BUG=76
Change-Id: I43672ee82a50f8fe706a5d607ef774a6e96db252
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14379
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This tests that the ticket age is measured from ticket issuance and not
the initial authentication. Specifically, that ssl_session_renew_timeout
also rebases the time.
Change-Id: Iba51efb49c691a44e6428d1cd35f0803ca3d396a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14375
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Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT, so we gracefully decline 0-RTT
as a server and forbid their combination as a client. We'll keep this
logic around until Channel ID is removed.
Channel ID will be replaced by tokbind which currently uses custom
extensions. Those will need additional logic to work with 0-RTT.
This is not implemented yet so, for now, fail if both are ever
configured together at all. A later change will allow the two to
combine.
BUG=183
Change-Id: I46c5ba883ccd47930349691fb08074a1fab13d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14370
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I0e2e4166ad2c57e3192af058f23374f014a2fcf4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14377
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Once 0-RTT data is added to the current 0-RTT logic, the server will
trigger a write when processing incoming data via SSL_read. This means
SSL_read will block on transport write, which is something we've not
tried to avoid far (assuming no renegotiation).
The specification allows for tickets to be sent at half-RTT by
predicting the client Finished. By doing this we both get the tickets on
the wire sooner and avoid confusing I/O patterns. Moreover, we
anticipate we will need this mode for one of the QUIC stateless reject
patterns.
This is tested by always processing NewSessionTickets in the
ExpectHalfRTTData path on 0-RTT connections. As not other
implementations using BoGo may not do this, this is configurable via the
shim config.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ia0f56ae63f15078ff1cacceba972d2b99001947f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14371
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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This is a remnant of before we made the handshake write
flight by flight.
Change-Id: I94c0105bb071ffca9ff5aa4c4bf43311c750b49a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14369
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This will make it easier to test 0-RTT later on.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I4d60b77c14bc9143ca9785d0a6b8169653a1b120
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14367
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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It's not immediately obvious what's going on here.
Change-Id: Ibbba80a6ff9ace4d88e89a42efc270b77b4fad12
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14368
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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The tests all work fine under it except for tests where the shim shuts
down. (In those the shim calls SSL_shutdown as the first function, so it
wouldn't do anything useful.)
Change-Id: Ia2e811bb3c553a690df38d1fd7d3107ae7c9aa12
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14366
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We've never allowed this as no good can come of it. Add a test for this.
Change-Id: I4b92372f58c1fe2054e33007adbe496d153a9251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14266
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This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The |select_certificate_cb| return values are somewhat confusing due
to the fact that they don't match the |cert_cb| ones, despite the
similarities between the two callbacks (they both have "certificate" in
the name! well, sort of).
This also documents the error return value (-1) which was previously
undocumented, and it expands the |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|
documentation regarding retrial (by shamelessly copying from
|SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method|).
Also updates other scattered documentation that was missed by previous
changes.
Change-Id: Ib962b31d08e6475e09954cbc3c939988b0ba13f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14245
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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They can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS.
This is similar to 9c8c4188 for RC4 ciphers.
Change-Id: I7cd3421b108a024f1ee11f13a6df881c2d0de3c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14284
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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Static RSA key exchange in SSLv3 does not have a length prefix. We were
checking the ClientHello version rather than the final version.
Change-Id: I2d0e9d3b5a368a7caf8b1ca69f1631400a847f52
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14314
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Based on elements of the Bugs structure, runner will tweak a ClientHello
message after parsing. However, unless the same tweaks are made to a
second ClientHello in a TLS 1.3 connection, it might appear that they
don't match.
Change-Id: I4467c8ece12dc75c7c7b0fad9e622e6783c55f21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14224
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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This shuffles a bit of the code around session resumption in TLS 1.3 to
make the async point cleaner to inject. It also fills in cipher and
tlsext_hostname more uniformly.
Filling in the cipher on resumption is a no-op as SSL_SESSION_dup
already copies it, but avoids confusion should we ever implement TLS
1.3's laxer cipher matching on the server. Not filling in
tlsext_hostname on resumption was an oversight; the relevant check isn't
whether we are resuming but whether we have a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill
things into.
Change-Id: Ic02eb079ff228ce4a4d3e0de7445e18cd367e8b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14205
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support for setting an |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD| which
allows a caller to control ticket encryption and decryption to a greater
extent than previously possible and also permits asynchronous ticket
decryption.
This change only includes partial support: TLS 1.3 work remains to be
done.
