These behave like EVP_AEAD_CTX_{seal,open} respectively, but receive
ciphertext and authentication tag as separate arguments, rather than one
contiguous out or in buffer.
Change-Id: Ia4f1b83424bc7067c55dd9e5a68f18061dab4d07
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These are never referenced within the library or externally. Some of the
constants have been unused since SSLeay.
Change-Id: I597511208dab1ab3816e5f730fcadaea9a733dff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17025
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https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12360/ made us define
BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY when building tests via Bazel. The test has now
been moved to crypto_test, where the flags are more easily under the
control of the consumer.
Change-Id: If237efca219a1f03d64dc801cc1d585556bf2d1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16987
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We've been compile-testing it for some time, and now we have a path (by
way of GTest and Chromium) to get them test coverage.
Change-Id: Ic33be8fce4bbef10cd586428e74972f230525792
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Reviewed-by: Kári Helgason <kthelgason@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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None of these declarations are ever defined or constants used.
Change-Id: Id71ed5f02f9972d375845eacd9ce290a64b1c525
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Originally we had some confusion around whether the features could be
toggled individually or not. Per the ARM C Language Extensions doc[1],
__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO implies the "crypto extension" which encompasses
all of them. The runtime CPUID equivalent can report the features
individually, but it seems no one separates them in practice, for now.
(If they ever do, probably there'll be a new set of #defines.)
[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0053c/IHI0053C_acle_2_0.pdf
Change-Id: I12915dfc308f58fb005286db75e50d8328eeb3ea
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These are, in turn, just taken from RFC 8032 and are all in
ed25519_tests.txt. But it's probably good to test non-empty inputs at
the EVP_PKEY layer too.
Change-Id: I21871a6efaad5c88b828d2e90d757c325a550b2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16989
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This was specific to some old software on the test machine. Shrinking
the critical section to not cover getrandom is probably worthwhile
anyway though, so keep it around but make the comment less scary.
Change-Id: I8c17b6688ae93f6aef5d89c252900985d9e7bb52
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16992
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This matches the example code in IG 9.10.
Change-Id: Ie010d135d6c30acb9248b689302b0a27d65bc4f7
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Clang 4.0 on ppc64le generated symbols called “.LCE0” and so on.
Change-Id: I6bacf24365aa547d0ca9e5f338e4bb966df31708
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This is a fairly shallow conversion because of the somewhat screwy Error
lines in the test which may target random functions like
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md. We probably should revise this, perhaps
moving those to normal tests and leaving error codes to the core
operation itself.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I27dcc945058911b2de40cd48466d4e0366813a12
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Change-Id: Icb3003d71e3d61eb98fb8835bd567e383f22affc
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This is less likely to make the compiler grumpy and generates the same
code. (Although this file has worse casts here which I'm still trying to
get the compiler to cooperate on.)
Change-Id: If7ac04c899d2cba2df34eac51d932a82d0c502d9
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We lost some parallelism by putting the tests into one binary and have
enough giant test vector files now that this takes some time. Shard them
back up again.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I1d196bd8c4851bf975d6b4f2f0403ae65feac884
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POWER8 has hardware transactional memory, which glibc uses to implement
locks. In some cases, taking a lock begins a transaction, wrapping
arbitrary user code (!) until the lock is released. If the transaction
is aborted, everything rewinds and glibc tries again with some other
implementation.
The kernel will abort the transaction in a variety of cases. Notably, on
a syscall, the transaction aborts and the syscall *does not happen*.
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/powerpc/transactional_memory.txt
Yet, for some reason, although the relevant change does appear to be in
the kernel, the transaction is being rewound with getrandom happening
anyway. This does not work very well.
Instead, only guard the DRBG access with the lock, not CRYPTO_sysrand.
This lock is only used to protect the DRBG from the destructor that
zeros everything.
Change-Id: Ied8350f1e808a09300651de4200c7b0d07b3a158
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BUG=129
Change-Id: Ia8b0639489fea817be4bb24f0457629f0fd6a815
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Change-Id: I4e0da85857e820f8151e2fb50d699f14fedee97b
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Change-Id: I2e7b9e80419758a5ee4f53915f13334bbf8e0447
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Change-Id: Ic22ea72b0134aa7884f1e75433dd5c18247f57ab
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The crypto target depends on having access to the fips_fragments when
compiling bcm.c. Explicitly load and add them as a dependency of that
target.
Change-Id: Ibe6f589cc63b653c52eb2c32b445ec31996b6247
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16946
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
LLVM likes to emit offsets of the form foo@toc@ha+16, which we didn't
support. Generalize parseMemRef to handle this case and avoid some of
the repeated offset special-cases. Offsets are now always folded into
the SymbolRef.
This still does not quite implement a fully general GAS-compatible
parser as GAS's parser is insane. GAS in x86_64 will happily accept
things like:
1@GOTPCREL+foo
blah1@GOTPCREL-blah2+blah3-blah4+blah5 # GOTPCREL modifies blah5, rest
# of expression is an offset.
GAS actually textually pulls @GOTPCREL out of the input partway through
parsing the expression and parses the modified input! Then its normal
parser goes and maintains a running expression of a specific type and,
at each term, attempts to merge it into what it currently has. So adding
and subtracting symbols is not commutative (signs must alternate or so)
and the last symbol wins.
