Change-Id: I3134b2ed1b2000bf2413c066c6560832c0ff03ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14704
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The built-in CMake support seems to basically work, though it believes
you want to build a fat binary which doesn't work with how we build
perlasm. (We'd need to stop conditioning on CMAKE_SYSTEM_PROCESSOR at
all, wrap all the generated assembly files in ifdefs, and convince the
build to emit more than one. Probably not worth bothering for now.)
We still, of course, need to actually test the assembly on iOS before
this can be shipped anywhere.
BUG=48
Change-Id: I6ae71d98d706be03142b82f7844d1c9b02a2b832
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14645
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These two functions behave identically if the input is a word, which is
true if bits <= BN_BITS2. This also matches upstream's version of the
function. I'm guessing the patch was originally submitted as we have it,
perhaps because we didn't notice BN_get_word at the time, and it got
switched to the existing BN_get_word function in review.
Change-Id: I7847e3086aab871c5aa28e15fae6f89c964862d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14331
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't like uninitialized function-level static consts and
Android complains we're casting away a volatile.
Change-Id: I7c53de45cff9fa2ef298f015cf3f5ecca82194d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14807
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This restores the original version of delocate.go, with the subsequent
bugfixes patched in. With this, the FIPS module builds with GCC and
Clang, with and without optimizations. I did patch over a variant of the
macro though, since it was otherwise really wordy.
Playing games with sections was a little overly clever and relied on the
compiler not performing a number of optimizations. Clang blew threw all
of those assumptions.
Change-Id: Ib4da468a5925998457994f9e392cf0c04573fe91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14805
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes two issues in clang.
- clang emits callq instead of call.
- clang emits .cfi_endproc after .size for the dummy functions. This
causes it to get confused as there is no matching .cfi_startproc.
Don't bother trying to omit the dummy functions.
Alas, clang seems to compile the DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION hooks in a way
that brings the .rel.ro back AND isn't honoring the noinline. We'll
probably need to go back to the original CL's setup there.
Change-Id: Ic21ea99e54a93cdc739e4f67dc308d83083607d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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In typical style I forgot to push a new revision before
landing fd49993c3b. That change accidently
dropped patchset eight when I squashed David's changes in, so this
restores that and fixes a couple of 80-char issues in a Python script.
Change-Id: I7e9338a715c68ae5c89d9d1f7d03782b99af2aa8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14784
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This is the only single-shot hash function which pretends it has a
failure case.
Change-Id: Ibf45e197eafc63c368be3783dfeec8ccb95589ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=187
Change-Id: I5775ce0886041b0c12174a7d665f3af1e8bce511
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14505
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14449
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On malloc error, CRYPTO_set_ex_data may fail. (See upstream's
62f488d31733e5dc77b339f905b44f165550e47d.)
It also failed to copy the reserved slots when we revised the app-data
machinery, although this is unreachable as EC_KEY is the only thing
which uses this function and EC_KEY has no reserved slots. (We probably
can/should also take CRYPTO_dup_ex_data out of there, as it's a little
bit weird...)
Change-Id: I60bbc301f919d4c0ee7fff362f979f6ec18d73b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14604
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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(Thanks to Sam Panzer for the patch.)
At least some linkers will drop constructor functions if no symbols from
that translation unit are used elsewhere in the program. On POWER, since
the cached capability value isn't a global in crypto.o (like other
platforms), the constructor function is getting discarded.
The C++11 spec says (3.6.2, paragraph 4):
It is implementation-defined whether the dynamic initialization of a
non-local variable with static storage duration is done before the
first statement of main. If the initialization is deferred to some
point in time after the first statement of main, it shall occur
before the first odr-use (3.2) of any function or variable defined
in the same translation unit as the variable to be initialized.
Compilers appear to interpret that to mean they are allowed to drop
(i.e. indefinitely defer) constructors that occur in translation units
that are never used, so they can avoid initializing some part of a
library if it's dropped on the floor.
This change makes the hardware capability value for POWER a global in
crypto.c, which should prevent the constructor function from being
ignored.
