Even without strict-aliasing, C does not allow casting pointers to types
that don't match their alignment. After this change, UBSan is happy with
our code at default settings but for the negative left shift language
bug.
Note: architectures without unaligned loads do not generate the same
code for memcpy and pointer casts. But even ARMv6 can perform unaligned
loads and stores (ARMv5 couldn't), so we should be okay here.
Before:
Did 11086000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000391us (2217026.6 ops/sec): 35.5 MB/s
Did 370000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5005208us (73923.0 ops/sec): 99.8 MB/s
Did 63000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5029958us (12525.0 ops/sec): 102.6 MB/s
Did 9894000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000017us (1978793.3 ops/sec): 31.7 MB/s
Did 316000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5005564us (63129.7 ops/sec): 85.2 MB/s
Did 54000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5054156us (10684.3 ops/sec): 87.5 MB/s
After:
Did 11026000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000197us (2205113.1 ops/sec): 35.3 MB/s
Did 370000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5005781us (73914.5 ops/sec): 99.8 MB/s
Did 63000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5032695us (12518.1 ops/sec): 102.5 MB/s
Did 9831750 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000010us (1966346.1 ops/sec): 31.5 MB/s
Did 316000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5005702us (63128.0 ops/sec): 85.2 MB/s
Did 54000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5053642us (10685.4 ops/sec): 87.5 MB/s
(Tested with the no-asm builds; most of this code isn't reachable
otherwise.)
Change-Id: I025c365d26491abed0116b0de3b7612159e52297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22804
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids upsetting the C compiler. UBSan is offended by the alignment
violations in those functions. The business with offset is also
undefined behavior (pointer arithmetic is supposed to stay within a
single object).
There is a small performance cost, however:
Before:
Did 6636000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000475us (1327073.9 ops/sec): 21.2 MB/s
Did 832000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5003481us (166284.2 ops/sec): 224.5 MB/s
Did 155000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5026933us (30833.9 ops/sec): 252.6 MB/s
After:
Did 6508000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 5000160us (1301558.4 ops/sec): 20.8 MB/s
Did 831000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 5002865us (166104.8 ops/sec): 224.2 MB/s
Did 155000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 5013204us (30918.4 ops/sec): 253.3 MB/s
(Tested with the no-asm build which disables the custom stitched mode
assembly and ends up using this one.)
Change-Id: I76d74183f1e04ad3726463a8871ee64be04ce674
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions don't appear to do any stack manipulation thus all they
need are start/end directives in order for the correct CFI tables to be
emitted.
Change-Id: I4c94a9446030d363fa4bcb7c8975c689df3d21dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22765
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Change-Id: Id70cfc78c8d103117d4c2195206b023a5d51edc3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22764
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It's not clear if it's a feature or bug, but binutils-2.29[.1]
interprets 'adr' instruction with Thumb2 code reference differently,
in a way that affects calculation of addresses of constants' tables.
(Imported from upstream's b82acc3c1a7f304c9df31841753a0fa76b5b3cda.)
Change-Id: Ia0f5233a9fcfaf18b9d1164bf1c88217c0cbb60d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22724
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Each operation was translated from fiat-crypto output using fiat-crypto
prettyprint.py. For example fe_mul is synthesized in
https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/blob/master/src/Specific/X25519/C32/femul.v,
and shown in the last Coq-compatible form at
https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/blob/master/src/Specific/X25519/C32/femulDisplay.log.
Benchmarks on Google Cloud's unidentified Intel Xeon with AVX2:
git checkout $VARIANT && ( cd build && rm -rf * && CC=clang CXX=clang++ cmake -GNinja -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/32-bit-toolchain.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release .. && ninja && ./tool/bssl speed -filter 25519 )
this branch:
Did 11382 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1053046us (10808.6 ops/sec)
Did 11169 Ed25519 signing operations in 1038080us (10759.3 ops/sec)
Did 2925 Ed25519 verify operations in 1001346us (2921.1 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1084851us (11061.4 ops/sec)
Did 3850 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1085565us (3546.5 ops/sec)
Did 11466 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1049821us (10921.9 ops/sec)
Did 11000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1013317us (10855.4 ops/sec)
Did 3047 Ed25519 verify operations in 1043846us (2919.0 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1068924us (11226.2 ops/sec)
Did 3850 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1090598us (3530.2 ops/sec)
Did 10309 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1003320us (10274.9 ops/sec)
Did 11000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1017862us (10807.0 ops/sec)
Did 3135 Ed25519 verify operations in 1098624us (2853.6 ops/sec)
Did 9000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1046608us (8599.2 ops/sec)
Did 3132 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1038963us (3014.5 ops/sec)
master:
Did 11564 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1068762us (10820.0 ops/sec)
Did 11104 Ed25519 signing operations in 1024278us (10840.8 ops/sec)
Did 3206 Ed25519 verify operations in 1049179us (3055.7 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1073619us (11177.1 ops/sec)
Did 3550 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1000279us (3549.0 ops/sec)
andreser@linux-andreser:~/boringssl$ build/tool/bssl speed -filter 25519
Did 11760 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1072495us (10965.1 ops/sec)
Did 10800 Ed25519 signing operations in 1003486us (10762.5 ops/sec)
Did 3245 Ed25519 verify operations in 1080399us (3003.5 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1076021us (11152.2 ops/sec)
Did 3570 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1005087us (3551.9 ops/sec)
andreser@linux-andreser:~/boringssl$ build/tool/bssl speed -filter 25519
Did 11438 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1041115us (10986.3 ops/sec)
Did 11000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1012589us (10863.2 ops/sec)
Did 3312 Ed25519 verify operations in 1082834us (3058.6 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1061318us (11306.7 ops/sec)
Did 3580 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1004923us (3562.5 ops/sec)
squashed: curve25519: convert field constants to unsigned.
