This commit adds coverage of the "offer" (first) step, as well as
testing all outputs of the "accept" (second) step, not just the shared
key.
Change-Id: Id11fe24029abc302442484a6c01fa496a1578b3a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This keeps the naming convention in line with the actual spec.
Change-Id: I34673f78dbc29c1659b4da0e49677ebe9b79636b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8090
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The test vectors are taken from the reference implementation, modified
to output the results of its random-number generator, and the results of
key generation prior to SHA3. This allows the interoperability of the
two implementations to be tested somewhat.
To accomplish the testing, this commit creates a new, lower-level API
that leaves the generation of random numbers and all wire encoding and
decoding up to the caller.
Change-Id: Ifae3517696dde4be4a0b7c1998bdefb789bac599
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8070
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that we no longer support Windows XP, this is available.
Unfortunately, the public header version of CRYPTO_MUTEX means we
still can't easily merge CRYPTO_MUTEX and CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX.
BUG=37
Change-Id: If309de3f06e0854c505083b72fd64d1dbb3f4563
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8081
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is easier to deploy, and more obvious. This commit reverts a few
pieces of e25775bc, but keeps most of it.
Change-Id: If8d657a4221c665349c06041bb12fffca1527a2c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code has caused a long history of problems. This change rewrites it
completely with something that is, hopefully, much simplier and robust
and adds more testing.
Change-Id: Ibeef51f9386afd95d5b73316e451eb3a2d7ec4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8033
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Constants representing TLS 1.3 are added to allow for future work to be
flagged on TLS1_3_VERSION. To prevent BoringSSL from negotiating the
non-existent TLS 1.3 version, it is explicitly disabled using
SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3.
Change-Id: Ie5258a916f4c19ef21646c4073d5b4a7974d6f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This renames the Channel ID EncryptedExtensions message to allow for
compatibility with TLS 1.3 EncryptedExtensions.
Change-Id: I5b67d00d548518045554becb1b7213fba86731f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL's bbio logic is kind of crazy. It would be good to eventually do the
buffering in a better way (notably, bbio is fragile, if not outright broken,
for DTLS). In the meantime, this fixes a number of bugs where the existence of
bbio was leaked in the public API and broke things.
- SSL_get_wbio returned the bbio during the handshake. It must always return
the BIO the consumer configured. In doing so, internal accesses of
SSL_get_wbio should be switched to ssl->wbio since those want to see bbio.
For consistency, do the same with rbio.
- The logic in SSL_set_rfd, etc. (which I doubt is quite right since
SSL_set_bio's lifetime is unclear) would get confused once wbio got wrapped.
Those want to compare to SSL_get_wbio.
- If SSL_set_bio was called mid-handshake, bbio would get disconnected and lose
state. It forgets to reattach the bbio afterwards. Unfortunately, Conscrypt
does this a lot. It just never ended up calling it at a point where the bbio
would cause problems.
- Make more explicit the invariant that any bbio's which exist are always
attached. Simplify a few things as part of that.
Change-Id: Ia02d6bdfb9aeb1e3021a8f82dcbd0629f5c7fb8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8023
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The 'elliptic_curves' extension is being renamed to 'supported_groups'
in the TLS 1.3 draft, and most of the curve-specific methods are
generalized to groups/group IDs.
Change-Id: Icd1a1cf7365c8a4a64ae601993dc4273802610fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7955
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
open_iscsi assumes that it can get |OPENSSL_malloc| after including only
pem.h and err.h. Since pem.h already includes quite a lot, this change
adds crypto.h to that set so that open_iscsi is happy.
Change-Id: I6dc06c27088ce3ca46c1ab53bb29650033cba267
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8031
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The key schedule in TLS 1.3 requires a separate Extract and Expand phase
for the cryptographic computations.
Change-Id: Ifdac1237bda5212de5d4f7e8db54e202151d45ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7983
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CECPQ1 is a new key exchange that concatenates the results of an X25519
key agreement and a NEWHOPE key agreement.
Change-Id: Ib919bdc2e1f30f28bf80c4c18f6558017ea386bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7962
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is consistent with the new convention in ssl_ecdh.c.
Along the way, change newhope_test.c to not iterate 1000 times over each
test.
Change-Id: I7a500f45b838eba8f6df96957891aa8e880ba089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8012
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We don't have any of these.
Change-Id: I8d12284fbbab0ff35ac32d35a5f2eba326ab79f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7981
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They're completely unused now. The handshake message reassembly logic should
not depend on the state machine. This should partially free it up (ugly as it
is) to be shared with a future TLS 1.3 implementation while, in parallel, it
and the layers below, get reworked. This also cuts down on the number of states
significantly.
Partially because I expect we'd want to get ssl_hash_message_t out of there
too. Having it in common code is fine, but it needs to be in the (supposed to
be) protocol-agnostic handshake state machine, not the protocol-specific
handshake message layer.
Change-Id: I12f9dc57bf433ceead0591106ab165d352ef6ee4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7949
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than this confusing coordination with the handshake state machine and
init_num changing meaning partway through, use the length field already in
BUF_MEM. Like the new record layer parsing, is no need to keep track of whether
we are reading the header or the body. Simply keep extending the handshake
message until it's far enough along.
ssl3_get_message still needs tons of work, but this allows us to disentangle it
from the handshake state.
Change-Id: Ic2b3e7cfe6152a7e28a04980317d3c7c396d9b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUF_MEM is actually a rather silly API for the SSL stack. There's separate
length and max fields, but init_buf effectively treats length as max and max as
nothing.
We possibly don't want to be using it long-term anyway (if nothing else, the
char*/uint8_t* thing is irritating), but in the meantime, it'll be easier to
separately fix up get_message's book-keeping and state tracking from where the
handshake gets its messages from.
Change-Id: I9e56ea008173991edc8312ec707505ead410a9ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The existing logic gets confused in a number of cases around close_notify vs.
fatal alert. SSL_shutdown, while still pushing to the error queue, will fail to
notice alerts. We also get confused if we try to send a fatal alert when we've
already sent something else.
Change-Id: I9b1d217fbf1ee8a9c59efbebba60165b7de9689e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7952
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function will return whether BoringSSL was built with
OPENSSL_NO_ASM. This will allow us to write a test in our internal
codebase which asserts that normal builds should always have assembly
code included.
Change-Id: Ib226bf63199022f0039d590edd50c0cc823927b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7960
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function is only really useful for DSA signature verification,
which is something that isn't performance-sensitive. Replace its
optimized implementation with a naïve implementation that's much
simpler.
Note that it would be simpler to use |BN_mod_mul| in the new
implementation; |BN_mod_mul_montgomery| is used instead only to be
consistent with other work being done to replace uses of non-Montgomery
modular reduction with Montgomery modular reduction.