Change-Id: I43ebe492d0ac1491f6f6c2097971a277f923dd3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14664
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This was a mess. HMAC_CTX_copy_ex would avoid having to cleanup and init
the HMAC_CTX repeatedly, but even that is unnecessary. hctx_tpl was just
to reuse the key. Instead, HMAC_CTX already can be reset with the same
key. (Alas, with a slightly odd API, but so it goes.) Do that, and use
goto err to cleanup the error-handling.
Thanks to upstream's b98530d6e09f4cb34c791b8840e936c1fc1467cf for
drawing attention to this. (Though we've diverged significantly from
upstream with all the heap-allocated bits, so I didn't use the change
itself.)
While I'm here, tidy up some variable names and cite the newer RFC.
Change-Id: Ic1259f46b7c5a14dc341b8cee385be5508ac4daf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14605
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These static output buffers are a legacy from a time before processes
had threads. This change drops support and callers who were depending on
this (of which there are hopefully none) will crash.
Change-Id: I7b8eb3440def507f92543e55465f821dfa02c7da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14528
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Change-Id: I32b37306265e89afca568f20bfba2e04559c4f0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14527
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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and relying on a compiler to generate code for unaligned access. Both gcc
and llvm currently do that but llvm is going to change to generate code for
aligned access. The change in llvm will break SHA-1 on POWER without this fix.
Change-Id: If9393968288cf94b684ad340e3ea295e03174aa9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14378
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are a few test vectors which were not imported from djb's. Mirror
those. Also as RFC 8032 uses a slightly different private key
representation, document this in curve25519.h.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I119381168ba1af9b332365fd8f974fba41759d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14445
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant of a previous iteration of the SSL client certificate
bridging logic in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ifa8e15cc970395f179e2f6db65c97a342af5498d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is slightly tidier than casting through function pointers. (Also
more defined? But we cast T* => void* within a function pointer all over
the place, so that's probably a lost cause.)
Change-Id: I8f435906f3066d1377eababf940e3db34c626acd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14313
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only need the size_t ones now.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ie6935656bbc4bd2b602b8fad78effc401c493416
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14312
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Not that this is remotely necessary since the code bounds to 1MB, the
caller bounds to INT_MAX (due to EVP_CIPHER) and the grandcaller bounds
to 16k (due to TLS).
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ia75990a30bac26ca617532630340ff94a88e4e20
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14311
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is redundant because these "AEAD"s are not meant to be used outside
of TLS, but since we've moved them into their own layer, they should
check internally.
Change-Id: Ieb3541b2e494902527c2bb56a816cef620cb237b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14310
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This makes it a bit easier to see what is what.
Change-Id: I0f73f6ffa84bd30de3efcbf2bd34e1d3a889d1ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14309
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=22
Change-Id: I9f392eef44e83efb4b13931acb2a3c642cbf1f29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14308
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=22
Change-Id: I5bfa543c261623d125e7a25cea905e3b90b0c014
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14307
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These will be used in follow-up commits. The _s names are taken from
upstream, to ease importing code. I've also promoted the CONSTTIME_*
macros from the test. None of them are really necessary except
~0u cannot substitute for CONSTTIME_TRUE_S on 64-bit platforms, so
having the macros seems safer.
Once everything is converted, I expect the unsigned versions can be
removed, so I've made the _8 and _int functions act on size_t rather
than unsigned. The users of these functions basically only believe that
array indices and bytes exist.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I987bfb0c708dc726a6f2afcb05b6619bbd600564
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14306
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This pulls in upstream's 0822d41b6d54132df96c02cc6f6fa9b179378351 and a
portion of a285992763f3961f69a8d86bf7dfff020a08cef9. The former, in
particular, fixes a crash on iOS.
Change-Id: I3c083975d8d11e58b5a2919fcabbf83628f36340
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14383
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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This ends up under half the size of the original file.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Idec69d9517bd57cee6b3b83bc0cce05396565b70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14305
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OPENSSL_free will handle NULL.