import re, sys, math
def weight(i):
return 2**int(math.ceil(25.5*i))
def convert(t):
limbs = [x for x in t.groups() if x.replace('-','').isdigit()]
v = sum(weight(i)*x for (i,x) in enumerate(map(int, limbs))) % (2**255-19)
limbs = [(v % weight(i+1)) // weight(i) for i in range(10)]
assert v == sum(weight(i)*x for (i,x) in enumerate(limbs))
i = 0
ret = ''
for s in t.groups():
if s.replace('-','').isdigit():
ret += str(limbs[i])
i += 1
else:
ret += s
return ret
fe_re = re.compile(r'(\s*,\s*)'.join(r'(-?\d+)' for i in range(10)))
print (re.sub(fe_re, convert, sys.stdin.read()))
Change-Id: Ibd4f7f5c38e5c4d61c9826afb406baebe2be5168
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This change doesn't actually introduce any Fiat code yet. It sets up the
directory structure to make the diffs in the next change clearer.
Change-Id: I38a21fb36b18a08b0907f9d37b7ef5d7d3137ede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22624
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Generating a 2048-bit RSA key with e = 3 (don't do this), the failure
rate at 5*bits iterations appears to be around 7 failures in 1000 tries.
Bump the limit up to 32*bits. This should give a failure rate of around
2 failures in 10^14 tries.
(The FIPS 186-4 algorithm is meant for saner values of e, like 65537. e
= 3 implies a restrictive GCD requirement: the primes must both be 2 mod
3.)
Change-Id: Icd373f61e2eb90df5afaff9a0fc2b2fbb6ec3f0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Previously, the ed25519 and SPAKE implementations called field element
operations in ways that did not satisfy the preconditions about ranges
of limbs. Furthermore, replacing signed field arithmetic with unsigned field
arithmetic with similar specifications caused tests to fail. This commit
addresses this in three steps:
(1) Split fe into fe and fe_loose, tracking the bounds
(2) Insert carry operations before uses of fe_add/fe_sub/fe_neg whose
input is already within only the loose bounds
(3) Assert that each field element is within the appropriate bounds at
the beginning and end of every field operation.
Throughput diff:
Ed25519 key generation: -2%
Ed25519 signing: -2%
Ed25519 verify: -2%
X25519: roughly unchanged
Detailed benchmarks on Google Cloud's unidentified Intel Xeon with AVX2:
git checkout $VARIANT && ( cd build && rm -rf * && CC=clang CXX=clang++ cmake -GNinja -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/32-bit-toolchain.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release .. && ninja && ./tool/bssl speed -filter 25519 )
this branch:
Did 11206 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1029462us (10885.3 ops/sec)
Did 11104 Ed25519 signing operations in 1035735us (10720.9 ops/sec)
Did 3278 Ed25519 verify operations in 1087969us (3013.0 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1078962us (11121.8 ops/sec)
Did 3610 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1002767us (3600.0 ops/sec)
Did 11662 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1077690us (10821.3 ops/sec)
Did 10780 Ed25519 signing operations in 1011474us (10657.7 ops/sec)
Did 3289 Ed25519 verify operations in 1083638us (3035.1 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1087477us (11034.7 ops/sec)
Did 3610 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1017023us (3549.6 ops/sec)
Did 11018 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1011606us (10891.6 ops/sec)
Did 11000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1029961us (10680.0 ops/sec)
Did 3124 Ed25519 verify operations in 1045163us (2989.0 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1081770us (11092.9 ops/sec)
Did 3610 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1014503us (3558.4 ops/sec)
master:
Did 11662 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1059449us (11007.6 ops/sec)
Did 10908 Ed25519 signing operations in 1000081us (10907.1 ops/sec)
Did 3333 Ed25519 verify operations in 1078798us (3089.5 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1072831us (11185.4 ops/sec)
Did 3850 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1075821us (3578.7 ops/sec)
Did 11102 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1017540us (10910.6 ops/sec)
Did 11000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1013279us (10855.8 ops/sec)
Did 3311 Ed25519 verify operations in 1066866us (3103.5 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1069668us (11218.4 ops/sec)
Did 3905 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1095501us (3564.6 ops/sec)
Did 11206 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1014127us (11049.9 ops/sec)
Did 10908 Ed25519 signing operations in 1015821us (10738.1 ops/sec)
Did 3344 Ed25519 verify operations in 1100592us (3038.4 ops/sec)
Did 12000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1072847us (11185.2 ops/sec)
Did 3570 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1009373us (3536.8 ops/sec)
Change-Id: Ia014386daf36c913f3ea44c5f9a420b98670e465
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We end up writing these switch cases everywhere. Let consumers decompose
these a bit. The original thought was folks should write switch-cases so
they handle everything they support, but that's a pain. As long as
algorithm preferences are always configured, we can still add new
dimensions because folks won't be asked to sign algorithms that depend
on dimensions they don't understand.