Change-Id: If587d463b73dd997acfc5b7ada955398c99cc342
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7732
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
sk_FOO_num may be called on const stacks. Given that was wrong, I suspect no
one ever uses a const STACK_OF(T)...
Other macros were correctly const, but were casting the constness a way (only
to have it come back again).
Also remove the extra newline after a group. It seems depending on which
version of clang-format was being used, we'd either lose or keep the extra
newline. The current file doesn't have them, so settle on that.
Change-Id: I19de6bc85b0a043d39c05ee3490321e9f0adec60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7946
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The array is of size two for the level and description, not because we allow
two alerts outstanding; we don't.
Change-Id: I25e42c059ce977a947397a3dc83e9684bc8f0595
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7940
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
|BN_mod_exp_mont_word| is only useful when the base is a single word
in length and timing side channel protection of the exponent is not
needed. That's never the case in real life.
Keep the function in the API, but removes its single-word-base
optimized implementation with a call to |BN_mod_exp_mont|.
Change-Id: Ic25f6d4f187210b681c6ee6b87038b64a5744958
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7731
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows an application to override the default of 1 second, which
is what's instructed in RFC 6347 but is not an absolute requirement.
Change-Id: I0bbb16e31990fbcab44a29325b6ec7757d5789e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7930
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also add a test.
This is the last of the openssl/asn1.h includes from the directories that are
to be kept in the core libcrypto library. (What remains is to finish sorting
out the crypto/obj stuff. We'll also want to retain a decoupled version of the
PKCS#12 stuff.)
Functions that need to be audited for reuse:
i2d_DHparams
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ibef030a98d3a93ae26e8e56869f14858ec75601b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7900
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The BORINGSSL_YYYYMM #defines have served well to coordinate short-term skews
in BoringSSL's public API, but some consumers (notably wpa_supplicant in
Android) wish to build against multiple versions for an extended period of
time. Consumers should not do this unless there is no alternative, but to
accommodate this, start a BORINGSSL_API_VERSION counter. In future, instead of
BORINGSSL_YYYYMM #defines, we'll simply increment the number.
This is specifically called an "API version" rather than a plain "version" as
this number does not denote any particular point in development or stability.
It purely counts how many times we found it convenient to let the preprocessor
observe a public API change up to now.
Change-Id: I39f9740ae8e793cef4c2b5fb5707b9763b3e55ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, the verification was only done when using the CRT method,
as the CRT method has been shown to be extremely sensitive to fault
attacks. However, there's no reason to avoid doing the verification
when the non-CRT method is used (performance-sensitive applications
should always be using the CRT-capable keys).
Previously, when we detected a fault (attack) through this verification,
libcrypto would fall back to the non-CRT method and assume that the
non-CRT method would give a correct result, despite having just
detecting corruption that is likely from an attack. Instead, just give
up, like NSS does.
Previously, the code tried to handle the case where the input was not
reduced mod rsa->n. This is (was) not possible, so avoid trying to
handle that. This simplifies the equality check and lets us use
|CRYPTO_memcmp|.
Change-Id: I78d1e55520a1c8c280cae2b7256e12ff6290507d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7582
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
(Imported from upstream's 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537.)
Change-Id: Ib2e1e7cd086f9c3f0d689d61947f8ec3e9220049
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7842
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the past we have needed the ability to deploy security fixes to our
frontend systems without leaking them in source code or in published
binaries.
This change adds a function that provides some infrastructure for
supporting this in BoringSSL while meeting our internal build needs. We
do not currently have any specific patch that requires this—this is
purely preparation.
Change-Id: I5c64839e86db4e5ea7419a38106d8f88b8e5987e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7849
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If we're to allow the buggy CPU workaround to fire when __ARM_NEON__ is set,
CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable also needs to be aware of it. Also add an API to export
this value out of BoringSSL, so we can get some metrics on how prevalent this
chip is.
BUG=chromium:606629
Change-Id: I97d65a47a6130689098b32ce45a8c57c468aa405
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7796
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commits:
- 9158637142
- a90aa64302
- c0d8b83b44
It turns out code outside of BoringSSL also mismatches Init and Update/Final
functions. Since this is largely cosmetic, it's probably not worth the cost to
do this.
Change-Id: I14e7b299172939f69ced2114be45ccba1dbbb704
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7793
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with SHA512_Final, use the different APIs rather than store md_len.
Change-Id: Ie1150de6fefa96f283d47aa03de0f18de38c93eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7722
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than store md_len, factor out the common parts of SHA384_Final and
SHA512_Final and then extract the right state. Also add a missing
SHA384_Transform and be consistent about "1" vs "one" in comments.
This also removes the NULL output special-case which no other hash function
had.
Change-Id: If60008bae7d7d5b123046a46d8fd64139156a7c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7720
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was only one function that required BoringSSL to know how to read
directories. Unfortunately, it does have some callers and it's not immediately
obvious whether the code is unreachable. Rather than worry about that, just
toss it all into decrepit.
In doing so, do away with the Windows and PNaCl codepaths. Only implement
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX on Linux.
Change-Id: Ie64d20254f2f632fadc3f248bbf5a8293ab2b451
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7661
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C and C++ disagree on the sizes of empty structs, which can be rather bad for
structs embedded in public headers. Stick a char in them to avoid issues. (It
doesn't really matter for CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX, but it's easier to add a char in
there too.)
Thanks to Andrew Chi for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Ic54fff710b688decaa94848e9c7e1e73f0c58fd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7760
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
aosp-master has been updated past the point that this is necessary. Sadly, all
the other hacks still are. I'll try to get things rolling so we can ditch the
others in time.
Change-Id: If7b3aad271141fb26108a53972d2d3273f956e8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to Android's complex branching scheme, we have to keep building against a
snapshotted version of wpa_supplicant. wpa_supplicant, in preparation for
OpenSSL 1.1.0, added compatibility versions of some accessors that we, in
working towards opaquification, have imported. This causes a conflict (C does
not like having static and non-static functions share a name).
Add a hack in the headers to suppress the conflicting accessors when
BORINGSSL_SUPPRESS_ACCESSORS is defined. Android releases which include an
updated BoringSSL will also locally carry this #define in wpa_supplicant build
files. Once we can be sure releases of BoringSSL will only see a new enough
wpa_supplicant (one which includes a to-be-submitted patch), we can ditch this.
Change-Id: I3e27fde86bac1e59077498ee5cbd916cd880821e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Opaquifying SSL_SESSION is less important than the other structs, but this will
cause less turbulence in wpa_supplicant if we add this API too. Semantics and
name taken from OpenSSL 1.1.0 to match.