Change-Id: I18593a015cd4a081c2eeebf0cd738a024d02a97d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14373
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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It still depends on crypto/x509, but we will need a CRYPTO_BUFFER
version of PKCS7_get_certificates for Chromium. Start with this.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I62dcb9ba768091ce37dc9fe819f4f14ac025219c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14372
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT, so we gracefully decline 0-RTT
as a server and forbid their combination as a client. We'll keep this
logic around until Channel ID is removed.
Channel ID will be replaced by tokbind which currently uses custom
extensions. Those will need additional logic to work with 0-RTT.
This is not implemented yet so, for now, fail if both are ever
configured together at all. A later change will allow the two to
combine.
BUG=183
Change-Id: I46c5ba883ccd47930349691fb08074a1fab13d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14370
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These will be used by Chromium's crypto::ECPrivateKey to work with
EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structures.
Note this comes with a behavior change: PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt
will no longer preserve PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo attributes. However, those
functions are only called by Chromium which does not care. They are also
called by the PEM code, but not in a way which exposes attributes.
The PKCS#12 PFX code is made to use PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key
because it's cleaner (no more tossing X509_SIG around) and to ease
decoupling that in the future.
crypto/pkcs8's dependency on the legacy ASN.1 stack is now limited to
pkcs8_x509.c.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I173e605d175e982c6b0250dd22187b73aca15b1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14215
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PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt still need to be split. The code for
processing PKCS#12 files is, for now, placed entirely in pkcs8_x509.c.
If we need to split it up, it should be straightforward to do so.
(Introduce a CRYPTO_BUFFER version of PKCS12_get_key_and_certs and go
from there.)
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9c87e916ec29ee14dbbd81c4d3fc10ac8a461f1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14214
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The padding check functions will need to tweak their calling conventions
and the constant-time helpers, so leaving those alone for now. These
were the easy ones.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ia00e41e26a134de17d56be3def5820cb042794e1
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With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0c, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
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This isn't strictly necessary for Chromium yet, but we already have a
decoupled version of hash algorithm parsing available. For now, don't
export it but eventually we may wish to use it for OCSP.
BUG=54
Change-Id: If460d38d48bd47a2b4a853779f210c0cf7ee236b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14211
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This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12921
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The OPTIONAL prf field is an AlgorithmIdentifier, not an OID. I messed
this up in the recent rewrite.
Fix the parsing and add a test, produced by commenting out the logic in
OpenSSL to omit the field for hmacWithSHA1. (We don't currently support
any other PBKDF2, or I'd just add a test for that.)
Change-Id: I7d258bb01b93cd203a6fc1b8cccbddfdbc4dbbad
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This isn't something we need to fix, just an explanatory comment.
Change-Id: I284e6580d176f981c6b161e9951f367fef1b1be6
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We forgot to run the script at some point.
Change-Id: I0bd142fdd13d64c1ed81d9b1515449220d1c936b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14329
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EVP_DigestUpdate can tolerate zero length inputs. Also properly clean up
ctx in all codepaths.
Change-Id: I90889c6236f6bf74625ba9f967de36949a9a6f83
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14327
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We still need to expose a suitable API for Chromium to consume, but the
core implementation itself should now be ready.
The supported cipher list is based on what EVP_get_cipherbynid currently
supports, excluding the entries which don't have OIDs.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I3befca0a34b330ec1f663a029a8fbf049a4406bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14212
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Playing around with the code, we seem to have sufficient positive test
vectors for the logic around the high bits, but not negative test
vectors. Add some. Also add a negative test vector for the trailing
byte.
(For future reference, use openssl rsautl -raw for raw RSA operations
and openssl pkeyutil for EVP_PKEY_sign.)
Change-Id: I36eddf048e51e037fd924902cd13dcb3c62bfd02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14325
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
To remove the OID table from Chromium, we'll need to decouple a lot of
this code. In preparation for that, detach the easy cases from the OID
table. What remains is PBES, cipher, and digest OIDs which will be doing
in follow-up changes.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie205d23d042e21114ca1faf68917fdc870969d09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14209
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