Change-Id: I3dd7f067f2c55212f0201876546bc70fee032bcf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22524
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
It always returns one, so just void it.
Change-Id: I8733cc3d6b20185e782cf0291e9c0dc57712bb63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22564
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Node's default settings spell P-256 as prime256v1. This comes from
OpenSSL additionally allowing the long and short names of each curve's
NID. This works out to one additional name per curve for the ones we
support. To avoid depending on the giant OID table, this replicates the
names in libssl.
Change-Id: I456a2db6939eb6745e5a9d2f12cf6886e6265b9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22545
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Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.
CVE-2017-3736
(Imported from upstream's 668a709a8d7ea374ee72ad2d43ac72ec60a80eee and
420b88cec8c6f7c67fad07bf508dcccab094f134.)
This bug does not affect BoringSSL as we do not enable the ADX code.
Note the test vector had to be tweaked to take things in and out of
Montgomery form. (There may be something to be said for test vectors for
just BN_mod_mul_montgomery, though we'd need separate 64-bit and 32-bit
ones because R can be different.)
Change-Id: I832070731ac1c5f893f9c1746892fc4a32f023f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22484
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Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22164
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
RC4 is dead and gone. This trims away the suiteNoDTLS flag.
Change-Id: I1ddc5d0811ad8cfb073e6e3c73100240bc649615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22469
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This avoids needing to keep track of which rules do and don't need it.
Change-Id: Id086b0622305f7f4acd3892f5d24d8e0c970febb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22468
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RC4 is gone. The only remaining exception was the dumb SSL_eNULL cipher,
which works fine in DTLS. It doesn't seem worth the trouble to retain
this special-case.
Change-Id: I31023b71192808e4d21e82109255dc4d6d381df8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22467
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We broke C++ file scanning. It also was silently failing on Windows
because os.Rename's error was ignored. Also make it work on Windows; we
just need to close the files early.
Change-Id: I1aa976ef67a1feaf574c41cf07d2202c245f027a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22466
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Due to a copy-paste error, the call to |left_shift_3| is missing after
reducing the password scalar in SPAKE2. This means that three bits of
the password leak in Alice's message. (Two in Bob's message as the point
N happens to have order 4l, not 8l.)
The “correct” fix is to put in the missing call to |left_shift_3|, but
that would be a breaking change. In order to fix this in a unilateral
way, we add points of small order to the masking point to bring it into
prime-order subgroup.
BUG=chromium:778101
Change-Id: I440931a3df7f009b324d2a3e3af2d893a101804f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22445
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This partially reverts commit 38636aba74.
Some build on Android seems to break now. I'm not really sure what the
situation is, but if the weird common symbols are still there (can we
remove them?), they probably ought to have the right flags.
Change-Id: Ief589d763d16b995ac6be536505acf7596a87b30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Those EXPECTs should be ASSERTs to ensure bn is not null.
Change-Id: Icb54c242ffbde5f8eaa67f19f214c9eef13705ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22366
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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An embedded item wasn't allocated separately on the heap, so don't
free it as if it was.
Issue discovered by Pavel Kopyl
(Imported from upstream's cdc3307d4257f4fcebbab3b2b44207e1a399da05 and
65d414434aeecd5aa86a46adbfbcb59b4344503a.)