Change-Id: Ia2e10ebb3257e1a119630c463b6bf389cf20ef18
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14144
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This makes its purpose clearer. That the session cache is based on the
initial SSL_CTX is confusing (it's a remnant of OpenSSL's backwards
session resumption ordering), but we're probably stuck with it.
Relatedly, document SSL_set_SSL_CTX better.
Change-Id: I2832efc63f6c959c5424271b365825afc7eec5e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14204
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although it returns failure, the cipher list should still be updated.
Conscrypt relies on this behavior to support a Java API edge case.
Change-Id: If58efafc6a4a81e85a0e2ee2c38873a7a4938123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14165
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It's more consistent to have the helper function do the check that
its every caller already performs. This removes the error code
SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS in favor of SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH.
Change-Id: I522239770dcb881d33d54616af386142ae41b29f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This in preparation of 0-RTT which needs the AEAD version as part of
early data, before the full version negotiation.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ief68bc69d794da6e55bb9208977b35f3b947273b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows a caller to configure a serving chain without dealing with
crypto/x509.
Change-Id: Ib42bb2ab9227d32071cf13ab07f92d029643a9a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14126
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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We'll measure this value to guide what tolerance to use in the 0-RTT
anti-replay mechanism. This also fixes a bug where we were previously
minting ticket_age_add-less tickets on the server. Add a check to reject
all those tickets.
BUG=113
Change-Id: I68e690c0794234234e0d0500b4b9a7f79aea641e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14068
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Previously, the |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based methods always rejected
certificate chains because none of the current callbacks is suitable to
use. In the medium-term, we want an async callback for this but, for
now, we would like to get Chromium working. Chromium already installs a
no-op callback (except for the logic that was moved into BoringSSL in
a58baaf9e6) and so this hack will suffice
for Chromium.
Change-Id: Ie44b7b32b9e42f503c47b072e958507754136d72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14125
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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(Otherwise it's a pretty opaque failure.)
Change-Id: I164b237eebe2641f2148bb705966da74b399a618
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14124
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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It's only called from within that file.
Change-Id: I281c9eb1ea25d9cfbec492ba8a4d007f45ae2635
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14027
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are still a few x509.h includes outside ssl_x509.c and ssl_file.c
due to referencing X509_V_* values, but otherwise these includes are no
longer needed.
Change-Id: Ide458e01358dc2ddb6838277d074ad249e599040
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14026
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is an API from OpenSSL 1.1.0 which is a little risky to add ahead
of bumping OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, but anything which currently builds
against BoringSSL already had an #ifdef due to the
ssl_cipher_preference_list_st business anyway.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION to make it easier to patch envoy for this.
BUG=6
Change-Id: If8307e30eb069bbd7dc4b8447b6e48e83899d584
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14067
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Everything has been updated to return the ECDSA curve.
Change-Id: Iee8fafb576c0ff92d9a47304d59cc607b5faa112
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14066
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds a CRYPTO_BUFFER getter for the peer certificate chain. Other
things we need for Chromium:
- Verification callback. Ultimately, we want an asynchronous one, but a
synchronous one will do for now.
- Configure client cert chain without X509
I've also removed the historical note about SSL_SESSION serialization.
That was years ago and we've since invalidated all serialized client
sessions.
BUG=671420
Change-Id: I2b3bb010f9182e751fc791cdfd7db44a4ec348e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14065
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Due to middlebox and ecosystem intolerance, short record headers are going to
be unsustainable to deploy.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I20fee79dd85bff229eafc6aeb72e4f33cac96d82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14044
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This function is a |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based method for getting the X.509
names from a CertificateRequest.
Change-Id: Ife26f726d3c1a055b332656678c2bc560b5a66ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14013
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This allows us to move the code from Chrome into BoringSSL itself.
BUG=126
Change-Id: I04b4f63008a6de0a58dd6c685c78e9edd06deda6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14028
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This is the first part to fixing the SSL stack to be 2038-clean.
Internal structures and functions are switched to use OPENSSL_timeval
which, unlike timeval and long, are suitable for timestamps on all
platforms.
It is generally accepted that the year is now sometime after 1970, so
use uint64_t for the timestamps to avoid worrying about serializing
negative numbers in SSL_SESSION.
A follow-up change will fix SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb to use
OPENSSL_timeval. This will require some coordinating with WebRTC.
DTLSv1_get_timeout is left alone for compatibility and because it stores
time remaining rather than an absolute time.