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ic39f58d74640fa19a60aafb434dd2c4cb43cdea9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Probably better to keep it out of the way for someone just trying to figure out
how to use the library. Notably, we don't really want people to think they need
to use the directioned init function.
Change-Id: Icacc2061071581abf46e38eb1d7a52e7b1f8361b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It has all of one function in there.
Change-Id: I86f0fbb76d267389c62b63ac01df685acb70535e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is avoids pulling in BIGNUM for doing a straight-forward addition on a
block-sized value, and avoids a ton of mallocs. It's also -Wconversion-clean,
unlike the old one.
In doing so, this replaces the HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK with EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE.
By having the maximum block size available, most of the temporary values in the
key derivation don't need to be malloc'd.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I940a62bba4ea32bf82b1190098f3bf185d4cc7fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7688
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also switch the EVP_CIPHER copy to cut down on how frequently we need to cast
back and forth.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I9af1e586ca27793a4ee6193bbb348cf2b28a126e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7689
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The EVP_MD versions do, so the types should bubble up.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ibccbc9ff35bbfd3d164fc28bcdd53ed97c0ab338
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7687
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reduces the chance of double-frees.
BUG=10
Change-Id: I11a240e2ea5572effeddc05acb94db08c54a2e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7583
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We do not need to support engine-provided verification methods.
Change-Id: Iaad8369d403082b728c831167cc386fdcabfb067
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In OpenSSL, socket BIOs only used recv/send on Windows and read/write on POSIX.
Align our socket BIOs with that behavior. This should be a no-op, but avoids
frustrating consumers overly sensitive to the syscalls used now that SSL_set_fd
has switched to socket BIOs to align with OpenSSL. b/28138582.
Change-Id: Id4870ef8e668e587d6ef51c5b5f21e03af66a288
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This currently doesn't prefix assembly symbols since they don't pull in
openssl/base.h
BUG=5
Change-Id: Ie0fdc79ae73099f84ecbf3f17604a1e615569b3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7681
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Both the header-level and section-level documentation define curve25519 which
is a little odd.
Change-Id: I81aa2b74e8028d3cfd5635e1d3cfda402ba1ae38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is needed by trousers. As with the PSS function, the version that
assumes SHA-1 is put into decrepit.
Change-Id: I153e8ea0150e48061b978384b600a7b990d21d03
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7670
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There was only one function that required BoringSSL to know how to read
directories. Unfortunately, it does have some callers and it's not immediately
obvious whether the code is unreachable. Rather than worry about that, just
toss it all into decrepit.
In doing so, do away with the Windows and PNaCl codepaths. Only implement
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX on Linux.
Change-Id: I3eb55b098e3aa042b422bb7da115c0812685553e
This slipped through, but all the callers are now using
EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305, so we can remove this version.
Change-Id: I76eb3a4481aae4d18487ca96ebe3776e60d6abe8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7650
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Instead, embed the (very short) encoding of the OID into built_in_curve.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: I0db36f83c71fbd3321831f54fa5022f8304b30cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7564
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
A lot of consumers of obj.h only want the NID values. Others didn't need
it at all. This also removes some OBJ_nid2sn and OBJ_nid2ln calls in EVP
error paths which isn't worth pulling a large table in for.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: Id6dff578f993012e35b740a13b8e4f9c2edc0744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
obj_mac.h is missing #include guards, so one cannot use NIDs without
pulling in the OBJ_* functions which depend on the giant OID table. Give
it #include guards, tidy up the style slightly, and also rename it to
nid.h which is a much more reasonable name.
obj_mac.h is kept as a forwarding header as, despite it being a little
screwy, some code #includes it anyway.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: Iec0b3f186c02e208ff1f7437bf27ee3a5ad004b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7562
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was fixed in 93a5b44296, but it wasn't
documented. Now that there are no pre-init functions to call like
CRYPTO_set_neon_capable, one instance of BoringSSL may be safely shared between
multiple consumers. As part of that, multiple consumers need to be able to call
CRYPTO_library_init possibly redundantlyand possibly on different threads
without synchronization.
(Though there is still that static initializer nuisance. It would be nice to
replace this with internal CRYPTO_once_t's and then CRYPTO_library_init need
only be called to prime armcap for a sandbox. But one thing at a time.)
Change-Id: I48430182d3649c8cf19082e34da24dee48e6119e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7571
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They may be spelled with or without underscores. Alas, a lot of C code (adb,
cURL) seems to find it a popular pasttime to #define printf *before* including
external headers. This is completely nonsense and invalid, but working around
it is easy and is what we (and OpenSSL) were doing before
061332f216.
I'll be sending a patch to cURL tomorrow to make them at least do their macro
trickery after external #includes for sanity. adb's sysdeps.h is a lot longer
and consistently #included first so I'll probably leave that be for lack of
time.
Change-Id: I03a0a253f2c902eb45f45faace1e5c5df4335ebf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7605
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commit 6f0c4db90e except for the
imported assembly files, which are left as-is but unused. Until upstream fixes
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4483, we shouldn't ship this
code. Once that bug has been fixed, we'll restore it.
Change-Id: I74aea18ce31a4b79657d04f8589c18d6b17f1578
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7602
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The documentation in |RSA_METHOD| says that the |ctx| parameter to
|mod_exp| can be NULL, however the default implementation doesn't
handle that case. That wouldn't matter since internally it is always
called with a non-NULL |ctx| and it is static, but an external
application could get a pointer to |mod_exp| by extracting it from
the default |RSA_METHOD|. That's unlikely, but making that impossible
reduces the chances that future refactorings will cause unexpected
trouble.
Change-Id: Ie0e35e9f107551a16b49c1eb91d0d3386604e594
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7580
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The removes the last of OpenSSL's variables that count occurrences of a
function on the stack.
Change-Id: I1722c6d47bedb47b1613c4a5da01375b5c4cc220
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7450
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
fatal_alert isn't read at all right now, and warn_alert is only checked
for close_notify. We only need three states:
- Not shutdown.
- Got a fatal alert (don't care which).
- Got a warning close_notify.
Leave ssl->shutdown alone for now as it's tied up with SSL_set_shutdown
and friends. To distinguish the remaining two, we only need a boolean.
Change-Id: I5877723af82b76965c75cefd67ec1f981242281b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7434
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This removes the thread-unsafe SIGILL-based detection and the
multi-consumer-hostile CRYPTO_set_NEON_capable API. (Changing
OPENSSL_armcap_P after initialization is likely to cause problems.)
