Change-Id: I5ce176538a53136aff3eea4af04b762ac9a5a994
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Along the way, split up the EVPTest Wycheproof tests into separate tests (they
shard better when running in parallel).
Change-Id: I5ee919f7ec7c35a7f2e0cc2af4142991a808a9db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(This upstreams a change that was landed internally.)
Change-Id: Ic32793f8b1ae2d03e8ccbb0a9ac5f62add4c295b
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cryptography.io wants things exposed out of EVP_get_cipherby* including,
sadly, ECB mode.
Change-Id: I9bac46f8ffad1a79d190cee3b0c0686bf540298e
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Change-Id: Ia24aae31296772e2ddccf78f10a6640da459adf7
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cryptography.io wants RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02, only used by the
ancient RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 function. Define it but never emit it.
Additionally, it's rather finicky about RSA_R_TOO_LARGE* errors. We
merged them in BoringSSL because having RSA_R_TOO_LARGE,
RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, and RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE is a
little silly. But since we don't expect well-behaved code to condition
on error codes anyway, perhaps that wasn't worth it. Split them back
up.
Looking through OpenSSL, there is a vague semantic difference:
RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY - Specifically emitted if a digest is
too big for PKCS#1 signing with this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE - You asked me to sign or encrypt a
digest/plaintext, but it's too big for this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS - You gave me an RSA ciphertext or
signature and it is not fully reduced modulo N.
-OR-
The padding functions produced something that isn't reduced, but I
believe this is unreachable outside of RSA_NO_PADDING.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE - Some low-level padding function was told to copy
a digest/plaintext into some buffer, but the buffer was too small. I
think this is basically unreachable.
-OR-
You asked me to verify a PSS signature, but I didn't need to bother
because the digest/salt parameters you picked were too big.
Update-Note: This depends on cl/196566462.
Change-Id: I2e539e075eff8bfcd52ccde365e975ebcee72567
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Make it clear this is not a pristine full copy of all of Wycheproof as a
library.
Change-Id: I1aa5253a1d7c696e69b2e8d7897924f15303d9ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28188
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DSA is deprecated and will ultimately be removed but, in the
meantime, it still ought to be tested.
Change-Id: I75af25430b8937a43b11dced1543a98f7a6fbbd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27825
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This works with basically no modifications.
Change-Id: I92f4d90f3c0ec8170d532cf7872754fadb36644d
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Along the way, add some utility functions for getting common things
(curves, hashes, etc.) in the names Wycheproof uses.
Change-Id: I09c11ea2970cf2c8a11a8c2a861d85396efda125
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The first step of RSA with the CRT optimization is to reduce our input
modulo p and q. We can do this in constant-time[*] with Montgomery
reduction. When p and q are the same size, Montgomery reduction's bounds
hold. We need two rounds of it because the first round gives us an
unwanted R^-1.
This does not appear to have a measurable impact on performance. Also
add a long TODO describing how to make the rest of the function
constant-time[*] which hopefully we'll get to later. RSA blinding should
protect us from it all, but make this constant-time anyway.
Since this and the follow-up work will special-case weird keys, add a
test that we don't break those unintentionally. (Though I am not above
breaking them intentionally someday...)
Thanks to Andres Erbsen for discussions on how to do this bit properly.
[*] Ignoring the pervasive bn_correct_top problem for the moment.
Change-Id: Ide099a9db8249cb6549be99c5f8791a39692ea81
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wpa_supplicant appear to be using these.
Change-Id: I1f220cae69162901bcd9452e8daf67379c5e276c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23324
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I've left EVP_set_buggy_rsa_parser as a no-op stub for now, but it
shouldn't need to last very long. (Just waiting for a CL to land in a
consumer.)
Bug: chromium:735616
Change-Id: I6426588f84dd0803661a79c6636a0414f4e98855
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The exponent is secret, so we should be using the consttime variant. See
also upstream's f9cbf470180841966338db1f4c28d99ec4debec4.
Change-Id: I233d4223ded5b80711d7c8f906e3579c36b24cd0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I'll fully remove this once Chrome 62 hits stable, in case any bug
reports come in for Chrome 61. Meanwhile switch the default to off so
that other consumers pick up the behavior. (Should have done this sooner
and forgot.)
Bug: chromium:735616
Change-Id: Ib27c4072f228cd3b5cce283accd22732eeef46b2
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Rather than clear them, even on failure, detect if an individual test
failed and dump the error queue there. We already do this at the GTest
level in ErrorTestEventListener, but that is too coarse-grained for the
file tests.
Change-Id: I3437626dcf3ec43f6fddd98153b0af73dbdcce84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19966
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We have no tests for encryption right now, and evp_tests.txt needs to
force RSA-PSS to have salt length 0, even though other salt values are
more common. This also lets us test the salt length -2 silliness.
Change-Id: I30f52d36c38732c9b63a02c66ada1d08488417d4
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We do not expose EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, so we can freely change the
semantics of EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL. That means we can pass in an
actual size_t rather than an int.
Not that anyone is actually going to exceed an INT_MAX-length RSA-OAEP
label.
Change-Id: Ifc4eb296ff9088c8815f4f8cd88100a407e4d969
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It was pointed out that we have no test coverage of this. Fix this. Test
vector generated using Go's implementation.
Change-Id: Iddbc50d3b422e853f8afd50117492f4666a47373
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crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
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We've got three versions of DATA_TOO_LARGE and two versions of
DATA_TOO_SMALL with no apparent distinction between them.