BUG=155
Change-Id: I1a5054813300874b6f29e348f9cd8ca80f6b9729
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13944
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The DTLS stack has two very different APIs for handling timeouts. In
non-blocking mode, timeouts are driven externally by the caller with
DTLSv1_get_timeout. In blocking mode, timeouts are driven by the BIO by
calling a BIO_ctrl with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT.
The latter is never used by consumers, so remove support for it.
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT implicitly depends on struct timeval
being used for timestamps, which we would like to remove. Without this,
the only public API which relies on this is the testing-only
SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb which is BoringSSL-only and we can change at
our leisure.
BUG=155
Change-Id: Ic68fa70afab2fa9e6286b84d010eac8ddc9d2ef4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13945
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This allows a caller to get an |SSL_METHOD| that is free of crypto/x509.
Change-Id: I088e78310fd3ff5db453844784e7890659a633bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All the other |X509_METHOD| functions have their type in the name. The
|CERT|-based functions happened not to because they were first, but
that's not a good reason.
Change-Id: I5bcd8a5fb1d1db6966686700e293d8b1361c0095
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14007
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We don't have a way to create an X509-less |SSL| yet but, when we do,
it'll be bad to call any X509-related functions on it. This change adds
an assert to every X509-related call to catch this.
Change-Id: Iec1bdf13baa587ee3487a7cfdc8a105bee20f5ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13970
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Rather than store CA names and only find out that they're unparsable
when we're asked for a |STACK_OF(X509_NAME)|, check that we can parse
them all during the handshake. This avoids changing the semantics with
the previous change that kept CA names as |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s.
Change-Id: I0fc7a4e6ab01685347e7a5be0d0579f45b8a4818
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13969
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This change converts the CA names that are parsed from a server's
CertificateRequest, as well as the CA names that are configured for
sending to clients in the same, to use |CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
The |X509_NAME|-based interfaces are turned into compatibility wrappers.
Change-Id: I95304ecc988ee39320499739a0866c7f8ff5ed98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13585
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Change-Id: I3bc1e46fb94104c4ae31c1c98fa0d5a931e5f954
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13974
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It has no more callers.
Change-Id: I587ccb3b63810ed167febf7a65ba85106d17a300
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13911
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
The two non-trivial changes are:
1. The public API now queries it out of the session. There is a long
comment over the old field explaining why the state was separate, but
this predates EMS being forbidden from changing across resumption. It
is not possible for established_session and the socket to disagree on
EMS.
2. Since SSL_HANDSHAKE gets reset on each handshake, the check that EMS
does not change on renego looks different. I've reworked that function a
bit, but it should have the same effect.
Change-Id: If72e5291f79681381cf4d8ceab267f76618b7c3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13910
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This lets us trim another two pointers of per-connection state.
Change-Id: I2145d529bc25b7e24a921d01e82ee99f2c98867c
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This effectively reverts b9824e2417. This
error seems to have mostly just caused confusion in logs and the
occasional bug around failing to ERR_clear_error. Consumers tend to
blindly call SSL_shutdown when tearing down an SSL (to avoid
invalidating sessions). This means handshake failures trigger two
errors, which is screwy.
Go back to the old behavior where SSL_shutdown while SSL_in_init
silently succeeds.
Change-Id: I1fcfc92d481b97c840847dc39afe59679cd995f2
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This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
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I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
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0-RTT requires matching the selected ALPN parameters against those in
the session. Stash the ALPN value in the session in TLS 1.3, so we can
recover it.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8668b287651ae4deb0bf540c0885a02d189adee0
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Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
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All the business with rewinding hs->state back or skipping states based
on reuse_message or a skip parameter isn't really worth the trouble for
a debugging callback. With SSL_state no longer exposed, we don't have to
worry about breaking things.
BUG=177
Change-Id: I9a0421f01c8b2f24c80a6b3e44de9138ea023f58
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The split was there out of paranoia that some caller may notice the
change in initial state. Now that SSL_state is neutered, simplify.
BUG=177
Change-Id: I7e2138c2b56821b0c79eec98bb09a82fc28238e8
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I doubt this matters, but this seems a little odd. In particular, this
avoids info_callback seeing the SSL_ST_OK once we stop switching
hs->state back and forth.
BUG=177
Change-Id: Ied39c0e94c242af9d5d0f26795d6e0f2f0b12406
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Code which manages to constrain itself on this will limit our ability to
rework the handshake. I believe, at this point, we only need to expose
one bit of information (there's some code that compares SSL_state to
SSL_ST_OK), if even that.