The right way to detect ARM features on Linux is getauxval. On aarch64,
we should be able to rely on this, so use it straight. Split this out
into its own file. The #ifdefs in the old cpu-arm.c meant it shared all
but no code with its arm counterpart anyway.
Unfortunately, various versions of Android have different missing APIs, so, on
arm, we need a series of workarounds. Previously, we used a SIGILL fallback
based on OpenSSL's logic, but this is inherently not thread-safe. (SIGILL also
does not tell us if the OS knows how to save and restore NEON state.) Instead,
base the behavior on Android NDK's cpu-features library, what Chromium
currently uses with CRYPTO_set_NEON_capable:
- Android before API level 20 does not provide getauxval. Where missing,
we can read from /proc/self/auxv.
- On some versions of Android, /proc/self/auxv is also not readable, so
use /proc/cpuinfo's Features line.
- Linux only advertises optional features in /proc/cpuinfo. ARMv8 makes NEON
mandatory, so /proc/cpuinfo can't be used without additional effort.
Finally, we must blacklist a particular chip because the NEON unit is broken
(https://crbug.com/341598).
Unfortunately, this means CRYPTO_library_init now depends on /proc being
available, which will require some care with Chromium's sandbox. The
simplest solution is to just call CRYPTO_library_init before entering
the sandbox.
It's worth noting that Chromium's current EnsureOpenSSLInit function already
depends on /proc/cpuinfo to detect the broken CPU, by way of base::CPU.
android_getCpuFeatures also interally depends on it. We were already relying on
both of those being stateful and primed prior to entering the sandbox.
BUG=chromium:589200
Change-Id: Ic5d1c341aab5a614eb129d8aa5ada2809edd6af8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7506
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Simplify the code by always caching Montgomery contexts in the RSA
structure, regardless of the |RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC| and
|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE| flags. Deprecate those flags.
Now that we do this no more than once per key per RSA exponent, the
private key exponents better because the initialization of the
Montgomery contexts isn't perfectly side-channel protected.
Change-Id: I4fbcfec0f2f628930bfeb811285b0ae3d103ac5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Partially fixes build with -Wmissing-prototypes.
Change-Id: If04d8fe7cbf068883485e95bd5ea6cdab6743e46
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7513
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For time_t and struct tm.
BUG=595118
Change-Id: I6c7f05998887ed2bd3fb56c83ac543894ef27fe6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7462
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Having a different API for this case than upstream is more trouble than is
worth it. This is sad since the new API avoids incomplete EC_GROUPs at least,
but I don't believe supporting this pair of functions will be significantly
more complex than supporting EC_GROUP_new_arbitrary even when we have static
EC_GROUPs.
For now, keep both sets of APIs around, but we'll be able to remove the scar
tissue once Conscrypt's complex dependencies are resolved.
Make the restored EC_GROUP_set_generator somewhat simpler than before by
removing the ability to call it multiple times and with some parameters set to
NULL. Keep the test.
Change-Id: I64e3f6a742678411904cb15c0ad15d56cdae4a73
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7432
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
People seem to condition on these a lot. Since this code has now been moved
twice, just make them all cross-module errors rather than leave a trail of
renamed error codes in our wake.
Change-Id: Iea18ab3d320f03cf29a64a27acca119768c4115c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7431
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This makes building OpenLDAP easier.
Change-Id: Ic1c5bcb2ec35c61c048e780ebc56db033d8382d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7406
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
libdecrepit wants some symbols visible. Also a build file typo.
Change-Id: I670d2324ab9048f84e7f80afdefc98cbab80335d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7411
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This another of those functions that tries to turn C into Python. In
this case, implement it in terms of the similar functions in EVP so that
at least we only have one list of things.
This makes life with nmap easier.
Change-Id: I6d01c43f062748d4ba7d7020587c286322e610bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7403
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This version is taken from OpenSSL 1.0.2 with tweaks to support the
changes that we have made to md32_common.h. None of the assembly
implementations have been imported.
This makes supporting nmap easier.
Change-Id: Iae9241abdbc9021cc6bc35a65b40c3d739011ccc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7402
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I've no idea who thought that this function was a good idea in the first
place, but including it in decrepit makes supporting nmap easier.
Change-Id: I7433cda6a6ddf1cc545126edf779625e9fc70ada
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7401
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This could live in decrepit, but it's tiny and having it makes the
interface more uniform that what we have for MD5 so I put it in the main
code. This is to more easily support nmap.
Change-Id: Ia098cc7ef6e00a90d2f3f56ee7deba8329c9a82e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7400
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This removes a hard dependency on |BN_mod_exp|, which will allow the
linker to drop it in programs that don't use other features that
require it.
Also, remove the |mont| member of |bn_blinding_st| in favor of having
callers pass it when necssaary. The |mont| member was a weak reference,
and weak references tend to be error-prone.
Finally, reduce the scope of some parts of the blinding code to
|static|.
Change-Id: I16d8ccc2d6d950c1bb40377988daf1a377a21fe6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7111
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function is a deprecated version of |X509_EXT_nconf_nid| that takes
a hash of |CONF_VALUE|s directly rather than a |CONF|.
Change-Id: I5fd1025b31d73b988d9298b2624453017dd34ff4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7363
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These functions are just like the _mgf1 versions but omit one of the
parameters. It's easier to add them than to patch the callers in some
cases.
Change-Id: Idee5b81374bf15f2ea89b7e0c06400c2badbb275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7362
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We shouldn't really have to do this, but there's a lot of code that
doesn't always include what it uses. In this case, since bio.h
references |BUF_MEM| in function signatures, it seems a little less
distasteful.
Change-Id: Ifb50f8bce40639f977b4447404597168a68c8388
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7361
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function was deprecated by OpenSSL in 0.9.8 but code that uses it
still exists. This change adds an implementation of this function to
decreipt/ to support these programs.
Change-Id: Ie99cd00ff8b0ab2675f2b1c821c3d664b9811f16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7360
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In OpenSSL, they create socket BIOs. The distinction isn't important on UNIX.
On Windows, file descriptors are provided by the C runtime, while sockets must
use separate recv and send APIs. Document how these APIs are intended to work.
Also add a TODO to resolve the SOCKET vs int thing. This code assumes that
Windows HANDLEs only use the bottom 32 bits of precision. (Which is currently
true and probably will continue to be true for the foreseeable future[*], but
it'd be nice to do this right.)
Thanks to Gisle Vanem and Daniel Stenberg for reporting the bug.
[*] Both so Windows can continue to run 32-bit programs and because of all the
random UNIX software, like OpenSSL and ourselves, out there which happily
assumes sockets are ints.
Change-Id: I67408c218572228cb1a7d269892513cda4261c82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7333
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change adds a |SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method| method that sets key_method on a SSL_CTX's cert.
