Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.
This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.
Change-Id: Icd9c2117c657f3aa6df55990c618d562194ef0e8
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The last one was an RC4 cipher and those are gone.
Change-Id: I3473937ff6f0634296fc75a346627513c5970ddb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13108
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds support for setting 0-RTT mode on tickets minted by
BoringSSL, allowing for testing of the initial handshake knowledge.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ic199842c03b5401ef122a537fdb7ed9e9a5c635a
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We repeat this in a bunch of places.
Change-Id: Iee2c95a13e1645453f101d8be4be9ac78d520387
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Rather than doing it right before outputing, treat this as a part of the
pipeline to finalize the certificate chain, and run it right after
cert_cb to modify the certificate configuration itself. This means
nothing else in the stack needs to worry about this case existing.
It also makes it easy to support in both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I6a088297a54449f1f5f5bb8b5385caa4e8665eb6
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This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
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This is in preparation for implementing 0-RTT where, like
with client_traffic_secret_0, client_handshake_secret must
be derived slightly earlier than it is used. (The secret is
derived at ServerHello, but used at server Finished.)
Change-Id: I6a186b84829800704a62fda412992ac730422110
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This removes another dependency on the crypto/x509 code.
Change-Id: Ia72da4d47192954c2b9a32cf4bcfd7498213c0c7
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So we can report it cleanly out of DevTools, it should behave like
SSL_get_curve_id and be reported on resumption too.
BUG=chromium:658905
Change-Id: I0402e540a1e722e09eaebadf7fb4785d8880c389
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This change removes the use of |X509_get_pubkey| from the TLS <= 1.2
code. That function is replaced with a shallow parse of the certificate
to extract the public key instead.
Change-Id: I8938c6c5a01b32038c6b6fa58eb065e5b44ca6d2
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I1c7a71d84e1976138641f71830aafff87f795f9d
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This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
(This is a second attempt at
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/12163/.)
BUG=chromium:671420
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state is now initialized to SSL_ST_INIT in SSL_HANDSHAKE. If there is no
handshake present, we report SSL_ST_OK. This saves 8 bytes of
per-connection post-handshake memory.
Change-Id: Idb3f7031045caed005bd7712bc8c4b42c81a1d04
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This avoids needing a extra state around client certificates to avoid
calling the callbacks twice. This does, however, come with a behavior
change: configuring both callbacks won't work. No consumer does this.
(Except bssl_shim which needed slight tweaks.)
Change-Id: Ia5426ed2620e40eecdcf352216c4a46764e31a9a
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This is to free up the hs->state name for the upper-level handshake
state.
Change-Id: I1183a329f698c56911f3879a91809edad5b5e94e
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This reverts commits 5a6e616961 and
e8509090cf. I'm going to unify how the
chains are kept in memory between client and server first otherwise the
mess just keeps growing.
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
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This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
The serialisation format of SSL_SESSIONs is also changed, in a backwards
compatible way. Previously, some sessions would duplicate the leaf
certificate in the certificate chain. These sessions can still be read,
but will be written in a way incompatible with older versions of the
code. This should be fine because the situation where multiple versions
exchange serialised sessions is at the server, and the server doesn't
duplicate the leaf certifiate in the chain anyway.
Change-Id: Id3b75d24f1745795315cb7f8089a4ee4263fa938
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There is no need to retain it beyond this point.
Change-Id: Ib5722ab30fc013380198b1582d1240f0fe0aa770
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These too have no reason to be called across files.
Change-Id: Iee477e71f956c2fa0d8817bf2777cb3a81e1c853
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s3_lib.c is nearly gone. ssl_get_cipher_preferences will fall away once
we remove the version-specific cipher lists. ssl_get_algorithm_prf and
the PRF stuff in general needs some revising (it was the motivation for
all the SSL_HANDSHAKE business). I've left ssl3_new / ssl3_free alone
for now because we don't have a good separation between common TLS/DTLS
connection state and state internal to the TLS SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
Leaving that alone for now as there's lower-hanging fruit.
Change-Id: Idf7989123a387938aa89b6a052161c9fff4cbfb3
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Each of these functions is called only once, but they're interspersed
between s3_lib.c and ssl_lib.c.
Change-Id: Ic496e364b091fc8e01fc0653fe73c83c47f690d9
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: Iec0e597af37137270339e9754c6e08116198899e
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The various key schedule cleanups have removed the need for this enum.
Change-Id: I3269aa19b834815926ad56b2d919e21b5e2603fe
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The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
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Change-Id: I84a8ff1d717f3291403f6fc49668c84f89b910da
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Change-Id: I5ef0fe5cc3ae0d5029ae41db36e66d22d76f6158
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Change-Id: Id8543a88929091eb004a5205a30b483253cdaa25
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This removes all explicit ssl->s3->hs access in those files.
Change-Id: I801ca1c894936aecef21e56ec7e7acb9d1b99688
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This takes care of many of the explicit ssl->s3->hs accesses.
Change-Id: I380fae959f3a7021d6de9d19a4ca451b9a0aefe5
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This cuts down on a lot of unchecked ssl->s3->hs accesses. Next is
probably the mass of extensions callbacks, and then we can play
whack-a-mole with git grep.