However its PPC64 parser is not as general and just terminates each
expression after @toc@ha and friends, except that it special-cases
foo@toc@ha+16: if it can parse one more expression after @toc@ha AND it
is a constant expression, then it is added into the running offset.
Otherwise it leaves that data unconsumed.
This is all ridiculous, so just generalize our parser slightly to cover
foo@toc@ha+16 and see how far we get from there.
Change-Id: I65970791fc10fb2638fd7be8cc841900eb997c9c
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OpenSSL's d2i_X509 parser is amazingly slow. Only do about 10,000 of
them, not 1,000,000.
BUG=chromium:729419
Change-Id: I7034c3dde7d5c5681986af2ab5e516e54553d3c6
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When building with OPENSSL_NO_ASM do not try to enable_language(ASM).
Even though the assembly source isn't being built this still causes
CMake to look for the assembler which will fail on platforms where one
is not available.
Change-Id: Ie4893f606143e8f8ca0807114068e577dc1e23e9
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The fuzzers are timing out on inputs that spam SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert
and SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs. In our current X509* caching
implementation, this can be quadratic. As this is an API fuzzer, not an
actual attack surface, this is not of much interest in itself, but
bounding this will let the fuzzers fuzz faster.
Change-Id: I3e27e938c413e5a0e8e6c7fad641f17c152dac39
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Drop some redundant instructions in reduction in ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx.
(Imported from upstream's 8fc063dcc9668589fd95533d25932396d60987f9.)
I believe this is a no-op for us as we do not currently enable the
ADX-based optimizations.
Change-Id: I34a5f5ffb965d59c67f6b9f0ca7937e49ba6e820
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BUG=129
Change-Id: I1fef45d662743e7210f93e4dc1bae0c55f75d3fe
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Change-Id: Ie88363c4f02016ee743b37a79e76432823b948a0
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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An offset > 2^15 would exceed the range of an addi immediate on ppc64le.
Thus, rather than add the offset after loading the TOC reference, have
different tocloader functions for each (symbol, offset) pair. In this
case, the linker can handle large offsets by changing the value of
foo+offset@toc@ha accordingly.
Change-Id: Iac1481bccaf55fb0c2b080eedebaf11befdae465
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In order to use AES-GCM-SIV in the open-source QUIC boxer, it needs to
be moved out from OPENSSL_SMALL. (Hopefully the linker can still discard
it in the vast majority of cases.)
Additionally, the input to the key schedule function comes from outside
and may not be aligned, thus we need to use unaligned instructions to
read it.
Change-Id: I02c261fe0663d13a96c428174943c7e5ac8415a7
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This tool exists to demo each of the supported FIPS actions in the
module. This change just makes it more chatty so that it's more obvious
what it's doing when you run it.
Change-Id: I99add6348afd3e3d6497e7111be2de73927d87af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16767
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Without this, trying to trigger the CRNGT on a system with RDRAND won't
work.
Change-Id: I0658a1f045620a2800df36277f67305bc0efff8b
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We want to clarify that this isn't the PWCT that FIPS generally means,
but rather the power-on self-test. Since ECDSA is non-deterministic, we
have to implement that power-on self-test as a PWCT, but we have a
different flag to break that actual PWCT.
Change-Id: I3e27c6a6b0483a6c04e764d6af8a4a863e0b8b77
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FIPS requires that the CTR-DRBG state be zeroed on process exit, however
destructors for thread-local data aren't called when the process exits.
This change maintains a linked-list of thread-local state which is
walked on exit to zero each thread's PRNG state. Any concurrently
running threads block until the process finishes exiting.
Change-Id: Ie5dc18e1bb2941a569d8b309411cf20c9bdf52ef
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Comments in CAVP are semantically important and we need to copy them
from the input to the output.
Change-Id: Ib798c4ad79de924487d0c4a0f8fc16b757e766d8
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At first I thought something was wrong, but some experiments with GCC
and digging into relocation definitions confirmed things were fine. In
doing so, tweak the comments so the offset is written more clearly. Both
offset+foo@toc@l and foo@toc@l+offset bind apply the @l after adding the
offset, but it's slightly less confusing with the former spelling.
Change-Id: I43b2c0b8855f64ac6ca4d95ae85bec680a19bc1c
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Most importantly, this version of delocate works for ppc64le. It should
also work for x86-64, but will need significant testing to make sure
that it covers all the cases that the previous delocate.go covered.
It's less stringtastic than the old code, however the parser isn't as
nice as I would have liked. I thought that the reason we put up with
AT&T syntax with Intel is so that assembly syntax could be somewhat
consistent across platforms. At least for ppc64le, that does not appear
to be the case.
Change-Id: Ic7e3c6acc3803d19f2c3ff5620c5e39703d74212
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Change-Id: I1a17860245b7726a24576f5e1bddb0645171f28e
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