
This fixes a minor bug where, if the SSL_accept call in ssl23_get_client_hello
failed, cb would not be NULL'd and SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP would get reported an
extra time.
It also unbreaks the invariant between s->packet, s->packet_length,
s->s3->rbuf.buf, and s->s3->rbuf.offset at the point the switch, although this
was of no consequence because the first ssl3_read_n call passes extend = 0
which resets s->packet and s->packet_length.
It also makes us tolerant to major version bumps in the ClientHello. Add tests
for TLS tolerance of both minor and major version bumps as well as the HTTP
request error codes.
Change-Id: I948337f4dc483f4ebe1742d3eba53b045b260257
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1455
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's a different handshake flow with more state machine coverage. We should
make sure to test the asynchronous version.
Change-Id: I0bb79ca7e6a86bd3cac66bac1f795a885d474909
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1454
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Didn't have coverage for abbreviated handshakes with NewSessionTicket. Also add
some missing resumeSession flags so the tests match the comments.
Change-Id: Ie4d76e8764561f3f1f31e1aa9595324affce0db8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also change MaxHandshakeRecordLength to 1 in the handshake coverage tests to
better stress the state machine.
Change-Id: I27fce2c000b3d4818fd2e9a47fb09d3f646dd1bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1452
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Test all pairs of client and server version, except for the ones that require
SSLv3 client support in runner.go. That is, as yet, still missing.
Change-Id: I601ab49c5526cd2eb4f85d5d535570e32f218d5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1450
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not part of SSL_OP_ALL and is unused, so remove it. Add a test that
asserts the version check works.
Change-Id: I917516594ec5a4998a8316782f035697c33d99b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1418
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When the write size was exactly SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+1 and record
splitting is needed, an extra byte would be added to the max size of the
message to be written. This would cause the requested size to not exceed
the max. If the SSL_WANT_WRITE error were returned, the next packet
would not get the extra byte added to the max packet size since
record_split_done is set. Since a different set of arguments
(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+1 vs SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) would be passed
to do_ssl3_write, it would return an "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING:bad write
retry" error.
To avoid a failure in the opposite direction, the max variable increment
is removed as well. This can happen when SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
is not enabled and the call to ssl3_write_bytes contains, e.g., a buffer
of 2*SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, where the first call into do_ssl3_write
succeeds writing the first SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH bytes, but writing
the second SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH bytes fails. This means the first
time the the second section of SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH bytes has called
do_ssl3_write with "max" bytes, but next call to ssl3_write_bytes in
turn calls into do_ssl3_write with "max+1" bytes.
Change-Id: Icf8453195c1145a54d31b8e8146801118207df03
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1420
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Add a framework for testing the asynchronous codepath. Move some handshake
state machine coverage tests to cover a range of record-layer and
handshake-layer asynchronicity.
This adds tests for the previous two async bugs fixed.
Change-Id: I422ef33ba3eeb0ad04766871ed8bc59b677b169e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1410
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use it to test DHE-RSA in BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I88f7bfa76507a6f60234d61d494c9f94b7df4e0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1377
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Default to the number of CPUs. Avoids the tests launching 64 valgrinds in
parallel on machines without gobs of memory.
Change-Id: I9eeb365b48aa7407e303d161f90ce69a591a884c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1375
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Assert that inappropriate fallbacks are detected, but if the client_version
matches the server's highest version, do not abort the handshake.
Change-Id: I9d72570bce45e1eb23fc2b74a3c5fca10562e573
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1373
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