It allows the private key method to be set once and inherited.
A copy of key_method (from SSL_CTX's cert to SSL's cert) is added in |ssl_cert_dup|.
Change-Id: Icb62e9055e689cfe2d5caa3a638797120634b63f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I went with NID_x25519 to match NID_sha1 and friends in being lowercase.
However, upstream seems to have since chosen NID_X25519. Match their
name.
Change-Id: Icc7b183a2e2dfbe42c88e08e538fcbd242478ac3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7331
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Node.js calls it but handles it failing. Since we have abstracted this
in the state machine, we mightn't even be using a cipher suite where the
server's key can be expressed as an EVP_PKEY.
Change-Id: Ic3f013dc9bcd7170a9eb2c7535378d478b985849
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7272
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was dropped in d27441a9cb due to lack
of use, but node.js now needs it.
Change-Id: I1e207d4b46fc746cfae309a0ea7bbbc04ea785e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7270
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The high bits of the type get used for the V_ASN1_NEG bit, so when used with
ASN1_ANY/ASN1_TYPE, universal tags become ambiguous. This allows one to create
a negative zero, which should be impossible. Impose an upper bound on universal
tags accepted by crypto/asn1 and add a test.
BUG=590615
Change-Id: I363e01ebfde621c8865101f5bcbd5f323fb59e79
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7238
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not used anywhere else, in the library or consumers (Google ones or
ones I could find on Debian codesearch). This is a sufficiently
specialized function that the risk of a third-party library newly
depending on it is low. This removes the last include of asn1.h or
x509.h in crypto/evp.
(This is almost entirely cosmetic because it wasn't keeping the static linker
from doing the right thing anyway. But if we were want to separate the legacy
ASN.1 stack into its own decrepit-like target, we'll need to be pickier about
separation.)
Change-Id: I9be97c9321572e3a2ed093e1d50036b7654cff41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A number of values have fallen off now that code's been shuffled
around.
Change-Id: I5eac1d3fa4a9335c6aa72b9876d37bb9a9a029ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7029
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing:
- d2i_PrivateKey
This removes evp_asn1.c's dependency on the old stack. (Aside from
obj/.) It also takes old_priv_decode out of EVP_ASN1_METHOD in favor of
calling out to the new-style function. EVP_ASN1_METHOD no longer has any
old-style type-specific serialization hooks, only the PKCS#8 and SPKI
ones.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: Ic142dc05a5505b50e4717c260d3893b20e680194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7027
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EVP_PKEY_asn1_find can already be private. EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str is used
only so the PEM code can get at legacy encoders. Since this is all
legacy non-PKCS8 stuff, we can just explicitly list out the three cases
in the two places that need it. If this changes, we can later add a
table in crypto/pem mapping string to EVP_PKEY type.
With this, EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD is no longer exposed in the public API
and nothing outside of EVP_PKEY reaches into it. Unexport all of that.
Change-Id: Iab661014247dbdbc31e5e9887364176ec5ad2a6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6871
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All the signature algorithm logic depends on X509_ALGOR. This also
removes the X509_ALGOR-based EVP functions which are no longer used
externally. I think those APIs were a mistake on my part. The use in
Chromium was unnecessary (and has since been removed anyway). The new
X.509 stack will want to process the signatureAlgorithm itself to be
able to enforce policies on it.
This also moves the RSA_PSS_PARAMS bits to crypto/x509 from crypto/rsa.
That struct is also tied to crypto/x509. Any new RSA-PSS code would
have to use something else anyway.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I6c4b4573b2800a2e0f863d35df94d048864b7c41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This stub returns an empty string rather than NULL (since some callers
might assume that NULL means there are no shared ciphers).
Change-Id: I9537fa0a80c76559b293d8518599b68fd9977dd8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7196
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The C implementation is still our existing C implementation, but slightly
tweaked to fit with upstream's init/block/emits convention.
I've tested this by looking at code coverage in kcachegrind and
valgrind --tool=callgrind --dump-instr=yes --collect-jumps=yes
(NB: valgrind 3.11.0 is needed for AVX2. And even that only does 64-bit AVX2,
so we can't get coverage for the 32-bit code yet. But I had to disable that
anyway.)
This was paired with a hacked up version of poly1305_test that would repeat
tests with different ia32cap and armcap values. This isn't checked in, but we
badly need a story for testing all the different variants.
I'm not happy with upstream's code in either the C/asm boundary or how it
dispatches between different versions, but just debugging the code has been a
significant time investment. I'd hoped to extract the SIMD parts and do the
rest in C, but I think we need to focus on testing first (and use that to
guide what modifications would help). For now, this version seems to work at
least.
The x86 (not x86_64) AVX2 code needs to be disabled because it's broken. It
also seems pretty unnecessary.
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4346
Otherwise it seems to work and buys us a decent performance improvement.
Notably, my Nexus 6P is finally faster at ChaCha20-Poly1305 than my Nexus 4!
