Commit Graph

16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Adam Langley
dc7e9c4043 Make the runner tests a go “test”
This change makes the runner tests (in ssl/test/runner) act like a
normal Go test rather than being a Go binary. This better aligns with
some internal tools.

Thus, from this point onwards, one has to run the runner tests with `go
test` rather than `go run` or `go build && ./runner`.

This will break the bots.

Change-Id: Idd72c31e8e0c2b7ed9939dacd3b801dbd31710dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6009
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 17:10:45 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite
af096751e8 Restore the NULL-SHA ciphersuite. (Alas.)
Change-Id: Ia5398f3b86a13fb20dba053f730b51a0e57b9aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5791
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 22:18:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
f2aa1e1a71 Remove Go implementation of non-standard ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
The BoringSSL implementation was removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5051. No need to have the runner half
around.

Change-Id: I49857f4d01be161df89fb7df93a83240b6a8cb02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:43 +00:00
David Benjamin
ec4353498c Remove DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)

Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.

Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:25 +00:00
Adam Langley
5021b223d8 Convert the renegotiation extension to the new system.
This change also switches the behaviour of the client. Previously the
client would send the SCSV rather than the extension, but now it'll only
do that for SSLv3 connections.

Change-Id: I67a04b8abbef2234747c0dac450458deb6b0cd0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5143
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-07-01 19:30:53 +00:00
Adam Langley
85bc5601ee Add ECDHE-PSK-AES{128,256}-SHA cipher suites.
If we're going to have PSK and use standard cipher suites, this might be
the best that we can do for the moment.

Change-Id: I35d9831b2991dc5b23c9e24d98cdc0db95919d39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-09 18:10:42 +00:00
David Benjamin
e9a80ff8ce Add tests for CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphers.
This drops in a copy of a subset of golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305 to implement
Poly1305. Hopefully this will keep them from regression as we rework the record
layer.

Change-Id: Ic1e0d941a0a9e5ec260151ced8acdf9215c4b887
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4257
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-04-08 20:47:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
a3e894921e Test that we reject RSA ServerKeyExchange more thoroughly.
The old test just sent an empty ServerKeyExchange which is sufficient as we
reject the message early. But be more thorough and implement the actual
ephemeral key logic in the test server.

Change-Id: I016658762e4502c928c051e14d69eea67b5a495f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-02-26 21:26:37 +00:00
David Benjamin
226a872d2f Don't set client_version to the ServerHello version.
The client_version needs to be preserved, both for the RSA key exchange and
(when this codepath is used for TLS) for the SChannel renego workaround. Fix
the tests to enforce this so the cipher suite version tests catch this.

Change-Id: I0c42dc3ec4830f3724026b400e5066e7a7f1ee97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-12-11 18:49:42 +00:00
David Benjamin
2af684fa92 Add tests for ECDHE_PSK.
pskKeyAgreement is now a wrapper over a base key agreement.

Change-Id: Ic18862d3e98f7513476f878b8df5dcd8d36a0eac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-10-29 20:33:09 +00:00
David Benjamin
48cae08563 Add tests for PSK cipher suites.
Only the three plain PSK suites for now. ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 will
be in a follow-up.

Change-Id: Iafc116a5b2798c61d90c139b461cf98897ae23b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-10-29 20:32:21 +00:00
David Benjamin
f7768e43b2 Test SHA-256 and SHA-384 CBC-mode cipher suites.
These were added in TLS 1.2. They are like the standard AES-CBC cipher suites,
but use different HMACs.

Change-Id: Ib89ddebd1aa398b1347f8285f5d827068b1bd181
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-09-06 00:17:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
83c0bc94d7 Test-only DTLS implementation in runner.go.
Run against openssl s_client and openssl s_server. This seems to work for a
start, although it may need to become cleverer to stress more of BoringSSL's
implementation for test purposes.

In particular, it assumes a reliable, in-order channel. And it requires that
the peer send handshake fragments in order. Retransmit and whatnot are not
implemented. The peer under test will be expected to handle a lossy channel,
but all loss in the channel will be controlled. MAC errors, etc., are fatal.

Change-Id: I329233cfb0994938fd012667ddf7c6a791ac7164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-13 23:43:38 +00:00
David Benjamin
f4e5c4e106 runner: Implement DHE-RSA.
Use it to test DHE-RSA in BoringSSL.

Change-Id: I88f7bfa76507a6f60234d61d494c9f94b7df4e0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1377
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-04 20:12:58 +00:00
Adam Langley
ac61fa379f Implement TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support for the client.
With this change, calling SSL_enable_fallback_scsv on a client SSL* will
cause the fallback SCSV to be sent.

This is intended to be set when the client is performing TLS fallback
after a failed connection. (This only happens if the application itself
implements this behaviour: OpenSSL does not do fallback automatically.)

The fallback SCSV indicates to the server that it should reject the
connection if the version indicated by the client is less than the
version supported by the server.

See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02.

Change-Id: I478d6d5135016f1b7c4aaa6c306a1a64b1d215a6
2014-06-23 12:03:11 -07:00
Adam Langley
95c29f3cd1 Inital import.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 13:17:32 -07:00