This lets us trim another two pointers of per-connection state.
Change-Id: I2145d529bc25b7e24a921d01e82ee99f2c98867c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13804
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Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13369
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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On the TLS side, we introduce a running buffer of ciphertext. Queuing up
pending data consists of encrypting the record into the buffer. This
effectively reimplements what the buffer BIO was doing previously, but
this resizes to fit the whole flight.
As part of this, rename all the functions to add to the pending flight
to be more uniform. This CL proposes "add_foo" to add to the pending
flight and "flush_flight" to drain it.
We add an add_alert hook for alerts but, for now, only the SSL 3.0
warning alert (sent mid-handshake) uses this mechanism. Later work will
push this down to the rest of the write path so closure alerts use it
too, as in DTLS. The intended end state is that all the ssl_buffer.c and
wpend_ret logic will only be used for application data and eventually
optionally replaced by the in-place API, while all "incidental" data
will be handled internally.
For now, the two buffers are mutually exclusive. Moving closure alerts
to "incidentals" will change this, but flushing application data early
is tricky due to wpend_ret. (If we call ssl_write_buffer_flush,
do_ssl3_write doesn't realize it still has a wpend_ret to replay.) That
too is all left alone in this change.
To keep the diff down, write_message is retained for now and will be
removed from the state machines in a follow-up change.
BUG=72
Change-Id: Ibce882f5f7196880648f25d5005322ca4055c71d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is to free up moving ssl->state into SSL_HANDSHAKE. ssl->state
serves two purposes right now. First, it is the state tracking for
SSL_HANDSHAKE. Second, it lets the system know there is a handshake
waiting to complete.
Instead, arrange things so that, if there is a handshake waiting to
complete, hs is not NULL. That means we need to initialize it when
creating a new connection and when discovering a renego.
Note this means we cannot make initializing an SSL_HANDSHAKE depend on
client vs. server.
Change-Id: I585a8d7e700c4ffe4d372248d34c44106ad7e7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12696
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
s3_lib.c is nearly gone. ssl_get_cipher_preferences will fall away once
we remove the version-specific cipher lists. ssl_get_algorithm_prf and
the PRF stuff in general needs some revising (it was the motivation for
all the SSL_HANDSHAKE business). I've left ssl3_new / ssl3_free alone
for now because we don't have a good separation between common TLS/DTLS
connection state and state internal to the TLS SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
Leaving that alone for now as there's lower-hanging fruit.
Change-Id: Idf7989123a387938aa89b6a052161c9fff4cbfb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12584
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Each of these functions is called only once, but they're interspersed
between s3_lib.c and ssl_lib.c.
Change-Id: Ic496e364b091fc8e01fc0653fe73c83c47f690d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12583
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: Iec0e597af37137270339e9754c6e08116198899e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12581
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12343
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
Change-Id: Id40d851ccd87e06c46c6ec272527fd8ece8abfc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This is already manually released at the end of the handshake. With this
change, it can happen implicitly, and SSL3_STATE shrinks further by
another pointer.
Change-Id: I94b9f2e4df55e8f2aa0b3a8799baa3b9a34d7ac1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get some of the duplicate logic out of the way.
Change-Id: Iee7c64577e14d1ddfead7e1e32c42c5c9f2a310d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11981
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I73a4751609b85df7cd40f0f60dc3f3046a490940
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11861
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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SSL_HANDSHAKE is dropped after the handshake, so I've removed the logic
around smaller sizes. It's much simpler when we can use CBS_stow and
CBB_finish without extra bounds-checking.
Change-Id: Idafaa5d69e171aed9a8759f3d44e52cb01c40f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now not only the pointers but also the list itself is released after the
handshake completes.
Change-Id: I8b568147d2d4949b3b0efe58a93905f77a5a4481
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11528
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One less field to reset on renego and save a pointer of post-handshake
memory.