bssl speed numbers follow:
x86
---
Old:
Did 1554000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000536us (1553167.5 ops/sec): 24.9 MB/s
Did 136000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003947us (135465.3 ops/sec): 182.9 MB/s
Did 30000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1022990us (29325.8 ops/sec): 240.2 MB/s
Did 1888000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000206us (1887611.2 ops/sec): 30.2 MB/s
Did 173000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003036us (172476.4 ops/sec): 232.8 MB/s
Did 30000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1027759us (29189.7 ops/sec): 239.1 MB/s
New:
Did 2030000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000507us (2028971.3 ops/sec): 32.5 MB/s
Did 404000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000287us (403884.1 ops/sec): 545.2 MB/s
Did 83000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1001258us (82895.7 ops/sec): 679.1 MB/s
Did 2018000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000006us (2017987.9 ops/sec): 32.3 MB/s
Did 360000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001962us (359295.1 ops/sec): 485.0 MB/s
Did 85000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1002479us (84789.8 ops/sec): 694.6 MB/s
x86_64, no AVX2
---
Old:
Did 2023000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000258us (2022478.2 ops/sec): 32.4 MB/s
Did 466000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002619us (464782.7 ops/sec): 627.5 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1001133us (89898.1 ops/sec): 736.4 MB/s
Did 2238000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000175us (2237608.4 ops/sec): 35.8 MB/s
Did 483000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001348us (482349.8 ops/sec): 651.2 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1003141us (89718.2 ops/sec): 735.0 MB/s
New:
Did 2558000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000275us (2557296.7 ops/sec): 40.9 MB/s
Did 510000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001810us (509078.6 ops/sec): 687.3 MB/s
Did 115000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1006457us (114262.2 ops/sec): 936.0 MB/s
Did 2818000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000187us (2817473.1 ops/sec): 45.1 MB/s
Did 418000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001140us (417524.0 ops/sec): 563.7 MB/s
Did 91000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1002539us (90769.5 ops/sec): 743.6 MB/s
x86_64, AVX2
---
Old:
Did 2516000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000115us (2515710.7 ops/sec): 40.3 MB/s
Did 774000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000300us (773767.9 ops/sec): 1044.6 MB/s
Did 171000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1004373us (170255.5 ops/sec): 1394.7 MB/s
Did 2580000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000144us (2579628.5 ops/sec): 41.3 MB/s
Did 769000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000472us (768637.2 ops/sec): 1037.7 MB/s
Did 169000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000320us (168945.9 ops/sec): 1384.0 MB/s
New:
Did 3240000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000114us (3239630.7 ops/sec): 51.8 MB/s
Did 932000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000059us (931945.0 ops/sec): 1258.1 MB/s
Did 217000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1003282us (216290.1 ops/sec): 1771.8 MB/s
Did 3187000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000100us (3186681.3 ops/sec): 51.0 MB/s
Did 926000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000071us (925934.3 ops/sec): 1250.0 MB/s
Did 215000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000479us (214897.1 ops/sec): 1760.4 MB/s
arm, Nexus 4
---
Old:
Did 430248 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000153us (430182.2 ops/sec): 6.9 MB/s
Did 115250 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000549us (115186.8 ops/sec): 155.5 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1030124us (26210.4 ops/sec): 214.7 MB/s
Did 451750 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000549us (451502.1 ops/sec): 7.2 MB/s
Did 118000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001557us (117816.6 ops/sec): 159.1 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1024263us (26360.4 ops/sec): 215.9 MB/s
New:
Did 553644 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000183us (553542.7 ops/sec): 8.9 MB/s
Did 126000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000396us (125950.1 ops/sec): 170.0 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000336us (26990.9 ops/sec): 221.1 MB/s
Did 559000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1001465us (558182.3 ops/sec): 8.9 MB/s
Did 124000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000824us (123897.9 ops/sec): 167.3 MB/s
Did 28000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1034854us (27057.0 ops/sec): 221.7 MB/s
aarch64, Nexus 6P
---
Old:
Did 358000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000358us (357871.9 ops/sec): 5.7 MB/s
Did 45000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1022386us (44014.7 ops/sec): 59.4 MB/s
Did 8657 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1063722us (8138.4 ops/sec): 66.7 MB/s
Did 350000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000074us (349974.1 ops/sec): 5.6 MB/s
Did 44000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1007907us (43654.8 ops/sec): 58.9 MB/s
Did 8525 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1042644us (8176.3 ops/sec): 67.0 MB/s
New:
Did 713000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000190us (712864.6 ops/sec): 11.4 MB/s
Did 180000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004249us (179238.4 ops/sec): 242.0 MB/s
Did 41000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005811us (40763.1 ops/sec): 333.9 MB/s
Did 775000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000719us (774443.2 ops/sec): 12.4 MB/s
Did 182000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003529us (181360.0 ops/sec): 244.8 MB/s
Did 41000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1010576us (40570.9 ops/sec): 332.4 MB/s
Change-Id: Iaa4ab86ac1174b79833077963cc3616cfb08e686
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7226
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some software #includes opensslconf.h which typically contains settings that we
put in opensslfeatures.h (a header name not in OpenSSL). Rename it to
opensslconf.h.
Change-Id: Icd21dde172e5e489ce90dd5c16ae4d2696909fb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7216
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some consumers of connect BIOs connect them explicitly, and we already have the
BIO_ctrl hooked up.
Change-Id: Ie6b14f8ceb272b560e2b534e0b6c32fae050475b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7217
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers of this function are not checking for the -1 result. Change
the semantics to match their expectations and to match the common
semantics of most other parts of BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I4ec537d7619e20e8ddfee80c72125e4c02cfaac1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7125
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY keeps the invariant.
(Imported from upstream's a38a159bfcbc94214dda00e0e6b1fc6454a23b78)
Change-Id: I4cb35615d76b77929915e370dbb7fec1455da069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7214
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response,
meaning everything was successfully closed down (even though it
wasn't). Better is to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to
receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake
is that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything
else (including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS
before acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it
because we're not acting on CCS messages!
(Imported from upstream's f73c737c7ac908c5d6407c419769123392a3b0a9)
Change-Id: Iaad5c5e38983456d3697c955522a89919628024b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7207
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This depends on https://codereview.chromium.org/1730823002/. The bit was only
ever targetted to one (rather old) CPU. Disable NEON on it uniformly, so we
don't have to worry about whether any new NEON code breaks it.
BUG=589200
Change-Id: Icc7d17d634735aca5425fe0a765ec2fba3329326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I switched up the endianness. Add some tests to make sure those work right.
Also tweak the DTLS semantics. SSL_get_read_sequence should return the highest
sequence number received so far. Include the epoch number in both so we don't
need a second API for it.
Change-Id: I9901a1665b41224c46fadb7ce0b0881dcb466bcc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7141
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with SPKI parsers, the intent is make EVP_PKEY capture the key's
constraints in full fidelity, so we'd have to add new types or store the
information in the underlying key object if people introduce variant key
types with weird constraints on them.
Note that because PKCS#8 has a space for arbitrary attributes, this
parser must admit a hole. I'm assuming for now that we don't need an API
that enforces no attributes and just ignore trailing data in the
structure for simplicity.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I6fc641355e87136c7220f5d7693566d1144a68e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6866
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are all the type-specific serializations rather than something
tagged with a type. i2d_PrivateKey's PKCS#8 codepath was unreachable
because every EVP_PKEY type has an old_priv_encode function.
To prune EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD further, replace i2d_PrivateKey into a
switch case so we don't need to keep old_priv_encode around. This cuts
down on a case of outside modules reaching into crypto/evp method
tables.
Change-Id: I30db2eed836d560056ba9d1425b960d0602c3cf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're only used by a pair of PEM functions, which are never used.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I89731485c66ca328c634efbdb7e182a917f2a963
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6863
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports upstream's ea6b07b54c1f8fc2275a121cdda071e2df7bd6c1 along
with a bugfix in 987157f6f63fa70dbeffca3c8bc62f26e9767ff2.
In an SPKI, a DSA key is only an INTEGER, with the group information in
the AlgorithmIdentifier. But a standalone DSAPublicKey is more complex
(and apparently made up by OpenSSL). OpenSSL implemented this with a
write_params boolean and making DSAPublicKey a CHOICE.