Change-Id: I81c506ea25c2569a51ceda903853465b8b567b0f
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We currently look up SSL_HANDSHAKE off of ssl->s3->hs everywhere, but
this is a little dangerous. Unlike ssl->s3->tmp, ssl->s3->hs may not be
present. Right now we just know not to call some functions outside the
handshake.
Instead, code which expects to only be called during a handshake should
take an explicit SSL_HANDSHAKE * parameter and can assume it non-NULL.
This replaces the SSL * parameter. Instead, that is looked up from
hs->ssl.
Code which is called in both cases, reads from ssl->s3->hs. Ultimately,
we should get to the point that all direct access of ssl->s3->hs needs
to be NULL-checked.
As a start, manage the lifetime of the ssl->s3->hs in SSL_do_handshake.
This allows the top-level handshake_func hooks to be passed in the
SSL_HANDSHAKE *. Later work will route it through the stack. False Start
is a little wonky, but I think this is cleaner overall.
Change-Id: I26dfeb95f1bc5a0a630b5c442c90c26a6b9e2efe
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BUG=101
Change-Id: Ia1edbccee535b0bc3a0e18465286d5bcca240035
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It is not called outside of t1_enc.c.
Change-Id: Ifd9d109eeb432e931361ebdf456243c490b93ecf
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It doesn't need to be exported out of t1_lib.c.
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This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
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This simplifies a little code around EMS and PSK KE modes, but requires
tweaking the SNI code.
The extensions that are more tightly integrated with the handshake are
still processed inline for now. It does, however, require an extra state
in 1.2 so the asynchronous session callback does not cause extensions to
be processed twice. Tweak a test enforce this.
This and a follow-up to move cert_cb before resumption are done in
preparation for resolving the cipher suite before resumption and only
resuming on match.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- The legacy SNI callback happens before resumption.
- The ALPN callback happens before resumption.
- Custom extension ClientHello parsing callbacks also cannot depend on
resumption state.
- The DoS protection callback now runs after all the extension callbacks
as it is documented to be called after the resumption decision.
BUG=116
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Having that logic in two different places is a nuisance when we go to
add new checks like resumption stuff. Along the way, this adds missing
tests for the ClientHello cipher/session consistency check. (We'll
eventually get it for free once the cipher/resumption change is
unblocked, but get this working in the meantime.)
This also fixes a bug where the session validity checks happened in the
wrong order relative to whether tickets_supported or renew_ticket was
looked at. Fix that by lifting that logic closer to the handshake.
Change-Id: I3f4b59cfe01064f9125277dc5834e62a36e64aae
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TLS 1.3 adds a number of places with extensions blocks that don't easily
fit into our ClientHello/EncryptedExtensions callbacks. Between
HelloRetryRequest, ServerHello, draft 18 going nuts with Certificate,
and NewSessionTicket when we do 0-RTT, this passes the "abstract things
that are repeated three times" sniff test.
For now, it rejects unknown extensions, but it will probably grow an
allow_unknown parameter for NewSessionTicket.
This involves disabling some MSVC warnings, but they're invalid as of
C99 which we otherwise require. See
https://connect.microsoft.com/VisualStudio/feedback/details/1230248/remove-c99-related-warnings-or-make-them-off-by-default
Change-Id: Iea8bf8ab216270c081dd63e79aaad9ec73b3b550
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For TLS 1.3 draft 18, it will be useful to get at the full current
message and not just the body. Add a hook to expose it and replace
hash_current_message with a wrapper over it.
BUG=112
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It's all of one bit, but having it on the SSL object means we need
manually to reset it on renego.
Change-Id: I989dacd430fe0fa63d76451b95f036a942aefcfe
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This is to allow for PSK binders to be munged into the ClientHello as part of
draft 18.
BUG=112
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This change renames |peer| to |x509_peer| and |cert_chain| to
|x509_chain| in |SSL_SESSION|. It also renames |x509| to |x509_leaf| and
|chain| to |x509_chain| in |CERT|. (All with an eye to maybe making
them lazily initialised in the future).
This a) catches anyone who might be accessing these members directly and
b) makes space for |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based values to take the unprefixed
names.
Change-Id: I10573304fb7d6f1ea03f9e645f7fc0acdaf71ac2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12162
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is already manually released at the end of the handshake. With this
change, it can happen implicitly, and SSL3_STATE shrinks further by
another pointer.
Change-Id: I94b9f2e4df55e8f2aa0b3a8799baa3b9a34d7ac1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The distinction for full handshakes is not meaningful (the timestamp is
currently the start of the handshake), but for renewed sessions, we
currently retain the timestamp of the original issuance.
Instead, when minting or receiving tickets, adjust session->time and
session->timeout so that session->time is the ticket issuance time.
This is still not our final TLS 1.3 behavior (which will need a both
renewable and non-renewable times to honor the server ticket lifetime),
but it gets us closer and unblocks handling ticket_age_add from TLS 1.3
draft 18 and sends the correct NewSessionTicket lifetime.
This fixes the ticket lifetime hint which we emit on the server to
mirror the true ticket lifetime. It also fixes the TLS 1.3 server code
to not set the ticket lifetime hint. There is no need to waste ticket
size with it, it is no longer a "hint" in TLS 1.3, and even in the TLS
1.3 code we didn't fill it in on the server.
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