Change-Id: Ifc0c3c73072af244ee3848d9a798988d2c8a7c38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11086
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10801
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Now that ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list is uninteresting, it can be an
implementation detail of ssl3_choose_cipher. This removes a tiny amount
of duplicated TLS 1.2 / TLS 1.3 code.
Change-Id: I116a6bb08bbc43da573d4b7b5626c556e1a7452d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10221
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows us to use CBB for all handshake messages. Now, SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
is responsible for implementing a trio of CBB-related hooks to assemble
handshake messages.
Change-Id: I144d3cac4f05b6637bf45d3f838673fc5c854405
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It is an explicit copy of something, but it's a lot easier to reason about than
the init_buf/init_num gynmastics we were previously doing. This is along the
way to getting init_buf out of here.
Change-Id: Ia1819ba9db60ef6db09dd60d208dbc95fcfb4bd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8432
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.
Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The separation is purely historical (what happened to use an SSL_ctrl hook), so
put them all in one place. Make a vague attempt to match the order of the
header file, though we're still very far from matching.
Change-Id: Iba003ff4a06684a6be342e438d34bc92cab1cd14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8189
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's unreachable and wouldn't work anyway. We'd never bubble up to the caller
to retry. As a consequence, the TLS side doesn't actually need to pay attention
to init_off.
(For now anyway. We'll probably need state of this sort once the write half is
all reworked. All the craziness with wpend_buf ought to be limited to the
SSL_write bits.)
Change-Id: I951534f6bbeb547ce0492d5647aaf76be42108a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8179
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The 'elliptic_curves' extension is being renamed to 'supported_groups'
in the TLS 1.3 draft, and most of the curve-specific methods are
generalized to groups/group IDs.
Change-Id: Icd1a1cf7365c8a4a64ae601993dc4273802610fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7955
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
A lot of consumers of obj.h only want the NID values. Others didn't need
it at all. This also removes some OBJ_nid2sn and OBJ_nid2ln calls in EVP
error paths which isn't worth pulling a large table in for.
BUG=chromium:499653
Change-Id: Id6dff578f993012e35b740a13b8e4f9c2edc0744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Most code already dereferences it directly.
Change-Id: I227fa91ecbf25a19077f7cfba21b0abd2bc2bd1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7422
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Partially fixes build with -Wmissing-prototypes.
Change-Id: I828bcfb49b23c5a9ea403038bc3fb76750556ef8
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7514
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I6267c9bfb66940d0b6fe5368514210a058ebd3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7494
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 4d6fe78f65be650c84e14777c90e7a088f7a44ce)
Change-Id: Id28e0d49da2490e454dcb8603ccb93a506dfafaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7206
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They should use the same P-256 check.
Change-Id: I66dd63663e638cba35b8f70f9cf119c718af4aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Move it into ssl->s3 so it automatically behaves correctly on SSL_clear.
ssl->version is still a mess though.
Change-Id: I17a692a04a845886ec4f8de229fa6cf99fa7e24a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This removes the various non-PRF checks from SSL3_ENC_METHOD so that can
have a clearer purpose. It also makes TLS 1.0 through 1.2's
SSL3_ENC_METHOD tables identical and gives us an assert to ensure
nothing accesses the version bits before version negotiation.
Accordingly, ssl_needs_record_splitting was reordered slightly so we
don't rely on enc_method being initialized to TLS 1.2
pre-version-negotiation.
This leaves alert_value as the only part of SSL3_ENC_METHOD which may be
accessed before version negotiation.
Change-Id: If9e299e2ef5511b5fa442b2af654eed054c3e675
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6842
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
We have need to normalize other versions during version negotiation, but
almost all will be post-negotiation. Hopefully later this can be
replaced with a value explicitly stored on the object and we do away
with ssl->version.
Change-Id: I595db9163d0af2e7c083b9a09310179aaa9ac812
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6841
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The various SSL3_ENC_METHODs ought to be defined in the same file their
functions are defined in, so they can be static.