Instead, have p_dsa_asn1.c encode an INTEGER directly. d2i_DSAPublicKey
only parses the standalone form. (That code will be replaced later, but
first do this in preparation for rewriting the DSA ASN.1 code.)
Change-Id: I6fbe298d2723b9816806e9c196c724359b9ffd63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing:
- d2i_ECParameters
- d2i_ECPrivateKey
This adds a handful of bytestring-based APIs to handle EC key
serialization. Deprecate all the old serialization APIs. Notes:
- An EC_KEY has additional state that controls its encoding, enc_flags
and conv_form. conv_form is left alone, but enc_flags in the new API
is an explicit parameter.
- d2i_ECPrivateKey interpreted its T** argument unlike nearly every
other d2i function. This is an explicit EC_GROUP parameter in the new
function.
- The new specified curve code is much stricter and should parse enough
to uniquely identify the curve.
- I've not bothered with a new version of i2d_ECParameters. It just
writes an OID. This may change later when decoupling from the giant
OID table.
- Likewise, I've not bothered with new APIs for the public key since the
EC_POINT APIs should suffice.
- Previously, d2i_ECPrivateKey would not call EC_KEY_check_key and it
was possible for the imported public and private key to mismatch. It
now calls it.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I30b4dd2841ae76c56ab0e1808360b2628dee0615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6859
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CBS_asn1_ber_to_der currently uses heuristics because implicitly-tagged
constructed strings in BER are ambiguous with implicitly-tagged sequences. It's
not possible to convert BER to DER without knowing the schema.
Fortunately, implicitly tagged strings don't appear often so instead split the
job up: CBS_asn1_ber_to_der fixes indefinite-length elements and constructed
strings it can see. Implicitly-tagged strings it leaves uncoverted, but they
will only nest one level down (because BER kindly allows one to nest
constructed strings arbitrarily!).
CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string then performs the final concatenation at parse
time. This isn't much more complex and lets us parse BER more accurately and
also reject a number of mis-encoded values (e.g. constructed INTEGERs are not a
thing) we'd previously let through. The downside is the post-conversion parsing
code must be aware of this limitation of CBS_asn1_ber_to_der. Fortunately,
there's only one implicitly-tagged string in our PKCS#12 code.
(In the category of things that really really don't matter, but I had spare
cycles and the old BER converter is weird.)
Change-Id: Iebdd13b08559fa158b308ef83a5bb07bfdf80ae8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
node.js uses a memory BIO in the wrong mode which, for now, we work
around. It also passes in NULL (rather than empty) strings and a
non-NULL out-arg for |d2i_PKCS12_bio|.
Change-Id: Ib565b4a202775bb32fdcb76db8a4e8c54268c052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7012
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This slightly simplifies the SSL_ECDH code and will be useful later on
in reimplementing the key parsing logic.
Change-Id: Ie41ea5fd3a9a734b3879b715fbf57bd991e23799
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6858
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is CVE-2016-0701 for OpenSSL, reported by Antonio Sanso. It is a no-op for
us as we'd long removed SSL_OP_DH_SINGLE_USE and static DH cipher suites. (We
also do not parse or generate X9.42 DH parameters.)
However, we do still have the APIs which return RFC 5114 groups, so we should
perform the necessary checks in case later consumers reuse keys.
Unlike groups we generate, RFC 5114 groups do not use "safe primes" and have
many small subgroups. In those cases, the subprime q is available. Before using
a public key, ensure its order is q by checking y^q = 1 (mod p). (q is assumed
to be prime and the existing range checks ensure y is not 1.)
(Imported from upstream's 878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648 and
75374adf8a6ff69d6718952121875a491ed2cd29, but with some bugs fixed. See
RT4278.)
Change-Id: Ib18c3e84819002fa36a127ac12ca00ee33ea018a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7001
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL accepts both OID 2.5.8.1.1 and OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 for RSA
public keys. The latter comes from RFC 3279 and is widely implemented.
The former comes from the ITU-T version of X.509. Interestingly,
2.5.8.1.1 actually has a parameter, which OpenSSL ignores:
rsa ALGORITHM ::= {
KeySize
IDENTIFIED BY id-ea-rsa
}
KeySize ::= INTEGER
Remove support for 2.5.8.1.1 completely. In tests with a self-signed
certificate and code inspection:
- IE11 on Win8 does not accept the certificate in a TLS handshake at
all. Such a certificate is fatal and unbypassable. However Microsoft's
libraries do seem to parse it, so Chrome on Windows allows one to
click through the error. I'm guessing either the X.509 stack accepts
it while the TLS stack doesn't recognize it as RSA or the X.509 stack
is able to lightly parse it but not actually understand the key. (The
system certificate UI didn't display it as an RSA key, so probably the
latter?)
- Apple's certificate library on 10.11.2 does not parse the certificate
at all. Both Safari and Chrome on Mac treat it as a fatal and
unbypassable error.
- mozilla::pkix, from code inspection, does not accept such
certificates. However, Firefox does allow clicking through the error.
This is likely a consequence of mozilla::pkix and NSS having different
ASN.1 stacks. I did not test this, but I expect this means Chrome on
Linux also accepts it.
Given IE and Safari's results, it should be safe to simply remove this.
Firefox's data point is weak (perhaps someone is relying on being able
to click-through a self-signed 2.5.8.1.1 certificate), but it does
further ensure no valid certificate could be doing this.
The following is the 2.5.8.1.1 certificate I constructed to test with.
The private key is key.pem from ssl/test/runner:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I031d03c0f53a16cbc749c4a5d8be6efca50dc863
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6852
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It takes ownership of the buffer, so it's not actually const. The
const-ness gets dropped once it transits through EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.
Also compare against INT_MAX explicitly for the overflow check. I'm not sure
whether the casting version is undefined, but comparing against INT_MAX matches
the rest of the codebase when transiting in and out of signed ints.
Change-Id: I131165a4b5f0ebe02c6db3e7e3e0d1af5b771710
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6850
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It's never used. It's not clear why one would want such a thing.
EVP_PKEY_CTX has no way for callers to register callbacks, which means
there shouldn't be a way for the library to present you an EVP_PKEY_CTX
out-of-context. (Whereas app_data/ex_data makes sense on SSL because of
its numerous callbacks or RSA because of RSA_METHOD.)
Change-Id: I55af537ab101682677af34f6ac1f2c27b5899a89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6849
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's many ways to serialize a BIGNUM, so not including asn1 in the name is
confusing (and collides with BN_bn2cbb_padded). Since BN_asn12bn looks
ridiculous, match the parse/marshal naming scheme of other modules instead.