BUG=177
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This makes sense to do if we are a client and initiate a renegotiation
at the same time as the server requesting one. Since we will never
initiate a renegotiation, this should not be necessary.
Change-Id: I5835944291fdb8dfcc4fed2ebf1064e91ccdbe6a
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We compare pointer/length pairs constantly. To avoid needing to type it
everywhere and get GTest's output, add a StringPiece-alike for byte
slices which supports ==, !=, and std::ostream.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I108342cbd2c6a58fec0b9cb87ebdf50364bda099
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|SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| now takes an |SSL_CTX*|, from which it uses the
|X509_METHOD| and buffer pool. This is our API so we can do this.
This also requires adding an |SSL_CTX*| argument to |SSL_SESSION_new|
for the same reason. However, |SSL_SESSION_new| already has very few
callers (and none in third-party code that I can see) so I think we can
get away with this.
Change-Id: I1337cd2bd8cff03d4b9405ea3146b3b59584aa72
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We sized the post-handshake message limit for the older zero-length
KeyUpdate and forgot to update it when it got larger.
Thanks to Matt Caswell for catching this.
Change-Id: I7d2189479e9516fbfb6c195dfa367794d383582c
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Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
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In honor of CVE-2016-9244. Although that particular bug BoGo was already
testing since it uses 16 bytes here.
The empty session ID case is particularly worth testing to make sure we
don't get confused somewhere. RFC 5077 allows clients to offer tickets
with no session ID. This is absurd since the client then has no way of
detecting resumption except by lookahead. We'll never do this as a
client, but should handle it correctly as a server.
Change-Id: I49695d19f03c4efdef43749c07372d590a010cda
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ssl_rsa.c now basically deals with private-key functions, so rename to
reflect that.
Change-Id: Ia87ed4c0f9b34af134844e2eeb270fc45ff3f23f
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I even made a note to update my change in light of this but still
managed to forget. With this, grep tells me that all |alert| values have
the correct default value now.
Change-Id: If37c4f2f6b36cf69e53303a3924a8eda4cfffed8
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We already have some cases where the default is DECODE_ERROR and, rather
than have two defaults, just harmonise on that. (INTERNAL_ERROR might
make more sense in some cases, but we don't want to have to remember
what the default is in each case and nobody really cares what the actual
value is anyway.)
Change-Id: I28007898e8d6e7415219145eb9f43ea875028ab2
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Change-Id: If97da565155292d5f0de5c6a8b0fd8508398768a
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This ABCD thing with multiple ways to enter the same function is
confusing. ClientHello processing is the most egregious of these, so
split it up ahead of time as an intermediate step.
States remain named as-is due to them being exposed as public API. We
should have a story for which subset of states we need to promise as
public API and to intentionally break all other cases (map to some
generic value) before we go too far there.
BUG=128
Change-Id: Id9d28c6de14bd53c3294552691cebe705748f489
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Previously, the alert was uninitialised.
(Thanks to Robert Swiecki and honggfuzz.)
Change-Id: I2d4eb96b0126f3eb502672b2600ad43ae140acec
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The Go side (thankfully not the C side) was not fully updated for the
exporter secret derivation being earlier at some point. Also TLS 1.2
upgrades the PRF hash for pre-1.2 ciphers to SHA-256, so make sure we
cover that.
Change-Id: Ibdf50ef500e7e48a52799ac75577822bc304a613
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Change-Id: I471880d785c38123e038279f67348bf02b47d091
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Replicate the logic in the AllTests targets to dump the error queue on
failure. GTest seems to print to stdout, so we do here too.
BUG=129
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The more complex ones will want a TEST_P, but here are a few easy ones
to start with.
BUG=129
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Right now the only way to set an SCT list is the per-context function
SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list. However this assumes that all the
SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the same SCT list, which is wrong.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own list, a
CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
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As previously discussed, it turns out we don't actually need this, so
there's no point in keeping it.
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The SNI extension may be ACKed by the server. This is kind of pointless,
but make sure we cover these codepaths.
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Change-Id: I878dfb9f5d3736c3ec0d5fa39052cca58932dbb7
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Change-Id: I38cd04fa40edde4e4dd31fdc16bbf92985430198
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ssl_get_new_session would stash a copy of the configured hostname
into the SSL_SESSION on the server. Servers have no reason to
configuring that anyway, but, if one did, we'd leak when filling in
the client-supplied SNI later.
Remove this code and guard against this by remembering to OPENSSL_free
when overwriting that field (although it should always be NULL).