Change-Id: I34a1d3437e8e61d4d50f2be70312e4630ea89c19
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6840
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This is a companion to SSL_get_rc4_state and SSL_get_ivs which doesn't
require poking at internal state. Partly since it aligns with the
current code and partly the off chance we ever need to get
wpa_supplicant's EAP-FAST code working, the API allows one to generate
more key material than is actually in the key block.
Change-Id: I58bc3f2b017482dbb8567dcd0cd754947a95397f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6839
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's not much point in putting those in the interface as the
final_finished_mac implementation is itself different between SSL 3.0
and TLS.
Change-Id: I76528a88d255c451ae008f1a34e51c3cb57d3073
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6838
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
As things stand now, they don't actually do anything.
Change-Id: I9f8b4cbf38a0dffabfc5265805c52bb8d7a8fb0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6837
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Both are connection state rather than configuration state. Notably this
cuts down more of SSL_clear that can't just use ssl_free + ssl_new.
Change-Id: I3c05b3ae86d4db8bd75f1cd21656f57fc5b55ca9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6835
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It's the same between TLS and SSL 3.0. There's also no need for the
do_change_cipher_spec wrapper (it no longer needs checks to ensure it
isn't called at a bad place). Finally fold the setup_key_block call into
change_cipher_spec.
Change-Id: I7917f48e1a322f5fbafcf1dfb8ad53f66565c314
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6834
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
That we're half and half is really confusing.
Change-Id: I1c2632682e8a3e63d01dada8e0eb3b735ff709ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This unifies the ClientKeyExchange code rather nicely. ServerKeyExchange
is still pretty specialized. For simplicity, I've extended the yaSSL bug
workaround for clients as well as servers rather than route in a
boolean.
Chrome's already banished DHE to a fallback with intention to remove
altogether later, and the spec doesn't say anything useful about
ClientDiffieHellmanPublic encoding, so this is unlikely to cause
problems.
Change-Id: I0355cd1fd0fab5729e8812e4427dd689124f53a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The new curve is not enabled by default.
As EC_GROUP/EC_POINT is a bit too complex for X25519, this introduces an
SSL_ECDH_METHOD abstraction which wraps just the raw ECDH operation. It
also tidies up some of the curve code which kept converting back and
force between NIDs and curve IDs. Now everything transits as curve IDs
except for API entry points (SSL_set1_curves) which take NIDs. Those
convert immediately and act on curve IDs from then on.
Note that, like the Go implementation, this slightly tweaks the order of
operations. The client sees the server public key before sending its
own. To keep the abstraction simple, SSL_ECDH_METHOD expects to
generate a keypair before consuming the peer's public key. Instead, the
client handshake stashes the serialized peer public value and defers
parsing it until it comes time to send ClientKeyExchange. (This is
analogous to what it was doing before where it stashed the parsed peer
public value instead.)
It still uses TLS 1.2 terminology everywhere, but this abstraction should also
be compatible with TLS 1.3 which unifies (EC)DH-style key exchanges.
(Accordingly, this abstraction intentionally does not handle parsing the
ClientKeyExchange/ServerKeyExchange framing or attempt to handle asynchronous
plain RSA or the authentication bits.)
BUG=571231
Change-Id: Iba09dddee5bcdfeb2b70185308e8ab0632717932
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Then deprecate the old functions. Thanks to upstream's
6977e8ee4a718a76351ba5275a9f0be4e530eab5 for the idea.
Change-Id: I916abd6fca2a3b2a439ec9902d9779707f7e41eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now your options are:
- Bounce on a reference and deal with cleanup needlessly.
- Manually check the type tag and peek into the union.
We probably have no hope of opaquifying this struct, but for new code, let's
recommend using this function rather than the more error-prone thing.
Change-Id: I9b39ff95fe4264a3f7d1e0d2894db337aa968f6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