I do not believe this is actually reachable in BoringSSL, even in the
face of malloc errors. The only field which sets ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE is in
X509_ATTRIBUTE. That field's value is X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET which cannot
fail to initialize. (It is a CHOICE whose initialization consists of
setting the selector to -1 and calling the type's callback which is
unset for this type.)
Change-Id: I29c080f8a4ddc2f3ef9c119d0d90a899d3cb78c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22365
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1 << 31 is technically an undefined shift. It should be 1u << 31 to shut
UBSan up. I've also converted the others for consistency.
Change-Id: I1c6fe282f55c7032cea39f5ff1035a7711155f02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22344
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Currently we only check that the underlying EC_METHODs match, which
avoids the points being in different forms, but not that the points are
on the same curves. (We fixed the APIs early on so off-curve EC_POINTs
cannot be created.)
In particular, this comes up with folks implementating Java's crypto
APIs with ECDH_compute_key. These APIs are both unfortunate and should
not be mimicked, as they allow folks to mismatch the groups on the two
multiple EC_POINTs. Instead, ECDH APIs should take the public value as a
byte string.
Thanks also to Java's poor crypto APIs, we must support custom curves,
which makes this particularly gnarly. This CL makes EC_GROUP_cmp work
with custom curves and adds an additional subtle requirement to
EC_GROUP_set_generator.
Annoyingly, this change is additionally subtle because we now have a
reference cycle to hack around.
Change-Id: I2efbc4bd5cb65fee5f66527bd6ccad6b9d5120b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22245
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(Credit to libFuzzer for finding this.)
Change-Id: I0353d686d883703d39145c5bdd1e56368a587a35
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Per the comment, it's no longer necessary. macOS i386 does not exist,
but apparently iOS i386 does! We can probably just remove it altogether,
but our cmake_minimum_required is nominally 2.8, so I just put the
version check in.
Bug: 210
Change-Id: I6e0617a3f292a218b2465eee85bd4814bd0e55c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22304
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Also switch them to accepting a u16 length prefix. We appear not to have
any such tests right now, but RSA-2048 would involve modulus well larger
and primes just a hair larger than a u8 length prefix alows.
Change-Id: Icce8f1d976e159b945302fbba732e72913c7b724
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22284
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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I really need to resurrect the CL to make them entirely static
(https://crbug.com/boringssl/20), but, in the meantime, to make
replacing the EC_METHOD pointer in EC_POINT with EC_GROUP not
*completely* insane, make them refcounted.
OpenSSL did not do this because their EC_GROUPs are mutable
(EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag and EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form). Ours
are immutable but for the two-function dance around custom curves (more
of OpenSSL's habit of making their objects too complex), which is good
enough to refcount.
Change-Id: I3650993737a97da0ddcf0e5fb7a15876e724cadc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This reverts commit 75d43b5785. Chatting
with EKR, there is some reason to believe that doing this might cause
more middlebox issues. Since we're still in the middle of working
towards viable deployment in the first place, revert this.
We can experiment with this later. I should have arranged for this to be
controlled more carefully anyway.
Change-Id: I0c8bf578f9d7364e913894e1bf3c2b8123dfd770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22204
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Both of these changes have stuck in Chrome for quite a while now. Let's
clear them.
Change-Id: I13094451be2584ecaaf6b60eedefb7212b7bcde2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22226
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This is an OpenSSL thing to support platforms where BN_ULONG is not
actually the size it claims to be. We define BN_ULONG to uint32_t and
uint64_t which are guaranteed by C to implement arithemetic modulo 2^32
and 2^64, respectively. Thus there is no need for any of this.
Change-Id: I098cd4cc050a136b9f2c091dfbc28dd83e01f531
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21784
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This reverts commit f6942f0d22.
Reason for revert: This doesn't actually work in clang-cl. I
forgot we didn't have the clang-cl try bots enabled! :-( I
believe __asm__ is still okay, but I'll try it by hand
tomorrow.
Original change's description:
> Use uint128_t and __asm__ in clang-cl.
>
> clang-cl does not define __GNUC__ but is still a functioning clang. We
> should be able to use our uint128_t and __asm__ code in it on Windows.
>
> Change-Id: I67310ee68baa0c0c947b2441c265b019ef12af7e
> Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22184
> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
TBR=agl@google.com,davidben@google.com
Change-Id: I5c7e0391cd9c2e8cc0dfde37e174edaf5d17db22
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22224
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
clang-cl does not define __GNUC__ but is still a functioning clang. We
should be able to use our uint128_t and __asm__ code in it on Windows.
Change-Id: I67310ee68baa0c0c947b2441c265b019ef12af7e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22184
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We never implemented psk_ke, so there's no need to define the constant.
Change-Id: I6e52596e1a2cf0b3db5e7cd96db6836f4290bf0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22144
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