Reported-By: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
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With the CRYPTO_BUFFER stuff, this API is now slightly more complex. Add
some tests as a sanity-check.
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This is purely to support curl, which now has HTTPS proxy support that,
sadly, uses the BIO SSL. Don't use the BIO SSL for anything else.
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The TLS 1.2 and 1.3 state machines do the exact same thing at the
beginning. Let them process the ClientHello extensions, etc., and
finalize the certificate in common code. Once we start picking
parameters, we begin to diverge. Everything before this point is
arguably part of setting up the configuration, which is
version-agnostic.
BUG=128
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The version negotiation logic was a little bizarrely wedged in the
middle of the state machine. (We don't support server renegotiation, so
have_version is always false here.)
BUG=128
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It has no other callers, now that the handshake is written elsewhere.
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
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This special-case is almost unexposed (the timeout is initialized to the
default) except if the caller calls SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0). Preserve
that behavior by mapping 0 to SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT in
SSL_CTX_set_timeout but simplify the internal state.
Change-Id: Ice03a519c25284b925f1e0cf485f2d8c54dc5038
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It is impossible to have to call dispatch_alert when writing application
data. Now that we don't send warning alerts through ssl3_send_alert, all
alerts are closure alerts, which means attempts to write will fail.
This prunes a lot of dead code, avoiding the re-entrancy in the write
path. With that gone, tracking alert_dispatch is much more
straightforward.
BUG=146
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Fix this and add a test. Otherwise enabling TLS 1.3 will cause a server
to blow through its session cache.
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This change moves the interface between |X509| and |CRYPTO_BUFFER| a
little further out, towards the API.
Change-Id: I1c014d20f12ad83427575843ca0b3bb22de1a694
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The recent CRYPTO_BUFFER changes meant that |X509| objects passed to
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert would be |free|ed immediately. However,
some third-party code (at least serf and curl) continue to use the
|X509| even after handing over ownership.
In order to unblock things, keep the past |X509| around for a while to
paper over the issues with those libraries while we try and upstream
changes.
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Change-Id: I44202457841f06a899e140f78ae8afa7ac720283
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Move to explicit hashing everywhere, matching TLS 1.2 with TLS 1.3. The
ssl_get_message calls between all the handshake states are now all
uniform so, when we're ready, we can rewire the TLS 1.2 state machine to
look like the TLS 1.3 one. (ssl_get_message calls become an
ssl_hs_read_message transition, reuse_message becomes an ssl_hs_ok
transition.)
This avoids some nuisance in processing the ServerHello at the 1.2 / 1.3
transition.
The downside of explicit hashing is we may forget to hash something, but
this will fail to interop with our tests and anyone else, so we should
be able to catch it.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I01393943b14dfaa98eec2a78f62c3a41c29b3a0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13266
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is kind of annoying (even new state is needed to keep the layering
right). As part of aligning the read paths of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
state machine, we'll want to move to states calling
ssl_hash_current_message when the process the message, rather than when
the message is read. Right now the TLS 1.2 optional message story
(reuse_message) depends on all messages preceded by an optional message
using ssl_hash_message. For instance, if TLS 1.2 decided to place
CertificateStatus before ServerKeyExchange, we would not be able to
handle it.
However, V2ClientHello, by being handled in the message layer, relies on
ssl_get_message-driven hashing to replace the usual ClientHello hash
with a hash of something custom. This switches things so rather than
ClientHellos being always pre-hashed by the message layer, simulated
ClientHellos no-op ssl_hash_current_message.
This just replaces one hack with another (V2ClientHello is inherently
nasty), but this hack should be more compatible with future plans.
BUG=128
Change-Id: If807ea749d91e306a37bb2362ecc69b84bf224c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13265
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This aligns the TLS 1.2 state machine closer with the TLS 1.3 state
machine. This is more work for the handshake, but ultimately the
plan is to take the ssl_get_message call out of the handshake (so it is
just the state machine rather than calling into BIO), so the parameters
need to be folded out as in TLS 1.3.
The WrongMessageType-* family of tests should make sure we don't miss
one of these.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I17a1e6177c52a7540b2bc6b0b3f926ab386c4950
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13264
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
If an existing chain had a NULL placeholder for a leaf we could end up
trying to increment its reference count. That results in a crash at
configuration time. Found via the SSL_CTX API fuzzer.
BUG=oss-fuzz:480
Change-Id: I0ddc2cbde2e625015768f1bdc8da625e8a4f05fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13383
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