Change-Id: I18ca2cb71ffc31b04c8fd0be316c362da4d7daf9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17529
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This imports upstream's scrypt implementation, though it's been heavily
revised. I lost track of words vs. blocks vs. bigger blocks too many
times in the original code and introduced a typedef for the fixed-width
Salsa20 blocks. The downside is going from bytes to blocks is a bit
trickier, so I took advantage of our little-endian assumption.
This also adds an missing check for N < 2^32. Upstream's code is making
this assumption in Integerify. I'll send that change back upstream. I've
also removed the weird edge case where a NULL out_key parameter means to
validate N/r/p against max_mem and nothing else. That's just in there to
get a different error code out of their PKCS#12 code.
Performance-wise, the cleanup appears to be the same (up to what little
precision I was able to get here), but an optimization to use bitwise
AND rather than modulus makes us measurably faster. Though scrypt isn't
a fast operation to begin with, so hopefully it isn't anyone's
bottleneck.
This CL does not route scrypt up to the PKCS#12 code, though we could
write our own version of that if we need to later.
BUG=chromium:731993
Change-Id: Ib2f43344017ed37b6bafd85a2c2b103d695020b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than adding a new mode to EVP_PKEY_CTX, upstream chose to tie
single-shot signing to EVP_MD_CTX, adding functions which combine
EVP_Digest*Update and EVP_Digest*Final. This adds a weird vestigial
EVP_MD_CTX and makes the signing digest parameter non-uniform, slightly
complicating things. But it means APIs like X509_sign_ctx can work
without modification.
Align with upstream's APIs. This required a bit of fiddling around
evp_test.cc. For consistency and to avoid baking details of parameter
input order, I made it eagerly read all inputs before calling
SetupContext. Otherwise which attributes are present depend a lot on the
shape of the API we use---notably the NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST tests for RSA
switch to failing before consuming an input, which is odd.
(This only matters because we have some tests which expect the operation
to abort the operation early with parameter errors and match against
Error. Those probably should not use FileTest to begin with, but I'll
tease that apart a later time.)
Upstream also named NID_Ed25519 as NID_ED25519, even though the
algorithm is normally stylized as "Ed25519". Switch it to match.
Change-Id: Id6c8f5715930038e754de50338924d044e908045
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These are, in turn, just taken from RFC 8032 and are all in
ed25519_tests.txt. But it's probably good to test non-empty inputs at
the EVP_PKEY layer too.
Change-Id: I21871a6efaad5c88b828d2e90d757c325a550b2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16989
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This is a fairly shallow conversion because of the somewhat screwy Error
lines in the test which may target random functions like
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md. We probably should revise this, perhaps
moving those to normal tests and leaving error codes to the core
operation itself.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I27dcc945058911b2de40cd48466d4e0366813a12
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It's about time we got rid of this. As a first step, introduce a flag,
so that some consumers may stage this change in appropriately.
BUG=chromium:534766,chromium:532048
Change-Id: Id53f0bacf5bdbf85dd71d1262d9f3a9ce3c4111f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16104
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The names in the P-224 code collided with the P-256 code and thus many
of the functions and constants in the P-224 code have been prefixed.
Change-Id: I6bcd304640c539d0483d129d5eaf1702894929a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15847
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RSA_verify_raw is the same as RSA_public_decrypt and fits the calling
convention better. This also avoids the extra copy.
Change-Id: Ib7e3152af26872440290a289f178c9a1d9bc673f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15826
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to implement RSA-PSS in the FIPS module without pulling
in EVP_PKEY. It also allows people to use RSA-PSS on an RSA*.
Empirically folks seem to use the low-level padding functions a lot,
which is unfortunate.
This allows us to remove a now redundant length check in p_rsa.c.
Change-Id: I5270e01c6999d462d378865db2b858103c335485
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We check the length for MD5+SHA1 but not the normal cases. Instead,
EVP_PKEY_sign externally checks the length (largely because the silly
RSA-PSS padding function forces it). We especially should be checking
the length for these because otherwise the prefix built into the ASN.1
prefix is wrong.
The primary motivation is to avoid putting EVP_PKEY inside the FIPS
module. This means all logic for supported algorithms should live in
crypto/rsa.
This requires fixing up the verify_recover logic and some tests,
including bcm.c's KAT bits.
(evp_tests.txt is now this odd mixture of EVP-level and RSA-level error
codes. A follow-up change will add new APIs for RSA-PSS which will allow
p_rsa.c to be trimmed down and make things consistent.)
Change-Id: I29158e9695b28e8632b06b449234a5dded35c3e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15824
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This is a remnant of the ECDSA code returning a tri-state -1, 0, 1.
Change-Id: I8bd1fcd94e07dbffc650f414ebc19f30236378bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15667
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This was a mess. HMAC_CTX_copy_ex would avoid having to cleanup and init
the HMAC_CTX repeatedly, but even that is unnecessary. hctx_tpl was just
to reuse the key. Instead, HMAC_CTX already can be reset with the same
key. (Alas, with a slightly odd API, but so it goes.) Do that, and use
goto err to cleanup the error-handling.
Thanks to upstream's b98530d6e09f4cb34c791b8840e936c1fc1467cf for
drawing attention to this. (Though we've diverged significantly from
upstream with all the heap-allocated bits, so I didn't use the change
itself.)
While I'm here, tidy up some variable names and cite the newer RFC.
Change-Id: Ic1259f46b7c5a14dc341b8cee385be5508ac4daf
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This is a remnant of a previous iteration of the SSL client certificate
bridging logic in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ifa8e15cc970395f179e2f6db65c97a342af5498d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14444
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BUG=22
Change-Id: I9f392eef44e83efb4b13931acb2a3c642cbf1f29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14308
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