Change-Id: I53d22ae0537a98e223ed943e943c48cb0743cf51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6822
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
OpenSSL 1.1.0 doesn't seem to have these two, so this isn't based on anything.
Have them return uint64_t in preparation for switching the internal
representation to uint64_t so ssl_record_sequence_update can go away.
Change-Id: I21d55e9a29861c992f409ed293e0930a7aaef7a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6941
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
We have the hook on the SSL_CTX, but it should be possible to set it without
reaching into SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: I93db070c7c944be374543442a8de3ce655a28928
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Move it into ssl->s3 so it automatically behaves correctly on SSL_clear.
ssl->version is still a mess though.
Change-Id: I17a692a04a845886ec4f8de229fa6cf99fa7e24a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
node.js is, effectively, another bindings library. However, it's better
written than most and, with these changes, only a couple of tiny fixes
are needed in node.js. Some of these changes are a little depressing
however so we'll need to push node.js to use APIs where possible.
Changes:
∙ Support verify_recover. This is very obscure and the motivation
appears to be https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/477 – where it's
not clear that anyone understands what it means :(
∙ Add a few, no-op #defines
∙ Add some members to |SSL_CTX| and |SSL| – node.js needs to not
reach into these structs in the future.
∙ Add EC_get_builtin_curves.
∙ Add EVP_[CIPHER|MD]_do_all_sorted – these functions are limited to
decrepit.
Change-Id: I9a3566054260d6c4db9d430beb7c46cc970a9d46
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6952
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In code, structs that happened to have a '(' somewhere in their body
would cause the parser to go wrong. This change fixes that and updates
the comments on a number of structs.
Change-Id: Ia76ead266615a3d5875b64a0857a0177fec2bd00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6970
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Conscrypt needs to, in the certificate verification callback, know the key
exchange + auth method of the current cipher suite to pass into
X509TrustManager.checkServerTrusted. Currently it reaches into the struct to
get it. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ib4e0a1fbf1d9ea24e0114f760b7524e1f7bafe33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6881
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Apparently OpenSSL's API is made entirely of initialization functions.
Some external libraries like to initialize with OPENSSL_config instead.
Change-Id: I28efe97fc5eb21309f560c84112b80e947f8bb17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6981
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With these stubs, cURL should not need any BoringSSL #ifdefs at all,
except for their OCSP #ifdefs (which can switch to the more generally
useful OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) and the workaround for wincrypt.h macro
collisions. That we intentionally leave to the consumer rather than add
a partial hack that makes the build sensitive to include order.
(I'll send them a patch upstream once this cycles in.)
Change-Id: I815fe67e51e80e9aafa9b91ae68867ca1ff1d623
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is only for Conscrypt which always calls the pair in succession. (Indeed
it wouldn't make any sense to not call it.) Remove those two APIs and replace
with a single merged API. This way incomplete EC_GROUPs never escape outside
our API boundary and EC_GROUPs may *finally* be made immutable.
Also add a test for this to make sure I didn't mess it up.
Add a temporary BORINGSSL_201512 define to ease the transition for Conscrypt.
Conscrypt requires https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/187801/ before
picking up this change.
Change-Id: I3706c2ceac31ed2313175ba5ee724bd5c74ef6e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The new OPENSSL_PRINTF_FORMAT_FUNC macro let doc.go catch a few problems. It
also confuses doc.go, but this CL doesn't address that. At some point we
probably need to give it a real C parser.
Change-Id: I39f945df04520d1e0a0ba390cac7b308baae0622
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Besides being a good idea anyway, this avoids clang warning about using
a non-literal format string when |ERR_add_error_dataf| calls
|BIO_vsnprintf|.
Change-Id: Iebc84d9c9d85e08e93010267d473387b661717a5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6920
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This centralizes the conditional logic into openssl/base.h so that it
doesn't have to be repeated. The name |OPENSSL_PRINTF_FORMAT_FUNC| was
chosen in anticipation of eventually defining an
|OPENSSL_PRINTF_FORMAT_ARG| for MSVC-style parameter annotations.
Change-Id: I273e6eddd209e696dc9f82099008c35b6d477cdb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6909
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change imports the following changes from upstream:
6281abc79623419eae6a64768c478272d5d3a426
dfd3322d72a2d49f597b86dab6f37a8cf0f26dbf
f34b095fab1569d093b639bfcc9a77d6020148ff
21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd
25efcb44ac88ab34f60047e16a96c9462fad39c1
56353962e7da7e385c3d577581ccc3015ed6d1dc
39c76ceb2d3e51eaff95e04d6e4448f685718f8d
a3d74afcae435c549de8dbaa219fcb30491c1bfb
These contain the “altchains” functionality which allows OpenSSL to
backtrack when chain building.
Change-Id: I8d4bc2ac67b90091f9d46e7355cae878b4ccf37d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6905
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Comment-only change; no functional difference.)
Some code was broken by the |d2i_ECDSA_SIG| change in 87897a8c. It was
passing in a pointer to an existing |ECDSA_SIG| as the first argument
and then simply assuming that the structure would be updated in place.
The comments on the function suggested that this was reasonable.
This change updates the comments that use similar wording to either note
that the function will never update in-place, or else to note that
depending on that is a bad idea for the future.
I've also audited all the uses of these functions that I can find and,
in addition to the one case with |d2i_ECDSA_SIG|, there are several
users of |d2i_PrivateKey| that could become a problem in the future.
I'll try to fix them before it does become an issue.
Change-Id: I769f7b2e0b5308d09ea07dd447e02fc161795071
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6902
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a companion to SSL_get_rc4_state and SSL_get_ivs which doesn't
require poking at internal state. Partly since it aligns with the
current code and partly the off chance we ever need to get
wpa_supplicant's EAP-FAST code working, the API allows one to generate
more key material than is actually in the key block.
Change-Id: I58bc3f2b017482dbb8567dcd0cd754947a95397f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6839
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Both are connection state rather than configuration state. Notably this
cuts down more of SSL_clear that can't just use ssl_free + ssl_new.
Change-Id: I3c05b3ae86d4db8bd75f1cd21656f57fc5b55ca9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6835
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Move the actual SSL_AEAD_CTX swap into the record layer. Also revise the
intermediate state we store between setup_key_block and
change_cipher_state. With SSL_AEAD_CTX_new abstracted out, keeping the
EVP_AEAD around doesn't make much sense. Just store enough to partition
the key block.
Change-Id: I773fb46a2cb78fa570f00c0a89339c15bbb1d719
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6832
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
wpa_supplicant needs to get at the client and server random. OpenSSL
1.1.0 added these APIs, so match their semantics.
Change-Id: I2b71ba850ac63e574c9ea79012d1d0efec5a979a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6830
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
